reporter while acting for the proprietor within the general scope of his employment, the proprietor will be answerable in exemplary damages for the malice, gross negligence, or wantonness of the editor or reporter in like manner as though he had done the wrong in proper person. Thus a proprietor of a newspaper will be held liable. for an accidental slip made by his printer's man in setting up the type, or for a libelous advertisement inserted by the editor without his knowledge.3

The publisher is not responsible for a libel which he does not know to be libelous. A newspaper proprietor is not responsible in exemplary damages for the actual malice of a reporter in procuring the publication of a libelous article, unless the former has participated in or ratified and confirmed the malicious act. One cannot be held liable for a libel published in a newspaper upon a showing that he was secretary and treasurer of a joint-stock association owning the paper; that he owned a majority of the stock of the association, and had a kind of supervision of the articles published therein, but not a controlling influence, it appearing that he had no knowledge of or personal connection with the article in question." Where a printing-press and newspaper establishment were assigned to a person merely as security for a debt, and the press remained in the sole possession and management of the assignor, the ownership of the assignee is not such as to render him liable to an action as proprietor for a libelous publication." If one newspaper copy and publish a libelous article from another newspaper, the

'Bruce v. Reed, 104 Pa. St. 408; 49 Am. Rep. 586.

2 Shepheard v. Whitaker, L. R. 10 Com. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402.

3 Harrison v. Pearce, 1 Fost. & F. 567.

Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mason, 115; Smith v. Ashley, 11 Met. 367; 45 Am. Dec. 217. In Michigan, on the question of mistake in reporting the contents of a legal document, it is

error to charge that such care as reporters usually use is the standard by which to determine the newspaper's liability. Reporters must use such degree of care as is reasonably sure to prevent mistake: Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., Mich. 1889.

Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis. 570. Mecabe v. Jones, 10 Daly, 222. Andres v. Welles, 7 Johns. 260; 5 Am. Dec. 267.

first paper makes the article its own, and is liable for all damages resulting from its publication. The fact that it had previously appeared in the other paper is no defense, though it may tend to mitigate the damages. Evidence that the plaintiff had in a previous action recovered damages against the other paper for the same article is altogether inadmissible, as in that action damages were given only for the publication of the libel in that paper.

ILLUSTRATIONS.-The defendant, M., regularly printed a magazine, but had nothing to do with preparing the illustrations. One number contained a libelous lithographic print. Held, that he was liable for this print, though he had never seen it, because it was referred to in a part of the accompanying letterpress, which had been printed by his servants. The editor was liable also: Watts v. Fraser and Moyes, 7 Car. & P. 369; 7 Ad. & E. 223. The proprietor of a newspaper on going away for a holiday expressly instructed his acting editor to publish nothing exceptionable, personal, or abusive, and warned him especially to scan very particularly any article brought in by B. The editor permitted an article of B's to appear which contained libelous matter. Held, that the proprietor was liable, though the publication was made in his absence and without his knowledge: Dunn v. Hall, 1 Ind. 345.

§ 1239. Repetition of Libel-Who Liable. - Every person who sells or gives away a written or printed copy of a libel may be made a defendant, unless he was ignorant of the contents. Every sale or delivery of a written. or printed copy of a libel is a new publication. But a servant who, in the course of business, delivers parcels containing libelous handbills is not liable in an action for libel, if shown to be ignorant of the contents of the parcel. The sender of a libelous letter is liable for its

1 Saunders v. Mills, 3 Moore & P. 520; 6 Bing. 213; Talbutt v. Clark, 2 Moody & R. 313; McDonald v. Woodruff, 2 Dill. 244; Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 510.

2 Creevy v. Carr, 7 Car. & P. 64; Hunt. Algar, 6 Car. & P. 245.

3 Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; Staub v. Van Bethuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467.

