vessel, and only retain the title for the purpose of securing future pay-
ments of the purchase money. Id.
9. THE DEFENDANTS ARE CHARGED AS COMMON CARRIERS by allegations
to the effect that "defendants are the owners and proprietors of the
boat, and copartners in freighting on the same, and that this boat has
been usually employed by them in carrying and transporting cotton and
other merchandise from the port of
to the port of and other
places in this state, for hire." Id.
10. THE LIABILITY OF A COMMON CARRIER extends to all losses, other than
those occasioned by the "act of God, or public enemies." Id.
11. "DANGERS OF THE SEA" and "perils of the river" are analogous terms,
and will be considered as of the same meaning. Id.
12. “Perils of THE SEA" denote actual accidents peculiar to that element,
that may not be avoided by the exercise of human prudence, but are
also sometimes held to include captures by pirates, and collisions occur-
ring without blame imputable to either, or, at all events, to the injured
vessel. Id.
13. THE OWNER OF A VESSEL IS LIABLE for the non-observance, by the mas-
ter, of an established custom, by which a vessel descending a river is re-
quired to give way to one ascending. Id
CONDITIONAL SALES.
See MORTGAGES, 3, 4.
1. PENAL LAWS can have no extraterritorial force. Dickson v. Dickson, 444.
2. NO PRINCIPLE OF COMITY among neighboring communities can be ex-
tended to give force and effect to the penal laws of one society in the
territory of another, nor of one of the states of the American Union in
another. Id.
3 DIVORCE GRANTED BY A COURT OF A SISTER STATE having jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and of the parties, is conclusive in all the world, and
the parties divorced may afterwards marry in the state, notwithstanding
the laws of such sister state provided that persons divorced should not
be released from the marriage contract, but if they again married they
should be punished for bigamy. Id.
See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.
1. "LAW OF THE LAND," as used in the Constitution, means a general public
law equally binding upon everv member of the community, under simi-
lar circumstances, and every pa.tial or private law which directly pro-
poses to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing, by
affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is not the "law of
the land." Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 51i.
2. ACT OF 1827, c. 39, which directed the dismissal of certain class of suits,
growing out of the reservations of lands to the heads of Indian families,
under the treaties of 1817 and 1819, with the Cherokees, upon certain
facts being made to appear, is partial, and therefore unconstitutional.
Id.
3. LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER to create as many different courts as the
wants of the country may require, each to be as distinct and independ-
ent as the other. Per Green, J. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 517.
4. JUDGES CAN NOT RIGHTFULLY EXERCISE AUTHORITY unless they receive
their appointment in one of the modes pointed out by the constitution.
Per Green, J. Id.
5. LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE PEOPLE is vested in the general assembly,
and it may do anything within the legitimate scope of legislation which
is not forbidden by the constitution, either in express terms or by impli
cation. It does not follow, however, because there is no restriction in
the constitution prohibiting a particular act of the legislature, that such
act is therefore constitutional. Some acts may be against the plain and
obvious dictates of reason, and therefore void. Per Green, J. Id.
6. "LAW OF THE LAND," as used in the constitution, means a general and
public law operating equally on every individual in the community.
Per Green, J. Id.
7. LEGISLATURE HAS NO POWER to deprive a person of the right of trial by
jury, in cases in which such right is secured to him by the constitution,
either directly or by conferring jurisdiction on a court of equity to try
cases, the trial of which, by jury, is a matter of right in a common law
court. Per Green and Kennedy, JJ. Id.
8. "LAW OF THE LAND," as used in the constitution, means a general and
public law, equally binding upon every member of the community. Per
Kennedy, J. Id.
9. JURY IN A CHANCERY COURT can not be constitutionally demanded by
either party. Per Kennedy, J. Id.
10. Act of 1829, c. 95, constituting a special tribunal, composed of existing
judges, for the disposition of suits commenced by the Bank of Tennessee
against its officers, their sureties and customers of the bank, who had
overchecked, and from whose decision there was no appeal, is unconsti
tutional and void. Id.
11. THE ACT OF 1830, extending relief to imprisoned debtors, is constitu-
tional, and applies to persons in prison when the act was passed. Som-
mers v. Johnson, 604.
12. THE LEGISLATURE MAY ENACT LAWS VARYING THE REMEDY for the
collection of debts, and if the laws are general, and contain such pro-
visions as the public good requires, they are constitutional, and all pro-
ceedings, as well for old as new debts, should conform to them. Id.
