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mons had no legal authority to establish the prece- | But it seems he received upon the spot a sufficient dent; and the precedent itself is a mere fact, without chastisement for exercising so unfairly his talents of any proof of right whatsoever.

Your correspondent concludes with a question of the simplest nature: Must a thing be wrong because it has never been done before? No. But, admitting it were proper to be done, that alone does not convey an authority to do it. As to the present case, I hope I shall never see the time, when not only a single person, but a whole county, and, in effect, the entire collective body of the people, may again be robbed of their birth-right by a vote of the house of commons. But if, for reasons which I am unable to comprehend, it be necessary to trust that house with a power so exorbitant and so unconstitutional, at least let it be given them by an act of the legislature.

PHILO JUNIUS.

LETTER XVIII.

TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, SOLICITOR GENERAL TO
July 29, 1769.

SIR,

HER MAJESTY.

misrepresentation. You are a lawyer, sir, and know better than I do upon what particular occasions a talent for misrepresentation may be fairly exerted; but to punish a man a second time, when he has been once sufficiently chastised, is rather too severe. It is not in the laws of England; it is not in your own Commentaries; nor is it yet, I believe, in the new law you have revealed to the house of commons. I hope this doctrint has no existence bue in your own heart. After all, sir, if you had consulted that sober discretion which you seem to oppose with triumph to the honest jollity of a tavern, it might have occurred to you, that, although you could have succeeded in fixing a charge of inconsistence upon Mr. Grenville, it would not have tended in any shape to exculpate yourself.

Your next insinuation, that sir William Meredith had hastily adopted the false glosses of his new ally, is of the same sort with the first. It conveys a sneer, as little worthy of the gravity of your character, as it is useless to your defense. It is of little moment I shall make you no apology for considering a cer- to the public to inquire by whom the charge was contain pamphlet, in which your late conduct is de-ceived, or by whom it was adopted. The only quesfended, as written by yourself. The personal inter- tion we ask is, whether or not it be true? The reest, the personal resentments, and, above all, that mainder of your reflections upon Mr. Grenville's conwounded spirit, unaccustomed to reproach, and, I duct destroy themselves. He could not possibly come hope, not frequently conscious of deserving it, are prepared to traduce your integrity to the house; he signals which betray the author to us as plainly as if could not foresee that you would even speak upon your name were in the title page. You appeal to the the question; much less could he foresee that you public in defense of your reputation. We hold it, sir, would maintain a direct contradiction of that docthat an injury offered to an individual is interesting trine which you had solemnly, disinterestedly, and, to society. On this principle, the people of England upon the soberest reflection, delivered to the public. made common cause with Mr. Wilkes. On this prin- He came armed, indeed, with what he thought a reciple, if you are injured they will join in your re- spectable authority, to support what he was consentment. I shall not follow you through the insipid vinced was the cause of truth; and, I doubt not, he form of a third person, but address myself to you intended to give you, in the course of the debate, an directly. an honorable and public testimony of his esteem. Thinking highly of his abilities, I cannot, however, allow him the gift of divination. As to what you are pleased to call a plan, coolly formed, to impose upon the house of commons, and his producing it, without provocation, at midnight, I consider it as the language of pique and invective, therefore unworthy of regard. But, sir, I am sensible I have followed your example too long, and wandered from the point.

You seem to think the channel of a pamphlet more respectable, and better suited to the dignity of your cause, than that of a newspaper. Be it so. Yet, if newspapers are scurrilous, you must confess they are impartial. They give us, without any apparent preference, the wit and argument of the ministry, as well as the abusive dullness of the opposition. The scales are equally poised. It is not the printer's fault if the greater weight inclines the balance.

