Catholic Church has its own way of dealing | ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They with this embarrassing problem. It makes a are all full of meaning and vitality to those broad separation between those who can be who orignate them, and to the direct disciples permitted to receive its doctrines on convic- of the originators. Their meaning continues tion, and those who must accept them on to be felt in undiminished strength, and is pertrust. Neither, indeed, are allowed any haps brought out into even fuller consciouschoice as to what they will accept; but the ness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided doctrine or crued an ascendency over other in, may admissibly and meritoriously make creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes themselves acquainted with the arguments of the general opinion, or its progress stops; it opponents, in order to answer them, and may, keeps possession of the ground it has gained, therefore, read heretical books; the laity, not but ceases to spread further. When either of unless by special permission, hard to be ob- these results has become apparent, controtained. This discipline recognizes a knowl-versy on the subject flags, and gradually dies edge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the away. The doctrine has taken its place, if not teachers, but finds means, consistent with as a received opinion, as one of the admitted this, of denying it to the rest of the world: sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold thus giving to the élite more mental culture, it have generally inherited, not adopted it; though not more mental freedom, than it al- and conversion from one of these doctrines to lows to the mass. By this device it succeeds another, being now an exceptional fact, occuin obtaining the kind of mental superiority pies little place in the thoughts of their prowhich its purposes require; for though culture fessors. Instead of being, as at first, conwithout freedom never made a large and lib- stantly on the alert either to defend themselves eral mind, it can make a clever nisi prius against the world, or to bring the world over advocate of a cause. But in countries pro- to them, they have subsided into acquiescence, fessing Protestantism, this resource is denied; and neither listen, when they can help it, to since Protestants hold, at least in theory, that arguments against their creed, nor trouble the responsibility for the choice of a religion dissentients (if there be such) with arguments must be borne by each for himself, and can- in its favor. From this time may usually be not be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, in dated the decline in the living power of the the present state of the world, it is practically | doctrine. We often hear the teachers of all impossible that writings which are read by the creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up instructed can be kept from the uninstructed. If the teachers of mankind are to be cognizant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published without restraint. in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognize, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the If, however, the mischievous operation of creed is still fighting for its existence: even the absence of free discussion, when the re- the weaker combatants then know and feel ceived opinions are true, were confined to what they are fighting for, and the difference leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those between it and other doctrines; and in that opinions, it might be thought that this, if an period of every creed's existence, not a few intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not af- persons may be found, who have realized its fect the worth of the opinions, regarded in fundamental principles in all the forms of their influence on the character. The fact, thought, have weighed and considered them however, is, that not only the grounds of the in all their important bearings, and have exopinion are forgotten in the absence of dis-perienced the full effect on the character, cussion, but too often the meaning of the which belief in that creed ought to produce in opinion itself. The words which convey it, a mind thoroughly imbued with it. But when cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to portion of those they were originally employed be received passively, not actively--when the to communicate. Instead of a vivid concep-mind is no longer compelled, in the same de tion, and a living belief, there remain only agree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the questions which its belief presents to it, the shell and husk only of the meaning is re- there is a progressive tendency to forget all tained, the finer essence being lost. The great of the belief except the formularies, or to give chapter in human history which this fact oc- it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it cupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly stud-on trust dispensed with the necessity of realied and meditated on. izing it in consciousness, or testing it by per It is illustrated in the experience of almost all sonal experience; until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, incrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant. To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realized in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the right in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects-the maxims and precepts contained in the New Testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other a set of every-day judgments and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standard she gives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbor as themselves; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to The doc which it it usual to act upon them. trines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than, other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers-are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ. Now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion of the Roman empire. When their enemies said, 'See how these Christians love one another' (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries, is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of Europeans. Even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ co-exist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. There are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognized sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers. Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field. The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines-those of pru dence and knowledge of life, of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning, when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion: there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who did understand it. The tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their er rors. A cotemporary author has well spoken of the deep slumber of a decided opinion.' But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge? Is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error, to enable any to realize the truth? Does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received-and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains? As soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them? The highest aim and best result of improved intelligence, it has hitherto been thought, is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths: and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object? Do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory? as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous. But though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavoring to provide a substitute for it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for his conversion. But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject-that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to obtain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school disputations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in