be pacified as well. I know it can be done if the Sheikhs are humoured; threaten them, and they will laugh at the Government whom they drove out.

As regards the Tokar district, it is now nearly deserted; the Arabs have gathered their crops and returned to their hills and valleys, and any small force might now go out and hold the old Government buildings without molestation; but the golden opportunity last autumn was lost when representatives of all tribes were there; then an agreement might have been come to, but not in the way it was worked. I think it very probable that Colonel Kitchener may get to Tokar, and if he holds the Government buildings without opposition he may get by August, when the Arabs commence to go down there, the people to keep quiet. The occupying of Tokar will be looked upon as the commencement of the reoccupying the Soudan by Egypt.

Trusting, my Lord, you will excuse this long letter, and my addressing you on a topic which is of the greatest importance to me and trade, I have, &c.

No. 5.

(Signed)

A. B. WYLDE.

Sir,

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

Foreign Office, March 25, 1887.

HER Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the correspondence between you and Colonel Kitchener in regard to the policy to be pursued in the Eastern Soudan, of which copies are inclosed in your despatches of the 16th January last and of the 19th ultimo.

I have already informed you that Her Majesty's Government approve the terms of your letter to Colonel Kitchener, and I should wish you to communicate to that officer their general concurrence in the views indicated in his reply.

I transmit to you herewith two printed copies of a letter from Mr. A. B. Wylde on this subject,* on which I should be glad to receive observations from you and Colonel Kitchener.

I notice that in Colonel Kitchener's letter to you some stress is laid on the necessity of subsidies to the Sheikhs. I should be glad if you would invite from him a more detailed statement of the amounts which he thinks it would be desirable to expend in this manner, of the period at which the expenditure will be required, of the extent to which it might be anticipated that such expenditure would secure a real pacification of the country round Suakin, and of the reductions which might, under such circumstances, be made in the garrison of Suakin.

(Extract.)

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.-(Received April 11.)

Cairo, April 3, 1887.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo. I have sent a copy of that despatch to Colonel Kitchener. On hearing from him I shall have the honour to address your Lordship again.

Mr. Fox has recently returned from Suakin. He called on me, and we had some conversation on Suakin affairs.

At a second interview Mr. Fox handed me the letter of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. I have informed Mr. Fox that without specific instructions from your Lordship I could not undertake to forward his letter to the Egyptian Government. I have pointed out to him that, were I to do so, my action would almost certainly be construed into an approval of his proposal on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and that I should not feel myself authorized to take any step which would have the appearance of conveying such approval without your Lordship's sanction. I have, therefore, told Mr. Fox that if he requires a written official answer to the question propounded in his letter he must address Nubar Pasha direct.

I showed Mr. Fox's letter, however, confidentially to Nubar Pasha, and I informed

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*No. 4.

C

Mr. Fox verbally of the answer which, as I gathered in conversation with his Excellency, would be returned in the event of Mr. Fox deciding to address him. That answer would be somewhat to the following effect: That under existing Firmans the Egyptian Government could not, without the consent of the Porte, take any measures which would involve a cession of Egyptian territory or the delegation of the right of government over that territory, whether to a foreign Government or to a Company. Further, that as regards any purely commercial concession which it would be within the attributes of the Egyptian Government to grant, Nubar Pasha would decline to express any opinion until the whole of the proposals were before him in detail.

I took this opportunity of sounding Nubar Pasha generally on the subject of the future of Suakin. It may be interesting to your Lordship to hear what his views are.

I asked Nubar Pasha what, irrespective of any argument based upon the Firmans, or upon the relations between Turkey and Egypt, he thought was the true interest of Egypt in respect to Suakin. On this point Nubar Pasha told me that he entertained a very strong opinion, and I may remind your Lordship that when Nubar Pasha assumed his present office in January 1883 he expressed approval of the policy of evacuating the Soudan generally, but expressly reserved the case of Suakin, which he thought should not be abandoned. On the 8th January, 1884, I telegraphed to Lord Granville: "Nubar Pasha entirely concurs in the wisdom of abandoning the Soudan, retaining possession of Suakin." (Egypt No. 1 of 1884. p. 181.)

