The mounted infantry move out in the mornings to make the rebels show up in the trenches. Three of the mounted infantry were wounded on the 21st ultimo. The Friendlies made a reconnaissance on the 24th, but did not go far enough to be of much use. One wounded. At 10 P.M. on the 25th the rebels made a heavy attack on the right water fort, setting fire to the zereba round it; they were repulsed with loss; one man killed in the fort. During the night of the 26th they made fresh entrenchments on the right front of the right water fort, and within 500 yards. The "Gannet" and forts shelled them while they were at work. At daylight a heavy fire was opened on them, compelling them to abandon it on the night of the 28th. All reports agree in stating that the losses were very heavy in this trench, and that it was impossible to live in it. It was only 2,800 yards from the "Gannet," and was a very false move, bringing them under the fire of the ship. Three men were wounded in the water fort on the afternoon of the 27th. The steam-ship "John Pender," of the Egyptian Telegraph Company, arrived on the afternoon of the 28th. Her electric light was placed at the disposal of the Governor, and has been of great use in preventing the rebels working at night. Her electricians have also repaired the Egyptian light, which is now in use. The enemy have been quieter since the 1st, but they are still in force, and are reported to be waiting for reinforcements from Tokar. Several deserters have come in: they state that there are about 2,000 men in the vicinity of the water forts; that the losses have been very heavy, mostly in the right trench, and are caused by the fire from the ship and mortars principally; they suffer from thirst. The men, armed with rifles, are blacks, old Egyptian soldiers, and are kept in their places by Arab spearmen behind in a second trench; at night their arms are taken from them, and they are well guarded. The horsemen are principally Bagarras, and the spearmen Jaalins from the Nile. Osman Digna was opposed to the operations, but is obliged to assist in obedience to orders received from the Khalifa Abdullah. They expect reinforcements from Tokar; about 250 have already arrived at Handoub. Osman Naïb wishes to capture the water forts first, and then expects the town to surrender from thirst. He also personally inspected the town walls near the principal gate one night last week. No ladders have yet been seen at Handoub. They have plenty of ammunition which has been recapped at Khartoum, and about a quarter of the force have rifles. They have six camel or mountain guns; two have been used in the siege, and are fired at night and dragged away directly afterwards; the other four are at Handoub. Ahmed Mahmoud has gone to Rowayah to endeavour to capture the fort at the salt works. The Emirs talk among themselves, and say it would be easier to take the town than the outside forts. Abu Girgeh is expected at Handoub about the 10th of the new moon. A large reinforcement started from Khartoum; cholera broke out, and they had to return. Her Majesty's ship "Racer" arrived on the 3rd instant; also three companies of Egyptians and some artillerymen in the condensing ship. The Italian transport "Europa" sailed on the 26th ultimo for Massowah. I promised her Commander that I would protect the Italian subjects here if the town was attacked. The French gun-boat "Météore" sailed on the 29th for Suez. She called here in consequence of the loss of one of the blades of her propeller. Commander H. J. May has relieved me of the Consular duties to-day. I have, &c. (Signed) B. R. BRADFORD, Commander, R.N. No. 88. My Lord, Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.-(Received October 22.) Cairo, October 9, 1888. I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a letter I have received from Sir Francis Grenfell, dwelling on the necessity of an increase in the Egyptian army. Both General Dormer and Sir Francis Grenfell have assured me that there need be no fear of the Egyptian troops being driven out of the positions they now hold at Wady Halfa and at Suakin, but that, for the reasons stated in Sir Francis Grenfell's letter, it is absolutely necessary to add to the army. The Khedive, also, in conversation with me, dwelt strongly on the necessity of organizing a system under which the battalions serving on the frontier would from time to time be relieved. The demand comes at a somewhat unfortunate moment, as the decrease in the revenue, which is to be anticipated next year by reason of the low Nile, is likely to cause some financial embarrassment. Nevertheless, the arguments advanced by the military authorities are so weighty that I am of opinion that the army should be to some extent increased, in spite of the additional expenditure which will be involved. Your Lordship will observe that, in the inclosed letter, Sir Francis Grenfell asks for three additional battalions of infantry, one troop of cavalry, and one troop of mounted infantry. In conversation, however, Sir Francis Grenfell informed me that. it would be more economical, and would equally well meet all necessary military requirements, if, instead of raising three new battalions of infantry, fifty men were added to each of the existing battalions, and only two new battalions were raised. The total additional cost, if this plan were adopted, would be about 52,000l. a-year, together with an original outlay of about 16,000l. for the first year. The net cost will, however, probably be less than 52,000l. a-year, as the greater the number of men recruited for the army the larger is the amount received from persons who, under the existing law, can avoid military service on payment of a certain sum of money. I arranged with Sir Francis Grenfell that application should be made at once to the Council of Ministers for an increase of fifty men to each of the existing battalions, and that the consideration of the remaining proposals should stand over until the return of Sir Edgar Vincent, who is expected to arrive in Egypt very shortly. Sir, Inclosure in No. 88. I have, &c. (Signed) Major-General Sir F. Grenfell to Sir E. Baring. E. BARING. War Office, Cairo, October 6, 1888. I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice that the existing situation of active hostility