tion of the law is and must be in every instance local, special and private."

It is sufficient that the law offers like privileges to all who may comply with its terms or come within its provisions.. In sustaining the constitutionality of a statute regarding elevated railways the court of appeal of New York has said: "The mere fact that some are not able to avail themselves of the opportunities offered does not impugn the general character of the act. When a railroad, under the general law, is constructed from one point to another, the topography of the country through which it runs may be such as to forbid the construction of another railroad. But one elevated railway can be constructed through the same street; and hence, upon any route in a city, but one company for the construction of a railway is practicable; and while the legislature could not by private act incorporate such company, the problem for it to solve by the general act was, how such railroads could be constructed under a general act authorized by the constitution. It would not be feasible to permit the formation of several corporations to operate railways in the same streets, nor would it be wise to lease a railway to be constructed by the corporation which by accident was first in time. Nor would the same plan for the construction and operation of railways in all places be practicable. Hence it becomes the duty of the legislature, by a law having a general operation, to provide machinery which should determine the necessity of a railway, and the streets and places where it should be constructed, the company or organization of individuals which should construct it, and the plan upon which it should be constructed. While upon any route the franchises are given to one corporation, the formation of that corporation is open to all persons on the same terms, and no person is excluded from becoming a stockholder therein. The methods adopted in this act seem well devised to attain the end sought, and it is quite certain that, without some such methods, no elevated or underground railways can be constructed. And the act is not limited in time. While it is true that one set of commissioners can act upon one application, a new set of commissioners can be appointed whenever any persons desire to form a corporation, and present the proper application. I can, therefore, entertain no doubt that this is a general

act within the meaning of the constitution."

In re N. Y. Elevated R. Co., 75 N.. Y. 346.

In In re of Church, 92 N. Y. 4, it was truly said, with respect to local and general laws: "It is not easy to define with accuracy the difference between the two forms of legislation, and the difficulty is better solved by adding examples of definitions. A law relating to particular persons or things as a class is said to be general; while one relating to particular persons or things of a class is local and private." Referring to a statute applicable to counties having within their boundaries a city of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants the court said, "The act of 1881 relates to a class, and applies to it as such, and not to the selected elements of which it is composed. The class consists of every county in the State having within its boundaries a city of one hundred thousand inhabitants, and territory beyond the city limits mapped into streets and avenues. Whether many or few, the law operates upon them all alike, and reaches them, not by a separate selection of one or more, but through the general class of which they are general elements.

The force of the general law of 1881 is not localized in Kings county, and confined to its territory. By its terms it applies equally to every other county which may prove to be within the constituted class. It is said there is but one such county; and so also is it said there was but one elevated railway.. Neither fact at all narrowed the terms of the law. Those terms in each case were broad enough to cover every county in the State, if it had the required city and the mapped territory on the one hand, or its own elevated road on the other." These remarks were made with regard to a statute which, though in its terms applicable to any county within the State, was in fact obviously intended to operate in a particular county only, and was unquestionably enacted in such terms as might obey the latter, while they violated and de stroyed the spirit of the constitutional inhibition against local legislation. Note in Am. St. Rep. 904.

Local Taxation. Plaintiff's counsel argues that such a restriction is found in section 5, article 11, which reads as follows, viz: "Any county or township organization shall have such power of

local taxation as may be prescribed by law."

It is argued that in accordance with the maxim "Inclusio unius," etc., this section forbids the taxation objected to, because it is not local taxation; conceding, however, that this section is applicable to the city of St. Paul, we are of the opinion that the taxation in question is local in the constitutional

sense.

The effect of this provision of the constitution is simply to authorize the legislature to delegate to county and township organizations the power of taxing themselves. The power of local taxation meant, is the power of taxing property which may properly be subjected to taxation in the place where such local organizations exist, that is, within the geographical limits of the county or township as the case may be.

It is urged that this construction gives no effect to the word "local," because no power other tharr such as is above mentioned could be conferred upon towns and counties; but we think the criticism is too refined.

The constitution was made by and for the plain people, and even if the counsel be right in supposing that, in the sense we ascribe to it, the word "local" is superfluous, it at any rate serves to make express, and put beyond doubt, that which might otherwise, in the popular mind, well be of doubtful implication. Davidson v. The County Com. of Ramsey Co., 18 Minn. 494.

