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Senator SYMINGTON. Let us put it this way. What you want to do in this field, instead of having a lot of autonomous setups, as was reported by the President in a letter to his friends in the press yesterday, telling his friends about the way the Pentagon was set up, a lot of independent organizations instead of one as in a business, each department reporting separately to the board of directors. What you want to do now is establish an organization going into the space problem on the basis of those sound business principles recommended in that letter from the President. Is that right?
Mr. FINAN. Exactly, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. I think you have a good bill based on these recent changes as a result of these hearings. There may be some additional changes that should be made but I think the bill is well drawn.
Mr. FINAN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator JOHNSON. Does that conclude your questions, Senator Symington? Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator JOHNSON. Senator Bricker?
CHARACTER OF THE NEW AGENCY
Senator BRICKER. Mr. Chairman-Mr. Stans, I note that you have suggested certain amendments here. I have been trying to determine in my own mind just the character of this new Agency. It is. essentially an executive agency, is it not, not an administrative, but an executive agency, an arm of the Presidency?
Mr. Stans. It is an executive and operating agency, yes.
Senator BRICKER. And not primarily responsible to the Congress. but responsible to the President?
Mr. Stans. Yes, sir.
Senator BRICKER. And it takes over sort of lock, stock, and barrel, the functions of the NACA?
Mr. Stans. It does, yes.
Senator BRICKER. That agency is a research agency and advisory commission?
Mr. STANs. It is a research agency, yes, sir, functioning under an advisory committee and a director appointed by the committee.
Senator BRICKER. And that function will be continued in this organization?
Mr. Stans. All of the functions of the NACA will be continued in this new organization.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER AGENCIES
Senator BRICKER. Then there will be additional functions taken over by this new administration or new agency as you outline the policy declaration in section 2 on page 2, what some of those functions are, at least the purposes of the agency. Would you have any objections from the administration point of view to including in there cooperation with the Atomic Energy Commission the same as with the Department of Defense?
Mr. Stans. I think the only objection is the practical one that if you named the Atomic Energy Commission, the question would arise as to whether you should
name anyone else. Senator BRICKER. Who? What other department? Mr. Stans. National Science Foundation, for example.
Senator BRICKER. Would they have a direct relationship, do you think, as would the Atomic Energy Commission in the development of propulsion?
Mr. Stans. Yes. They would have a definite interest in this area, and so would the Bureau of Standards.
Senator BRICKER. Would there be any real objection to naming them, then?
Mr. STANS. I think there would be no objection to saying that the Agency would cooperate with each of them in their particular fields, although I think the preference would be to leave them out entirely.
Senator BRICKER. Why do you pick out, then, the Department of Defense rather than these others which are also vitally interested?
Mr. STANS. Well, because Defense has a direct competing interest in some areas of the overall aspects of the program. There are some things that will go into space, as completed vehicles or devices, that will be military.
Senator BRICKER. Do you think that this Agency is authorized in any way to take those functions away from the Department of Defense?
Mr. STANS. It is not; except, Senator, to the extent that they are not qualified for retention in the Department of Defense within the language of the policy directive.
Senator BRICKER. Of course, the final determination in that would be the Department of Defense because they have the veto.
Mr. STANS. Well, it would be a veto except that in the case of the difference of opinion between the two agencies, it would be the President who will decide.
Senator BRICKER. I think the bill says with the consent, does it not, of the President?
Mr. STANS. Yes, sir; it does.
Senator BRICKER. Would the same relationship prevail with regard to the other three departments you have mentioned?
Mr. STANS. Yes, of course.
Senator BRICKER. And would you have any objection to naming the Atomic Energy Commission in section 4, subparagraph 1 under a ?
Mr. Stans. I am going to ask the draftsman of the bill to comment on that because I know the point was considered at the time the bill was drawn. Mr. Finan.
Mr. Finan. Senator, one of the problems we have here is the extent to which other agencies of Government currently have an interest in the space program, and as time goes on, additional agencies may have an increasing interest or, let us say, completely new interests. And the problem here, in mentioning agencies, is where do you stop. There would be a presumption if you name 3 or 4 agencies and left out a fifth that there was to be no cooperation with that fifth agency, or that there was to be less cooperation or less in the way of an effective working relationship.
While this is a new and an exotic program, generally speaking, in terms of the organizational problems it generates, it is a familiar
problem. And the Congress, as a matter of longstanding policy, has refrained from writing into law a lot of detail having to do with the interrelationships among the executive agencies, and the extent to which they should or should not work together.
Our experience has been that where agencies have interrelated programs that they can and do work together; and to the extent problems develop, they are usually of such a complicated character that they require at least for awhile almost day-to-day attention of the President. Only the Chief Executive can correctly straighten them out. In other words, we do not feel that the Atomic Energy Commission or the National Science Foundation or any of these other agencies are in any way going to suffer or be left out, or their capacity or their programs ignored in this space program, by reason of there being no reference to them in the bill.
Senator BRICKER. I would certainly hope not, but wouldn't that same logic to which you have alluded here apply to naming the Dep ment of Defense and not naming the others?
Mr. FINAN. The big difference is that the Department of Defense is and will be operating in outer space in connection with weapons systems, in military operations, and as far ahead as we can see at the moment, there is no other agency in view that is apt to be operating space vehicles or other objects in space. That is the unique characteristic of the Department of Defense here.
