deprive the lessee of ingress and egress to such apartments at all hours and times.1 Nor can he object to the free use of the bell and knocker, halls, staircase or passageways, or any of the necessary adjuncts of his furnished apartments, unless it be otherwise stipulated at the time of the taking of the apartments.2

There is always an implied condition or obligation on the part of the landlord who rents furnished apartments that the same shall be reasonably fit for habitation, and if they are not, the tenant may quit without notice.3

7. Tenement Houses, "French Flats," Apartment Houses.-The word "tenement" in the sense here used signifies "a house or homestead," or "rooms let in a house." The compound word "tenement-house," must, therefore, signify a house with distinct tenements or homes which separate and different families or persons occupy as tenants as distinguished from boarding houses or hotels where the occupancy is not one of tenancy, but that of boarders or guests.

Flats and apartment houses are properly classed with tenement houses, since they are buildings occupied by tenants in name and

P. New. R. 224; Cadogan v. Kennet, Cowp. 432; Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 17. 1. Maclennan v. Ins. Co., 39 U. C. R. 515; Lane v. Dixon, 3 M. G. & S. 776.

2. Underwood v. Burrows, 7 C. & P. 26; Maclennan v. Ins. Co., 39 U. C. R. 515.

3. When they are infested with vermin. Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. &

W 5.

Where premises were rendered noxious and unwholesome for want of proper sewerage. Collins v. Barrow, 1 M. & Rob. 112.

Where persons have lately died upon the premises of small pox or other highly contagious diseases. Smith v. Marrible, 11 M. & W. 5. See also Wilson v. Finch Hatton, L. R., 2 Ex. Div. 343; Dutton v. Gerrish, 63 Mass. 94; Edwards v. Ethrington, 7 D. & R. 117; Perrett v. Dupre, 3 Rob. (La.) 52; Mechelen v. Wallace, 7 Ad. & E. 54; Coonfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & W. 308; Wallace v. Lent, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 481; Minor V. Sharon, I12 Mass. 477; Caesar v. Kountz, 60 N. Y. 229; Crump v. Morrell, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 249; Tyler v. Disbrow, 40 Mich. 415; Cowie . Goodwin, 9 C. & P. 378; Potter v. Truett, 3 Harringt. 331; Salesbury v. Marshall, 4 C. & P. 65; Warehouse Co. v. Carr, 5 C. P. D. 507; Campbell v. Wenlock, 4 F. & Fin. 716. See, however, Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68; Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W.

52; Smith v. Kinkaid, 1 Bradw. (Ill.) 620; Coe v. Vodges, 71 Pa. St. 383; Machine Co. v. King, 51 Vt. 462; Westlake v. Degraw, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 669; O'Brien v. Capwell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 477; Graves v. Cammeron, 58 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 75; Christopher v. Austin, II N. Y. 216; Sutphen v. Sebass, 14 Abb. Pr., N. C. (N. Y.) 67; Welles v. Castles, 3 Gray (Mass.) 323; Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me, 316; Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 89; Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 242; Howard v. Doolittle, 3 Duer, (N. Y.) 464; Chappell v. Gregory, 34 Beav. 250, and Searle v. Loverich, L. R., 9 Q. B. 131.

Where it has been held that there is no implied warranty in the lease of a house, or of land, that it should be reasonably fit for habitation, occupation or cultivation, and that there is no contract (still less any condition) implied by law on the demise of real property, only that it is fit for the purpose for which it is let. Yet the case' of furnished lodgings or apartments is expressly distinguished upon the ground that the letting is a contract of a mixed nature, being in fact a bargain for house and furniture, which of necessity must be such as are fit for the purpose for which they are to be used See generally LANDLORD AND TEN ANT.

4. Bouv. Law Dict.

5. Jacobs Law Dict., title Tene

ment.

However they may be divided, they are separate dwellings for separate and different families, although there may be but one entrance and outer door to the building. The lease of such flats or apartment houses, if the lessee assumes control of the premises, will create a tenancy and interest in the real estate, and the relation of landlord and tenant is accordingly estab lished.2

8. Termination of Rights.-Since a lodger or lessee of apartments in a house has no interest in the land upon which the building is erected beyond that connected with the enjoyment of the particular room or apartments, it naturally follows that with the destruction of the building the rights of the lessee are terminated.3 When the thing leased is destroyed, the accruing of rent ceases, and the entry upon the premises by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding does not constitute an eviction.*

A lessee of apartments is not liable for rent subsequent to the time of leaving when compelled to do so by the misconduct of his landlord; but when a lessee abandons possession of the apartments and subsequently returns to them he is liable for rent during the interval of his absence, even though the landlord has made some use of the apartments while the tenant was absent.2 While the goods of a tenant of apartments are liable for his landlord's rent, yet he is not justified in quitting without notice, merely from a fear, however reasonable, that his goods may be seized for his landlord's rent.3 Where a party leases apartments at a weekly or monthly rent, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, he is justified in quitting the same at the end of any week or month, as the case may be, without notice to the landlord, but when he enters on a new week or month he must remain until the expiration of his time or pay rent for the week or month so entered upon.

LOG-ROLLING.-See note 5.

LOGGING.-See SHIPPING; NAVIGATION.

1. Bissell v. Lloyd, 100 Ill. 216; Rowbotham v. Pearce, 5 Houst. (Del.) 135; Coddington v. Dunham, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 412; Bank v. Newton, 76 N. Y. 616.