The quotation from your Commentaries is matter Your pamphlet, then, is divided into an attack of record: it can neither be altered by your friends, upon Mr. Grenville's character, and a defense of your nor misrepresented by your enemies: and I am will own. It would have been more consistent, perhaps, ing to take your own word for what you have said in with your professed intention, to have confined your- the house of commons. If there be a real difference self to the last. But anger has some claim to in-between what you have written, and what you have dulgence, and railing is usually a relief to the mind. I hope you have found benefit from the experiment. It is not my design to enter into a formal vindication of Mr. Grenville upon his own principles. I have neither the honor of being personally known to him, nor do I pretend to be completely master of all the facts. I need not run the risk of doing an injustice to his opinions, or to his conduct, when your pamphlet alone carries, upon the face of it, a full vindication

spoken, you confess that your book ought to be the standard. Now, sir, if words mean any thing, I apprehend, that when a long enumeration of disqualifications (whether by statute or the custom of parliament) concludes with these general comprehensive words, "but subject to these restrictions and disqualifications, every subject of the realm is eligible of common right," a reader, of plain understanding, must of course rest satisfied that no species of disqualification whatsoever had been omitted. The Your first reflection is, that Mr. Grenville* was, known character of the author, and the apparent acof all men, the person who should not have com-curacy with which the whole work is compiled, plained of inconsistence with regard to Mr. Wilkes. would confirm him in his opinion: nor could he posThis, sir, is either an unmeaning sneer, a peevish ex- sibly form any other judgment, without looking upon pression of resentment; or, if it means anything, your Commentaries in the same light in which you you plainly beg the question; for whether his par-consider those penal laws, which, though not reliamentary conduct, with regard to Mr. Wilkes, has pealed, are fallen into disuse, and are now, in effect, or has not been inconsistent remains yet to be proved. a snare to the unwary.*

of both.

*Mr. Grenville had quoted a passage from the doctor's excellent Commentaries, which directiy contradicted the doctrine maintained by the Coctor in the house of com

mons.

* If, in stating the law upon any point, a judge deliberately affirms that he has included every case, and it should appear that he has purposely omitted a materiai case, he does, in effect, lay a snare for the unwary.

You tell us, indeed, that it was not part of your him for a bad reasoner. Junius does not say that it plan to specify any temporary incapacity; and that was incumbent upon doctor Blackstone to foresee you could not, without a spirit of prophecy, have and state the crimes for which Mr. Wilkes was exspecified the disability of a private individual sub-pelled. If, by a spirit of prophecy, he had even done sequent to the period at which you wrote. What so, it would have been nothing to the purpose. The your plan was I know not; but what it should have question is, not for what particular offenses a person been, in order to complete the work you have given may be expelled, but, generally, whether by the law us, is by no means difficult to determine. The in- of parliament expulsion alone creates a disqualifica capacity, which you call temporary, may continue tion. If the affirmative be the law of parliament, seven years; and though you might not have fore- doctor Blackstone might and should have told us so. seen the particular case of Mr. Wilkes, you might, The question is not confined to this or that particuand should, have foreseen the possibility of such a lar person, but forms one great general branch of case, and toid us how far the house of commons were disqualification, too important in itself, and too exauthorized to proceed in it by the law and custom of tensive in its consequences, to be omitted in an accuparliament. The freeholders of Middlesex would rate work expressly treating of the law of parliathen have known what they had to trust to, and ment. would never have returned Mr. Wilkes, when colonel Luttrell was a candidate against him. They would have chosen some indifferent person, rather than submit to be represented by the object of their contempt and detestation.

Your attempt to distinguish between disabilities which affect whole classes of men, and those which affect individuals only, is really unworthy of your understanding. Your Commentaries had taught me, that, although the instance in which a penal law is exerted, be particular, the laws themselves are general: they are made for the benefit and instruction of the public, though the penalty falls only upon an individual. You cannot but know, sir, that what was Mr. Wilkes's case yesterday may be yours or mine to-morrow, and that, consequently, the common right of every subject of the realm is invaded by it. Professing, therefore, to treat of the constitution of the house of commons, and of the laws and customs relative to that constitution, you certainly were guilty of a most unpardonable omission, in taking no notice of a right and privilege of the house more extraordinary and more arbitrary than all the others they possess put together. If the expulsion of member, not under any legal disability, of itself creates in him an incapacity to be elected, I see a ready way marked out, by which the majority may, at any time, remove the honestest and ablest men who happen to be in opposition to them. To say that they will not make this extravagant use of their power would be a language unfit for a man so learned in the laws as you are. By your doctrine, sir, they have the power and laws, you know, are intended to guard against what men may do, not to trust to what they will do.

