ACCOUNT FOR GOODS SOLD is an entire demand where it is wholly due, and
can not be split into several causes of action. Guernsey v. Carver, 60.
ADMINISTRATORS.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
ADMINISTRATORS DE BONIS NON.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.
1. ACTS OF A GENERAL AGENT BIND HIS PRINCIPAL, whether according to
instructions or not. Rossiter v. Rossiter, 62.
2. ACTS OF A SPECIAL AGENT must be strictly within his authority to bind
the principal. Id.
3. GENERAL CLAUSE IN A POWER OF ATTORNEY given for a specific purpose, au-
thorizing the agent to do "any and every act" in the principal's name
which he could do in person, must be construed to relate to the specific
purpose, and does not constitute such agent a general agent. Id.
4. NOTE EXECUTED IN THE PRINCIPAL'S NAME, for the purchase of prop-
erty, by an agent acting under a power of attorney to collect debts, dis-
pose of realty, and adjust all the concerns of his principal in a particular
place, "and to do any and every act" which he could do in person, does
not bind such principal. Id.
5. AGENT IS PERSONALLY LIABLE ON A NOTE given by him in his principal's
name without authority. Id.
6. SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION by the principal of the giving of such note
does not make it his note so as to release the agent from liability thereon.
Id.
7. AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE A SEALED CONTRACT must be under seal to bind
the principal. Blood v. Goodrich, 121.
8. PRINCIPAL'S SUBSEQUENT PAROL ACKNOWLEDGMENT is insufficient to ren-
der binding a sealed contract executed in his name, where no authority
under seal is produced. Id.
9. SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT accompanied by acts may be
proper evidence in such case after notice to the adverse party to produce
the agent's authority. Id.
1. OCCUPANT OF A BUILDING has a right to admit whom he pleases to enter
and remain, to expel any one who abuses the privilege, and to lay hands
on the person to expel him, if necessary. Watrous v. Steel, 648.
2 IDEM.-But where one has invited or permitted another to enter, he can
not justify an assault to expel him, if the conduct for which the per-
son is sought to be forcibly expelled was occasioned by the owner's
abuse. Id.
1. ASSIGNMENT TO TRUSTEES for benefit of creditors, which contains a pro-
vision that each of the assenting creditors must, within a specified time,
either execute a release of his whole debt, or be denied any share in the
proceeds of the property assigned, is void as against creditors. Atkinson
v. Jordan, 280.
2. CREDITORS WHO HAVE NOT ASSENTED TO SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT may sub-
ject the property in the hands of the assignees to the payment of their
debts. Id.
ASSIGNEES OF BONDS take them subject to the obligor's equity against the
obligee, but they do not take them subject to an unknown equity of a
stranger against the obligee. Moore v. Holcombe, 683.
ASSUMPSIT MAY BE MAINTAINED for the actual value of labor done under a
special contract which has been waived by the parties or been substan-
tially performed. Newman v. McGregor, 293.
See INFANCY, 2; JUDGMENTS, 20. 21.
1. AN ATTACHMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY is the taking such property
into the legal custody of an officer by virtue of, and in pursuance of the
directions contained in, a writ of attachment. Lowry v. Cady, 628.
2. AN ATTACHMENT MAY BE PROVED as between the officer and the re-
ceiptor, by other evidence than the attachment itself; the receipt, when
once taken, is the appropriate and proper evidence for that purpose. Id.
3. A RECEIPT TAKEN on attachment, estops the receiptor from denying the
attachment. Id.
4. WHETHER AMENDING A DECLARATION will dissolve an attachment, quære
Id.
AUCTIONS.
See EXECUTIONS, 29.
AUTREFOIS ACQUIT OR CONVICT.
1. PLEA OF ACQUITTAL OR CONVICTION upon a good indictment, although no
judgment was ever rendered thereon, is a good plea in bar to a second
indictment for the same offense. State v. Nowell, 458.
2. CONVICTION OF A PERSON FOR MANSLAUGHTER, who was indicted for
murder, will be a good plea in bar to a subsequent indictment for the
same offense, notwithstanding the judgment on such conviction was erro-
neously arrested on the defendant's motion. Id.
BAILMENTS.
See WAREHOUSEMEN.
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.