1. PAROL AGREEMENT FOR THE ASSIGNMENT of the copy-right of a book, in
consideration of a promise to deliver a number of copies of the book to
the assignor, is valid. Gould v. Banks, 91.
2. MUTUAL CONCURRENT PROMISES are sufficient consideration for each
other. Id.
3. TRANSFER OF AN INTEREST in the copy-right of a book must be in writing.
Id.
4. WHERE PERFORMANCE OF AN AGREEMENT is to be concurrent on both
sides, neither party can recover without showing performance, or an
offer to perform on his part. Id.
5. PLAINTIFF HAVING AGREED TO ASSIGN his interest in a copy-right in con-
sideration of a promise to deliver a number of copies of the book, can not
recover for a breach of such agreement without showing that he has
made or tendered an assignment in writing. Id.
6. WHERE PROMISES IN A CONTRACT ARE INDEPENDENT, and performance is
not to be concurrent, either party may recover for a breach thereof with.
out showing performance on his part.
7. OFFER TO DELIVER GOODS AFTER A BREACH of the contract to deliver
them, by which a right of action has accrued to the other party, will not
defeat the action, whether already commenced or not. Id.
8. PARTY MAY WAIVE HIS RIGHT OF ACTION and accept performance after a
breach of the contract. Id.
9. LAW IMPLIES THAT BOOKS ARE TO BE PRINTED in a skillful and workman-
like manner where an agreement is made to print and deliver a specified
number of copies. Id.
10. PAROL ENLARGEMENT OF THE TIME of performance of a written con-
tract is valid if the contract itself would be valid if made by parol
Blood v. Goodrich, 121.
11. TIME OF PERFORMANCE of a contract to convey land can not be ex-
tended by parol. Id.
12. WHERE COVENANTS OR AGREEMENTS ARE MUTUAL and independent, one
party may sue the other without averring or showing performance on his
part, and his non-performance can not be pleaded in bar of the action.
Dey v. Dox, 137.
13. PARTY POSITIVELY REFUSING TO PERFORM his contract can not sue the
other for non-performance, whether the promises are independent or not,
if one is the consideration for the other, and the contract is wholly ex-
ecutory. Id.
14. WHERE PERFORMANCE OF ONE PROMISE is a condition precedent, and
is to be done or excused before a right of action accrues on the other
promise, the one is independent and the other dependent. Id.
15. WHERE PROMISES ARE CONCURRENT, neither party can sue without
averring and proving performance or its equivalent on his part. Id.
16. WHERE WHEAT IS TO BE DELIVERED BEFORE PAYMENT of the consider-
ation, the promise to deliver is independent, and the promise to pay is
dependent, so that the vendor can not sue without averring and proving
performance on his part. Id.
17. VENDOR CAN NOT SUE, AFTER A RECOVERY against him for non-delivery
of the wheat in such a case, to recover for a breach of the vendee's prom-
ise to pay, even though the recovery against him was for the full value
of the wheat; for the damages should have been properly adjusted in the
former suit. Id.
18. SEPARATE DEEDS OR INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED AT THE SAME TIME and
in relation to the same subject-matter, may be taken together and con-
strued as one instrument. Hills v. Miller, 218.
19. AGREEMENT TO PAY IN SPECIFIC ARTICLES becomes, on failure to make
such payment at the time and in the manner stipulated, an agreement to
pay in money. Newman v. McGregor, 293.
20. PROMISE FOR THE BENEFIT OF A THIRD PERSON may be sued on by that
party. Principle applied to a promise by one of two payees to keep the
drawer clear if he would pay a certain sum to such payee; the other
payee was deemed beneficially interested in such promise. Kelly v.
Evans, 325.
21. A PAROL EXECUTORY CONTRACT, not mercantile, is a nudum pactum
when unsupported by a consideration. Whitehill v. Wilson, 326.
22. CONTRACTS ARE SPECIALTIES or parol contracts; there is no such middle
class as contracts in writing. Contracts in writing, but not under seal,
23. CONTRACTS AGAINST THE POLICY of a public statute will be set aside in
equity, at the instance of a particeps criminis. The court does not inter-
fere for the sake of the party, but for the public good. Johnson v.
Cooper, 502.
