Dr. BRONK. I think this is very important, sir, because, as we all know, many of our Government agencies have suffered gravely because they have been unable to compete with nongovernmental agencies. I am one who believes that our Government deserves no less than the best.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, if we do that, sir, don't we make it difficult for the other agencies of Government that use scientific personnel in their programs?

Dr. BRONK. It might be a very good way of encouraging them to try for the same.

Senator SYMINGTON. I must say that is a pretty good answer.
Senator McClellan?

Senator MCCLELLAN. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. BRONK. Thank you, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Our next witness is Mr. Don K. Price, Jr., dean designate of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration?

Mr. Price, will you come up?

Mr. Price, I understand you are the author of a publication called Government and Science. And that you have done considerable work in the field of relations between the Government and science. We are looking forward to your testimony.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record your biography covering your experience and qualifications.

(The biography referred to is as follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF DON K. PRICE, JR., VICE PRESIDENT, FORD FOUNDATION, DEAN DESIGNATE, HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Price was born in Middlesboro, Ky., on January 23, 1910. He received his bachelor of arts degree from Vanderbilt in 1931 and was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University, receiving his bachelor of arts in 1934 and bachelor of literature in 1935.

He was a reporter and editor of the Nashville Tennessean in 1930-32. From 1935 to 1937 he was a research assistant for the HOLC. He was a staff member of the Social Science Research Council from 1937 to 1939. He was assistant and associate director of the Public Administration Clearing House from 1939 to 1953. He served in the United States Coast Guard from 1943 to 1945. He was a staff member of the Bureau of the Budget from 1945 to 1946. From 1952 to 1953 he was Deputy Chairman of the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense. He also lectured at the University of Chicago from 1946 to 1953. He was the associate director of the Ford Foundation from 1953 to 1954 and its vice president since 1954. Later in 1958 he will become the dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration.

He has been a member of various committees on Government organization. He is also a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the author of Government and Science published in 1954, and other publications.

Senator SYMINGTON. The committee is ready for any statement that you might wish to make.

STATEMENT OF DON K. PRICE, JR., VICE PRESIDENT, FORD FOUNDATION, AND DEAN DESIGNATE, HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Mr. PRICE. Thank you very much, Senator. I will be glad to start, if I may, by talking briefly from notes that I have made. I was on a trip abroad when I got a letter from Senator Johnson inviting

me to appear, and I did not have time to prepare a completely written statement. But perhaps it will be more useful for me to try to answer questions.

I think the problem, that makes S. 3609 a tremendously challenging piece of legislation is that we are caught up here by 2 trends that 30 years ago or even 20 years ago would have seemed inconceivable to us.

At that time, we were getting used to the idea that technology and industrialization were causing us a lot of social problems. We weren't used to the idea that we were going to have to depend every month and every day for our security on a massive Military Establishment, a necessity which I think we all take for granted today. And, second, we weren't used to the idea that the strength of that Military Establishment was going to have to depend not on a traditional corps of professional soldiers and not on a reserve of militia, but on the state of our science and technology, which is multiplying the powers of destruction, as it has become quite commonplace to say, to such an extent that no one can quite see where this leads us in the long-range future.

Now, it seems to me that these two general ideas underlie all of the important issues that are represented in this bill. And while this bill alone, of course, won't determine the future of the world, I think the kind of moves we make on it will have some effect on the way we work out the future of our relations between civilian and military power in this Government. We all hope those relations can be along the lines that are consonant with our fundamental and traditional principles. Then, too, we must consider the equally important but newer problems of the relation between responsible political authority on the one hand, and the rapidly developing influence of science on the other; this is an equally important, and I think equally difficult, problem.

Both of these problems have a great potential impact, I think, on the future relations of private and public institutions in this country, because obviously if everything that is needed for military strength is to be drawn into the military system, even on a contractual basis, the possibility of truly independent private institutions becomes very difficult for us to maintain.