Local Improvements.- By common usage, especially as evidenced by the practice of courts and text writers, the term "local improvements" is employed as signifying improvements made in a particular locality, by which the real property adjoining or near such locality is specially benefited. Cooley on Taxation, 109, 110, 177, 419, 423, 447 and 459; Dillon on Mun. Corp., §§ 400, 401, 586, 596, 597, and many cases cited by these authors; Dorgan v. City of Boston, 12 Allen 223.

An examination of these authorities will also show that the term "local improvements," or terms synonymous, are more commonly applied to the grading, curbing and paving of streets than to any other class of improvements. Our constitution is presumed to have employed the term "local improvements" in the sense thus attributed to it by common usage. That this was in fact the sense in which the term in question

was used in the constitution will, perhaps, be further apparent when it is considered that the local improvement amendment was adopted in 1869, especially in view of the decision of Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366.

A consideration of the difficulties presented by that case and of the analogous difficulties which will readily suggest themselves, will tend to conform to the notion that the amendment of 1869 designed to remedy the defects in the original constitution by using the term "local improvement" in the sense indicated above.

From this constitutional amendment it follows that the fact that the street to be improved is in the most public thoroughfare in the city does not prevent the improvement from being "local;" but the local character of the improvement depends upon the special benefit which will result to the real property adjoining or near the locality in which the improvement is to be made. Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 507.

Local Office. - The most material question, as it seems to me, and that on which all others turn in this application, is, whether the office of a member of the county board of supervisors, elected for a district, is a local office in the sense that the incumbent must reside in the district and continue to reside there until the end of his term, or forfeit his office.

This is a question on which we may reasonably expect considerable difference of opinion, and on which, too, unfortunately, no light can be thrown by the examination of authorities. So far as the question depends on the statute, that may almost be said to be silent. It contains no express provision, but is claimed by the respondents to require a residence in the district by implication. On the other hand, the attorney general insists that it is not a local office in the sense above stated. I am inclined to agree with him. The implication that a supervisor must reside in the district, derived from the words "to be elected in and for each of the assessor districts," seems to be too far fetched. It is by no means a necessary inference from these words, that the person elected should be a resident of the district. The act of electing must be performed in the district by the qualified voters, and the person so elected is the supervisor for the district; but does this imply that he must reside within it?

Of necessity I think not. Suppose the legislature had seen fit to prescribe specifically the qualifications of county supervisors, and among other things had declared in terms that they should be residents of the county, and then had provided the same means for electing them as are now provided, would the occurrence of these words, just as they now occur, have implied any intention on the part of the legislature to require a residence in the district as well as in the county? I think not, and if not then, then not now; because it is one of the qualifications of every officer, prescribed by general statute, that he must be an inhabitant of the district, county or town, etc., within which the duties of his office are required to be discharged. With this general qualification as to residence, which existed at the time the act was passed, and applied at once to officers elected under it, it appears to me that we are not

authorized to infer from the words in question an intention to impose still another qualification of the same kind, namely, residence in the district. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. The Supervisors of Milwaukee Co., 21 Wis. 451.

Local Purpose.-The mandamus in this case is confessedly founded upon a supposed statute of this State, ch. 776 of the laws of 1868, and has no legal support if the supposed statute was never the law of the State. The first section appears to provide that the commissioners of highways of the town of Marlborough are authorized and directed to lay out the highway (describing it), and vests in the town for road purposes the right, title and interest of the State in so much of the lands as may be necessary for the purposes of said highway. This section purports to dispose of a part of the public property for a local purpose, and therefore with in the provisions of § 9, art. 1, of the constitution. That section ordains that "the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes." That the section in question appropriates public property is obvious on its face, that the purpose to which it is appriated is local, in the sense of the constitution, has been adjudged, in principle at least. in People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 378; People v. Purdy, 54 N. Y. 278. The improvement was in no way necessary or important for the naviga

tion of Lake Champlain. So far as we can discover, it would add nothing to the tonnage or commerce of the lake. Its sole purpose seems to have been to save the expense of land carrying to the people living at or near Wellsborough falls for the brief distance of not more than three miles. The appropriation might thus be claimed to be for a local purpose, even within the very strict and narrow definition used by the counsel for the relators upon the argument in this court, which was in these words: whenever the direct benefit is to be purely and exclusively local, the purpose is local, and the fact that the general public may incidentally be benefited did not make the purpose a general one. People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 382.

