INDEX.

ACTIONS.
ACCOUNT FOR GOODS SOLD is an entire demand where it is wholly due, and

can not be split into several causes of action. Guernsey v. Carver, 60.

ADMINISTRATORS.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

ADMINISTRATORS DE BONIS NON.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

ADVERSE POSSESSION
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 4.

AGENCY.
1. ACTS OF A GENERAL AGENT BIND HIS PRINCIPAL, whether according to

instructions or not. Rossiter v. Rossiter, 62.
2. ActS OF A SPECIAL AGENT must be strictly within his authority to bind
the principal. Id.

.
3. GENERAL CLAUSE IN A POWER OF ATTORNEY given for a specific purpose, au-

thorizing the agent to do “any and every act” in the principal's name
which he could do in person, must be construed to relate to the specifio

purpose, and does not constitute such agent a general agent. Id.
4. Note EXECUTED IN THE PRINCIPAL'S NAME, for the purchase of prop-

erty, by an agent acting under a power of attorney to collect debts, dis-
pose of realty, and adjust all the concerns of his principal in a particular
place, “and to do any and every act” which he could do in person, does

not bind such principal. Id.
5. AGENT IS PERSONALLY LIABLE ON A Note given by him in his principal's

name without authority. Id.
6. SUBSEQUENT RATIFICATION by the principal of the giving of such note

does not make it his note so as to release the agent froin liability thereon.

Id.
7. AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE A SEALED CONTRACT must be under seal to bind

the principal. Blood v. Goodrich, 121.
8. PRINCIPAL'S SUBSEQUENT PAROL ACKNOWLEDGMENT is insufficient to ren-

der binding a sealed contract executed in his name, where no authority

under seal is produced. Id.
9. SUBSEQUENT Written ACKNOWLEDGMENT accompanied by acts may be

a

AM. DEO. VOL. XXIV-50

proper evidence in such case after notice to the adverse party to produce
the agent's authority. Id.

See OFFICERS, 3, 4.

ALIENS.
See SUCCESSIONS, 1.

ARREST.
See WARRANT OF ARREST.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
1. OCCUPANT OF A BUILDING has a right to admit whom he pleases to enter

and remain, to expel any one who abuses the privilege, and to lay hands

on the person to expel him, if necessary. Watrous v. Steel, 648.
2 IDEM.—But where one has invited or permitted another to enter, he can

not justify an assault to expel him, if the conduct for which the per-
son is sought to be forcibly expelled was occasioned by the owner's
abuse. Id.

ASSIGNMENT.
1. ASSIGNMENT TO TRUSTEES for benefit of creditors, which contains a pro

vision that each of the assenting creditors must, within a specified time,
either execute a release of his whole debt, or be denied any share in the
proceeds of the property assigned, is void as against creditors. Atkinson

v. Jordan, 280.
2. CREDITORS WHO HAVE NOT ASSENTED TO SUCH AN ASSIGNMENT may sub-

ject the property in the hauds of the assignees to the payment of their
debts. Id.

ASSIGNMENTS.
ASSIGNEES OF Bonds take them subject to the obligor's equity against the

obligee, but they do not take them subject to an unknown equity of a
stranger against the obligee. Moore v. Holcombe, 683.

ASSUMPSIT.
ASSUMPSIT MAY BE MAINTAINED for the actual value of labor done under a

special contract which has been waived by the parties or been substan.
tially performed. Newman v. McGregor, 293.

See INFANCY, 2; JUDGMENTS, 20. 21.

ATTACHMENTS.
• 1. AN ATTACHMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY is the taking such property
AUCTIONS.
See EXECUTIONS, 29.

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT OR CONVICT.
1. PLEA OF ACQUITTAL OR CONViction upon a good indictment, although no

judgment was ever rendered thereon, is a good plea in bar to a second

indictment for the same offense. State v. Nowell, 458.
2 Conviction Of A PERSON FOR MANSLAUGHTER, who was indicted for

murder, will be a good plea in bar to a subsequent indictment for the
same offense, notwithstanding the judgment on such conviction was erro.
neously arrested on the defendant's motion. I.

BAILMENTS.
See WAREHOUSEMEN.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.

