QUANTUM MERUIT.
See ASSUMPSIT.
1. Where the TERM OF OFFICE HAS EXPIRED before quo warranto is applied
for, or will expire before trial, the application will be denied. People v.
Loomis, 33.
2. WHERE THE TERM EXPIRES AFTER INFORMATION in the nature of quo
warranto, but before judgment, such judgment will, nevertheless, be ren-
dered, as the prevailing party is entitled to costs.
See ATTACHMENTS; EXECUTIONS.
1. THE OBJECT OF THE RECORDING ACT was to protect a subsequent bona
fide purchaser against a previous conveyance of the legal estate. Grim-
stone v. Carter, 230.
2. ABSOLUTE DEED WITH A DEFEASANCE should be recorded in the book of
mortgages, otherwise no benefit is derived from the recording of the in-
strument. Id.
1. PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST for an unincorporated religious society vests
in the corporation whenever the requisites of the statute are complied
with so as to render them legally competent to take property in their
corporate capacity. First Baptist Church v. Witherell, 223.
2. THE CHURCH CONSISTS of persons who have made a public profession of re-
ligion, and who are associated together by a covenant of church-fellow-
ship for the purpose of celebrating the sacrament, and watching over the
spiritual welfare of each other. Id.
3. A CONGREGATION IS A VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION of individuals or families,
united for the purpose of having a common place of worship, to provide
a proper teacher to instruct them in religious doctrines and duties, to
administer the ordinance of baptism, etc. Id.
4. MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH have no other or greater rights as corporators
than any
other members of the society who statedly attend with them
for the purposes of divine worship. Id.
5. LEGAL TRIBUNALS have no jurisdiction over the church as such, except so
far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others, and to preserve
the public peace. Id.
6. THE CHURCH JUDICATORIES determine all questions relating to the faith
and practice of the church and its members, but can not interfere with
the temporal concerns of the congregation or society with which the
church is connected. Id.
7. MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH Excluded for HERESY may still not only be
voters as members of the congregation, but may be also elected trustees,
and have the management of the temporal concerns of the congregation.
Id.
8. THE CHURCH JUDICATORIES can not remove a minister without the con-
sent of a majority of the members of the congregation, or of their legally
constituted trustees, if they are incorporated. Id.
9. WHETHER CHANCERY CAN INTERFERE to prevent changes in the doctrines
or modes of worship from those as originally established by a religious
society, quære. Id.
REMAINDERS AND REVERSIONS.
See EXECUTIONS, 40.
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS.
See VENDOR And Vendee, 9, 15, 16.
RES JUDICATA.
See JUDGMENTS, 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17.
See DAMAGES; EQUITY, 7, 8; Fraud.
1. SCHOOL DISTRICT CAN Not Change THE SITE of its school-house, without
the consent of the school commissioners. Baker v. Freeman, 118.
2. SCHOOL TRUSTEES ARE LIABLE IN TRESPASS for assessing an illegal tax
voted by the district to change the site of its school-house, and for issu.
ing a warrant to collect such tax. Id.
3. SCHOOL TRUSTEES ARE NOT MERE MINISTERIAL OFFICERS bound to obey
the illegal resolutions of the district. Id.
See OFFICERS, 2; TAXATION.
SCIRE FACIAS.
See JUDGMENTS, 13, 14, 15.
See EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES.
RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE prevails in Ohio; it is a settled rule of the common
law, and continues to exist, except where it has been abolished by stat-
ute. McFeely v. Moore, 314.
1. SHERIFF'S DEED is the conveyance of the debtor's legal title, without any
warranty, express or implied. Henderson v. Overton, 492.
2. SHERIFF'S DEED, AS AN ASSURANCE OF TITLE, stands lower than any
other. Id.
8. JUDGMENT CREDITOR IS NOT ESTOPPED from asserting an after-acquired
title to land, sold under execution, against the purchaser at such sale.
Id.
