LOWER.-See note 1.

interests and policy of the State, and would confer title where heretofore none have been supposed to exist. No one has ever thought that an island cut off from the main land by the stream in ordinary stages of low water could be added to the land of an adjacent proprietor merely because in the very dry season of the year the stream had almost disappeared, and no water flowed over the intervening dry and sandy or pebbly bed. The doctrine that low water mark is the extreme verge to which a long drought may reduce the stream would lead to such results. Ordinary high water and ordinary low water each has its reasonably well defined marks, so nearly certain that there is not much difficulty in ascertaining it. The ordinary rise and fall of the stream usually finds nearly the same limits. But to bound title by a mark which is set by an extraordinary flood, or an extreme drought, would do injustice and contravene the common understanding of the people. We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff's title was bounded by ordinary low water mark, where that was properly submitted to the jury. Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. St. 343.

But it is further contended by counsel for respondents that even if it shall be held that the line does not run in the middle of the stream, it must be held that it runs where the water and land meet at low water. But low water mark is not the bank of a stream. It is the point to which the stream recedes at its lowest stage. The banks of the stream on the other hand are

"the elevations of land which confine the waters in their natural channel, when they rise the highest and do not overflow the banks." Gould, Waters,

§ 45.

In Howard v. Ingersol, 13 How. (U. S.) 381, WAYNE, J., in speaking of the like question there under consideration, said: "The call is for the bank-the fast land which confines the water of the river in its channel or bed in its whole width-that is to be the line. The bank or slope from the bluff or perpendicular of the bank may not be reached by water for two thirds of the year, still the water line impressed upon the bank above the slope is the line required by the commissioners, and the shore of the river, though left dry for any time, and but occasionally covered

by water, in any stage of it, to the bank. was retained by Georgia as the river up to that line.

The same line was again considered by the same court in Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U. S. (23 How.) 505; and the court repeated its former ruling, holding that the line ran on the west bank of the Chattahoochee river; that the bed of that river belonged to Georgia; and that it included that portion of the soil which is alternately covered and left bare as there may be an increase or diminution in the supply of water, and which is adequate to contain it at its average and mean stage during the entire year, without reference to the extraordinary freshets of the winter or spring, or the extreme droughts of the summer or autumn." To like effect see also Gould, Waters, § 200. People ex rel. v. Madison Co. (Ill. 1888), 14 West Rep. 718.

Portions of the premises lie between the original, ordinary and extreme low water marks. The tenants contend that these portions never belonged to the demandant's predecessors in title under the ordinance of 1647, and that the words of the ordinance, "shall have propriety to the low water mark," should be construed as meaning to the ordinary low water mark. But it has been settled for 50 years that they mean to extreme low water mark. We cannot disturb a rule of property which has been acted on so long, on the strength of general meaning. Sparhawk v. Bullard, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 95; Attorney General v. Wharf Co., 12 Gray (Mass.) 553, 558; Wonson Wonson, 14 Allen (Mass.) 71, 82; Attorney General v. Woods, 108 Mass. 436, 440; Sewall & Day v. Boston Water Power Co. (Mass. 1888), 16 N. E. Rep. 786.

V.

1. Lower Rates.-A railway company agreed with A & B, coal owners, that they would carry their coal, subject to clause 11, at certain charges given in the schedule; and they also agreed (clause 9), that in the event of their charging any trader for the same description of traffic lower rates than those stipulated to any station, then, in that event, A & B were to have corresponding reductions in the rates payable by them to such station.

Clause I was to the effect that notwithstanding the rates or charges before specified, they were entitled to

LOWEST.-See note 1.
LOYAL.-See note 2.
L. S.-See note 3.

charge A & B rates or charges similar to those charges and paid by the Eglington Coal Company, and in the event of any consideration being given to the Eglington Co. for raising them, a similar consideration shall be given to A & B. The railway company charged D, another coal owner, not a party to the agreement, a lower rate per ton, taking into account the greater distance the coal was carried. The agreement with Eglington was not in evidence. It was alleged that the rate charged A & B was not higher than that charged to the Eglington Co. Held, affirming the decision of the court below, that there was nothing in clause 11 to supersede the effect of clause 9, and that upon the true construction of the latter clause, A & B were entitled to a corresponding share with D, and payment of overcharges-"lower rates"-meaning proportionately lower rate per ton per mile, and not a less sum per ton irrespective of the distance carried. Glascow v. Mackunin, 11 App. Cas. 386. See generally FREIGHT, vol. 8, p. 941.

