2. Statutory Statutory liens, as those of mechanics, upon real estate are assignable, and the assignee may enforce the lien as if he were the original creditor, although there are decisions denying the assignability of this lien.2 If the existence of the lien conferred by statute does not depend upon possession of the property sought to be charged, it may be assigned.3 3. Equitable. The assignment of a debt carries with it, in equity, all securities held as collateral to sustain the debt, and all remedies and rights possessed by the assignor pass to the assignee, though no mention is made thereof. The question as to Holly v. Hungerford, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 76; Jones v. Sinclair, 2 N. H. 321; Lovett v. Brown, 40 N. H. 511; Meany v. Head, Mason (U. S.) 319; The Case of an Hostler, Yelv. 67 and note; Rushforth v. Hadfield, 6 East 523 n. 2; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468. "The general rule in this State is, that, in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, the assignment of a claim for which the assignor may have by law a specific lien, before action, destroys the right to the lien, and a reassignment to him does not revive the lien." Tewksbury v. Bronson, 48 Wis. 581; Caldwell v. Lawrence, 10 Wis. 331. A lien cannot be assigned while the assignor retains possession of the prop, erty charged therewith. Wing v. Griffin, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 162; but when possession of the property is also transferred it may not be destroyed. Bean v. Bolton, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 87; Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. St. 414. "While the holder of a debt, secured by lien cannot transfer the lien to a stranger without also assigning the debt, he may release it to one claiming an interest in or a junior lien on the property.' Buckner . McIlroy, 31 Ark. 631, 634. "A lien may be assigned, but such assignment must be subordinate to the rights of the principal owner. An absolute sale of the property is tortious, forfeits the lien, and passes no benefit to the purchaser, except in case of an actual delivery; it protects him from an action of trespass or replevin in the cepit against the principal owner." Coit v. Waples, 1 Minn. 134; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.) 3S2; Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 556; Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172. "A party having a lien upon goods may transfer the possession subject to the lien 13 C. of L.-40 to a third party, who may lawfully hold the property until the lien be paid; but if the transferee sell the goods, the owner is remitted to his original rights, freed from the lien, and may bring trover against him." Nash v. Mosher, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 431; Marshall v. Davis, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. St. 242. Assignment of a judgment and execution passes future but not past collections. Robinson v. Towns, 30 Ga. 818. See also Bolen v. Crosby, 49 N. Y. 183; Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 747 1. Iaege v. Boisseau, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 83; Tuttle v. Howe, 14 Minn. 145; Skyrme v. Occidental Mill, 8 Nev. 219; Rodgers v. Omaha Hotel Co., 4 Neb. 54; Mason v. Germaine, 1 Mont. 263; Kerr v. Moore, 54 Miss. 286. 2. Darr 2. Mo. & R. R. Co., 27 Ark. 564; Fitzgerald v. First Pres. Ch., 1 Mich. (Nisi P.) 243; Cairo & V. R. Co. v. Fackney, 78 Ill. 116. 3. Jones on Liens, § 990. 4. Batesville Institute v. Kauffman, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 151; Cathcart's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 416; Prescott v. Hull, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 284; Lindsey v. Bates, 42 Miss. 397; Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 747; Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348; Stevens 7. Chadwick, 10 Kan. 406; Painter v. Harding; 3 Phila. (Pa.) 449; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199; Sloan v. Campbell, 71 Mo. 387; Hall v. Mobile & Montgomery R. Co., 58 Ala. 10; Lagow v. Badollet, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 416; Jones v. Hurst, 67 Mo. 568; Hurt v. Wilson, 38 Cal. 263; Perry v. Roberts, 30 Ind. 244. Assignment of a debt secured by mortgage carries with it the mortgage security. Lawrence v. Knapp, 1 Root (Conn.) 248; s. c., I Am. Dec. 42; Stewart v. Preston, 1 Fla. 10; s. C., 44 Am. Dec. 621; Miller v. Hoyle, 6 Ired. 625 when equity passes a lien by subrogation will be found treated elsewhere.1 An attorney's lien on a judgment can be transferred by assignment.2 LIE—LYING.