every respect inferior to the I affirm no such thing. As mankind im- powerful dialectics which formed the intellects prove, the number of doctrines which are no of the 'Socratici viri:' but the modern mind longer disputed or doubted will be constantly owes far more to both than it is generally willon the increase: and the well-being of man- ing to admit, and the present modes of edukind may almost be measured by the number cation contain nothing which in the smallest and gravity of the truths which have reached degree supplies the place either of the one or the point of being uncontested. The cessa- of the other. A person who derives all his tion, on one question after another, of serious instruction from teachers or books, even if he controversy, is one of the necessary incidents escape the besetting temptation of contenting of the consolidation of opinion; a consolida- himself with cram, is under no compulsion to tion as salutary in the case of true opinions, | hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment, even among think- | opinions, on the other hand, are generally ers, to know both sides; and the weakest some of these suppressed and neglected truths, part of what everybody says in defence of his bursting the bonds which kept them down, opinion, is what he intends as a reply to an- and either seeking reconciliation with the tagonists. It is the fashion of the present truth contained in the common opinion, or time to disparage negative logic-that which fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves points out weaknesses in theory or errors in up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole practice, without establishing positive truths. truth. The latter case is hitherto the most Such negative criticism would indeed be poor frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedenough as an ultimate result; but as a means ness has always been the rule, and many-sidedto attaining any positive knowledge or convic-ness the exception. Hence, even in revolution worthy the name, it cannot be valued tions of opinion, one part of the truth usually too highly; and until people are again syste-sets while another rises. Even progress, matically trained to it, there will be few great which ought to superadd, for the most part thinkers, and a low general average of intel- only substitutes, one partial and incomplete lect, in any but the mathematical and physical truth for another; improvement consisting departments of speculation. On any other chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth subject no one's opinions deserve the name of is more wanted, more adapted to the needs knowledge, except so far as he has either had of the time, than that which it displaces. forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. That, therefore, which when absent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse than absurd it is to forego, when spontaneously offering itself! If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwisé ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labor for ourselves. It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. Popular opinions, on subjects not nipable to sense, are often true, but seldom U never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation, every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided assertors too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole. Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration of what is called civilization, and of the marvels of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favor; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau's were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau's doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the | of fair play to all sides of the truth. When popular opinion wanted; and these are the there are persons to be found, who form an deposit which was left behind when the flood exception to the apparent unanimity of the subsided. The superior worth of simplicity of world on any subject, even if the world is in life, the enervating and demoralizing effect of the right, it is always probable that dissenthe trammels and hypocrisies of artificial so-tients have something worth hearing to say ciety, are ideas which have never been en- for themselves, and that truth would lose tirely absent from cultivated minds since something by their silence. Rousseau wrote; and they will in time pro- It may be objected, 'But some received duce their due effect, though at present need-principles, especially on the highest and most ing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power. vital subjects, are more than half-truths. The Christian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that subject, and if any one teaches a morality, which varies from it, he is wholly in error.' As this is of all cases the most important in practice, none can be fitter to test the general maxim. But before pronouncing what Christian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what is meant by Christian morality. If it means the moral ity of the New Testament, I wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose that it was an nounced, or intended, as a complete doctrine of morals. The Gospel always refers to a pre existing morality, and confines its precepts t the particulars in which that morality was t be corrected, or superseded by a wider and higher; expressing itself, moreover, in term In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individual-most general, often impossible to be inter ity, to liberty and discipline, and all the other preted literally, and possessing rather the in standing antagonisms of practical life, are pressiveness of poetry or eloquence than th expressed with equal freedom, and enforced precision of legislation. To extract from it and defended with equal talent and energy, body of ethical doctrine, has never been poss there is no chance of both elements obtaining ble without eking it out from the Old Test their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the ment, that is, from a system elaborate indee other down. Truth, in the great practical con- but in many respects barbarous, and intende cerns of life, is so much a question of the recon- only for a barbarous people. St. Paul, a d ciling and combining of opposites, that very clared enemy to this Judaical mode of inte few have minds sufficiently capacious and im- preting the doctrine and filling up the schen partial to make the adjustment with an ap- of his Master, equally assumes a pre-existin proach to correctness, and it has to be made by morality, namely that of the Greeks and R the rough process of a struggle between com- mans; and his advice to Christians is in batants fighting under hostile banners. On any great measure a system of accommodation of the great open questions just enumerated, that; even to the extent of giving an app if either of the two opinions has a better claim ent sanction to slavery. What is call than the other, not merely to be tolerated, Christian, but should rather be termed th but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is logical, morality, was not the work of Chr the one which happens at the particular time or the Apostles, but is of much later orig and place to be in a minority. That is the having been gradually built up by the Cat opinion which, for the time being, represents lic Church of the first five centuries, a the neglected interests, the side of human well-though not implicitly adopted by moderns a being which is in danger of obtaining less than Protestants, has been much less modified its share. I am aware that there is not, in them than might have been expected. this country, any intolerance of differences of the most part, indeed, they have conten ⚫ opinion on most of these topics. They are ad- themselves with cutting off the additi duced to show, by admitted and multiplied which had been made to it in the Middle A examples, the universality of the fact, that each sect supplying the place by fresh a only through diversity of opinion is there, in tions, adapted to its own character and the existing state of human intellect, a chance dencies. That mankind owe a great deb |