ILLUSTRATIONS. The defendant said to his companion, B., "He that goeth before thee is perjured." Held, that the plaintiff can sue, if he aver and prove that he was at that moment walking before B.: Aish v. Gerish, 1 Roll. Abr. 81. A libel was published on a "diabolical character," who, "like Polyphemus, the man-eater, has but one eye, and is well known to all persons acquainted with the name of a certain noble circumnavigator." The plaintiff had but one eye, and his name was I'Anson. Held, that it was clear that he was the person referred to: I'Anson v. Stuart, 1 Term Rep. 748; 2 Smith's Lead. Cas., 6th ed., 57. A newspaper article pronounced the verdict of a jury to be "infamous," and added that "we cannot express the contempt which should be felt for these twelve men who have thus not only offended public opinion, but have done injustice to their own oaths." Held, that an action of libel might be maintained by a member of the jury against the publisher: Byers v. Martin, 2 Col. 605; 25 Am. Rep. 755. Two persons were charged in a bill in equity as having fraudulently altered certain instruments, without specifying the person who did it. Held, that either of the parties charged might sue: Forbes v. Johnson, 11 B. Mon. 48. An action was brought by Louis Fleischmann, a baker and restaurant-keeper in New York City, against a newspaper proprietor for libel. The complaint alleged the defamatory matter to be an article relating to the swill-milk business carried on by Gaff, Fleischmann, & Co. in Queens County, and did not refer to the plaintiff by name or description, nor to his restaurant. Held, that a demurrer to the complaint should be sustained: Fleischmann v. Bennett, 23 Hun, 200. The defendant in a speech commented severely on the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church, and the degrading punishments imposed on penitents. He read from a paper an account given by three policemen of the severe penance imposed on a poor Irishman. It appeared incidentally from this report that the Irishman had told the policemen that his priest would not administer the sacrament to him till the penance was performed. The plaintiff averred that he was the Irishman's priest, but it did not appear how enjoining such a penance on an Irishman would affect the character of a Roman Catholic action without joining his wife, and without proving special damage; because if in fact his wife did keep a bawdy-house, the plaintiff could be indicted for it": Huckle v. Reynolds, 7 Com. B., N. S., 114. Courts will not allow two persons to litigate a suit for libel, the libel consisting in an attack upon the chastity of a third person not a party: Loughead v. Bartholomew, Wright, 90. The words "all the bravery you ever showed was in sleeping with your sisters" will not support an action for slander by one of the unmarried sisters of the person to whom they were addressed, without proof of extrinsic facts to show that the speaker meant to charge sexual intercourse with such sisters: Millison v. Sutton, 1 Ind. 508. priest. The alleged libel was in no other way connected with the plaintiff. Held, no libel, and no slander of plaintiff: Hearne v. Slowell, 12 Ad. & E. 719; 6 Jur. 458; 4 Perry & D. 696. The declaration in an action for libel alleged in the first count that the defendant falsely and maliciously accused the plaintiff of conspiring with P. to defraud the neighbors and friends of the plaintiff and P.; and that the defendant caused said false and malicious libel to be published in a certain newspaper, as follows: "As to the E. company, I doubt not all are willing that it should pay a fair dividend, six per cent, even ten per cent, on the actual value of the plant. Here comes the rub; when the N. company was capitalized for forty thousand dollars, its actual value was not fifteen thousand dollars. It was a plan for the T. company to make a good sale, as no profit could be made with the sharp, bitter competition of the S. company in the field, and it was a scheme by which certain parties [meaning the plaintiff and said P.] attempted to make twenty thousand dollars or more by buying a property worth in the neighborhood of fifteen thousand dollars and capitalizing it for forty thousand dollars, and by selling stock to their neighbors and friends [meaning the neighbors and friends of the plaintiff and said P.] which was more than half water [meaning that more than half of the par value of said stock represented