Local Prejudice. See CHANGE OF VENUE, vol. 3, p. 90. In an action by a foreign corporation for the price of lumber sold, defendant counter claimed for services rendered, and for damages for breach of contract. In support of a petition for removal to the federal court plaintiff filed an affidavit signed by several citizens of the county in which defendant resided, stating in general terms that from prejudice and local influence the plaintiff could not obtain a fair trial in that county, or in the judicial district. The facts stated in the affidavit were that defendant had a large and influential business connection in the county and district, and that the counties had had more or less litigation in their corporate capacity, which had excited a prejudice against nonresident corporations. This affidavit was controverted by one signed by numerous citizens of the vicinity. Held, that the petition would be denied. Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. Rep. 885.

An affidavit, made by an agent, for removal on account of prejudice, under the act of congress of 1887, is insufficient, which alleges that "I have reason to believe" in the existence of prejudice, and does not cause the prejudice to "be made to appear to the court." Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33.

Three days' notice is not a reasonable time to allow defendant an opportunity to contest the allegation of local prejudice before an order of removal is made. Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. Rep. 578.

Under act March 3rd, 1887. providing that on application for removal on the ground of prejudice or local influence, the existence of such prejudice or local

influence must "be made to appear to said circuit court," the affidavit for removal must set forth facts and circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court of the existence of the prejudice and local influence; and an affidavit stating merely affiant's belief or opinion that prejudice or local influence exists is not sufficient. Amy v. Manning, 38 Fed. Rep. 868.

An application for removal from a State court on the ground of local influence and prejudice must be made, and the question of fact tried, in the federal court. Kaitel v. Wylie, 38 Fed. Rep. 865.

A petition for the removal of a cause under the local prejudice clause, which alleges that petitioner cannot obtain justice in the trial court, nor any other in the State to which the case could be removed, is insufficient in not alleging prejudice against the party seeking removal, or influence exerted by the adverse party, and the affidavit accompanying it should state the facts supporting such averments. Goldworthy 7. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769.

Complainants, some of whom were citizens of Pennsylvania, and the remainder aliens, on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of the E. Co., filed a bill in a Tennessee court against the E. Co., a corporation of Tennessee, the R. & D. Co., and the R. & W. Co., both corporations of Virginia, and the directors of the three corporations, citizens of New York, Virginia and Tennessee, for an injunction. The injunction was granted, and, after service thereof, S, a citizen of Tennessee, without the knowledge or consent of complainant's solicitors, obtained an order making him a co-complainant. The R. & D. Co., having filed its answer, removed the suit to the circuit court on the ground that it was a suit pending between I, a citizen of Tennessee, and petitioner, a citizen of Virginia; that the amount of $2,000 was involved; and that by reason of local influence or prejudice petitioner could not obtain justice in the State court. Held, that the cause was improperly removed. Under the act of 1867, as re-enacted in Rev. Stat., § 639, subd. 3, removal on the ground of prejudice or local influence can only be had when all the parties on one side are citizens of different States from those on the other. Thouron v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 673.

As there was no right of removal on

the part of defendants or either of them while the original complainants were the only parties plaintiff, the joinder of S. as co-complainant in a representative suit so brought, in no way changed the character, object, or purpose of the suit, and did not confer on the R. & D. Co. the right to remove the suit. Thouron v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co, 38 Fed. Rep. 673.

The right to a removal of a cause under the local prejudice clause of the act of August 13th, 1888, § 2, is not dependent on the amount involved, there being no provision in relation thereto in such clause. McDermott v. Chicago & N. W. Ry Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 529.

Under the act of March 3rd, 1887, providing for a removal when it shall be made to appear to the circuit court that from prejudice or local influence defendant will not be able to obtain justice in the State court, the question whether there is prejudice, etc., is open to enquiry, and may be determined from the evidence produced by both parties on motion to remand. Dennison T. Brown, 38 Fed. Rep. 535.

An affidavit that defendant has no acquaintance in the county in which the trial in the State court will be had; that plaintiff is well known there as a lawyer and politician, having lived and practiced law at the county seat many years, and having been a candidate for the office of attorney general of the State-does not make a case for removal. Dennison v. Brown, 38 Fed. Rep. 535.

Under act of congress, March 3rd, 1887, providing for the removal of controversies between citizens of different States on the application of a defendant and when it shall be "made to appear" that a fair trial cannot be had in the State court wherein the action is pending, or in any other to which it may be removed under the State law, it is not sufficient that defendant swears posi tively that such prejudice, etc., exists so as to render a fair trial in any State court impossible, without showing the facts on which the averment is based, as the act mentioned is a substitute for the act of 1867, which only required the belief of the applicant in such prejudice to be shown. Amy v. Manning, 38 Fed. Rep. 536.

Act of congress March 3rd, 1887, providing that where there is a controversy in a State court between a citizen of the State wherein the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any de