To resume, Nubar Pasha said that he attached little importance to the abandonment of the distant provinces acquired by Ismaïl Pasha; that the evacuation of Khartoum was an unavoidable necessity, and that he attached no importance to the abandonment of Massowah, the possession of which was of no great practical benefit to Egypt. But he thought the case of Suakin altogether different. It was so near to Egypt that its cession to any other Power could not but be injurious to Egyptian interests. He looked forward to the time when the neighbouring provinces of the Soudan would again come under Egyptian influence, not by reconquest, but through the agency of trade. He considered that Dongola and Suakin were the two points from which the Soudan might be dominated. He regretted the loss of Dongola, but he would regret much more the loss of Suakin.

Nubar Pasha was much opposed to granting any rights to an English trading Company such as those demanded by Mr. Fox. He did not consider that, practically, there was any distinction between cession to an English Company and cession to the English Government. He would prefer to keep Suakin in the hands of the Egyptian Government, and to develop the resources of the place under English guidance, and with the assistance of Anglo-Egyptian officers. If this were impossible, he preferred, both on commercial and diplomatic grounds, cession to the Turks to any other course.

Nubar Pasha concluded by saying, that, whilst he recognized the value of the work done by Colonel Kitchener and other Englishmen, he considered that their systems of administration were unduly expensive. He believed that only very moderate subsidies would be required for the tribes, that the ideas of English officers on this subject were too expensive, and that if subsidies were judiciously granted, the Suakin garrison might be still further reduced.

Without going fully into Nubar Pasha's arguments with Mr. Fox, I intimated to that gentleman that I thought his views would probably not be favourably entertained by the Egyptian Government. Mr. Fox appeared to make light of this objection, and said that the Khedive and Nubar Pasha would have to act in any way which might seem fit to Her Majesty's Government. I may add that, from the general tenour of his conversation, he appeared to be very confident that the support of Her Majesty's Government could be obtained. He spoke of the strong public opinion on this subject in England, the strength of which he appeared, so far as I can form an opinion on such a subject, to exaggerate.

I told Mr. Fox that I thought he was in error in taking so little account of the opposition of the Egyptian Government, more especially as, in this case, they would most probably be supported by the Porte; that, without doubt, the Egyptian Government would be bound to defer to any positive order issuing from Her Majesty's Government; that the system which had been pursued during the last four years by myself, acting under general instructions from successive Governments of Her Majesty, had been to avoid the employment of imperious language, and rather to endeavour by persuasion to guide the Egyptian Government to the adoption of any views which might be entertained by Her Majesty's Government; that I had no special reason to suppose that in this particular instance Her Majesty's Government would depart from the attitude which they had previously taken up; and that I could not but think that the views of the Egyptian and Turkish Governments would be considered by Her Majesty's Government as an important element in dealing with the case.

I now venture to submit to your Lordship some observations of my own in connection with Mr. Fox's project. That project, if I understand it rightly, may be described briefly as follows:

An English Company is to be established which shall become entirely responsible for the Government of the Eastern Soudan. It is to bear all the expenses of the Government, and at the same time to collect all the revenues. Control over the interior is to be exercised not by European Agents, but by employing the agency of the tribal Chiefs. The construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber constitutes an important element in the project.

I gathered from conversation with Mr. Fox that the success of the East India Company in India had greatly influenced him and his friends in putting forward this proposal. Without going into any long discussion on this question, I may remark that there appears to me to be but a very slight analogy between the condition of India at the time when the rule of the East India Company was established and the present condition of the Soudan. It did not appear to me, in conversation with Mr. Fox, that he was well acquainted with the main political features of the situation with which the East India Company had to deal. Without, however, attempting to differentiate the political situation of the two countries, I may remark that the East India Company was, in its first conception, a bona fide private Company, whereas an important and, as I understood, an essential part of Mr. Fox's scheme was that the Soudan Company should not only be under the protection of the English Government, but should also be guaranteed by that Government a fixed rate of interest for the capital expended on the Suakin-Berber Railway.

The next observation I have to make is that, in respect to two questions, there is, so far as I am aware, no difference of opinion whatever amongst the various authorities in connection with Suakin affairs.

The first of these points is that no attempt should be made to re-establish the direct Government of the Egyptian authorities in the Soudan. The second point is that every effort should be made by diplomatic action to pacify the Soudan and to develop trade. Considerable differences of opinion exist, however, as to the practical measures which are most suitable to the execution of this policy.