See ASSIGNMENT; INSOLVENCY.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.
1. A Bona FIDE PURCHASER must aver that he not only paid the purchase

money, but that he obtained the legal title before he had notice of the

prior equity. Grimstone v. Carter, 230.
2. POSSESSION IS SUFFICIENT to Put On INQUIRY as to the actual rights of

the possessor, and is good constructive notice of those rights. la.
3. BETWEEN A PURCHASER In Good Faite under the recording act, and a

bona fide purchaser within the decisions of the courts of equity, there is

no distinction. Ia.
4. PURCHASER Who Buys Land knowing that his vendor is not seised in fee,

but that he only has an equitable title to the land, can not rely upon the
plea that he is an innocent purchaser for value without notice. Craig

v. Leiper, 479.
3. WHERE LAND IS CLAIMED BY Entry from the state, every person dealing

therewith is presumed to know the fact, whether it has or has not been
granted by the state, because this is a matter of record, which ordinary
diligence can ascertain, and which all interested are bound to know, if

material, before they contract. Id.
6. WHERE Two PERSONS HAVE, In Good Fairii, purchased, at different

times, a tract of land from the same person, who holds only the equitable
title thereto, the first purchaser has the best right, and must prevail, the

equities being equal otherwise. Id.
7. AN INNOCENT PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE of a tract of land from a

person holding the legal title thereto, takes it discharged of a trust, cre.
ated by a previous contract to convey to another party, because of the
laches of the latter in taking his deed; but where the vendor ly holds
the equitable title to the land, notice thereof is communicated by a con-
tract to convey, as well by deed, and the rights of the parties are gov.
erned by the maxim, qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. Id.

BONDS.
1. BLANK PIECE OF PAPER SIONED and sealed by a party, and subsequently

filled up, pursuant to his direction given at the time of signing and seal.
ing, is not his bond, there being no subsequent delivery or acknowledg.

ment. Gilbert v. Anthony, 439.
2. PAPER SIGNED AND SEALED while blank, and afterwards filled up as an

official bond, without redelivery, is not binding upon the parties signing.

Wynne v. Governor, 448.
See ASSIGNMENTS; PAYMENT, 3, 4; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 11, 19, 20.

CASE.
See INFANCY, 3; Pews, 2.

CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.
See LEGACIES AND LEGATEES, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

CHURCHES.
See RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

CITIZENSHIP.
AN ACQUIRED CHARACTER DEPENDING ON ACTUAL RESIDENCE, and not on

the existence of commercial relations, is abandoned for every purpose of
legal effect the instant a step is taken to abandon the country. Miller's
Estate, 345.

See ALIENS; SUCCESSIONS.

COMMON CARRIERS.
1. Common CARRIER IS BOUND TO INQUIRE as to the value of parcels re-

ceived for carriage, where there is no agreement or notice limiting his
liability, and if without doing so he takes such a parcel and charges for
its transportation according to its external appearance, he is liable for its

full value in case of loss. Orange Co. Bank v Brown, 129.
2. CARRIER HAVING GIVEN GENERAL NOTICE that he will not be liable be-

yond a certain amount, unless informed of the value of parcels, and
unless an additional premium is paid, is liable only to that amount, if at
all, for the loss of a package whose value was not disclosed to him,
whether he made inquiry or not, where such notice is brought home to

the owner. Id.
3. IF ANY MEANS HAVE BEEN USED TO CONCEAL the value of a package the

carrier is not liable, whether he has given notice or not. Id.
4. MONEY CARRIED IN A PASSENGER'S TRUNK for transportation merely,

and not for traveling expenses, is not baggage, and if the carrier is not

informed of its presence, he is not liable for its loss. Id.
6. NotiFYING THE CARRIER THAT IT IS "A TRUNK OF IMPORTANCE," is not

sufficient, in such a case, to charge him with knowledge of its value.

Id.
6. REASONABLE AMOUNT OF BAGGAGE is included in the fare for the passen.

ger owning it, and the carrier is liable for its loss. II.
7. Part OWNERS, Wuen ConSIDERED PARTNERS. - Part owners of a vessel

using the same in trade, and participating in the profits springing there.
from, will be considered partners, and as such, liable for responsibilities

incurred in that trade. Jones v. Pitcher, 716.
8. THE Holders of the LEGAL TITLE to a vessel are not considered liable

as owners, if they have parted with both possession and control of the