4. SHERIFF'S DEED IMPOSES NO LEGAL LIABILITY, either express or implied,
on the judgment creditor to protect the title acquired by the purchaser
at execution sale; and if the party against whom the execution issued,
had no title to the property sold, the purchaser acquires none, and the
deed is void, both at law and in equity. Id.
See COMMON CARRIERS, 7, 8, 13.
1. IT IS ACTIONABLE PER SE TO SAY of another, "He has sworn falsely,
and I will attend to the grand jury respecting it." Gilman v. Lowell,
96.
2. Neither Damage nor MALICE REQUIRES PROOF in an action of slander,
if the words are actionable per se. Id.
3. GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE PLAINTIFF is a proper subject of inquiry in
ascertaining the amount which he is entitled to recover. Id.
4. WHERE THE WORDS SPOKEN ARE PROVED TRUE, under a plea of justifi
cation no action lies, however malicious the motive. Id.
5. PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION ADMITS MALICE, and excludes every defense
based on the absence of malice. Id.
6. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY ENHANCES the damages. Id.
7. UNDER THE GENERAL ISSUE IN SLANDER the defendant may show any.
thing which repels the presumption of malice, and does not imply the
truth of the charge or tend to prove it true. Id.
8. REPORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE PREVALENT in the neighborhood are in-
admissible under the general issue in an action of slander, because,
though they tend to disprove malice, they tend also to show the truth
of the words. Id.
9. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES tending to prove the truth of the words are
not admissible in evidence under the general issue in slander. Id.
10. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES which disprove malice but do not tend to
prove the truth of the words, are admissible under the general issue.
Id.
11. TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT HONESTLY BELIEVED that he spoke
the truth in charging the plaintiff with swearing falsely in testifying
that he was a freeholder, evidence is admissible under the general issue
to prove that before making the charge the defendant searched the
records without finding any land in the plaintiff's name, owing to a mis-
take in the index, if the falsity of the charge is expressly admitted. Id.
12. SUCH EVIDENCE WILL NOT DEFEAT A RECOVERY, but is admissible only
to mitigate the damages. Id.
13. IT IS NOT ACTIONABLE SLANDER to charge a married woman with adul-
tery. Berry v. Carter, 762.
A CLAIM WILL NOT LIE AGAINST THE STATE at law or in equity, or by anal-
ogy to the principles of law, to enable a petitioner to recover moneys
which he as bail had paid, by reason of the departure of his principal
without the jail liberties, under permission of a suspension law, which
had been adjudged unconstitutional. Davison v. State, 598.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT, for the sale of a tract of land, at the
instance of the vendee, will not be defeated by the lapse of time, when
it appears that the delay has been by the consent of both parties, and
occasioned by the embarrassment of the vendor's title; or where it has
been caused by the vendee being insane, or by the vendor failing to ob-
tain the legal title, notwithstanding thirty years may have elapsed from
the making of the contract. Craig v. Leiper, 479.
PREAMBLE TO A STATUTE has no binding force in construing such statute in
a manner hostile to the obvious meaning of its subsequent enactments.
Per Edmonds, Senator. Hart v. Mayor of Albany, 165.
1. STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT A Good Defense where the party relying on
it has been guilty of fraud in permitting another to make improvements
on lands without objection. Town v. Needham, 246.
2. A PROMISE IS ORIGINAL, and not required by the statute of frauds to be
in writing, if it be at the time of sale to pay for goods furnished to an-
other, upon the credit of such promise. Rhodes v. Lee. 744.
1. LIMITATION, PRESCRIBED BY THE ACT OF 1799, c. 8, sec. 4, for bringing
actions to recover specific property, lost and delivered in a gaming trans-
action, applies only to actions at law, and not to a suit in equity, to de-
clare void a conveyance of land executed in payment of a loss at gaming.
Johnson v. Cooper, 502.