no assets, and was of no real value]. In fact, the T. plant at the time it was sold and capitalized for forty thousand dollars was not worth near fifteen thousand dollars, as a large sacrifice had to be made, and was made, by the projectors [meaning the plaintiff and said P.], who dare not force the loss of removing the S. competition on the stockholders after making one hundred per cent and more on the stock sold." The second count alleged that the plaintiff was engaged in business in the city in which the newspaper was published; and that the defendant caused to be published in said newspaper "a false and malicious libel concerning the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff was greatly injured in his trade, business, and employment "; and set out the publication annexed to the first count. Held, on demurrer, that the declaration was insufficient, in failing to apply the alleged libelous words to the plaintiff, or to show in what sense they were used: McCallum v. Lambie, 145 Mass. 234. § 1251. Past holding or pursuit insufficient. § 1252. Words actionable where calling or office is slandered. § 1261. 1262. Act referred to must be of or incident to plaintiff's calling. § 1263. Charge as to particular transaction not actionable - Exceptions. § 1264. Comparisons as to merits not actionable. § 1265. Other words not actionable except in case of special damage. § 1245. Slander-In General. Slander, i. e., oral defamation, is actionable in three cases only, unless special damage is proved. The three cases in which a slander is 1 The reasons that the law distinguishes between slanderous words and written defamation are summed up by an English author as follows: "Vox emissa volat; litera scripta manet. The written or printed matter is permanent, and no one can tell into whose hand it may come. Every one now can read. The circulation of a newspaper is enormous, especially if it be known to contain libelous matter. And even a private letter may turn up in after years, and reach persons for whom it was never intended, and so do incalculable mischief. Whereas a slander only reaches the immediate by-standers, who can observe the manner and note the tone of the speaker, — who have heard the antecedent conversation, which may greatly qualify his as sertion,- who probably are acquainted with the speaker, and know what value is to be attached to any charge made by him; the mischief is thus much less in extent, and the publicity less durable. 2. A slander may be uttered in the heat of a moment, and under a sudden provocation; the reduction into writing and the publication of a libel show greater deliberation and malice. 3. A third reason is sometimes given, that a libel is more likely to lead to a breach of the peace. But I doubt if this is so. A man would be more tempted to personally actionable per se, i. e., in which from the mere utterance of the words the court will presume some damage to have been suffered by the plaintiff, are: 1. Where the words charge the plaintiff with the commission of some indictable offense; or 2. Impute to him a contagious or infectious disease tending to exclude him from society; or 3. Are spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or trade. In no other case are spoken words defamatory, unless they have caused some special damage to the plaintiff. § 1246. Words Imputing Indictable Offense. - Spoken words, which impute that the plaintiff has been guilty of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude or subjecting him to an infamous punishment are actionable without proof of special damage.1 chastise a villain who slandered him to his face than a libeler who lampooned him in the papers. Even if it were so, it would tend to explain why libel is a crime and slander not, rather than to account for the distinction just pointed out between the evidence required in the respective civil actions. For this is a further important difference between slander and libel: that for every libel criminal proceedings may be taken by way of information or indictment, if the person defamed does not desire damages; whereas a slander, unless it be blasphemous, seditious, or obscene, is not criminal at all ": Odgers on Libel and Slander, 3. 