I would like to discuss three general issues in this bill, and I am very glad to be able to say that I think the bill takes a sound approach to them.

The first is the issue of the military-civilian relation. The second is the issue how an agency of this sort ought to be headed. And the third is the relation of this agency to the rest of the Government.

First, as to the military-civilian relationship, I would not like to see any step taken which would even momentarily weaken the state of our weapons development. I served for some time as Deputy Chairman of the old Research and Development Board, and that experience gave me a very lively sense of the need for the continuous advancement of military technology. It made me think, too, that it would be very easy to exaggerate the difficulties of military people in getting along with scientists. I think military administrators are generally like civilians in their attitude to scientists; if they run a big bureaucratic show, they have to run it according to the rules of the game, which are not always welcome to the independent scientist. I do not argue for a civilian agency here because I think there is any

thing in the military mind as such that makes it unsympathetic to scientific thinking. My reason for advocating a civilian agency is quite different; it is that we face in our society today a situation in which every aspect of our business and industry and agriculture and science needs to contribute to military affairs. That makes me all the more eager, therefore, not to organize all those aspects of our society under the control of the Department of Defense and the military services.

I therefore would come out quite strongly, as this bill does, for setting up this new venture, which I am sure will go ahead with a great deal of pioneering zest in the near future, as a civilian agency. And I don't see that such civilian status will involve any necessary handicap to the future of our military preparedness.

I say that even though I don't think that it is possible to draw in advance, by statutory language or any other means, a precise dividing line, with respect to scientific subject matter or types of operation, between the concerns of the agency proposed here, and the concerns of the military services.

But, as I can remember it, I could never see such a line drawn in the field of research between the Atomic Energy Commission and the military, or between the Public Health Service and the military, or the Agriculture Department and the military. I think these things have to be worked out as a practical matter with discretion and flexibility, especially since you are working here in a field of a totally new kind, where you cannot say today what the nature of the problem is going to be 12 months from now.

I am glad to see this Agency built on the basic structure of the NACA. Immediately after the war our permanent military scientific research machinery was being built up largely on a system of contracting out as much as possible. But during that time the NACA was a constant example of the advantages, for some types of purposes, of keeping a strong operation going within Government laboratories in parallel with the operations carried on in private business.

And I think the past efficiency of the NACA and its close cooperation with the military are the best reasons for believing that similar arrangement of efficient cooperation can be maintained in the future by the new agency.

I have only one general comment to add: I think it would be worse to set up this Agency on a halfway basis than not to do it at all. If the Congress of the United States wants this Agency to be a vital and vigorous partner of the military, I think it is important to give it the ability to do the job.

Therefore I was very pleased to read the provisions of this bill that give this Agency the opportunity to employ at above the normal Government salary ceilings.

I say that because I once had a great deal of experience watching people move from important jobs in the military departments to less important jobs for military contractors at very much higher salaries. And in the long run it was the Government that paid those new salaries. Unless the Agency proposed here is able to compete for personnel on equal terms with the military contractors, we are bound to have a steady drift away from this sort of responsible civilian institution, and into an undue concentration of strength in the system which is supported entirely by military contracts.

Second, then, how should an agency of this sort be headed? And I come out on this issue without any reservations on the side of a single executive head, as the bill provides.

It is, of course, quite normal for people with primarily scientific and academic background, accustomed to a committee style of operation in laboratories and in universities, to prefer boards and commissions for scientific purposes. But this new Agency is about to move far beyond a mere research program, and beyond even the operating magnitude of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, to a size of an operating program that requires vigorous executive direction. Even within the NACA, I think the success of that operation has come about in a very large part because the Board has been wise enough to delegate authority, to a very great extent, to a very able executive director.

I must say, if this Agency were starting from scratch, I would be a little disturbed at the language which requires the Board to be consulted in advance on a considerable number of specific pieces of busi

ness.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think the bill requires that the consultation be made from the standpoint of their having any authority. It is simply to consult and advise with them before making a decision without the Board's having any decisive authority.