—Telling a bare, naked lie is saying a thing which is false, knowing or not knowing it to be so, and without any design to injure, cheat or deceive another person. Every deceit comprehends a lie; but a deceit is more than a lie on account of the view with which it is practiced, its being coupled with some dealing, and the injury which it is calculated to occasion, and does occasion, to another person.3 See note 4. Eq. (N. Car.) 269; Kern v. Hazlerigg, II Ind. 443; Fisher v. Johnson, 5 Ind. 492; Brumfield v. Palmer, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 227; Forwood v. Dehoney, 5 Bush (Ky.) 174. The assignment of a bond for a deed secures future but not accrued rents to assignee. Van Driel v. Rosierz, 26 Iowa 575. In Maine: "There is no doubt but a deed or other instrument in writing under seal is necessary to cover the mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged premises," and therefore, the simple assignment of a note secured by a mortgage does not pass that security to assignee. Johnson v. Leonards, 68 Me. 237, 239; Vose v. Handy, 2 Me. 322; Smith v. Kelley, 27 Me. 237. 1. See SUBROGATION. 2. Sibley v. County of Pine, 31 Minn. 201. Authorities for Lien.-The leading text book upon liens, and one of great value is Jones on Liens (1888). The writer of this article desires to acknowledge his obligations to the author of that work, which has been of the greatest assistance, and contains an exceptionally clear and intelligible presentation of the law. He feels privileged to add, however, that while, in following the footsteps of so thorough a writer, it is difficult to produce new principles or to present the law in a new light, the whole subject is arranged upon a different plan, and it is hoped that the cases to date have been cited. 3. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 56. 4. "Lying About."- Än owner is liable to a penalty for cattle "found lying about any highway, notwithstanding they are under the control of a keeper at the time. Lawrence v. King, L. R., 3 Q. B., 345. BLACKBURN, J., said: "I think if cattle driven along a highway were to lie down for a short time, and then were driven on again, they could not be said to be found lying about the highway. Neither would it be an offence if a right of pasture was claimed on the side of the road, and cattle were in the care of a person, feeding on the roadside in the exercise of the right of pasture." "Lying at Anchor."-A vessel is not "lying at anchor," so as to be liable for anchorage, when it is fastened to a pier. Walsh v. N. Y. Floating Dry Dock Co., 77 N. Y. 453. In Reid v. Lancaster Fire Ins. Co., 19 Hun (N. Y.) 285, it is said: "By a vessel lying at anchor is generally understood her floating upon the water, but held by her cable and anchor. The fact that a vessel with her anchor out might happen, by means of an exceptionally low tide, to touch the bottom, would not take her out of the protection of the policy. In such a case the grounding would be an accidental and casual circumstance; but here the vessel was intentionally beached at high tide, and the hull opened for the water to run in and out." It was accordingly held, that a vessel so beached was not "lying at anchor" within the meaning of a policy of insurance. A vessel floating in the dock of any wharf, though moved to a different wharf, must be considered, with regard to wharfage dues, as "lying at" the former wharf. Dewees v. Adga, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 105. "Lying Days."- Under a charter party the charterers were to "load and discharge as fast as the ship can work, but a minimum of seven days to be allowed merchants, and ten days on demurrage over and above the said lying days at £25 per day." Held, that the lying days from the context meant "working" and not "running" days, and consequently that Sunday was not LIEU. See note I. to be counted. Commercial Steamship Co. v. Boulton, L. R., 10 Q. B. 346. "Lying in Wait."-In State v. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741, 769, this expression is thus treated of: "Bouvier, in his Law Dict., says lying in wait' is 'being in ambush for the purpose of murdering another.' In the case of Burgess v. The Com., 2 Va. Cas. 483, JUDGE DADE, in delivering the opinion of the court, on page 488, says: 'Now, we take the expression lying in wait, not merely to mean his concealing himself in the path of his intended victim for the purpose of killing him, but the deliberately and premeditatedly seeking an occasion to effect the deadly purpose.' In Jones's Case, 1 Leigh (Va.) 598, JUDGE DANIEL says: 'Lying in wait may be with a view to great injury, abuse and bodily harm, without the settled purpose to kill.' In Tennessee, the statute in relation to murder in the first and second degree is substantially the same as in Virginia and this State. And in the case of Riley v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 646, it appears on page 651, in the opinion of the court, that the judge at the trial, before the jury, among other things, instructed the jury in substance, 