1 Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225; Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188; 4 Am. Dec. 337; Anonymous, 60 N. Y. 263; 19 Am. Rep. 174; Miller v. Parrish, 8 Pick. 384; McCuen v. Ludlum, 17 N. J. L. 12; Johnson v. Shields, 25 N. J. L. 116; Gosling v. Morgan, 32 Pa. St. 273; Klumph v. Dunn, 66 Pa. St. 141; 5 Am. Rep. 355; Perdue v. Burnett, Minor, 138; Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 709; Stitzell v. Reynolds, 67 Pa. St. 54; 56 Am. Rep. 390; Hoag v. Hatch, 23 Conn. 585; Ranger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 80; Filber v. Dautermann, 26 Wis. 518; Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430; 2 Am. Rep. 411; Davis v. Brown, 27 Ohio St. 326; Young v. Miller, 3 Hill, 21; Martin v. Stillwell, 13 Johns. 275; 7 Am. Dec. 374; Widrig v. Oyer, 13 Johns. 124; Case v. Buckley, 15 Wend. 327; Bissell v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; Hillhouse v. Peck, 2 Stew. & P. 395; Johnston v. Morrow, 9 Port. 525; Dudley v. Horn, 21 Ala. 379; Heath v. Devaughn, 37 Ala. 677; Berdeaux v. Davis, 58 Ala. 611; Giddens v. Mirk, 4 Ga. 364; Taylor v. Kneeland, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 68; Gage v. Shelton, 3 Rich. 242; Burton v. Burton, 3 G. Greene, 316; Brite v. Gill, 2 T. B. Mon. 65; 15 Am. Dec. 122; Demarest v. Haring, 6 Cow. 76; McKee v. Wilson, 87 N. C. 300; Page v. Merwin, 54 Conn. 426. Ry "infamous punishment" in this connection does not mean a punishment which subjects the criminal after he has served it out to permanent civil disabilities as is the ordinary meaning: See Bouv. Dict. In this section it means corporal punishment, e. g., imprisonment, and this either in the penitentiary or in a common jail or house of corection: Wilcox v. Edwards, 5 Blackf. 183; Rammel v. Otis, 60 Mo. 365; Bush v. Benton, 26 Mo. 153; Billings v. Wing, 7 Vt. 439; Griffin v. Moore, 43 Md. 246; Elliot v. Ashbury, 2 Bibb, 473; 5 Am. Dec. 631. This principle is maintained by a great majority of the decisions, though in some cases it has not been adhered to. Thus in Vermont it has been held that, in order to render the charge actionable per se, the act imputed shall not only be subject to an infamous punishment, but also involve moral turpitude.' In Massachusetts it has been held actionable to charge a person with an offense that may subject him to a punishment which will bring disgrace on him, though the punishment be not infamous.2 In Minnesota it is said that if the words. charge a crime punishable criminally by indictment they are actionable. In Missouri and Maryland the crime must be indictable and punishable corporally, and not by a fine or imprisonment in default of a money payment. In Kentucky words that charge merely an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment are actionable per se. And in several states it is provided by statute what words shall be actionable per se. It is actionable, therefore (under the general rule at the beginning of this section), to charge a man with the commission of such a specific crime or offense as altering marks on animals,' assault with intent to rob, attempting to corrupt a jury, attempt to murder,10 arson," attempt Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292. See mell v. Otis, 60 Mo. 365; Griffin v. Kimmis v. Stiles, 44 Vt. 351. Moore, 43 Md. 246. 2 Miller v. Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Buckley v. O'Neil, 113 Mass. 193; 18 Am. Rep. 466. Therefore in that commonwealth to charge a woman with being a common drunkard (punishable by confinement in the house of correction), or that she was drunk in a single instance (punishable by a fine of five dollars), is actionable, "for the punishment of a woman for either offense must bring disgrace on her": Brown v. Nickerson, 5 Gray, 1. 3 St. Martin v. Desnoyer, 1 Minn. 156; 61 Am. Dec. 494; McCarthy_v. Barrett, 12 Minn. 494. And see Estes v. Carter, 10 Iowa, 400, and Lucas v. Flinn, 35 Iowa, 9, where the same rule seems to be laid down. Birch v. Benton, 26 Mo. 153; Ram 5 Lemons v. Wells, 78 Ky. 117. 6 Arkansas, California, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and North Carolina. Perdue v. Burnell, Minor, 138. But see Johnston v. Morrow, 9 Port. 525. 8 Lewknor v. Cruchley, Cro. Car. 140. Gibbs v. Dewey, 5 Cow. 503. 10 Scott v. Hilliar, Lane, 98; 1 Vin. Abr. 440; Preston v. Pinder, Cro. Eliz. 308. 11 Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. 442; 29 Am. Dec. 261; Wallace v. Young, 5 T. B. Mon. 155; House v. House, 5 Har. & J. 125; Gage v. Shelton, 3 Rich. 342. As to say of a person, "I can prove that J. burnt the gin-house of C., by H.,' or that "J. was in a condition |