letter was permitted to be read purporting to be from the lords commissioners of the treasury, without any evidence except what appeared on the face of the letter, that they were commissioners. That, too, was a criminal case, and it was distinctly objected, on the part of the defendant, that the authority of the commissioners should be shown by producing the commission by which they were appointed. The trustees and collector of a school district are regular officers, annually chosen, with powers and duties well defined and regulated by statute; and it is not perceived why their official characters may not be shown in the same manner as that of a justice of the peace or a constable. They are officers of almost equal notoriety, and the duties of a collector are very much of the same nature as those of a constable: Laws of 1819, p. 198, secs. 20 to 25. I am inclined to think, therefore, the parol evidence upon these points was admissible. Whether it was sufficient or not is a question which does not arise on this bill of exceptions. The objections are specifically to the nature of the evidence, and not to its defect or sufficiency.

This disposes of the two first exceptions. The next objection was to the introduction of the warrant, on the ground that it was signed only by two trustees. I am inclined to think the objection was properly overruled. Where power is delegated to two or more individuals for a mere private purpose, in no respect affecting the public, it is necessary that all should join in the execution of it. Thus, arbitrators must all unite in an award. But in matters of a public concern, if all are present, the majority can act, and their acts will be the acts of the whole: 1 Bos. & Pul. 236; 3 T. R. 592; 6 Johns. 41 [Green v. Miller, 5 Am. Dec. 184]. There can be no doubt that a contract made by all of the trustees and signed by two would be binding, or that two could contract against the will of the third, if he was duly notified or consulted and refused to act. The convenient dispatch of public business requires that it should be so: Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 526, and cases there cited. The objection here was simply that the warrant was not signed by all the trustees. There is nothing to show, or from which it is to be inferred, that all the trustees did not concur and act in the previous proceedings, and assent to the issuing of the warrant. In Yates v. Russell, 17 Johns. 468, which was a writ of error upon a judgment entered upon the report of referees, in an action not referable under the statute, the report was signed by only two of the referees, and one of the errors relied upon

was that it did not appear that all the referees met and heard the parties. It was held by Chancellor Kent, who delivered the opinion in the court of errors, that it was to be presumed that all the referees met, as nothing appeared to the contrary; and if they did not, the objection should have been taken in the court below. That principle seems to be applicable to this case, and disposes of this point. It was also objected that it did not appear that school district number fifteen was ever laid out and recorded. The objection was removed by the subsequent evidence in the case. The record of the town of Warwick was produced, by which the laying out and recording of the district was fully shown. The evidence offered by the plaintiff was properly rejected.

Judgment affirmed, with double costs.

OFFICIAL CHARACTER, PROOF OF.-Acts done by one in a particular office are evidence of his due appointment and induction into it, and may be conclusive against himself: Johnson v. Wilson, 9 Am. Dec. 50. That one's official character may be proved by evidence that he is generally reputed to be and has acted as such officer, without producing a commission or certificate of appointment, is held, citing McCoy v. Curtice, in People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 287; Colton v. Beardsley, 38 Id. 37.

