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Mr. FINAN. To include them in just what manner? Do you mean to employ foreign scientists in the agency?

Mr. VANCE. Correct.

Mr. FINAN. If that is your question, there is another provision in the bill that relates to that. This provision does not deal directly with that, but elsewhere we do have in this bill the authority for the employment of aliens; yes, sir.

Mr. VANCE. Let me approach it this way. What is the purpose of this section? This is subsection 4 of section 6.

Mr. FINAN. The purpose of this section, as is true of the preceding section, is to set out in law substantially the full scope of the type of program that the Congress is authorizing this new agency to conduct. And this particular section runs to arranging for the participation of the scientific community in planning scientific measurements, observations, and so on, just as it is spelled out here. In other words, we will endeavor to get the advice of expert scientists and others in connection with formulating this totally new and unprecedented program. But it means to get their advice and help and not to turn any vestige of authority or direct governmental responsibility over to them.

EMPLOYMENT OF ALIEN SCIENTISTS

Thank you.

Mr. VANCE. Now, you mentioned that there was another section of the bill which was related to contracts with foreign scientists. Could you point to that, please?

Mr. FINAN. In section 6 (b) (9) on page 9, the subsection beginning on line 7 which reads:

When determined by the Director to be necessary and subject to such security investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, to employ aliens without regard to statutory provisions prohibiting payment of compensation to aliens.

That is the direct purpose of that section.
Mr. VANCE. I see.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you yield on that point, if you are going on to another point?

What I would like to ask is this. If you have a need for this section which includes the words "scientific community," why wouldn't it be well to limit that to the United States and then cover the question of foreign scientists in the amendment that you have offered on international cooperation in such form as the committee might rewrite it?

Mr. FINAN. Senator, we would not like to see this section 6 (a) (4) on page 6 circumscribed in that manner. This is simply a section which will authorize the Agency to arrange to get advice and assistance from eminent scientists wherever they may be on the basis of which the Agency itself will then formulate its own program. This is a section that was developed, as I believe I mentioned earlier, in recognition of the new and to a considerable degree unpredictable character of this space program.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think the section is good, but I thought you were working two things in together and perhaps it isn't quite clear as they are now.

Mr. FINAN. Well, we think they are clear in this respect, that section 6 (a) (4) on page 6 grants no authority to employ anyone. It has nothing to do with the employment of persons as Government officers or employees. The other subsection that I referred to on page

9, section 6 (b) (9), refers only to the waiver of certain statutes which prohibit the payment of compensation to aliens. As we see them, they are clearly separable and serve distinct purposes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

COMPOSITION OF THE SPACE BOARD Mr. VANCE. Turning to the amendments which have been suggested today, I note that in section 4 (a) (1) in the first sentence the words "no more than eight” are to be removed and the word “nine" is to be substituted, so that the sentence will read:

Nine of the members of the Board shall be designated from appropriate departments or agencies of the Government of the United States.

Could you tell us the reason for that change?

Mr. STANS. The reason is a very simple one. It would seem to be that there was a great deal of suspicion or misunderstanding of the figure “8”, which was inserted only to bring about a balance as closely as possible between those employed in the Government and those employed outside. The balance can be achieved as closely by reversing the provision and making it read "nine" in the Government and “eight” outside. There was nothing sinister in the suggestion of 8, and to avoid any further issue, we suggest it be changed to 9.

Senator JOHNSON. It does make it a little more understandable. After you got a second run at it, you made it a little clearer at least to some dense people.

Mr. STANS. If it does make it clearer, I am very happy to have made the suggestion.

Senator JOHNSON. Doesn't it make it clearer to you? Mr. STANS. No. Senator Johnson. Under your former language did you have eight Mr. STANS. No. The whole point of the language was flexibility. It might well be, Senator, for example, that instead of 17 members, and you will notice that that was originally stated at not to exceed 17, that some President might decide to make it only 11, in which case he could get a majority by appointing 6. So that the whole paragraph, the whole section was written with flexibility in mind, and since that seems to have created misunderstandings and some distrust, we suggested it be clarified by making it 17 in total, 9 within the Government.