2. Griffith Hodges, 1 Car. & P. 419; Way v. Myers, 64 Ga. 760.

3. Rickett v. Tullick, 6 Car. & P. 66; Bethell v. Blencome, 3 M. & G. 119.

4. Huffell v. Armetstead, 7 Car. & P. 56; Willson v. Abbott, 4 Dowl. & R. 694; Peacock v. Rappan, 6 Esp. 4; Flower v. Darby, 1 T. R. 159; Kemp v. Derrett, 3 Čampb. 510; Jones v. Mills, 10 C. B., N. S. 788.

to vote upon the bill what the subject of it is, so that they may not perform that duty deceived or ignorant of what they are doing; and, secondly, to prevent the mischievous legislative practice known as log rolling; that is, of embracing in one bill several distinct matters, none of which perhaps could singly obtain the passage or assent of the legislature, and then procuring its passage by a combination of the minority in favor of each of the measures into a majority that will adopt them all. Walker v. Griffith, 60 Ala. 369 The exercise of a vigilant, pressing, 5. The act applies to Cherokee present out of door influence upon the county only, and if it be urged against members. The mass of the the act that it is hodge-podge or log members of our legislature are a rolling legislation, because provision is thoughtless, careless, light hearted body made therein to purchase and build of men, who come there for their "per bridges, as well as construct a court diem." and to spend their "per diem." house, the answer is that it cannot be For a brief time they feel the imporinvalidated because the fund is to be tance and responsibility of their posidevoted to several acts or purposes. If tion. They soon, however, engage in this were not the case, then various acts idle pleasure, and on all questions disof the legislature regarding appropria- connected with their immediate constittions would be invalid, especially the uents they become as wax, to be annual appropriations made for miscel- moulded by the most pressing influences, laneous purposes, because the money therein appropriated is to be used for several distinct and separate purposes. Commrs. of Cherokee Co. v. The State ex rel., 36 Kan. 340.

The object of the constitutional provision is twofold (that a bill shall be read three times on different days, etc.), first, truly to inform members who are

etc.

In this case, in the opinion, JUSTICE GRIER said: "That what, in the technical vocabulary of the politician is termed log rolling, is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable by indictment." Marshall v. B. & D. R. Co.. 16 How. (U. S.) 336; Co-op., bk. 14, p. 963. See Illegal Contracts, vol. 9, p. 901.

I. DEFINITIONS-Logs.-Logs means the stems or trunks of trees cut into convenient lengths for the purpose of being afterwards manufactured into lumber of various kinds, but does not

include manufactured lumber of any kind, nor timber which is squared or otherwise shaped for use, without further change in form.1

Lumber. Lumber is timber sawed or split for use in building, and is material essential for building any kind of a house ordinarily used for business or by families.2

Timber. Timber includes the stems or trunks of trees when cut and shaped for use in the erection of buildings or other structures, and not to be manufactured into lumber within the ordinary nieaning of the word lumber.3

Stumpage. Stumpage means the sum by agreement to be paid an owner for trees standing (or lying) upon his land, the party purchasing being permitted to enter upon the land and to cut down and remove the same. In other words, it is the price paid for a licence to cut.4

II. CONTRACT OF SALE-1. What Constitutes. In a case where the whole instrument, being considered, implies a completed sale, it will be so held, although the words, in their strict grammatical sense, denote future action; but an instrument signed by one party only in which he agrees to sell and that he will give the right to enter, cut and remove lumber is not a contract of sale but only a promise to make one."

1. Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393, .398.

"Cedar shingle rift" comes within the term "logs or lumber." Sands v. Sands, 74 Me. 239.

"Logs" does not include masts. 40

Me. 145.

2. Ward v. Kadel, 38 Ark. 174, 180. 3. Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393, 398; Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis. 189, 192. Timber embraces nothing but materials for building or manufacturing purposes, and in a contract for the purchase of "timber," the purchaser acquires no title to trees not suitable for any purpose but for firewood. Nash v. Drisco, 51 Me. 417.

Timber may include fencing stuff, if that corresponds with the local interpretation. Hunter v. Hunter, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 25, 87.

The word "timber," in the Massachusetts statute, which allows "the owner of land taken for a highway a reasonable time to take off his timber, wood, or trees," includes buildings and parts of buildings. Com. v. Noxon, 121 Mass. 42.

A liberal construction of the word timber will include railroad ties. Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Wis. 393, 398.

United States Statutes.-The term timber in the acts of congress of March 2nd, 1831, relative to the lands of the

United States, signifies the standing and felled trees prepared for transportation to a vessel or sawmill, such as sawlogs or timber in bulk; but does not embrace any article manufactured from the tree, as shingles or boards. The trees are those the wood of which is generally used in ship and house building. U. S. v. Schuler, 6 McLean (U. S.) 28, 38.

The term timber is not to be confined to trees or wood of such sizes as must be especially adapted to house or ship building. It means live, growing trees of a useful class, and cannot be held to apply to those of a large size only. U. S. v. Stores, 14 Fed. Rep. (U. S.) 824.

4. Blood v. Drummond, 67 Me. 476. 5. McDowell v. Laer, 35 Wis. 171. A lumberman turned over a quantity of logs to a banker, who took them for a firm, giving the firm's paper to the lumberman in payment, but himself keeping the title to the logs until the notes should be met, the lumberman having the right to deposit the notes with the banker, and draw against them. Held, a sale from the lumberman to the banker. [CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.] Davis v. Maltz, 57 Mich. 496.

6. McDonald v. Bewick, 51 Mich. 79. In a contract for the sale and delivery of 5,000 feet of timber was a clause: "and I agree to pay said Q four and