MAJORITY MAY EXECUTE POWer Delegated TO SEVERAL, WHEN.-A majority of county commissioners may act in relation to public business: Commissioners v. Lecky, 9 Am. Dec. 418. But in Geter v. Commissioners, 1 Id. 621, it was held that a power conferred by statute on five commissioners, relating to the removal of tobacco inspectors, must be executed by all jointly, and that an act done by four would be invalid. A majority of directors of a corporation must be present at any meeting for the transaction of business, unless the statute prescribes a less number, and a majority of a quorum may decide: Ex parte Willcocks, 17 Am. Dec. 525, and citations in the note thereto. Whether or not a majority of arbitrators can make an award, see Moore v. Ewing, 1 Am. Dec. 195, and note; Towne v. Jaquith, 4 Id. 84; Green v. Miller, 5 Id. 184; Patterson v. Leavitt, 10 Id. 98. That in matters of public concern, where a power is conferred upon a number of persons jointly, all must be present, but a majority may act; and that where an act is done, or a warrant or other process or official document is signed by a majority of those to whom a power is confided, the presence and concurrence, or notice to, and refusal by the rest, will be presumed until the contrary appears, are propositions to support which the foregoing decision has been frequently cited: People v. Whiteside, 23 Wend. 15; Woolsey v. Tompkins, Id. 326; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Den. 253; Miller v. Garlock, 8 Barb. 157; Doolittle v. Doolittle, 31 Id. 313; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 565; Gildersleeve v. Board of Education, 17 Abb. Pr. 210. Notice and refusal are equivalent to attendance in such a case: Horton v. Garrison, 23 Barb. 179. But where a tax-warrant was signed by all the trustees, but it appeared that one of them was not present at the meeting, and did not meet and consult with the others with respect to it, but signed afterwards, it was held void, citing the principal case: Keeler v. Frost, 22 Barb. 401. The doctrine laid down in McCoy v. Curtice on this subject was adopted into the revised statutes, though the revisers seem to have in

tended to provide a uniform rule applicable to powers delegated, either for public or for private purposes: People v. Whiteside, 23 Wend. 15.

JUSTIFICATION OF OFFICERS BY THEIR PROCESS.-See, on this subject, the note to Savacool v. Boughton, 21 Am. Dec. 109; Wilcox v. Smith, Id. 213; Miller v. Brown, 23 Id. 693, and Reynolds v. Moore, and Baker v. Freeman, post. The principal case is cited to the point that process regular on its face is a protection to the officer who executes it, whether the magistrate issuing it has or has not jurisdiction of the particular case, or whether his proceedings have been regular or irregular, in Coon v. Congden, 12 Wend. 499.

REYNOLDS V. MOORE.

[9 WENDELL, 35.]

TAX WARRANT ISSUED BY DE FACTO TRUSTEES of a school district, and regular on its face, is a sufficient protection to the collector, and in trespass against him for a seizure thereunder, evidence showing that the requirements of the statute, as to notice, etc., in the proceedings for the organization of the district were not complied with, is inadmissible. DOUBLE COSTS MUST BE ALLOWED TO A SCHOOL DISTRICT COLLECTOR who obtains judgment in an action against him for an official act.

ERROR from the common pleas in an action of trespass for taking a yoke of cattle. The defendant justified the taking as tax collector of a school district, under a warrant from the trustees. The district had been formed out of four others, and the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that the requirements of the statute had not been complied with in organizing the district; that one of the trustees of one of the original districts had not consented to the change; that due notice had not been given of the alteration, etc., but on the defendant's objection, the evidence was rejected. The plaintiff excepted, and submitted to a nonsuit, and the court awarded double costs to the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. J. R. Van Duzer, for the plaintiff in error.

C. P. Kirkland and J. A. Spencer, for the defendant in error. By Court, SUTHERLAND, J. The new district was a district de facto. It had organized, chosen its officers, levied a tax, and a warrant had been issued for its collection. The trustees who issued the warrant were officers de facto, and the warrant was regular upon the face of it. This is sufficient to protect the officer. Whether all the forms prescribed by the statute in organizing the district, or in its subsequent proceedings, had been complied with, is not a matter to be inquired into between these parties. This is fully established by the cases of Savacool

v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170 [21 Am. Dec. 181]; Wilcox v. Smith, Id. 231; and McCoy v. Curtice [ante, 113], and the authorities there referred to. The fallacy of the plaintiff's argument, I apprehend, is this: He supposes that the evidence offered by him would have established the fact that there was no such district as the one in question; whereas, in truth, it would only have shown an irregularity or informality in the organization of the district; that there was such a district formed and duly recorded, was proved.

The defendant was entitled to double costs. He is an officer within the meaning of the statute: 2 Rev. Stat. 617, sec. 24. Judgment affirmed.