Isn't that correct?

Mr. PRICE. Perfectly correct, Senator; and to my mind that saves it from being a handicap of any seriousness.

And if this language seems wise in order to make the transition from the NACA to the present Agency desirable, I certainly wouldn't think of advising a change in it.

The director, if he is a wise man, would actually consult with the Board a great deal more than this suggests; but when the emergency comes, I think it is sometimes quite unwise to have that kind of a requirement pinned down in language. But, as it is put here, I don't think the requirements is likely to be a serious difficulty.

Now, the third general point I would like to comment on very quickly is the relation of the new agency with the rest of the Government. Part of this will involve international affairs, where the Department of State is bound to be concerned. It will involve finance. It will involve almost every part of the Government. I, myself, feel rather strongly that the Government has suffered rather severely in the past 15 or 20 years from the multiplication of unduly formalized systems of interdepartmental coordination. They start out sometimes by being useful, but as they tend to run down in their dynamics and drive, they wind up by being more of a handicap than an asset to the central direction of the executive branch. Therefore, I would hope that this bill would not include any rigid prescriptions as to the nature of the interdepartmental machinery or the liaison with other agencies that should be developed.

I would like to emphasize that I think this agency will have to have very close relations with the military, with the Atomic Energy Commission, and with the State Department, and on the most important issues will be tied right into the Presidency. But I think those relationships will be more effective if the lines of interdepartmental communication aren't cluttered up by unduly rigid statutory procedures of coordination.

I think I would do well to stop at this point, Senator. I would be happy to answer any questions that may occur to you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Price.

Senator McClellan, do you have any questions?

RELATIVE MERITS OF A SINGLE DIRECTOR OR A COMMISSION FORM OF ADMINISTRATION

Senator MCCLELLAN. When I asked one previous witness, he favored the Commission approach to administration rather than having a director. What is your position with respect to that?

Mr. PRICE. On that, Senator, I'm afraid that I am just a little old fashioned. I feel that the leaders of the earliest period of our Government, who started our constitutional system with the idea that a single executive was better than a plural one-I think they were very smart administrators. Unless there is a very special reason for heading an agency with a board, for example, that has truly quasijudicial activities, I don't think that it is a good idea to have it under a plural head. I think the NACA has long since outgrown the size and stage of development at which a board is an acceptable instrument for directing the job.

Senator MCCLELLAN. If I'm correct, as I interpret this bill, the real power and the final authority of decision is vested in the Director. Mr. PRICE. That seems to me correct, as I read it, sir.

Senator MCCLELLAN. The Board is advisory only. The Board might be unanimous with one viewpoint, and the Director could disregard that and make a decision independent of the Board's counsel and advice. I'm not arguing the question, but that is placing a great deal of authority in one man, is it not?

Mr. PRICE. Yes, sir; but I think that is the only way you get responsibility. I think if a director took that line over any period of time and on issues of any importance, the head of the executive branch of the Government would then have to decide what he was going to do about the matter. I cannot imagine that situation persisting very long without the matter being settled by one side or the other.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Do you favor the Director's being appointed for an indefinite term?

Mr. PRICE. I would favor his being in that position with exactly the same tenure of office as any other administrator or Cabinet member; that is to say, removable by the President at a moment's

notice.

Senator MCCLELLAN. In other words, the Director, once appointed and confirmed, could only be removed by the President or, of course, by impeachment.

Mr. PRICE. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Do you think that measure of personal security and feeling of authority and so forth is essential to his job? In other words, he goes in there thinking, "Well, now, I have the authority, I can do it; as long as I please the President, why, I'm the boss."

Mr. PRICE. It seems to me, Senator, that is the only way to get the kind of responsibility you need in this kind of a job. This isn't very much personal security, as I look back over history.