217 Opinion of the Court In the brief for defendant, filed March 27, 1939, counsel stated: He [Goltra] also claims rental for the facilities themselves which belong to the defendant. To endeavor to charge the Government with rent for the unloading facilities which the Government itself owned, is in itself a complete demonstration of the extreme and fantastic character of the contentions advanced on some branches of this claim. One might as well confront the owner of a residence with a bill for rent! Counsel for the Government now urge that the foregoing statements indicate failure of consideration for any possible sale based upon the 1930 negotiations. The matters advanced deal with a theory not pleaded in the earlier Goltra case, and not proved at trial. The evidence submitted both at the trial of the earlier and the instant case shows that after August 31, 1930, Goltra and his successors in interest treated the crane as belonging to them, while the Government treated the crane as having been disposed of by it. Goltra's pleadings in the former case followed this theory. Statements unrelated to the joined issues of the prior action made by counsel in briefing that case under court rules allowing pleading of alternative positions based upon contrary assumptions of fact are entitled to little weight, particularly when there exists no indication whatever that the court in the earlier case accepted such statements of counsel as fact and acted upon them. Whatever weight may be assigned plaintiff's inconsistencies would bear primarily upon the question of adverse possession rather than upon the question of consideration. So far as the 1930 transaction is concerned, there was either a sale then, or there was not. If the transaction between Goltra and the Government amounted to a sale in 1930, it is immaterial what they, in 1939, thought they had done. A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to a contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which such assent is manifested must be done with the intent to do those acts; but, generally, neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor real or apparent intent Opinion of the Court 119 C. Cls. that the promises shall be legally binding is essential. Restatement of Contracts, § 20. It is clear that were private parties involved here plaintiffs' right to the crane by the mere fact of asserted ownership since 1930 would be such that, in all probability, there would have been no lawsuit. The Government, however, benefits from the long-established principle that statutes of limitations, adverse possession, laches, and the unauthorized acts of agents do not militate against its rights. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U. S. 414; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 408-9. Since there seems to be no basis for concluding that, as has been suggested, the Act of June 3, 1924 (43 Stat. 360), transferred title to the crane to the Inland Waterways Corporation, the peculiar questions which arise when the sovereign is party to a suit must be resolved. A primary consideration is whether or not the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War, or either of them, had authority to dispose of the crane. If they did not, their ostensible agency may not be invoked to bind the United States. If either official possessed authority to dispose of the crane, it then becomes necessary to determine whether or not they exercised that power. Plaintiffs and defendant agree that the Chief of Engineers possessed authority to enter into the contracts for lease and sale of the barges, towboats, and unloading facilities, and that this power was derived from the Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 182, as amended, which, as a wartime measure, authorized the President to buy, build, or requisition ships, plants, and material, providing further that: All ships constructed, purchased, or requisitioned under authority herein, or heretofore or hereafter acquired by the United States, shall be managed, operated, and disposed of as the President may direct. The President's statutory authority was delegated by Executive Order to the Secretary of War (See Exec. Orders 2644, July 11, 1917; 3018, Dec. 3, 1918; 3063, March 12, 1919; 3064, 1 The Missouri Statute of Limitations applying to actions involving personal property is 5 years; involving real property, 10 years. Rev. St. Mo. Secs. 1002-B and 1014. 217 Opinion of the Court March 12, 1919). The Act of June 15, 1917, supra, defined "plant" to include: any ** discharging terminal and any facilities. or improvements connected with any of the foregoing descriptions of property. Although specifically authorizing the President to manage, operate, and dispose of ships acquired under the Act, no such use and disposal provision was included to cover plants, and it has been urged here that the Secretary of War never possessed authority to dispose of terminal facilities. It was the contemporaneous and, we believe, the correct interpretation of the Act that the power to manage, operate, and dispose of plants acquired under the Act was included in the grant of power to so deal with the ships which the plants were designed to service. Any other interpretation would have resulted in denial of the power of plant acquisition and ship operation, and would have presented the ridiculous situation of a Government agency empowered to acquire facilities. needed in the war effort-but not authorized to use the facilities acquired, or to dispose of them at the end of their usefulness. Where a reasonable meaning is possible, a statutory interpretation leading to absurd results is to be avoided. