Judgment of Seneca common pleas reversed with single costs, and the costs to abide the event of a new trial. TENANT IN COMMON MAY MAINTAIN TROVER AGAINST CO-TENANT, WHEN AND WHEN NOT.-See, on this subject, Bell v. Layman, 15 Am. Dec. 83; Hyde v. Stone, 18 Id. 501 and note; Sheldon v. Skinner, 21 Id. 161; Hyde v. Stone, 22 Id. 582; Gilbert v. Dickerson, Id. 592. The principal case is referred to, as an authority on this point, in Rogers v. Arnold, 12 Wend. 37; Tyler v. Taylor, 8 Id. 588; Fobes v. Shattuck, 22 Id. 569; Foster v. Magee, 2 Lans. 184; Channon v. Lusk, Id. 215; King v. Phillips, 1 Id. 429: Dyckman v. Valiente, 42 N. Y. 561. CASES IN THE COURT OF ERRORS OF NEW YORK. HART V. MAYOR ETC. OF ALBANY. [9 WENDELL, 571.] INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN A MERE TRESPASS will not be granted where the injury is not irreparable and destructive to the plaintiff's estate, but is susceptible of pecuniary compensation in the ordinary course of the law. Per Sutherland, J. INJUNCTION TO PREVENT MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS is applicable only where the right is controverted by numerous persons, each standing on his own ground, and not to cases where one or more persons persevere in repeated acts of trespass, notwithstanding suits and recoveries against them. Per Sutherland, J. COMPLAINANT MUST AT LEAST ESTABLISH A STRONG PRIMA FACIE RIGHT in order to obtain an injunction against a trespass. Per Sutherland, J. INDIVIDUAL HAS NO RIGHT TO MOOR A FLOATING WAREHOUSE PERMANENTLY IN A PUBLIC BASIN or part of a public river within the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation, in violation of a municipal ordinance, even though it be moored opposite his own lot on the pier. SUCH A WAREHOUSE IN A PUBLIC RIVER IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE, because it obstructs navigation, and may be indicted as such, or abated without indictment by any individual aggrieved by it. INDIVIDUAL CAN NOT APPROPRIATE PART OF A PUBLIC HIGHWAY to his exclusive use, though enough is left for the accommodation of others. DESTRUCTION OF A FLOATING WAREHOUSE IS NOT AN IRREPARABLE TRES PASS against which an injunction will lie, even though the owner of it has a right to maintain it, such an injury being susceptible of ample compensation in damages. Per Sutherland, J. CITY OF ALBANY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE BASIN constructed in the Hudson river opposite said city, under the act of 1823, for the purpose of passing by-laws to prevent obstructions to navigation therein, and enforcing the same by penalties not exceeding twenty-five dollars for each offense. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.-A municipal corporation having authority to prevent obstructions in a river within its bounds, may summarily remove such an obstruction as a public nuisance. THIS POWER MAY BE EXERCISED BY AN ORDINANCE directing the officers of the corporation to remove the obstruction. PARTY MAINTAINING A PUBLIC NUISANCE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL in summary proceedings for its abatement. PREAMBLE TO A STATUTE has no binding force in construing such statute in a manner hostile to the obvious meaning of its subsequent enactments. Per Edmonds, Senator. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CAN NOT ORDAIN A FORFEITURE, seizure, and sale of a floating warehouse constituting an obstruction in a public river, in case the owner refuses to remove it, under a clause in its charter giving it power to pass by-laws to prevent such obstructions, and to enforce the same by penalties not exceeding a certain sum. Per Edmonds, Senator. APPEAL from chancery. The appellants, as complainants below, filed their bill against the mayor, aldermen, etc., of Albany, setting forth, in substance, that they were merchants engaged in the transportation of goods on the Hudson river from New York to Albany, etc.; that to facilitate their business they had rented two lots with stores thereon on the pier, forming what is called the basin in Albany, and had constructed, at an expense of about three thousand dollars, a float or ark, particularly described in the bill, for receiving and discharging merchandise, and had moored the same in the basin opposite the lots occupied by them, at a place where the vessels navigating the Hudson (except certain tow-boats and canal boats used by the complainants or transacting business with them) never came or had occasion to come in the course of their business; that said float did not obstruct navigation, and was of great convenience in unloading tow-boats, etc.; but that the defendants had, on July 25, 1831, for the purpose of preventing the complainants from enjoying the use of their property, passed an ordinance, having special reference to said float, directing the dock-master to affix a notice on any vessel, boat, or float in the basin not engaged in navigating the Hudson river or canals, requiring the owner to remove it within ten days, and if not so removed, directing the dock-master to remove it and sell it, or the materials composing it, at auction, and, after deducting expenses, to pay the proceeds to the chamberlain of the city; and that another ordinance amendatory thereof, and of the same tenor, was subsequently