Lower Floor.-The words "first floor in" the building are equivalent to first story of the building, and naturally include the walls. The apparent intention is to separate a section of the building as a distinct tenement. The words "first floor" define the lower and upper boundaries of this, but there is nothing to fix the lateral boundaries except the boundaries of the building. In this respect the words differ somewhat from the word "room." Floor means a section of the building between horizontal planes; the words "in a building" show that the section is of the whole building, and not of a part of it. The word "room" includes a description of the perpendicular as well as of the horizontal planes which bound the parcel of the house described by it, and excludes the outside of the lateral walls, at least, when they constitute the walls of another room, as clearly as the words "first floor" exclude the flooring of the story above it. Under what circumstances a lease of a story would include a space beyond the building, over land not belonging to it, not considered. In this case the build

ing adjoins the sidewalk, and the

"lower floor in the building" in the lease must be held to include the entire front wall of that part of the building unless there is something to control the natural meaning of the language. Lowell v. Strohan (Mass. 1887), 12 N. E. Rep. 404.

1. The Lowest Responsible Bidder.The sixth section of act of assembly of May (Pennsylvania), 1874, directing that contracts shall be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder" imposes duties upon the city authorities which are not simply ministerial, but discretionary and deliberative, and courts will not therefore interfere to restrain these authorities from awarding a contract to one who is not the lowest bidder, even though their action has been indiscreet, unless it is shown that they have acted corruptly and in bad faith. Findley v. City of Pittsburg, 82 Pa. St. 351.

2. The petition contained only the averment of the claimant's loyalty"That he was loyal." It is verified neither by him nor by his attorney. The agency of the person who does verify it is not alleged in the affidavit nor established by power of attorney. The jurat contains no indication of the place where it was made nor of the authority of the officer to administer the oath. The averment that the person who furnished supplies or stores for the army during the rebellion "was loyal" does not comply with the requirements of the Boyman act (22 Stat. L., p. 485, § 4), that he "did not give any aid or comfort to said rebellion, but was throughout loyal to the government of the United States." Woody v. United States, 23 Court of Claims U. S. 160.

3. By long usage and the general understanding of legal writers "L. S." is regarded as the true representation of a seal, in a copy of legal precepts. If the word "seal" were written in the place of the seal on the writ or summons, it would not be a true copy, for no such writing is upon the writ or summons. Whether we might receive that as a sufficient representation is not necessary to say; but we have no hesitancy in deciding that the letters "L. S." are the proper designation and copy of the seal. Smith v. Butler, 25 N. H. 524.

the prisoner so lying in wait, for the purpose of inflicting some great bodily harm upon deceased (though short of the intention of taking life, but which would be murder at common law), it would be murder in the first degree." The court further stated to the jury "that if any stick or other weapon is used by one lying in wait for the purpose calculated to produce great bodily harm, and if used in such manner, great bodily harm is the probable consequence and that death ensue so that at common law it would be murder, it is murder in the first degree.' Riley v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 651.

Lying up. Where "ice" is excepted from the perils enumerated in a policy of insurance as those assumed by the insurers, upon a cargo of a vessel described therein as lying in the port of New York, the latter are not liable for a loss occasioned by such peril to the cargo while such vessel was being fastened to a pier in the East River, in the city of New York, just after having been towed from her previous berth in the Hudson river, although the enumerated perils were declared in the policy to be those "on said trip or voyage or while lying up as aforesaid," without any mention in such policy of a trip or voyage of any kind; and a mere permission was given in such policy to tow such vessel "from place to place in New York harbor."

The loss in such case must be deemed to have occurred while the vessel was lying up within the meaning of the policy, and therefore as not having occurred so as to make the underwriters liable. Dows v. Howard Ins. Co., 5 Robt. (N. Y.) 473

1. Bearing Interest at One M per Cent. -An indictment having been framed

for receiving treasury notes of the United States, stolen from the United States mail, which were described as. bearing interest annually of "one per centum," upon the trial a treasury note was offered in evidence bearing interest at one M per centum. Held, that the letter M which appeared upon the face of the note offered in evidence was a material part of the description of the note; and that the defendant had the right to introduce parol evidence for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the said letter M. U. S. v. Hardyman, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 176.

2. The word is used in the California statutes of 1863-4, p. 333, authorizing the city council of Oakland to improve the streets, etc., in the said city. The special use of the word marks it as a distinct kind of improvement from the other improvements mentioned in the act, so that if the resolution, passed under the act by the city council, of their intention to do the work, describes it as macadamizing only, curbing the sidewalks will not be included, and a contract made under the resolution for both improvements will be void as to the curbing. "The question whether the term macadamizing also includes curbing is settled by the statute under which the parties having the matter in charge were working." Beaudry v. Valdez, 32 Cal. 269.

This was followed in Himmelmann v. Satterlee, 50 Cal. 70, wherein it was held that macadamize (as used in a resolution of city authorities "that W street be macadamized and curbed") means only that the roadway shall be improved, and does not authorize macadamizing the sidewalks. See also State v. District Court of Ramsey County, 33 Minn. 164.

3. Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. (U. S.)