Sheffler, Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. 518 State, Lewellen v. (Okl. Cr. App.). 489 245 671 ..1067 472 608 State, Julian v. (Okl. Cr. App.). 244 269 245 968 .1002 245 967 586 244 .1098 ... 489 (186 P.) Page 742 Trombly, Staniford v. (Cal.).. State v. Pack (Kan.). State v. Peterson (Wash.) State v. Phillips (Kan.).. State, Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. (Okl.) State v. Rader (Or.).. State v. Raub (Kan.). 264 743 Tryon v. Clinch (Cal. App.) 934 Turney, Goodrich v. (Cal. App.). 79 Tyler v. Obiague (Or.) xiii Page 599 737 .1042 150 806 . 579 State, Richards v. (Kan.) State v. Schluter (Wash.) State v. Sowders (Wash.). 260 State v. Spokane (Wash.). 864 State V. State Board of Equalization (Mont.) 697 State v. Superior Court of Washington in and for King County (Wash.). 851 State v. Superior Court of Washington in and for King County (Wash.). 891 State, Taylor v. (Okl. Cr. App.) 243 State v. Terrell (Utah). 108 989 198 752 1025 Ukase Inv. Co. v. Portland (Or.)........ 558 364 239 State, Tropp v. (Okl. Cr. App.). 737 State, Ward v. (Okl. Cr. App.). 489 State, Ward v. (Okl. Cr. App.). 967 State v. Ward (Kan.).. .1009 State, Whitehead v. (Okl. Cr. App.). 970 Vaughn, Watkinson v. (Cal.). 753 State, Woody v. (Okl. Cr. App.). ......1100 1 State Board of Equalization, State (Mont.) V. Wade v. Hope & Killingsworth (Okl.)..... 235 697 (Cal.) 356 Steinbeck, Lawson v. (Cal. App.) 842 Walker v. Haslett (Cal. App.). 622 Sternberger v. Continental Mines Power & Walker, Kettenbach v. Idaho). 912 Reduction Co. (Colo.).. 910 Walker, Mason v. (Colo.).. 544 Stearns v. Superior Court in and for Los Walker, Wells v. (Wash.).. 857 390 Stem v. Kemp (Okl.).. 946 Walker Const. Co., Vaile v. (Cal. App.).. 602 Stewart v. Cadeau (Wash.). 894 tion (Cal. App.). 830 Stewart v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co. (Cal. App.). Walmsley v. Pickrell (Wash.). 847 160 Stockgrowers' State Bank V. Millard Ward v. Andrews (Cal. App.). 605 ... 612 (Wyo.) 121 Stockton Terminal & E. R. Co., Mercan tile Trust Co. v. (Cal. App.).. .1049 Stockwell, Hyde v. (Cal. App.). Ward v. Goetting (Cal. App.). 640 489 967 .1009 Stone v. Hancock (Cal. App.). Strain, Rohrbacher v. (Or.). 604 Warren Const. Co., Wilcox v. (Or.). 13 533 Strayer, Moore v. (Cal. App.). 162 Watkinson v. Vaughn (Cal.). 753 Struven, Roger v. (Cal. App.). 817 Superior Court in and for Los Angeles 390 Weavering v. Schneider (Cal. App.). 602 406 Superior Court in and for Trinity County, 634 Wegele v. Ismert-Hincke Milling Co. (Kan.) 130 41 Superior Court of Washington in and for Wegener, Wright v. (Or.).. 41 851 Weikel v. Davis (Wash.) 323 Superior Court of Washington in and for Weir v. Campbell (Colo.) 526 891 Weiss, Martin v. (Or.). 550 Welch v. Spokane International R. Co. .1065 (Idaho) 915 882 Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water Co. (Cal.).. 766 Tayiah v. Bunnell (Okl.)... Weldon v. Newsom (Colo.) 516 192 857 240 Wells Fargo Exp. Co., Saari v. (Wash.).. 898 940 Taylor v. Enid Nat. Bank (Okl.). 232 .... 243 West, Board of Education of Salt Lake 114 West, Nowka v. (Okl.). 220 207 West v. West (Kan.). .1004 Teague Inv. Co. v. Setchel (Cal. App.)...1046 Theden, Union Pac. R. Co. v. (Kan.) Thimsen v. Reigard, two cases (Or.).. 108 West Coast Steel Co., Crowl v. (Wash.) 866 West Marginal Way in City of Seattle, In 752 re (Wash.).. 644 133 West Pub. Co., Foster v. (Okl.). ...1083 Thompson, Brumley v. (Kan.) Thompson, Grayson v. (Okl.). 559 Western Salt Co. v. San Diego (Cal.) 345 Co. (Cal. Thomsen v. Giebisch (Or.).. 10 App.) 181 Thorn v. Edgar Zinc Co. (Kan.) 972 White v. Harrigan (Okl.). 224 Tiefel v. Chant (Cal. App.) 382 White v. Kroeger (Okl.). 477 Tieslau, Alameda County v. (Cal. App.).. 398 White v. Kroeger (Okl.). 478 v. (Cal.) 142 Titsworth Co. v. Analla (N. M.). .1079 Whitehead v. State (Okl. Cr. App.). Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. of San Diego v. Brown (Cal. App.)... 970 386 Tjosevig, Holland y. (Wash.). 317 Todd, Ex parte (Cal. App.).. 790 Town of Gold Bar v. Gold Bar Lumber Co. (Wash.) Wilcox v. Warren Const. Co. (Or.). 