maintained by the Soudanese force on the frontier and at Suakin appears to show signs of a certain revival of Mahdiism in the Soudan, which is, in all probability, greatly to be accounted for by the enforced purely defensive action of His Highness' troops. There are, in my opinion, very little grounds for the hope that any great change for the better will occur for some time to come in those districts, and I would therefore submit that it is essential that the present situation should be considered as the normal one in calculating what is necessary to provide for the proper defence of the country, by efficiently guarding the frontier and Suakin. It is also absolutely incumbent, in my opinion, that some steps should be taken for the proper relief of the troops employed on service on the frontier and at Suakin. The Egyptian army, being conscripted, is in a very different position in this respect to a volunteer army, and at present it is impossible to carry out the proper reliefs which have been promised to the soldiers and laid down by the Regulations. At present the state of the frontier and Suakin shows that the battalions have been, in one case, five years, and two over three and a-half years, on service at Wady Halfa; and this, if continued, will act most injuriously on the discipline and fighting value of the troops employed away from their country for the defence of the frontier. No reserve at present exists to fall back upon in case of emergency and for the [806] K maintenance of public security in Egypt, for which duty the army, since the absorption of the police reserve, is held responsible, but has no men available to detach for this duty. Already this year assistance has been demanded by the civil power, and a detachment of mounted men has been sent to Minieh. With these obligations, the army is unable to maintain the ordinary and necessary duties of Cairo and Alexandria. For the above reasons, I beg to lay before your Excellency my firm conviction of the absolute necessity for an immediate increase of the establishment of the army being at once adopted by His Highness' Government. The following numbers are, in my opinion, the minimum force that should be maintained for the defence of the country under existing circumstances: Suakin.-2 battalions of infantry; 1 troop of mounted infantry; 1 garrison battery of artillery. Halfa.-4 battalions of infantry; 1 squadron of cavalry; 1 garrison battery of artillery; 1 camel battery of artillery; 1 camel corps. corps. Korosko.-2 battalions of infantry; 1 division of garrison artillery; 1 camel Assouan, Shellal, and Derawe.-3 battalions of infantry; 1 troop of cavalry; 1 division of garrison artillery; camel corps. Alexandria.- battalion of infantry. Cairo. 2 battalions of infantry; 1 squadron of cavalry; 1 horse battery of artillery; 1 camel or mule battery of artillery; camel corps; the Depôt. The total strength of the army then would be : 14 battalions of infantry. 2 squadrons of cavalry. 1 horse battery. 2 camel batteries. 3 camel corps. 1 troop mounted infantry. Depôt. I hope that your Excellency will concur in the views I have put forward, and will consider the importance of the above points, and therefore the grave necessity for an increase of the army. The time has come when it is absolutely necessary to provide reliefs. At present there is only one battalion in Cairo for this purpose, and this battalion has only just returned from Suakin, where it has been quartered over two years and a-half. P.S.-The proposed increase would be: 3 battalions of infantry. 1 troop of cavalry. I have, &c. (Signed) 1 troop of mounted infantry. F. GRENFELL. No. 89. F. G. (Extract.) Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.-(Received October 22.) Cairo, October 9, 1888. YOUR Lordship may possibly have observed that during the last month or two there have been frequent allusions in the English newspapers to the desirability of undertaking the reconquest of Dongola. I observed a little while ago in the" Times" a letter from Sir Samuel Baker, apparently advocating operations in the Soudan of an even more extended nature. Many of the military authorities think that it would be useless to regain Dongola unless an advance were made as far as Berber. It would probably be impossible to stop at Berber. Once there, an attempt to reconquer Khartoum would almost inevitably follow. Neither do I know of any particular reason why a quiet frontier should be assured even with the reconquest of Khartoum. Plausible and even valid reasons would not be wanting to show the desirability of an extension of territory towards Sennaar on the one hand, and Kordofan on the other. The difficulties which now beset the Egyptian Government are, in fact, inseparable from the position of any civilized Government living in close proximity to a number of barbarous tribes as neighbours. They are similar in nature to those which have been experienced by the English Government in India and by the Russian Government in Central Asia. It cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the possession of any one spot will assure the tranquillity of the frontier. There is a strong probability that the only effect of an advance would be to shift the frontier difficulties one stage further from the centre. I can well understand that Sir Samuel Baker and others, who were instrumental in extending the dominions of the late Khedive, should be grievously disappointed at the collapse of a policy which they had reason to hope had acquired a character of permanency, and especially that they should view with regret the failure of the very creditable efforts made to check the Slave Trade at its source. In my own opinion, however, the real state of the case scarcely admits of doubt. The task undertaken by the late Khedive was far beyond the military strength and administrative capacity of the Egyptian Government. It was hardly possible that it could have been carried to a successful issue. Sooner or later, the whole fabric must have inevitably been overthrown at the hands of the Mahdi, or of some such leader. There is now no alternative but to remain on the defensive at Wady Halfa and Suakin, or to undertake operations which, however limited in scope in the first instance, will infallibly lead to an attempt to reconquer