24. A WRITTEN CONTRACT MAY BE VACATED by a subsequent oral contract
in reference to the same subject. Deshazo v. Lewis, 769.
25. A SUBSEQUENT VERBAL ALTERATION of a written contract, such as the
verbal extension of the time of redemption beyond that expressed in the
mortgage deed, is valid and binding, if supported by a consideration.
Id.
See CONTRACTS, 1, 3, 5, 7; PARTNERSHIP, 6.
1. DIRECTORS ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE, as trustees, for loss occasioned by
willful abuse of their trust, or by the misapplication of the funds of a
moneyed or other joint-stock corporation. Robinson v. Smith, 212.
2. IDEM.-Directors are equally liable, if they suffer the corporate funds or
property to be lost or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the
duties of their trust.
3. JOINT STOCK CORPORATIONS are mere partnerships, except in form. Id.
See EQUITY, 1; ESTOPPEL, 5, 7; EVIDENCE, 1, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.
DOUBLE COSTS MUST BE ALLOWED to a school district collector who obtains
judgment in an action against him for an official act. Reynolds v.
Moore, 116.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 11; QUO Warranto, 2.
1. LICENSE BY ONE TENANT IN COMMON to a third person to cut timber on
the common land is good, and gives such person title to the trees cut,
especially where the license is given in satisfaction of a demand against
all the co-tenants. Baker v. Wheeler, 66.
2. TENANT IN COMMON CAN NOT CONVEY or dispose of lands of his co-ten-
ants without authority under seal, or in any other manner than a stranger
might do. Blood v. Goodrich, 121.
3. TENANT IN COMMON CAN NOT MAINTAIN TROVER for a dispossession of
the common chattel by his co-tenant. Farr v. Smith, 162.
4. SALE OR DESTRUCTION OF THE COMMON CHATTEL by a co-tenant is a con-
version for which trover lies. Id.
5. WHERE A TENANT IN COMMON claiming to own the whole premises, con-
veys the whole to a third person, who enters under such conveyance,
claiming title to the whole, it is such an ouster of the other tenants in
common as to bar their right of entry after twenty years. Town v. Need-
ham, 246.
6. WHERE A TENANT IN COMMON AGREES with his co-tenant to release to
him his interest in the estate in exchange for the other's stand and med-
icines as a physician, and the other relinquishes the practice of medicine
and the drugs and enters into possession of the land pursuant to the
agreement, making improvements thereon, the case will be taken out of
the statute of frauds, and the execution of a release will be decreed.
ld.
7. WHERE A CO-TENANT MAKES IMPROVEMENTS in the belief that he is sole
owner, chancery will, on a partition suit, so divide the premises as to
give him the benefit of the improvements. Id.
8. TRESPASS OR TROVER WILL LIE for one co-tenant of a chattel against the
other, only upon the destruction of the joint property or upon such a
disposition of it as is tantamount thereto. Lucas v. Wasson, 266.
9. DEED BY ONE TENANT in common, conveying a specific portion of the
common estate by metes and bounds, is void as against his co-tenant, to
whom the portion so conveyed is subsequently set apart by partition.
Jewett v. Stockton, 594.
See PARTNERSHIP, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
WHETHER COVENANTS OF WARRANTY in a deed are merged in the mortgage
given for the purchase money and in the foreclosure thereof, or pass to
the purchaser under the mortgage sale, quære. Town v. Needham, 246.
1. JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION of a felony will be reversed, unless the record
shows a plea or issue, notwithstanding the defendant was personally
present at the trial. Hill v. State, 441.
2. VERDICT HAVING BEEN FOUND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT in a criminal case,
and the judgment thereon having been erroneously arrested on the de-
fendant's motion, the judgment of arrest may be reversed on error, and
a judgment of conviction rendered. State v. Norvell, 458.
3. PARTICEPS CRIMINIS is not confined to a transaction, which in the common
acceptation of the term means an act that may be visited by an indict-
ment or other criminal prosecution, but applies to other transactions
contrary to good morals, whether they be immoral per se or prohibited
by statute, under a penalty, or by a simple prohibition, or as militating
against the policy of a statute, or fraud, or other contract. Johnson v.
Cooper, 502.
See AUTREFOIS ACQUIT; CONFLICT OF LAWs; JEOPARDY; JURY; LARCENY;
MURDER
|