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The truth of the matter is evidently this: doctor Blackstone, while he was speaking in the house of commons, never once thought of his Commentaries, until the contradiction was unexpectedly urged, and stared him in the face. Instead of defending himself upon the spot, he sunk under the charge in an agony of confusion and despair. It was well known that there was a pause of some minutes in the house, from a general expectation that the doctor would say something in his own defense; but it seems his faculties were too much overpowered to think of those subtleties and refinements which have since occurred to him. It was then Mr. Grenville received that severe chastisement which the doctor mentions with so much triumph: I wish the honorable yentleman, instead of shaking his head, would shake a good argument out of it. If to the elegance, novelty, and bitterness of this ingenious sarcasm, we add the natural melody of the amiable sir Fletcher Norton's pipe, we shall not be surprised that Mr. Grenville was unable to make him any reply.

As to the doctor, I would recommend it to him to be quiet. If not, he may, perhaps, hear again from PHILO JUNIUS.

Junius himself.

Postscript to a pamphlet entitled An Answer to a
Question stated; supposed to be written by Dr.
Blackstone, solicitor to the queen, in answer to
Junius's letter.

Since these papers were sent to the press, a writer, in the public papers, who subscribes himself Junius, has made a feint of bringing this question to a short issue. Though the foregoing observations contain. in Upon the whole, sir, the charge against you is of a my opinion at least, a full refutation of all that this plain, simple nature; it appears even upon the face writer has offered, I shall, however, bestow a very few of your own pamphlet. On the contrary, your justi- words upon him. It will cost me very little trouble fication of yourself is full of subtlety and refinement, to unravel and expose the sophistry of his argument. and in some places not very intelligible. If I were "I take the question," says he, "to be strictly this: personally your enemy, I should dwell with a malig- Whether or no it be the known established law of nant pleasure upon those great and useful qualifica-parliament, that the expulsion of a member of the tions which you certainly possess, and by which you house of commons, of itself, creates in him such an have once acquired, though they could not preserve to incapacity to be re-elected, that, at a subsequent elecyou the respect and esteem of your country; I should tion, any votes given to him are null and void; and enumerate the honors you have lost, and the virtues that any other candidate, who, except the person exyou have disgraced; but, having no private resent-pelled has the greatest number of votes, ought to be ments to gratify, I think it sufficient to have given the sitting member." my opinion of your public conduct, leaving the punishment it deserves to your closet and to yourself

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Waiving, for the present, any objection I may have to this state of the question, I shall venture to meet our champion upon his own ground; and attempt to support the affirmative of it, in one of the two ways by which he says it can be alone fairly supported. "If there be no statute," says he, "in which the Knowledge there is none) the custom of parliament specific disability is clearly created, etc. (and we acmust then be referred to; and some case, or cases, strictly in point, must be produced, with the decision of the court upon them." Now I assert that this has

been done. Mr. Walpole's case is strictly in point, to prove that expulsion creates absolute incapacity of being re-elected. This was the clear decision of the house upon it; and was a full declaration that in capacity was the necessary consequence of expulsion. The law was as clearly and firmly fixed by this resolution, and is as binding in every subsequent case of expulsion, as if it had been declared by an express statute that a "member, expelled by a resolution of the house of commons, shall be deemed incapable of being re-elected." What ever doubt, then, there might have been of the law, before Mr. Walpole's case, with respect to the full operation of a vote of expulsion, there can be none now. The decision of the house, upon this case, is strictly in point, to prove that expulsion creates absolute incapacity in law or being re-elected.

null and void; and that his competitor ought to have been returned, No, says a great orator, first show me your law for this proceeding Either produce me a statute, in which the specific disability of a clergyman is created; or produce me a precedent, where a clergyman has been returned, and another candidate, with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member. No such statute, no such precedent, to be found. What answer then is to be given to this demand? The very same answer which I will give to that of Junius. That there is more than one precedent in the proceedings of the house," where an incapable person has been returned, and another candidate, with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member; and that this is the known and established law, in all cases of incapacity, from whatever cause it may arise."