the whole, or the greater part, of the Soudan. The adoption of the latter policy would involve military operations on a large scale, and would result in the whole of the Egyptian financial question being reopened in a serious form. More than this, in view of the great difficulties of exercising any effective European control over the Soudan-difficulties which are the natural result of the geographical situation and climate of the country, and of the religious fanaticism of its inhabitants-there is but little guarantee that the Egyptian government of the Soudan would be more successful in the future than it was in the past. It is just possible that, in the future, circumstances may arise which will render it desirable for the Egyptian Government to move from its present strictly defensive attitude; but for the present there can, I venture to think, be no question that the only wise policy to pursue is to render Wady Halfa and Suakin safe against any attack, and to abandon altogether any idea of offensive operations. Sir Francis Grenfell, I may observe, entirely agrees with me on this point. No. 90. Commander Bradford to Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.-(Received at the Foreign Office, October 27.) "Gannet," at Suakin, September 20, 1888. Sir, I HAVE the honour to report to your Royal Highness that I took over the duties of Senior Officer of the Red Sea Division from Commander Neville on the 10th instant. The "Dolphin" sailed for Suez and Port Saïd on the morning of the 11th. At 8:15 A.M. on the 12th the rebels made a raid on some harmless old men cutting wood outside the water forts, killing four; the forts at once opened fire, driving them off with loss of five or six killed. Prior to this Osman Digna had been quiet for some months, trading with the town's people, and a merchant of the place has informed me that he has received over 12,000 bags of grain from Suakin. I understand that he has been stirred up by one Osman Niab, who is in command of the force investing the town. On the 15th and 16th the forts fired a few rounds at small parties of the enemy. On the morning of the 17th a large party of horse and foot were seen marching from Handoub, and I opened fire on them with common shell (range too long for shrapnel): this party took up a position near the water forts, and during the night threw up intrenchments at about 1,000 yards in front of the water forts, with the object of preventing the townspeople getting water from the wells. [806] K 2 Since Tuesday, 18th, none of the water carriers have been able to visit the wells except one of very inferior quality, inside the ridge on which the water forts stand. On the night of the 17th, about 3 A.M., they made a smart attack on the right water fort; the musketry fire was heavy, and they have since kept up a pretty constant fusilade from their intrenchments, the two water forts and a 10-inch mortar returning it: they evidently have plenty of ammunition and rifles. 3. I visited the left water fort on the afternoon of the 18th; the intrenchments extend across the space between the forts, affording good cover, and appear to be about four or five feet deep; they fired fairly well, two or three bullets striking the fort, and a large number going just over, while I was there. 4. On the morning of the 19th, after consultation with the Governor, Colonel Holled Smith, who relieved Major Rundle on the 13th, I determined to shift berth to a spot between Quarantine Island and Suakin, where I could assist in shelling the intrenchments. In the morning I opened fire on a convoy coming down through the bush, and turned it back into the interior. In the afternoon I fired a few rounds to get the range, and to-day I have fired Shrapnel and common with good effect at a range of 3,600 yards. 5. I gather from the Governor that the Egyptian force in Suakin is not sufficient to permit of a movement being made to turn the rebels out of their works; but it will have to be done sooner or later, as I am of opinion that shell-fire will not be sufficient: the enemy will leave in the day, and return at night to extend the intrenchments towards the forts. 6. We now have good moonlight; the electric light is not in working order; our artificers have taken it in hand: the Egyptian Engineering Staff is very weak (one Englishman), remainder Arabs. 7. In the present state of affairs I am of opinion that the town should not be left without the presence of a man-of-war, and a second ship would make the town more secure. 8. There have been very few casualties-three Egyptian soldiers and two townspeople wounded, one being in the town by a spent bullet. A deserter reports that Osman Niab intends to take the place in seven days; and that up to the evening of the 19th the rebels had lost fifteen killed and sixteen wounded. Osman Niab is from the Nile, and has evidently gained his experience in the siege of Khartoum, as this is the first time that intrenchments have been thrown up in any of the attacks on Suakin. The son of Mahomed Ali, Sheikh of the Friendlies, has deserted to the rebels; he has gone north to stir up the tribes against the Government. 9. I am doing the duties of Consul in the absence of Mr. Cameron's successor. 10. The ship's company have suffered from a severe attack of fever, which does not appear to decrease, two or three fresh cases occurring every day. Half the engine-room staff are in hospital or sick, which makes the work very heavy for the remainder. September 21.-I have kept this letter open to the last moment, so as to send the latest information. This morning the enemy have worked round to the left of the water forts, within 1,500 yards of the town wall, and at about 8 A.M. they commenced a heavy fusilade, sending out a body of mounted men towards Fort Foulah; they showed in considerable numbers, at least 1,000 foot-men. Shell has very little effect on them, as they watch for the flash of the gun and take cover at once. Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.-(Received by telegraph, October 27.) My Lord, Cairo, October 27, 1888. I HAVE had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph, this day, that the most recent news from Suakin causes some little anxiety. Colonel Holled Smith, the officer commanding, reports that the artillery fire of |