Senator JOHNSON. I think that is quite an improvement. I'm sorry you don't.

Mr. VANCE. I note in the same subsection 1 of section 4, in line 23, the word “one” has been changed to read “three”. Can you tell us the reason for that change?

Mr. STANS. Well, really for the same reason. The language was "at least one," to be sure that the Department of Defense was included, but there was no limitation in it. It was left flexibly to the President to appoint as many as he wanted from the Department of Defense, but at least one. Now, in the face of all of the questions and objections that have been raised, the suggestion is made that it be changed to three.

Mr. VANCE. And this was put in at the suggestion of the Department of Defense; is that correct?

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Mr. STANS. It was put in as a result-yes, of recommendations of the Department of Defense and consideration by the administration.

PERIOD OF OBLIGATED SERVICE AFTER TRAINING Mr. VANCE. Now, either Mr. Stans of Mr. Finan, in section 6 (b) (12), on page 10, in line 24, it reads as follows, in part:

For a period equal to three times the length of any time off with pay granted such employee without charge to annual leaveAnd so forth. Can you tell us how you arrived at the figure “three times?

Mr. FINAN. I had a discussion earlier with Senator Saltonstall on that same point. The ratio of length of service to length of training received is strictly a matter of policy, and one for the Congress to determine. This particular section of this particular bill was simply lifted from the general training bill that would grant this kind of authority broadly within the executive branch and which has already passed the Senate, and as a matter of convenience and since hearings had already been held on the other bill, and it was clearly understood, we simply used substantially the same or I believe identical language here in this particular section.

Mr. VANCE. Thank you.

QUESTION OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR TRANSFERS Now, I direct your attention to section 8 appearing on page 15. I would like to ask whether or not any consideration was given in the drafting of this section to including a sentence requiring that the action provided for therein be done with the concurrence of the Congress in any way?

Mr. FINAN. This section again is modeled after a section which was incorporated in the Airways Modernization Act which was passed by the Congress last year, and is designed to serve much the same purpose.

A question was raised earlier of a somewhat similar type and that is: Would we have any objection to a provision in here that called for the notification or advice to Congress about action taken under this section? To that the answer was: “We would have no objection

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Mr. VANCE. Your answer to my question is: “There was no consideration given to such a provision as I mentioned in my question.”

Mr. FINAN. Well, it is rather hard to say what matters were and were not given consideration in the drafting of this rather elaborate and technical bill. But again, because we had a model which had been found acceptable to the President and the Congress to deal with a comparable situation, we simply used as a model the comparable provision in the Airways Modernization Act.

Mr. VANCE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Senator BRICKER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?
Senator Johnson. Senator Bricker.

RELATIVE MERITS OF SINGLE VERSUS MULTIHEADED ADMINISTRATION

Senator BRICKER. I think the most serious long-range problem of Congress in reference to this bill is the determination of the nature, of the character of the Agency. Now, Mr. Stans testified a while ago that you patterned this after the general practice in administrative agencies, but there is a completely different character between this. kind of an agency and the Atomic Energy Commission, for instance, which is the most nearly comparable activity that I can think of which the Congress has authorized. There, we did elect a board or authorized a board responsible to the Congress, reporting continually to the Congress, and here you have a different character of an agency, entirely appointed by the President, of course, with the confirmation of the Senate, but it is a single-head agency with only an advisory committee, and it is responsible, or the Agency head is responsible, to the President, which converts it into an executive arm rather than a legislative arm, in my judgment. Is that your interpretation of the bill?

Mr. FINAN. Well, to begin with, Senator, we do not see how it would be possible under our Constitution to establish this Agency as anything except an organ of the executive branch. It is carrying out purely executive functions. There is nothing here that has any flavor of legislation.