13 287 896 Trans-Pacific Corporation, Marden, Orth Wilkin v. Board of Com'rs of Oklahoma 474 Williams, Ex parte (Cal. App.). THE PACIFIC REPORTER VOLUME 186 (56 Mont. 600) ance of remarks calculated to bring soldiers of the United States into contempt, and also disloyal, contemptuous, and slurring language about the form of the United States government, proof that defendant made either of the statements 4-INFORMATION CHARGING SEDI- charged in the information was sufficient to sustain conviction. STATE v. WYMAN. (No. 4379.) (Supreme Court of Montana. Dec. 17, 1919.) 1. WAR TION SUFFICIENT; "ATROCITY." CRIMINAL LAW 369(15), 370, 371(1, 12), 372(1) EVIDENCE OF OTHER ACTS OF ACCUSED ADMISSIBLE IN CERTAIN CASES. Under Rev. Codes, §§ 9147, 9148, information charging violation of Sedition Act, by stat-5. ing that "our soldiers would act in the same way and commit the same atrocities as have been reported of the German soldiers" held Evidence of other acts or declarations of the sufficient without setting out the German atroci- accused of a like nature with those constituting ties, notwithstanding information charged words the offense charged is admissible for purpose of to have been spoken "in speaking of the atroci- showing intent, guilty knowledge, or motive in ties reported to have been committed by the corroboration of offense charged, to prove idenGerman soldiers in the present war," the lat-tity of perpetrator of crime, or to negative the ter quotation being merely parenthetical and idea that the particular offense complained of no part of the seditious utterance, such lan- was the result of mere accident or mistake, or guage being calculated to bring soldiers of the the employment of a mere loose word or phrase, United States into contempt, and disrepute, or to show that the act complained of was a the charge of "atrocity" implying that our sol- part of a chain or system of crimes. diers would be outrageously or wantonly wicked, criminal, vile, cruel, and their conduct extremely horrible and shocking. 6. WAR 4-"CALCULATED," IN CONSTRUCTION OF SEDITION ACT MEANS "INTENDED.' The word "calculated" within Sedition Act, 2. WAR 4-REMARKS IN PRESENCE OF wo- making language "calculated" to bring govern MEN ALONE MAY BE SEDITIOUS. In prosecution for sedition in violation of Sedition Act, it was no defense that the alleged seditious remarks were made in the presence of women alone. 3. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION 125(20) -INFORMATION CHARGING SEDITION STATING ONLY ONE OFFENSE. In prosecution for sedition in violation of Sedition Act, information charging that defendant stated that the United States soldiers would commit the same atrocities as had been reported of the German soldiers, that his nephew, like a great many other soldiers, would not have entered service if they had not been compelled to do so, and that he would just as soon live under the Kaiser's government as under the government of the United States, held not objectionable as charging two distinct crimes, the statute defining but one crime, and the information, therefore, being in the language of the statute and in the conjunctive, states but one offense. 4. WAR 4-PROOF OF ONE SEDITIOUS REMARK SUFFICIENT THOUGH INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE. DECLARATIONS OF LOYALTY NOT ADMISSIBLE. In prosecution for sedition in violation of Sedition Act, evidence of statements by defendant tending to show his loyalty held inadmissi In prosecution for sedition in violation of Sedition Act, where information charged utter- ble. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 186 P.-1 the Kaiser's government as under the government of the United States," etc. Having entered his plea of not guilty, appellant was permitted', on the day of trial, to withdraw his plea and file a general and special demurrer to the information, which demurrer was by the court overruled, and appellant again entered his plea of not guilty and thereupon proceeded to trial on the information. He was convicted of the crime of sedition, as charged in the information, and judgment pronounced that he serve an indeterminate term of not less than six years nor more than twelve years at hard labor in the state's prison. Thereupon he moved for a Appeal from District Court, Custer Coun- new trial, which motion was