'That to constitute lying in wait, three things must concur, to wit: waiting, watching and secrecy; and that these facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to authorize the conclusion that there was lying in wait; that if they should be of opinion that there was such lying in wait, and that the fatal blow was given by the prisoner, so lying in wait. for the purpose of inflicting some great bodily harm upon the deceased (thought short of the intention of taking life, but which would be murder at common law), it would be murder in the first degree.' . . The evidence which I have stated did not prove, or sufficiently tend to prove, that the killing amounted to murder by lying in wait.' If it be proved that the killing was of such a character that, under ordinary circumstances, it would have been murder at common law, and the fact of lying in wait exist, that fact will make it a case of murder in the first degree. Riley v. The State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 661. Can it be said that if the killing be proved, and the fact of lying in wait' exist, that fact will make it a case of murder in the first degree? Does 'lying in wait,' as used in the statute necessarily presuppose or imply malice? Does not the statute mean that if a homicide is proved to have been commited with malice, the crime is murder in the second degree, but if it be shown, in addition, that the fact of lying in wait' existed, the offence for that reason is raised to murder in the first degree?" In People v. Miles, 55 Cal. 207, it is held that the term "concealed" is not synonymous with "lying in wait." "If the defendant concealed himself for the purpose of shooting the deceased unawares, then he was lying in wait, which is evidence of deliberation and intention. But a person might, while concealed, shoot another without committing the crime of murder.” An indictment held defective for leaving out the words "lying in wait," in Com. v. Reiper, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 282. "Lying on" in an instrument, "in the description of the metes and bounds and location of land, import in law, as well as in fact, that it extends to and borders upon the boundary designated in the description." Caroon v. Doe d. Hickman, 4 Houst. (Del.) 337. "Lying Up."—Where a vessel was insured against perils "on said trip or voyage, or while lying up as aforesaid," a loss occurring while she was being towed in the harbor was held to be within this clause. Dows v. Howard Ins. Co., 5 Robt. (N. Y.) 473. The court said: "The meaning of the word lying in the enumeration of the perils is not necessarily confined to mere inertness of position, joined, as it is, with the preposition 'up,' but embraces the idea of change from a prior state of activity to one of repose. In this case it meant a cessation of active navigation, making trips or voyages from port to port. The vessel in question did not cease to lie up whenever she was towed from place to place in the harbor, any more than if she lay at the wharf; although for greater caution the privilege of towing was expressly reserved." 1. Where, in an interpleader issue, the court is empowered by statute to substitute any claimant as defendant "in lieu of" the original defendant, this does not mean that such claimant should stand "in the actual place of" the defendant. Gerhard v. Montagu & Co., 38 W. R. 76. "It is said that the claimant being substituted in lieu of the original defendant, means that he must stand ex LIFE (See also DUE PROCESS OF LAW; DURING; ESTATES; JEOPARDY; LIFE INSURANCE).1 LIFE ANNUITY.-See ANNUITY, vol 1, p. 592. actly in that defendant's shoes, but the words do not admit of such a narrow interpretation. The claimant may be made an additional defendant, in which case clearly he would be at liberty to raise any additional defences open to him, or he may be substituted altogether as defendant for the original defendant, in which case the same liberty must be left to him. The words mean 'instead of' rather than in the actual place of original defendant " And this interpretation was sustained at a later stage of the case. 61 L. T., N. S. 564. On a summons for a prohibition on the ground that the judge, having no power to make a committal order, had no jurisdiction to make a receiving order, as such receiving order could only be made "in lieu of" a committal order, and could not be made where a committal order could not be made, it was held that the judge had a discretion to make, and had properly made, the receiving order "in lieu of" a committal order, although he could not have made a committal order in consequence of the inability of the judgment debtor to satisfy the debt. Reg. v. Long, 59 L. T., N. S. 32. Where by an act certain property, when owned by the head of a family, was exempted from levy and sale under execution, and by a subsequent amendatory act each head of a family, at his election, "in lieu of" the property mentioned in the earlier act, might hold exempt property to the value of $150, it was held that the words “in lieu of" did not confine the exemption to persons having the property named in the former act. "If a head of a family has such property as well as other kinds, he may select of the other kinds in lieu of the property named; but a man, the head of a family, although he has not such property, and has other kinds, may select out of what kind he has so much as the law allows, and it shall be exempt from sale, etc." State, to use of Garrett v. Farmer, 21 Mo. 160. 