I shall now, therefore, beg leave to make a slight amendment to Junius's state of the question, the affirmative of which will then stand thus: "It is the known and established law of parlia

But incapacity in law, in this instance, must have the same operation and effect with incapacity in law in every other instance. Now, incapacity of being re-elected implies, in its very terms, that any votes given to the incapable person, at a subsequent elec-ment, that the expulsion of any member of the house tion, are null and void. This is its necessary operation, or it has no operation at all: it is vox et præterea nihil. We can no more be called upon to prove this proposition, than we can to prove that a dead man is not alive, or that twice two are four. When the terms are understood, the proposition is self-evident. Lastly, it is, in all cases of election, the known and established law of the land, grounded upon the clearest principles of reason and common sense, that if the votes given to one candidate are null and void, they cannot be opposed to the votes given to another candidate; they cannot affect the votes of such candidate at all. As they have, on the one hand, no positive quality to add or establish, so have they, on the other hand, no negative one to substract or destroy. They are, in a word, a mere nonentity. Such was the determination of the house of commons in the Malden and Bedford election; cases strictly in point to the present question, as far as they are meant to be in point; and to say that they are not in point in all circumstances, in those particularly which are independent of the proposition which they are quoted to prove, is to say no more than that Malden is not Middlesex, nor serjeant Comyns Mr. Wilkes.

Let us see then how our proof stands. Expulsion creates incapacity, incapacity annihilates any votes given to the incapable person; the votes given to the qualified candidate stand, upon their own bottom, firm and untouched, and can alone have effect. This, one would think, would be sufficient. But we are stopped short, and told that none of our precedents come home to the present case, and are challenged to produce "a precedent in all the proceedings of the house of commons that does come home to it, viz.: where an expelled member has been returned again, and another candidate, with an inferior number of votes, has been declared the sitting member."

Instead of a precedent, I will beg leave to put a case, which, I fancy, will be quite as decisive to the present point. Suppose another Sacheverel (and every party must have its Sacheverell) should, at some future election, take it into his head to offer himself a candidate for the county of Middlesex. He is opposed by a candidate whose coat is of a different color, but, however, of a very good color. The divine has an indisputable majority; nay, the poor layman is absolutely distanced. The sheriff, after having had his conscience well informed by the reverend casuist, returns him, as he supposes, duly elected. The whole house is in an uproar at the apprehension of so strange an appearance amongst them. A motion, however, is at length made, that the person was incapable of being elected; that his election, therefore, is

of commons creates in him an incapacity of being re-
elected; that any votes given to him at a subsequent
election are, in consequence of such incapacity, null
and void; and that any other candidate, who, except
the person rendered incapable, has the greatest num-
ber of votes, ought to be the sitting member."
But our business is not yet quite finished. Mr.
Walpole's case must have a re-hearing. "It is not
possible," says the writer," to conceive a case more ex-
actly in point. Mr. Walpole was expelled, and, hav-
ing a majority of votes at the next election, was re-
turned again. The friends of Mr. Taylor, a candidate
set up by the ministry, petitioned the house that he
might be the sitting member. Thus far the circum-
stances tally exactly, except that our house of com-
mons saved Mr. Luttrell the trouble of petitioning.
The point of law, however, was the same.
It came
regularly before the house, and it was their business
to determine upon it. They did determine it ; for
they declared Mr. Taylor not duly elected."

Instead of examining the justness of this representation, I shall beg leave to oppose against it my own view of this case, in as plain a manner and as few words as I am able.

It was the known and established law of parliament, when the charge against Mr. Walpole came before the house of commons, that they had power to expel, to disable, and to render incapable for offenses. In virtue of this power they expelled him.

Had they, in the very vote of expulsion, adjudged him, in terms, to be incapable of being re-elected, there must have been at once an end with him. But though the right of the house, both to expel and adjudge him incapable, was clear and indubitable, it does not appear to me that the full operation and effect of a vote of expulsion singly was so. The law in this case had never been expressly declared; there had been no event to call up such a declaration. I trouble not myself with the grammatical meaning of the word expulsion; I regard only its legal meaning. This was not, as I think, precisely fixed. The house thought proper to fix it, and explicitly to declare the full consequences of their former vote, before they suffered these consequences to take effect: and in this proceeding they acted upon the most liberal and solid principles of equity, justice, and law. What then did the burgesses of Lynn collect from the second vote? Their subsequent conduct will tell us: it will with certainty tell us that they considered it as decisive against Mr. Walpole. It will also, with equal certainty, tell us, that, upon a supposition that the law of election stood then as it does now, that they knew it to stand thus, they inferred, “that,

and

at a future election, and in case of a similar return, the house would receive the same candidate, as duly elected, whom they had before rejected." They could infer nothing but this.