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364, 370. The defendant relies heavily upon the fact that the Act from which the Chief of Engineers (as subordinate to the Secretary of War) ultimately derived his authority to enter into the contract, expired 6 months after the conclusion of war with the German Empire 2 and that the Act itself was repealed long prior to 1930. We think this theory is inapplicable here because the power conferred by the Act of June 15, 1917, to manage, operate, and dispose, was exercised when the contract for lease with option to purchase was entered into. Once the power was properly exercised, the subsequent expiration of authority became immaterial. The termination of power in the President and his delegated subordinates to enter further agreements of this kind took no validity away from a subsisting contract entered into War with the German Empire was officially ended by joint resolution of both houses of Congress signed by the President on July 2, 1921. 953606-51-18 Opinion of the Court 119 C. Cls. while the Act remained in full force. The authority of the Chief of Engineers to bind the United States as contracting officer in this particular transaction has never been questioned. Having the power to represent the Government in making the contract, the Chief of Engineers had the power to negotiate and enter into a modification or settlement of the contract in the interest of the United States. United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U. S. 321. The Government's 5-year lease of Goltra's crane site expired July 14, 1927. At its expiration, the United States had the right under the contract to a renewal, under which it would be liable for rent, or the right to remove the crane from Goltra's property. Neither was done until 1930, the Government evidently awaiting the conclusion of litigation. In that year the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers concurred in disposing of the gantry crane and in the settlement of the Goltra rent claims. Although the parties involved in 1930 and those litigating here employ the word "abandon" when speaking of the Government's disposition of the crane, it is clear that there was in this case no abandonment in the strict legal sense. The legal concept of abandonment is not met without a showing that the article was given up with the idea that it should return to the public domain, or with no idea at all except that the owner was dispossessing himself of it. There can be no abandonment of property to another. Abandonment must be made by the owner, without being pressed by any duty, necessity, or utility to himself, but simply because he no longer desires to possess the thing; and, further, it must be made without any desire that any other person shall acquire the same; for if it were made for a consideration it would be a sale or barter, and if without consideration, but with intention that some other person should become possessor, it would be a gift. Stephens v. Mansfield, 11 Cal. 363. We need not, therefore, consider whether or not the Government officials involved here possessed the authority to abandon Government property, because, clearly, no abandonment occurred or was intended. The record contains no hint of any purported relinquishment of the crane into the mass of the public domain with no care or thought of who the next appropri 217 Opinion of the Court ator might be. The disposition of the crane was to Goltra, and that disposition was either a gift or a sale. Because of the presence of an offer, acceptance and consideration, we hold it to have been a sale. Goltra's letter of February 13, 1930, was an offer to release rental claims in return for the crane. Goltra had a claim for rental for use of his property. The Secretary of War's reply was not an outright rejection of Goltra's offer, although it could have been so construed by Goltra, who had conditioned his offer upon the Government's "immediate release” to him of the unloading facilities. This question becomes unimportant in the light of the Acting Secretary of War's letter of August 13, 1930. That letter referred to the prior conversations and correspondence with Goltra, thus reviving those terms and constituting a new offer if not an acceptance of Goltra's original offer. Goltra's actions upon receipt thereof indicated that he considered his original offer still open and accepted; they equally indicated an acceptance of this new offer. Cf. Restatement of Contracts, §§ 73, 20. Goltra obtained the concurrence of his contracting officer, the Chief of Engineers, in the offer and from that day forward treated the crane as his own and the Government as having been released from claims for rent. Early evidence of Goltra's relinquishment of rental claims is found in a "corrected bill" submitted to the Chief of Engineers on May 14, 1931. In this bill, submitted nearly a year after the exchange of letters discussed above, Goltra claimed land rental, improvements rental, and watchmen pay only to August 31, 1930, and interest from that date to date of payment, thereby recognizing that no claim for rental accrued after that date. Goltra's pleadings in the earlier Goltra case affirmed this position. In the giving up of these claims for rent by Goltra, immediate consideration passed for the sale of the crane, for it is elementary that the giving up of a legal right, even a tenuous cause of action, is good consideration for a bargain. Restatement of Contracts, §§ 75, 76. At the time the crane was valueless, an obstruction, and a liability, the Government was glad to acquiese in Goltra's position. Had Goltra claimed additional rent after the sale, the Government would have had a defense to his claim. Goltra did not claim rent |