Now, insofar as the Atomic Energy Commission is concerned, we would see the situation with respect to the space program as being very dramatically different from the situation that confronted this country and the Congress toward the close of World War II when the problem came up of how to organize for the conduct of the atomicenergy programs in peacetime. There, you had a program which had to be conducted in the interests of national security under a total cloak of secrecy for a very considerable period of time. There was going to be no basis for the normal democratic processes to work in connection with that program for an unforeseeable period of time.

The one thing that was known was that we had developed the most terrible weapon of war that anybody had ever imagined. Whoever had that program turned over to them, therefore, was going to be operating out of sight of the public, so to speak, even out of sight of the majority of the Members of the Congress, and was going to be dealing with a death-dealing instrument of perfectly terrifying proportions. And it was against that background that the Congress felt that, under all of the circumstances, no one man under the President should be given this kind of responsibility and this kind of power. And they deliberately put it in a multiheaded agency where the members have fixed, overlapping terms in order to prevent that sort of situation.

Now, in contrast, our space program is one that, as far as the civil side is concerned, is to be conducted in the broad light of day, with only such secrecy involved as may be necessary while we are using military rocketry in order to launch these vehicles—where its purposes are the advancement of science on a broad front and where its purposes cannot be served unless the results of these experiments and these explorations are made fully available to the scientific community to capitalize on.

So, we would say that the situation here is quite different, and it is one in which the well-established pattern of the executive branch

organization is much more suitable and much more applicable than was the case when we were originally establishing the atomic-energy program and which led to the conclusion that a multiheaded agency seemed to be the best solution to an admittedly very difficult problem.

Senator BRICKER. Of course, the atomic-energy concept had worked pretty well in the field. I think they have done a remarkably constructive and fine job. After all, it is just a balancing of efficiency of 1 head who could make decisions rapidly, carry them out, getting the checks that come from, sav, a 5-man or a 3-man board.

Mr. FINAN. Well, we believe that the space program is one in which the normal machinery of Government ought to be allowed to work, which is to place one man in the position where the President and the Congress can clearly and without any doubt hold him fully responsible, not only for such successes as his Agency might have, but for any failures which may occur.

Senator BRICKER. I don't see how
Mr. FINAN. That cannot be done under a multiheaded arrangement.
Senator BRICKER. Why not?

Mr. Finan. Because you can't fix responsibility that clearly. You have a group responsibility.

Senator BRICKER. I can't conceive of why the secrecy in the atomicenergy field would make any difference, as far as the character and the nature of the administration itself was concerned. If one is sufficient, the other would be. _Mr. FINAN. Well, sir, my impression—the history of the Atomic Energy Act was one in which other considerations were thought to outweigh the question of efficiency. The traditional American way of organizing any large operating enterprise, be it public or private, is to head it up with a single executive. It has been a tradition in our country since the Constitution was written.

The debates, you will recall, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, went deeply into this question of whether the President should be one man or a group. And we have learned to operate our major business enterprises successfully and our major governmental enterprises successfully under the single-executive arrangement.

Senator BRICKER. Wouldn't the same logic apply to all the other administrative agencies of the Government, then?

Mr. FINAN. I would say that in every case with which I am familiar—and I think I am familiar with the majority of them—the decision was made to put a board or a commission at the head of an agency on the basis of considerations other than the efficient operation of the agency. For one reason or another, multijudgments were wanted. In our regulatory commissions, a judicial approach toward the decisionmaking process, where private rights are involved, is sought. Another result you can get with it is by making it bipartisan. But these other benefits are benefits which do not run to the question of operating efficiency, but to other things.

Senator BRICKER. You have attempted to get that through your Advisory Board here, with judicial policy, regulation, the overall conduct determined by the multiple agency itself?

Mr. Finan. In this case, we are providing this Advisory Board for a little bit different purpose. It is, in part, to continue the NACA arrangements which have worked so well, and we must bear in mind

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