4 Day v. Bream, 2 Moody & R. 54. "A servant carries a libelous letter for his master, addressed to C. It is his duty not to read it. If he does read it, that is a publication by his master to him, although he was never intended to read it. If after reading it he delivers it to C., then this is a publication by the servant to C., for which the person libeled, not being C.,

further publication by the receiver, if such further publication was a probable consequence of sending it.1 But one who authorized libelous words to be published in a Chicago newspaper is not liable for their republication in a San Francisco paper, in the absence of any evidence tending to connect him with the publication. It is no defense to an action of libel for a publication in a newspaper that the publishers believed the article to be true," or that the person libeled has failed to prosecute for a previous publication of the libel."

ILLUSTRATIONS.-A, at his news-stand, sold a newspaper containing a libel upon B. Held, that he was responsible in damages to B for publication: Staub v. Van Benthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467. Defendant sent to a newspaper as an advertisement a false statement that he wanted the plaintiff to pay a bill. The publisher put it among other "wants," one of which called for a "dead-head." A third person cut the advertisement out, pasted it on a postal card, and sent it to a young woman engaged to be married to plaintiff. Held, libelous, and that it was a question of fact whether the sending of the postal card was a natural consequence of the publication: Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66; 53 Am. Rep. 9. Defendant at a hearing before the governor presented to him and to three other persons copies of a pamphlet prepared by a third person and bearing upon the matter in hand. This pamphlet contained a reflection upon plaintiff's character, plaintiff's name, however, not being given. There was no express malice, and defendant was ignorant of the precise contents of the pamphlet. Held, that the action was not maintainable: Woods v. Wiman, 47 Hun, 362. A libelous article indicating that a neighboring ticket-broker is not reliable is conspiciously posted forty days in the ticket-office of a railroad company whose principal terminus and office are in the same city. There is evidence that such office is used to publish general information of interest to purchasers of tickets. Held, that the jury may find that the company had knowledge

can sue either the master or the servant, or both. If the servant never reads it, but simply delivers it as he was bidden, then he is not liable to any action, unless he either knew, or ought to have known, that he was being employed illegally. If he either knew, or ought to have known, then it is no defense for him to plead, 'I was only

obeying orders"": Odgers on Libel and Slander, 161.

1 Miller v. Butler, 6 Cush. 71; 52 Am. Dec. 768.

2 Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Ill. App. 570.

3 Cass v. New Orleans Times, 27 La. Ann. 214.

Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 261.

of the character of the notices posted, and that the libel would not have remained posted so long had not the company authorized or ratified it: Fogg v. R. R. Co., 148 Mass. 513.

§ 1240.

Repetition of Slander.

Every person who repeats a slander to others which some one else has started, or which has been told to him, is liable.1 It is no defense that he did not originate it, or that it was a current rumor, and he believed it true; 2 or that he says that he does not believe it, or although the charge was repeated for the purpose of asking advice;1 or that when he repeated it he gave his authority, or merely said that so and so said so. It is immaterial that the slanderous words were not repeated with any desire to extend their circulation, or confirm the story, or cause the person to whom it is told to believe it to be true. A slander, un

1 Calloway v. Middleton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 372; 12 Am. Dec. 409; Evans v. Smith, 5 T. B. Mon. 363; 17 Am. Dec. 74. Where one hears another make a charge which he repeats, he will not be exempt from liability, unless, at the time of repeating the words, he affords the person of whom the charge is made a cause of action against the original author: Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539; 27 Am. Rep. 293.

2 Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; Carpenter v. Bailey, 53 N. H. 590; Calloway v. Middleton, 2 A. K. Marsh. 372; 12 Am. Dec. 409; Shenck Shenck, 20 N. J. L. 208; Funk v. Beverly, 112 Ind. 190.

527.

Finch v. Finch, 21 S. C. 342.
Branstetter v. Dorrough, 81 Ind.

Johnson v. Brown, 57 Barb. 118; McPherson v. Daniels, 10 Barn. & C. 270; De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392; Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602; Treat v. Browning, 4 Conn. 408; 10 Am. Dec. 156; Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447; 6 Am. Dec. 346; Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 711; 5 Am. Rep. 514; Miller v. Kerr, 2 McCord, 285; 13 Am. Dec. 722; Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; 72 Am. Dec. 420; Johnston v. Lance, 7 Ired. 448;

Skinner v. Powers, 1 Wend. 451; Sans v. Joerris, 14 Wis. 663; Fowler v. Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9. Contra, Tatlow v. Jacket, 1 Harr. (Del.) 333; 26 Am. Dec. 399.