2 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS MUST BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF, by way of
plea, in courts of equity, or the benefit thereof is waived. This practice
is founded on the rule of common law, quisquis juri pro se introducto re-
nunciat. Id.
3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A GOOD PLEA in bar of a bill in equity, as
well as of an action at law, where it is brought for a legal demand. Col
lard v. Tuttle, 627.
4. THE STATUTE MAY BE RELIED ON in defense of a suit brought to enforce
a contract to convey land bought at public sale, or to pay over the
amount received for its redemption. Id.
5. STATUTE DOES NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL A DEMAND in such case; but
after a great length of time a demand will be presumed. Id.
1. ALIEN HAS NO HERITABLE BLOOD, by the common law, and can not re-
ceive or transmit lands by descent, nor can one inherit who is obliged to
trace his descent through an alien. Jackson v. Fitz Simmons, 198.
2. COMMON LAW RULE PREVAILED IN NEW YORK until 1830, the statute of
11 and 12 Wm. III., c. 6, enabling persons to inherit through alien an-
cestors not having been adopted here until then. Id.
3. NATURALIZED SON OF AN ALIEN FATHER could not inherit from a nat-
uralized brother of the father who died intestate before 1830, though the
father died before the intestate. Id.
4. FIFTH CANON OF THE STATUTE OF 1786 did not enable the children of an
alien father to inherit from a brother of the father, where the latter died
before the brother.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2.
1. AT COMMON LAW ACTS PERFORMED ON SUNDAY were valid, unless ex-
pressly prohibited; and consequently contracts made, work and labor
done, and even business of one's ordinary calling, were not considered
by it illegal, because performed on that day. Ames v. Kyle, 463.
2. STATUTE ON 1741, c. 14, SEC. 2, OF TENNESSEE, prohibits work and labor
of one's ordinary calling from being performed on Sunday, but does not
extend to all kinds of labor indiscriminately. Id.
3. TENDER OF CHATTELS ON SUNDAY, in performance of a contract, is legal
both at the common law and under such statute; and therefore where
the day of performance falls on Sunday, a tender on the next day is too
late. Id.
1. A SURETY CAN NOT MAINTAIN INDEBITATUS ASSUMPSIT against his prin-
cipal before payment; but a bill of exchange or a negotiable note given
and received in satisfaction will support the count for money paid.
Miller v. Howry, 320.
2. IDEM.-But where a surety holds a counter bond in the amount of the sum
secured, given in consideration of his liability, he may sue thereon be.
fore payment. Id.
3. REVOKING A LEVY ON THE GOODS OF ONE OF TWO SURETIES, does not
release the other; for as between themselves they are both principals,
and the creditor may pursue either. Whitehill v. Wilson, 326.
4. MERE FORBEARANCE, however prejudicial to the surety, will not dis-.
charge him. United States v. Simpson, 331.
5. LOSS FROM INDULGENCE PURELY PERMISSIVE, will not discharge a surety;
as the surety ought to have warned the creditor to proceed. Id.
6. IN SUCH CASe Actual DetrIMENT is not the criterion or material ingre
dient. Id.
7. WHERE THE CREDITOR HAS DISABLED HIMSELF to pursue the principal,
the surety is ipso facto discharged. Id.
8. SURETIES WHO HAVE PAID THE DEBT for which they were security, may
reach in equity any fund set apart by the principal debtor for the pay-
ment of such debt, no matter who the trustee or cestui que trust is.
Rodes v. Crockett, 489.
9. IF A DEBTOR MORTGAGE HIS LAND TO A CREDITOR, on condition that
the mortgagee pay out of the land another debt for which certain sure-
ties of the mortgagor are liable, such sureties may in equity set up that
condition by parol, and enforce it upon the property in the hands of the
mortgagee. Id.
10. DISMISSAL OF A SUIT AND RELEASE OF ATTACHMENT sued out by the pay-
ees against the principal on a promissory note is not a discharge of the
surety. Bank of Montpelier v. Dixon, 640.
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