The writer of the volume in question meets me upon my own ground. He acknowledges there is no statute by which the specific disability we speak of is created; but he affirms, that the custom of parliament has been referred to, and that a case strictly in point has been produced with the decision of the court upon it. I thank him for coming so fairly to the point. He asserts, that the case of Mr. Walpole is strictly in point, to prove that expulsion creates an absolute incapacity of being re-elected; and for this

It is needless to repeat the circumstance of dissimilarity in the present case: it will be sufficient to observe, that, as the law of parliament, upon which the house of commons grounded every step of their proceedings, was clear beyond the reach of doubt, so neither could the freeholders of Middlesex be at a loss to foresee what must be the inevitable conse-purpose he refers generally to the first vote of the quence of their proceedings in opposition to it; for, upon every return of Mr. Wilkes, the house made inquiry whether any votes were given to any other candidate.

But I could venture, for the experiment's sake, even to give this writer the utmost he asks; to allow the most perfect similarity throughout, in these two cases; to allow that the law of expulsion was quite as clear to the burgesses of Lynn as to the freeholders of Middlesex. It will, I am confident, avail his cause but little. It will only prove, that the law of election, at that time, was different from the present law. It will prove, that, in all cases of an incapable candidate returned, the law then was, that the whole election should be void. But now we know that this is not law. The cases of Malden and Belford were, as has been seen, determined upon other and more just principles; and these determinations are, I imagine, admitted on all sides to be law.

I would willingly draw a veil over the remaining part of this paper. It is astonishing, it is painful, to see men of parts and ability giving in to the most unworthy artifices, and descending so much below their true line of character. But, if they are not the dupes of their sophistry, (which is hardly to be conceived) let them consider that they are something much worse.

The dearest interests of this country are its laws and its constitution. Against every attack upon these, there will, I hope, be always found amongst us the firmest spirit of resistance, superior to the united efforts of faction and ambition: for ambition, though it does not always take the lead of faction, will be sure, in the end, to make the most fatal advantage of it, and draw it to its own purposes. But, I trust, our day of trial is yet far off; and there is a fund of good sense in this country which cannot long be deceived by the arts either of false reasoning or false patriotism.

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The gentleman who has published an answer to Sir William Meredith's pamphlet, having honored me with a postscript of six quarto pages, which he modestly calls bestowing a very few words upon me, I cannot, in common politeness, refuse him a reply. The form and magnitude of a quarto imposes upon the mind; and men, who are unequal to the labor of discussing an intricate argument, or wish to avoid it, are willing enough to suppose that much has been proved, because much has been said. Mine, I confess, are humble labors: I do not presume to instruct the learned, but simply to inform the body of the people; and I prefer that channel of conveyance which is likely to spread farthest among them. The advocates of the ministry seem to me to write for fame, and to flatter themselves, that the size of their works will make them immortal. They pile up reluctant quarto upon solid folio, as if their labors, because they are gigantic, could contend with truth and heaven.

house upon that occasion, without venturing to recite the vote itself. The unfair, disingenuous artifice of adopting that part of a precedent which seems to suit his purpose, and omitting the remainder, deserves some pity, but cannot excite my resentment. He takes advantage eagerly of the first resolution, by which Mr. Walpole's incapacity is declared; but as to the two following, by which the candidate with the fewest votes was declared "not duly elected," and the election itself vacated, I dare say he would be well satisfied if they were for ever blotted out of the journals of the house of commons. In fair argument, no part of a precedent should be admitted, unless the whole of it be given to us together. The author has divided his precedent; for he knew, that, taken together, it produced a consequence directly the reverse of that which he endeavors to draw from a vote of expulsion. But what will this honest person say, if I take him at his word, and demonstrate to him, that the house of commons never meant to found Mr. Walpole's incapacity upon his expulsion only? What subterfuge will then remain?