In Kenney v. McLaughlin, 5 Gray, 3, 66 Am. Dec. 345, the court say: "The uttering of the words is a wrongful act, purposely done, and this is sufficient to constitute legal malice. To prove legal malice, it is not necessary to show that the words were uttered from personal enmity or ill-will. When the words are uttered, the true measure of damages is the injury caused by the utterance. The 'story' uttered or repeated by the defendant contains a charge against the plaintiff of a nature to destroy her reputation. It was a false charge. It is no answer in any forum to say that she only repeated the story as she heard it. If the story was false and slanderous, she must repeat it at her peril. There is safety in no other rule. Often the origin of the slander cannot be traced. If it were, possibly it might be harmless. He who gives it circulation gives it its power of mischief. It is the successive repetitions that do the work. A falsehood often repeated gets to be believed. We think the instructions of the

like a written or printed libel, can seldom be circulated by an innocent hand, unconscious of the nature of his act; hence a person uttering slanderous wo1 ls is liable only for the effect of his publication of them, and not for the results of their repetition by others,' unless the utterer intended that the words should be repeated in the way they were, or knew from the relations of the parties that they would certainly be. In a leading case in New

learned judge were not in conformity The story is related to one before igto the law, as understood in this norant of it, without giving the percommonwealth: Walcott v. Hall, 6 son from whom it was received, withMass. 514; 4 Am. Dec. 173; Alderman out expressing any disbelief of it, v. French, 1 Pick. 18; 11 Am. Dec. without any apparent purpose of in114; Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick. 379; quiry as to its truth, and with the 15 Am. Dec. 228; Commonwealth v. assertion in reply to the disbelief of Snelling. 15 Pick. 337; Stone v. Var- the witness of the currency of the reney, 7 Met. 91; 39 Am. Dec. 762; port. It seems to us that the jury, Watson v. Moore, 2 Cush. 133. The treating the instructions as applicable jury were instructed that if the de- to the case before them, may have fendant merely said there was a re- been misled; that they may have unport in circulation of the kind set derstood the learned judge to mean forth in the writ, and did not say so that the simple repetition of a slanwith any design to extend its circula- derous story, without express malice, tion, or in any degree to cause the was not actionable. But under the person whom she addressed to believe limitations stated, if they were possior suspect the charge which the story ble, we think the rule laid down is imputed to be true, or to add to it not the law. A man cannot say that any sanction or authority of her own, there is a story in circulation that A or to give it any further circulation poisoned his wife, or B picked C's or credit, and it was true that such pocket in the omnibus, or that D has story was in circulation, it would not committed adultery, and relate the be actionable to say so. It seems story, and when called upon to anscarcely possible that a story could be swer, say: 'There was such a story repeated by a person of any respecta in circulation; I but repeated what I bility under the circumstances and heard, and had no design to circulate with the results supposed. To say it or confirm it'; and for two very that such a story is current, and to plain reasons: that the repetition of relate it to one before that time igno- the story must, in the nature of rant of its existence, necessarily gives things, give it currency; and the repeit further circulation; and a party is tition without the expression of dispresumed to know and intend the belief will confirm it. The danger is necessary consequences of his acts. an obvious one, and long since pointed And such is the case before us. The out, and it is, that bad men may give witness had never heard of the story, currency to slanderous reports, and and expresses her disbelief of it. The then find in that currency their own defendant, so far from expressing a protection from the just consequences concurrence in the witness's disbelief, of a repetition." replies: 'It [the story] is all over the glass-house.' And when the witness says this could not be, or her husband, who worked at the glasshouse, would have heard it, the defendant replied: 'It was not in the upper but the lower glass-house.'

1 Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; Hastings v. Stetson, 126 Mass. 329; 30 Am. Rep. 683; Ward v. Dick, 47 Conn. 300; 36 Am. Rep. 75; Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293; 39 Am. Rep. 454.

Odgers on Libel and Slander, 167.