1. In a dissenting opinion in Coffey v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 J. & Sp. (N. Y.) 327 (s. c., 44 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 487], FREEDMAN, J., says, favoring the position that suicides are insane: "Freed, therefore, from all embarrassments which the intervention of other questions might occasion, I think the examination of the point at issue may be commenced in the most fitting manner by considering for a moment what life is. The definitions of it, given by philosophers and biologists are almost innumerable. But none of them commends itself so much to my mind as that given by Professor Herbert Spencer, who deservedly ranks in scientific circles as one of the greatest of modern thinkers. It is that life consists in the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences; or, in other words, in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations. Consequently, life is a continuous struggle. All vital actions considered, not separately, but in their ensemble, have for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by certain inner processes. There are increasing external forces tending to bring the matter of which organic bodies consist into that state of stable equilibrium displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this tendency is constantly antagonized; and the perpetual changes which constitute life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the antagonism. So strong is this antagonism in the human organism that while there is life there is hope. The strength in the natural, sane man of the love of life is indeed proverbial. Drowning men will catch at straws. All that a man has will he give in exchange for his life." Where by a deed conveying certain lands the premises were warranted free from encumbrance "except that the Presbyterian society have a right to have the horse shed stand where now it does during the life thereof," it was held that the term "life" referred to the continuance or existence of the shed as such, and that the exception in the deed was equivalent to saying that the shed, as long as it could reasonably be used for the purpose for which it was erected, might continue to stand on the land conveyed, and that the owners of the shed might make reasonable repairs upon it from time to time as they were needed. Benham v. Minor, 38 Conn. 252. LIFE INSURANCE (See ACCIDENT INSURANCE; BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS; FIRE INSURANCE; GUARANTEE INSURANCE; INSURANCE; MARINE INSURANCE; MUTUAL INSURANCE). 5. Action by Assignee, 650. 6. Assignee Must Have Insurable Interest, 650. VI. Title to the Policy and Its Proceeds, 650. 1. Where Payable to Life Insured, 650. 2. Where Payable to Third Party, 651. 3. Where Payable to Children of Beneficiary in Case of Survivorship, 652. 4. Where Payable to Wife and Children, 653. 5. Where Insurance Is on Life of Debtor, 653. 6. Presumption as to Policy on Life of Another, 654. 7. Voluntary Payment of Premium, 654. 8. Where Insured Survives Beneficiaries, 654. 9. Change of Beneficiary, 655. VII. Notice and Proofs of Death, 656. 1. Compliance with Require ments of Policy Condition Precedent to Recovery, 656. 2. Insured Only Bound to Make Proofs Required by Policy, 657. 3. Two Policies in Same Com- 4. Presumption After Absence 7. Reasonable Time, 658. VIII. Amount of Recovery, 659. I. DEFINITIONS 1. Life Insurance.-The contract of life insurance is "that in which one party agrees to pay a given sum, upon the happening of a particular event, contingent upon the duration of human life, in consideration of the immediate payment of a smaller sum, or certain equivalent periodical payments by another."1 1. Bunyon on Ins. "The contract commonly called life assurance, when properly considered, is a mere contract to pay a certain sum of money on the death of a person, in consideration of the due payment of a certain annuity for his life-the amount of the annuity being calculated, in the first instance, according to the probable duration of the life; and, when once fixed, it is constant and invariable. The stipulated amount of annuity is to be uniformly paid on one side and the sum to be paid in the event of death is always |