See ASSIGNMENT; INSOLVENCY.
1. A BONA FIDE PURCHASER must aver that he not only paid the purchase
money, but that he obtained the legal title before he had notice of the
prior equity. Grimstone v. Carter, 230.
2. POSSESSION IS SUFFICIENT TO PUT ON INQUIRY as to the actual rights of
the possessor, and is good constructive notice of those rights. Id.
3. BETWEEN A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH under the recording act, and a
bona fide purchaser within the decisions of the courts of equity, there is
no distinction. Id.
4. PURCHASER WHO BUYS LAND knowing that his vendor is not seised in fee,
but that he only has an equitable title to the land, can not rely upon the
plea that he is an innocent purchaser for value without notice. Craig
v. Leiper, 479.
5. WHERE LAND IS CLAIMED BY ENTRY from the state, every person dealing
therewith is presumed to know the fact, whether it has or has not been
granted by the state, because this is a matter of record, which ordinary
diligence can ascertain, and which all interested are bound to know, if
material, before they contract. Id.
6. WHERE TWO PERSONS HAVE, IN GOOD FAITH, purchased, at different
times, a tract of land from the same person, who holds only the equitable
title thereto, the first purchaser has the best right, and must prevail, the
equities being equal otherwise. Id.
7. AN INNOCENT PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE of a tract of land from a
person holding the legal title thereto, takes it discharged of a trust, cre-
ated by a previous contract to convey to another party, because of the
laches of the latter in taking his deed; but where the vendor only holds
the equitable title to the land, notice thereof is communicated by a con-
tract to convey, as well by deed, and the rights of the parties are gov.
erned by the maxim, qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. Id.
1. BLANK PIECE OF PAPER SIGNED and sealed by a party, and subsequently
filled up, pursuant to his direction given at the time of signing and seal-
ing, is not his bond, there being no subsequent delivery or acknowledg.
ment. Gilbert v. Anthony, 439.
2. PAPER SIGNED AND SEALED while blank, and afterwards filled up as an
official bond, without redelivery, is not binding upon the parties signing.
Wynne v. Governor, 448.
See ASSIGNMENts; Payment, 3, 4; Pleading and PRACTICE, 11, 19, 20.
CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.
See LEGACIES AND LEGATEES, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
CHURCHES.
See RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.
AN ACQUIRED CHARACTER DEPENDING ON ACTUAL RESIDENCE, and not on
the existence of commercial relations, is abandoned for every purpose of
legal effect the instant a step is taken to abandon the country.
Estate, 345.
1. COMMON CARRIER IS BOUND TO INQUIRE as to the value of parcels re-
ceived for carriage, where there is no agreement or notice limiting his
liability, and if without doing so he takes such a parcel and charges for
its transportation according to its external appearance, he is liable for its
full value in case of loss. Orange Co. Bank v Brown, 129.
2. CARRIER HAVING GIVEN GENERAL NOTICE that he will not be liable be-
yond a certain amount, unless informed of the value of parcels, and
unless an additional premium is paid, is liable only to that amount, if at
all, for the loss of a package whose value was not disclosed to him,
whether he made inquiry or not, where such notice is brought home to
the owner. Id.
3. IF ANY MEANS HAVE BEEN USED TO CONCEAL the value of a package the
carrier is not liable, whether he has given notice or not. Id.
4. MONEY CARRIED IN A PASSENGER'S TRUNK for transportation merely,
and not for traveling expenses, is not baggage, and if the carrier is not
informed of its presence, he is not liable for its loss. Id.
5. NOTIFYING THE CARRIER THAT IT IS "A TRUNK OF IMPORTANCE," is not
sufficient, in such a case, to charge him with knowledge of its value.
Id.
6. REASONABLE AMOUNT OF BAGGAGE is included in the fare for the passen
ger owning it, and the carrier is liable for its loss. Id.
7. PART OWNERS, WHEN CONSIDERED PARTNERS. -Part owners of a vessel
using the same in trade, and participating in the profits springing there-
from, will be considered partners, and as such, liable for responsibilities
incurred in that trade. Jones v. Pitcher, 716.
8. THE HOLDERS OF THE LEGAL TITLE to a vessel are not considered liable
as owners, if they have parted with both possession and control of the
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