Let it be remembered, that we are speaking of the intention of men who lived more than half a century ago; and that such intention can only be collected from their words and actions, as they are delivered to us upon record. To prove their designs by a supposition of what they would have done, opposed to what they actually did, is mere trifling and impertinence. The vote by which Mr. Walpole's incapacity was declared is thus expressed: "That Robert Walpole, esq.. having been, this session of parliament, committed a prisoner to the Tower, and expelled this house for a breach of trust in the execution of his office, and notorious corruption, when secretary at war, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present parliament."* Now, sir, to my understanding, no proposition of this kind can be more evident, than that the house of commons, by this very vote, themselves understood, and meant to declare, that Mr. Walpole's incapacity arose from the crimes he had committed, not from the punishment the house annexed to them. The high breach of trust, the notorious corruption, are stated in the strongest terms. They do not tell us that he was incapable because he was expelled, but because be had been guilty of such offenses as justly rendered him unworthy of a seat in parliament. If they had intended to fix the disability upon his expulsion alone, the mention of his crimes in the same vote would have been highly improper. It could only perplex the minds of the electors, who, if they col lected any thing from so confused a declaration of the law of parliament, must have concluded, that their representative had been declared incapable be

*

certain quarto, called The Case of the last Election for the It is well worth remarking, that the compiler of a County of Middlesex considered,has the impudence to re cite this very vote in the following terms (vide page 11: session of parliament expelled the house, was, and is in"Resolved, that Robert Walpole, esq., having been this capable of being elected a member to serve in the pres ent parliament." There cannot be a stronger positive proof of the treachery of the compiler, nor a stronger presumptive proof that he was convinced that the vote, if duly recited, would overturn his whole argument.

cause he was highly guilty, not because he had been | of a public office, was, and ought to be, incapable of punished. But, even admitting them to have un- sitting in the same parliament. Far from attemptderstood it in the other sense, they must then, from ing to invalidate that vote, I should have wished that the very terms of the vote, have united the idea of the incapacity declared by it could legally have been his being sent to the Tower with that of his ex- continued for ever. pulsion; and considered his incapacity as the joint effect of both.*

I do not mean to give an opinion upon the justice of the proceedings of the house of commons with regard to Mr. Walpole; but certainly, if I admitted their censure to be well founded, I could no way avoid agreeing with them in the consequence they drew from it. I could never have a doubt, in law or reason, that a man convicted of a high breach of trust, and of a notorious corruption, in the execution