Mr. Fox considers that trade may best be developed by the creation of a Company endowed with very extensive powers of government. I pointed out to Mr. Fox that by thus associating government and trade together he introduced a new and very important element into the discussion of the question. I may add that, as at present advised, I am by no means convinced that it would be wise to give any support to this proposal. In the first place, it would, as I have already mentioned, encounter considerable opposition from the Egyptian Government, and would not improbably give rise to diplomatic difficulties with the Porte, who would, almost certainly, view the proposal with disfavour. In the second place, either the Company must be a bond fide private Company which would not receive any special degree of support from Her Majesty's Government beyond what usually extended to British subjects trading in foreign countries, or it must be a Company strongly backed by British influence, if not by British credit.

Under the first of these hypotheses I doubt if the Company could be formed, and, if it were formed, I doubt still further whether its operations would be successful. Under the second of these hypotheses, I cannot but think that on the occurrence of the first difficulty -and it would be very strange if difficulties did not arise-the position of the Company would sink into insignificance, and the necessity for more prominent and active interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government would arise. I should be much surprised if the Government were not then placed in this position-that they would either be obliged to let their Soudan policy break down, or that they would be forced into a more active interference in Soudan affairs than, for my own part, I should think at all desirable. In fact, I look upon the matter much in this light. If Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to take an active part in the government of the Soudan, the operations of the Company, so far as their governing attributes are concerned, would probably fail.

If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government are prepared to interfere actively, a course which I by no means recommend, then I see no great object in employing the agents of a Company rather than Government Agents.

Looking at the purely financial aspect of the case, I cannot but think that Mr. Fox's proposals are incapable of execution. Mr. Fox did not appear to me to have sufficiently considered this side of the question.

I have mentioned that an essential part of his plan is the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber. I may say that I have always looked upon the construction of this railway as rather a wild project. I believe the difficulties in the way of its construction C 2

[806]

are much greater than is often believed. I cannot but think that it would cost more than the sum of 1,000,000l., or about 3,500l. a mile, which is Mr. Fox's estimate.

I am very sceptical indeed as to the possibility of preserving order along the line through the agency of a number of savage Arab Chiefs, and without the employment of an adequate force of military or police. I am still more sceptical as to the possibility of the railway ever being made a commercial success.

Mr. Fox, indeed, himself owned that it would be impossible to raise the capital required for the construction of a railway without an English guarantee. It is, of course, for Her Majesty's Government to judge whether a proposal to give such a guarantee should be submitted to Parliament. I venture to doubt the advisability of any such proceeding.

My own opinion, therefore, is adverse to making any radical change in the policy as regards the Eastern Soudan, such as would be involved in the adoption of the measures proposed by Mr. Fox. It appears to me that the discussion had much better be limited to deciding on the practical measures to be taken, with a view to giving effect to the policy which is now generally accepted, viz., that trade should be opened without making any organic change in the political situation of the Egyptian Government at Suakin.

I have already mentioned that a good deal of difference of opinion exists as to the detailed measures to be adopted with a view to giving effect to this policy. The views of Colonel Kitchener are not identic with those of Mr. Wylde, who possesses considerable local influence, and has undoubtedly great local knowledge.

It is not easy for any one at a distance to form an independent opinion upon the matters in dispute. I shall, however, be in a better position to deal with this branch of the question when I hear from Colonel Kitchener in answer to the letter I have addressed to him, inclosing your Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo. I may add that Colonel Kitchener's position is one of considerable difficulty; that he appears to be acting with great judgment, and that, so far as I am able to form an opinion, he merits the fullest support from the English and Egyptian Governments.

On the other hand, I am not sure that Colonel Kitchener has not, with a view to bringing about the fall of Tokar, delayed opening out trade somewhat too long. I will draw Colonel Kitchener's special attention to this point, but I may say, generally speaking, that having chosen an officer of Colonel Kitchener's ability to fill the post of Governor of Suakin, it appears to me the wisest course to leave him a wide discretion as regards the conduct of local affairs.

I cannot forget that whilst Colonel Kitchener is acting under a sense of responsibility, his critics, of whom I understand Mr. Fox to be one, are irresponsible.

Sir,

Inclosure in No. 6.

Mr. Fox to Sir E. Baring.

Cairo, March 31, 1887.

WITH reference to the object of iny visits to Cairo and Suakin, it will probably be more satisfactory to Lord Ribblesdale and others associated with him if I returned to England with some definite understanding as to the probable conditions which the Egyptian Government may be disposed to consider in connection with any arrangements for the future government of Suakin and the abandoned provinces of the Soudan.