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Senator BRICKER. Now, coming, Mr. Stans, to your amendment in regard to international cooperation, I would object personally very strenuously to having any direct authority given to the State Department. The President speaks for the United States in international affairs. The State Department is only an agency of the Presidency in international relationships. I think that you would be on much sounder ground to name the President there rather than to give the power to negotiate agreements to the State Department itself or approved by that Department simply because the President is the spokesman for the United States in foreign affairs and the State Department is only an agency of the Presidency to carry out his program.
Mr. Stans. Well, Senator, I am assuming that the Department of State would proceed under its proper authority in any negotiations or agreements of any kind and if any questions were such as to require action by the President, he would be brought in. I am not assuming that this gives the Department of State any more authority than it now has.
Senator BRICKER. It certainly does. It gives the State Department the authority and with the approval of Congress to enter into international executive agreements, and the President is the only one now that has that authority and the only one in my judgment that ought to have that authority.
Mr. STANS. I don't think that was a question, Senator. want me to speak to that?
Senator BRICKER. I want to know why you put the power in the State Department rather than the President who has the authority, if anyone has. The authority ought to be limited to him, rather
than the Congress giving to the State Department the authority to enter into international agreements, which this does.
Mr. STANS. Well, all I can say, Senator, is to repeat what I said before, that I assume that the State Department would operate within its existing authority and within its existing relationship with the President.
Senator BRICKER. But isn't the issue about Congress giving the authority to the State Department to enter into executive agreement with other countries of the world? That authority is now and ought to continue to be limited to the President of the United States.
Mr. FINAN. Senator, if I may comment on that, I understand this language to refer to the negotiation. :
Senator BRICKER. Pursuant to agreement by the State Department and approved by that Department.
Mr. FINAN. It says negotiated by the Department or approved by the Department; yes, sir.
Senator BRICKER. Who enters into the agreement? Mr. FINAN. I would assume only the President under the Constitution has the authority to enter into these agreements.
Senator BRICKER. You ought to say. so, then.
Senator BRICKER. Let us not change the constitutional authority by a direct grant of the power to the State Department.
Mr. Stans. There is no intention of changing the constitutional authority.
Senator BRICKER. I think it could be better worded than it is.
Senator JOHNSON. In that connection, Senator Bricker, did you ask him to submit amending language?
Senator BRICKER. I think the committee can draft the language.
Just what can this new Agency do—just one question and answer, please.
QUESTION OF NECESSITY FOR NEW AGENCY
Just what can this Agency do and what should it do that cannot be done at the present time by the NACA and by the Atomic Energy Commission and by the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, and other established departments? Mr. STANS. I think
Senator BRICKER. Is it just simply for administrative purposes to pull it all together or is there some new function that is now not given to any department of the Government?
Mr. Stans. I think, Senator, that is answered in my opening statement, but I will be glad to refer to it again. The purpose of this is to change the fundamental organization of NACA, its name, its powers and its authority in a number of areas in order for it to be able to take on this major responsibility under a structure in which it can operate most effectively.
Senator BRICKER. What are those functions that are not now lodged anywhere?
Mr. STANS. Well, one of the functions that the Agency does not now have is the authority to contract in a proportion necessary for this program. Its contracting authority is limited to $500,000. Even the name of the Agency has outlived its
SENATOR BRICKER. I appreciate that. That needs to be changed as its functions change; but what I am getting at is: what new functions are given to this Agency that are not now lodged anywhere in the Government?
Mr. Stans. The function of coordinating the space program of the Government.
Senator BRICKER. Well, that was my premise to the question. Is it anything more than a coordinating authority with all of the others drawn into it?
Mr. Stans. The coordinating authority with the implementation that is necessary, yes.
Senator BRICKER. That is all.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATION Mr. VANCE. Mr. Stans, there are some ambiguities in my mind with respect to the nature of this organization; namely, was it intended to be primarily a research organization-was it intended to engage in operations for research purposes only—is it actually to produce and operate aeronautical and space vehicles?
Now, the language I think is ambiguous on that and I would like to ask you what the intent is.
Mr. STANS. The intent is that it does all of the things that you have quoted, to engage in a program of research, develop that kind of a program, conduct scientific studies in research, to actually develop, test, launch, and operate vehicles in space, and to arrange generally for cooperation with the scientific community and in the Government in that general area.
Mr. VANCE. I see. It is intended to cover all three of those aspects. Mr. STANS. Yes.
DEFINITION OF "SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY”
Mr. VANCE. Now, next, with respect to section 6 (a) (4) of the bill, if you have it before you, that provides that the agency shall arrange for participation by the scientific community in planning scientific measurements and observations to be made through the use of aeronautical and space vehicles, and conduct or arrange for the conduct of such measurements and observations, and provide, as appropriate, dissemination for the data collected.
I would like to ask, first, what is meant by the term "scientific community" as used in that section?
Mr. FINAN. With the chairman's permission, I would like to comment on that. That is a shorthand way of saying whatever scientific talent and know-how is available, in both the Government and in private life, that has relevance for this space program.
Mr. VANCE. Does it include foreign scientists? Mr. Finan. I beg your pardon? Mr. VANCE. Does it include foreign scientists or is it limited to the United States?
Mr. FINAN. It could include developments that came about by reason of research by foreigners, yes.
Mr. VANCE. Is the intent to include foreign scientists as well?