by the court ty; A. C. Spencer, Presiding Judge. R. L. Wyman was convicted of sedition, and from Judgment of conviction and from order denying motion for new trial, he appeals. Affirmed. H. J. Haskell, of Glendive, and Henry C. Smith, of Helena, for appellant. S. C. Ford and Frank Woody, both of Helena, and Otto Gerth, of Great Falls, for the State. MATTHEWS, J. On the 23d day of April, 1918, the county attorney of Dawson county filed an information against appellant, in which it is alleged that on the 15th day of March, 1918, at the county of Dawson and state of Montana, the said R. L. Wyman committed the crime of sedition, as follows: denied, and appealed from the judgment of conviction and from the order of the court denying his motion for a new trial. At the outset the Attorney General moved this court to dismiss both the appeal from the judgment of conviction and the appeal from the order, on technical grounds, but in asmuch as counsel for appellant has, in part, supplied the deficiencies complained of, by the filing of an amended transcript on appeal, and in view of the gravity of the charge and the severity of the sentence imposed, the motion and the objections therein contained will be disregarded, and the cause disposed of on its merits, to the end that, should it appear that the appellant was not lawfully convicted, he shall not unjustly suffer the severe penalty imposed upon him. 1. The first contention of appellant is that the Sedition Act (Acts Extra Sess., 15th Leg. Assem. 1918, c. 11) attempted to deal with a subject exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United States, and was therefore unconstitutional. The question was fully covered and finally disposed of by this court in the case of State v. Kahn, 56 Mont., 182 Pac. 107. 2. The same is true of appellant's contention that the Sedition Law is defective in that it fails or omits the "basic element of intent' altogether"; the Kahn Case laying down the rule that the Sedition Act, being purely statutory, is valid, though intent is not made an ingredient, and that, if the intent were needed, the word "calculated" is sufficiently broad to include intent. court well said: "That said R. L. Wyman did then and' there, while the United States was engaged in war, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously state to divers persons and utter the following language calculated to bring the soldiers of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute: The said defendant did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously say to divers persons and in the presence of divers persons, in speaking of the atrocities reported to have been committed by the German soldiers in the present war, that our soldiers would act in the same way and commit the same atrocities as have been reported of the German soldiers, and that the soldiers of the United States army are no better than the German soldiers, and that his nephew, Owen, who was then a soldier in active service in the army of the United States, like a great many other soldiers from this country who are now in the service, would never have gone into the service if they had not been compelled to go, and that the said defendant did then and there, while the United States was engaged in war, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously state to divers persons and in the presence of divers persons and utter the following disloyal, contemptuous, and slurring language about the form of government of the Unit-8 R. C. L. 62. ed States: The said defendant did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously state to divers persons and in the presence of divers persons that he would just as soon live under The "It is elementary that for the preservation of the peace, the safety of the people, and the good order of society, the Legislature may prohibit certain acts, and attach a penalty for disobedience, without including any evil intent as an ingredient of the offense other than the general intent implied from a violation of the statute." State v. Kahn, supra, citing 12 Cyc. 148; 3. The next contention of appellant presents a question more difficult of solution. Counsel adroitly argues that the language at |