Assuming that an English Chartered Corporation is in a position to conclude sufficiently satisfactory arrangements with Her Majesty's Government, would the Egyptian Government be prepared to grant a Firman to the proposed Corporation for the government of the Egyptian Soudan Red Sea Littoral, in consideration of the said Corporation undertaking to become responsible for the entire cost of the government of the Egyptian Soudan Red Sea Littoral and the maintenance of order and peace in the Soudan; the Egyptian Government granting to the said Corporation the right to levy and collect the export and import customs duties of the Soudan, and to transfer its late monopoly of the Soudan ivory trade.

The Egyptian Government to reserve its right to resume the Government of the Red Sea Littoral, and to cancel the Firman in the event of the proposed Corporation failing to carry out the stipulations of the Firman.

I am,

(Signed)

&c.

FRANCIS WM. FOX.

No. 7.1

My Lord,

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.-(Received May 9.)

Cairo, April 29, 1887.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward a Report which I have received from Colonel Kitchener. In connection with this Report, I can only repeat the observation which I have on several occasions had the honour to make to your Lordship, viz., that though there appears to be considerable difference of opinion amongst the local authorities at Suakin as to the best method of carrying out the policy of the English and Egyptian Governments, yet that, as Colonel Kitchener is responsible, the wisest plan will be to follow his advice. I shall continue to urge upon Colonel Kitchener the desirability of opening trade without any unnecessary delay.

Inclosure in No. 7.

I have, &c.

(Extract.)

Colonel Kitchener to Sir E. Baring.

Suakin, April 14, 1887.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2nd April, forwarding to me a copy of Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 25th March, requesting a further expression of my views on various points.

With regard to Mr. A. B. Wylde's letter that you forward, it is not very easy for me to make many remarks. There is, no doubt, a good deal of truth in it, but there is much that appears to me very doubtful, if not absolutely inaccurate.

For instance, in the pacification of the north, upon which Mr. Wylde lays much stress, I am totally unaware that Mr. Wylde did anything further than visit Rowayah in my predecessor's time with a view to doing some trade. When passing through Cairo on my way here I wrote to a Sheikh of the Ababdehs at Assouan, who had previously worked for me in the Bishareen country, and asked him to send a good messenger through from Assouan to Suakin to tell all the Sheikhs that I had gone to the latter place, and to report to me about their feelings. This he at once did, and the messenger arrived and reported that all the Bishareen Sheikhs on the way were friendly and happy, and that they would have nothing to do with Mahdiism. I had considerable relations with these tribes when on the Nile, and, in my opinion, Mahdiism has never entered the north. Emissaries have been sent among them from the Mahdiists, causing some revolutions, and while Osman Digna was at Tamai the Arabs were obliged to obey him to a certain extent, but to put the north on a par with the south (where there formerly existed the rebel stronghold of Tamai, and where there still exists the rebel post of Tokar) appears to me absolutely absurd. A cursory glance at the diary of events and the history of the rebellion will show this.

Mr. Wylde appears to me to advocate that the Government should keep the coast and allow trade to be opened up fully with the interior, without any influence or interference with regard to safeguarding such trade.

In my opinion, arrangements should be made with the Sheikhs and principal people to secure trade before it is allowed indiscriminately to pass to those who are irreconcilable fanatics. The result of not taking such precautions would lead most probably, in my opinion, to intertribal warfare, which must be followed by the coast stations being abandoned or reinforced, and as there is no present means of reinforcing such stations they would have to be abandoned, which would have a very bad effect everywhere.

I am quite as anxious as Mr. Wylde for the opening up of trade, but Mr. Wylde appears to me to have a mistaken idea that any arrangements for assisting Sheikhs in the future government and settlement of their country must, of necessity, bring them again under the Egyptian Government, which, he thinks, must be avoided at all hazards. I see no actual reason to fear this. As an example of the difficulties attending some of Mr. Wylde's proposals, he advocates opening up Trinkitat, which is the port of Tokar. Tokar is now in the hands of Fakih Aly, a fanatical Emir, who fights all friendly Arabs, plundering all those who fall into his hands. Within the last few days his horsemen have been within three miles of this town, looting from the friendly Arabs. Supposing that I open a market at Trinkitat (which I do not think would be possible while Mahdiism exists at Tokar), and feed and clothe Fakih Aly and his followers, what will all the friendly