JUSTIFICATION OF OFFICERS BY THEIR PROCESS.-See the note to Savacool v. Boughton, 21 Am. Dec. 109; and other cases in the American Decisions, cited in the note to McCoy v. Curtice, ante, 113. See also Baker v. Freeman, post. In Coon v. Congden, 12 Wend. 499; and Earl v. Camp, 16 Id. 566, Reynolds v. Moore is referred to as an authority for the position that a minis. terial officer is protected by process regular on its face, though the magistrate issuing it had not jurisdiction of the case or his proceedings were irregular.

OFFICERS DE FACTO, WHO ARE.-See the note to Hildreth v. McIntire, 19 Am. Dec. 63. Persons acting as school trustees, without objection, though chosen at a meeting held outside the district, were held to be trustees de facto, on the authority of Reynolds v. Moore, in Myer v. Crispell, 28 Barb. 56.

BAKER V. FREEMAN.

[9 WENDELL, 36.]

OWNER OF PROPERTY SOLD UNDER ILLEGAL PROCESS PURCHASING the same at such sale, either personally or by his agent, can recover only the amount of his bid and interest thereon in trespass for the unlawful taking. SCHOOL DISTRICT CAN NOT CHANGE THE SITE OF ITS SCHOOL-HOUSE, without the consent of the school commissioners.

SCHOOL TRUSTEES ARE LIABLE IN TRESPASS FOR ASSESSING AN ILLEGAL TAX voted by the district to change the site of its school-house, and for issuing a warrant to collect such tax.

SCHOOL TRUSTEES ARE NOT MERE MINISTERIAL OFFICERS bound to obey the illegal resolutions of the district.

ERROR from the common pleas in an action of trespass brought against the defendants as school trustees, for causing a sale of certain wheat growing on the plaintiff's land. The trustees justified under a warrant issued by them to collect a tax voted by the district to purchase a site and build a new school-house. The facts concerning the voting of the tax sufficiently appear from the opinion. The wheat in question was levied upon and

sold by the collector to collect a balance of the plaintiff's proportion of said tax, amounting to seventeen dollars and five cents. The plaintiff's son, P. Freeman, purchased said wheat at the sale for the amount of the tax remaining due. The plaintiff himself harvested it, and his son exercised no acts of ownership over it. The defendants offered to prove by the son that he acted as agent for his father in the purchase, and purchased with his money, but the evidence was rejected. The judge charged the jury that the vote to raise the tax was illegal because the consent of the school commissioners of the two towns included in the district had not been obtained to the proposed change of the site of the school-house, and that the resolution to raise such tax was no protection to the defendants. The defendants excepted. Verdict for the plaintiff for ninetythree dollars and forty-one cents, which was about the value of the wheat. The defendants sued out this writ.

B. F. Butler, for the plaintiffs in error, contended, among other things, that the vote to raise the tax was a protection to the defendants: Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170 [21 Am. Dec. 181]; 1 Cai. 91; 8 Johns. 69; 9 Id. 229; 13 Id. 444.

J. C. Spencer, for the defendant in error, cited 6 T. R. 443; Cowp. 640; 16 East, 21; 10 Mass. 356, 105; 13 Id. 282, to the point that the defendants might have refused to act and were not protected.

By Court, NELSON, J. The court below erred in excluding the evidence of P. Freeman, that he bid off the wheat as the agent of his father, and the jury also erred in finding a verdict to the amount of the value of the wheat. The court gave no directions on this point to the jury, but their exclusion of the above testimony sufficiently indicated their opinion, as that decision must have been made upon the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to the value of the property sold. The evidence abundantly shows that it was bid off for the benefit of the plaintiff; and in such a case, a party is entitled only to the amount of the bid and the interest of the same, which is the true measure of damages.

Though the material facts in the case are not very clear, I consider the following as proved: That the district was composed of a part of the town of Royalton, Niagara county, and of a part of the town of Shelby, Orleans county; that the district owned a school-house and the site upon which it stood. In such a state of things, the inhabitants had no authority to