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Now, sir, observe how forcibly the argument returns. The house of commons, upon the face of their proceedings, had the strongest motives to declare Mr. Walpole incapable of being re-elected. They thought such a man unworthy to sit among them. To that point they proceeded, and no farther; for they respected the rights of the people, while they asserted their own. They did not infer, from Mr. Walpole's incapacity, that his opponent was duly elected; on the contrary, they declared Mr. Taylor not duly elected," and the election itself void. Such, however, is the precedent which my honest • ADDRESSED TO THE PRINTER OF THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER. friend assures us is strictly in point, to prove, that exSIR, May 22, 1771. pulsion of itself creates an incapacity of being elected. Very early in the debate upon the decision of the If it had been so, the present house of commons Middlesex election, it was observed by Junius, that the should at least have followed strictly the example house of commons had not only exceeded their boasted precedent of the expulsion and subsequent in- before them, and should have stated to us, in the capacitation of Mr. Walpole, but that they had not even same vote, the crimes for which they expelled Mr. adhered to it strictly as far as it went. After convicting Wilkes: whereas they resolve simply, that, "having Mr. Dyson of giving a false quotation from the journals, and having explained the purpose which that contemp- been expelled, he was and is incapable." In this tible fraud was intended to answer, he proceeds to state proceeding, I am authorized to affirm, they have the vote itself by which Mr. Walpole's supposed incapa- neither statute, nor custom, nor reason nor one city was declared, viz., “Resolved, that Robert Walpole, esq., having been this session of parliament committed a single precedent to support them. On the other side, prisoner to the Tower, and expelled this house for a high there is, indeed, a precedent so strongly in point, breach of trust in the execution of his office, and notori- that all the enchanted castles of ministerial magic ous corruption when secretary at war, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this pres- fall before it. In the year 1698 (a period which the ent parliament:" and then observes, that, from the rankest Tory dares not except against) Mr. Wollasterms of the vote, we have no right to annex the incapaci- ton was expelled, re-elected, and admitted to take tation to the expulsion only; for that, as the proposition stands, it must arise equally from the expulsion and the his seat in the same parliament. The ministry have commitment to the Tower. I believe, sir, no man, who precluded themselves from all objections drawn from knows anything of dialectics, or who understands Eng- the cause of his expulsion; for they affirm absolutely, lish, will dispute the truth and fairness of this construction. But Junius has a great authority to support him, that expulsion, of itself, creates the disability. which, to speak with the duke of Grafton, I accidentally Now, sir, let sophistry evade, let falsehood assert, and met with this morning in the course of my reading. It impudence deny; here stands the precedent: a landcontains an admonition, which cannot be repeated too often. Lord Sommers, in his excellent tract upon the mark to direct us through a troubled sea of controRights of the People, after reciting the votes of the con- versy, conspicuous and unremoved. vention of the 28th of January, 1689, viz.: "That king James the Second, having endeavored to subvert the constitution of this kingdom, by breaking the original contract between king and people, and, by the advice of Jesuits, and other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself, out of this kingdom, hath abdicated the government," etc.makes this observation upon it: "The word abdicated relates to all the clauses foregoing, as well as to his deserting the kingdom, or else they would have been wholly in vain." And that there might be no pretence for confirming the abdication merely to the withdrawing, lord Sommers' father observes, That king James, by refusing to govern us according to that law by which he held the crown, did impliedly renounce his title to it. Junius's construction of the vote against Mr. Walpole be now admitted (and, indeed, I cannot comprehend how it can honestly be disputed) the advocates of the house of commons must either give up their precedent entirely, or be reduced to the necessity of maintaining one of the grossest absurdities imaginable, viz.: "That a commitment to the Tower is a constituent part of, and contributes half at least to the incapacitation of the person I need not make you any excuse for endeavoring to keep alive the attention of the public to the decision of the Middlesex election. The more I consider it, the more I am convinced, that, as a fact, it is indeed highly injurious to the rights of the people; but that, as a precedent, it is one of the most dangerous that ever was established against those who are to come after us. Yet, I am so far a moderate man, that I verily believe the majority of the house of commons, when they passed this dangerous vote, neither understood the question, or knew the consequence of what they were doing. Their motives were rather despicable than criminal, in the extreme. One effect they certainly did not foresee. They are now reduced to such a situation, that if a member of the present house of commons were to conduct himself ever so improperly, and, in reality, deserve to be sent back to his constituents with a mark of disgrace, they would not dare to expel him; because they know that the people, in order to try again the great question of right, or to thwart an odious house of commons, would probably overlook his immediate unworthiness, and re

who suffers it.

I have dwelt the longer upon the discussion of this point, because, in my opinion, it comprehends the whole question. The rest is unworthy of notice. We are inquiring whether incapacity be, or be not, created by expulsion. In the cases of Bedford and Malden, the incapacity of the persons returned was matter of public notoriety, for it was created by act of parliament. But really, sir, my honest friend's suppositions are as unfavorable to him as his facts. He well knows that the clergy, besides that they are represented in common with their fellow subjects, have also a separate parliament of their own; that their incapacity to sit in the house of commons has been confirmed by repeated decisions of that house; and that the law of parliament, declared by those decisions, has been, for above two centuries, notorious and undisputed. The author is certainly at liberty to fancy cases, and make whatever comparisons he thinks proper: his suppositions still continue as distant from fact as his wild discourses are from solid argument.

The conclusion of his book is candid to an extreme. He offers to grant me all I desire. He thinks he may safely admit, that the case of Mr. Walpole makes directly against him; for it seems he has one grand solution in petto for all difficulties. "If (says turn the same person to parliament. But, in time, the precedent will gain strength; a future house of commons will have no such apprehensions; consequently, will not scruple to follow a precedent which they did not estab lish. The miser himself seldom lives to enjoy the fruit of his extortion, but his heir succeeds to him of course, and takes possession without censure. No man expects him to make restitution; and, no matter for his title, he lives quietly.upon the estate.

PHILO JUNIUS.

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