passed; that, in obedience to said ordinances, the dock-master had affixed a notice to the plaintiffs' float, requiring them to remove it in ten days or he would take possession and remove it; and that, as it could not be removed without taking it to pieces or destroying it, it was the intention of the defendants to destroy it, to the irreparable injury of the complainants, etc. The bill further alleged that the said ordinances were illegal and unconstitutional, and that the common council had no jurisdiction, etc., and prayed an injunction. An injunction was accordingly granted, restraining the defendants and their agents from intermeddling with the float or ark of the complainants. The defendants filed an answer admitting the passage of the ordinances referred to, and the proceedings of the dock-master as alleged, but denying that they had any intention of destroying the complainants' property further than to remove it from the basin. They admitted that it would be necessary to take it to pieces. They further alleged that said float was an obstruction to navigation, denying the allegations of the bill to the contrary, and claimed that they had full authority to remove it. They also set out some other facts, and the provisions of sundry statutes, which sufficiently appear from the opinions of Sutherland, J., and Senators Allen and Edmonds. On the coming in of the answer, the chancellor dissolved the injunction, 3 Paige, 213, and the complainants appealed to this court. B. F. Butler and A. Van Vechten, for the appellants. SUTHERLAND, J. The chancellor ordered the injunction in this case to be dissolved, principally upon the ground that the threatened interference of the defendants with the complainants' property, if carried into effect, would, if illegal, be a mere trespass, for which the complainants would have an ample remedy at law, and that it was not the course of the court in such cases to grant an injunction before the complainants' right was established at law, unless it was free from all doubt, or unless, from the nature of the case, the injury would be irreparable,, or, from the irresponsibility of the defendants, compensation by way of damages could not be obtained; and he was of the opinion that the right of the complainants to erect and continue the float in question, in the manner set forth in the pleadings, was at least doubtful, and, if it should finally be established, that it was an ordinary case for the assessment of damages by a jury, and there was no allegation or pretense of the irresponsibility of the defendants. The general doctrine that a court of equity will not grant an injunction to restrain a mere trespass where the injury is not irreparable and destructive to the plaintiff's estate, but is susceptible of pecuniary compensation, and for which the party. may obtain adequate satisfaction in the ordinary course of law, is believed to be perfectly established. The practice of granting injunctions in any case of mere trespass is quite modern in the English court of chancery. As late as 1786, Lord Thurlow, in Mogg v. Mogg, 2 Dick. 670, said that no such case was to be found, and denied an injunction in that case, although the act complained of was the cutting and destruction of timber, ou the ground that the defendant was a mere trespasser, and as such liable to an action at law. Subsequently to that period, however, the practice has grown up, and is now well established, of restraining trespasses in special cases where irreparable injury would otherwise follow; thus, in Mitchell v. Dors, 6 Ves. 147, Lord Eldon allowed an injunction against the defendant, who had worked from his own coal mine into that of the plaintiff. Lord Eldon put himself upon the authority of a similar case said to have been decided by Lord Thurlow. This appears to have been the case of Flamang, and is stated at length by Lord Eldon in Hanson v. Gardner, 7 Ves. 308. In Courthorpe v. Mapplesden, 10 Id. 290, a trespasser was enjoined from cutting timber, it being alleged to be done in collusion with the tenant; Lord Eldon remarked that the trespass partook of the nature of waste, there being collusion with the tenant, and he put the decision upon that ground, expressly reserving himself upon the case of a mere trespass, though he refers to the cases of Mitchell v. Dors and Hanson v. Gardner. In Earl Cowper v. Barker, 17 Ves. 128, the trespass was in the nature of waste. The bill was filed by the lord of a manor, and his lessees, to restrain the defendant from taking certain stones of a peculiar character and value, found at the bottom of the sea within the manor. It was put upon the ground of the irreparable nature of the injury. In Thomas v. Oakley, 18 Ves. 184, the defendant was restrained from taking stone from the plaintiff's quarry. Lord Eldon goes somewhat at length into the doctrine, and refers to the cases of injunctions to restrain the cutting of timber, digging of coal and other mines, and says that the court interferes in such cases to prevent the removal and destruction of that which is the plaintiff's estate and freehold; and he held the principle equally applicable to a stone quarry. So in Robinson v. Lord Byron, 1 Bro. C. C. 588, an injunction was granted against diverting a water-course from a mill, on the ground |