son and the weight of authority were against the proposition that such personal representative had any different rights than the decedent, and that view is supported, as stated, by the weight of decision: Mayer v. Myers, 129 Ind. 366, 27 N. E. 740; Williams v. Jones, 95 N. C. 504.

C. As Against Third Parties.-Since by the statutes in general the chattel mortgage is of no force or effect except it is made and recorded in accordance with the conditions imposed by law, and we have considered the effect of the failure to comply with those statutory requirements for the execution of such mortgages, taking in their order the executing, acknowledgment, stamping where required, the affidavit to accompany the instrument and when it is necessary the delivery to the mortgagor of a copy of the document, we have only finally its completion by putting it on record. We have not here considered the form of the instrument nor the description of the parties or the chattels intended to be mortgaged. The sufficiency of description of property in chattel mortgages formed the subject of a note to Barrett v. Fisch, 76 Iowa, 553, 14 Am. St. Rep. 238, 41 N. W. 310.

The first question as to who third parties are might be readily answered by saying that they were all others than the parties themselves as already dealt with, but, in this connection, when third parties are spoken of, they are to be taken as meaning creditors of the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers and mortgagees and assignees of the mortgagee. The mortgage, while good between the parties, is almost universally held invalid against third parties unless it is recorded in accordance with the law of the state in which it is so recorded. Recordation is dispensed with similarly when the mortgagor transfers the possession of the chattels mortgaged to his mortgagee. We have not to consider this phase of the transaction here. The authority is abundant for the reasons already given, namely evidence of good faith inter partes, notice to the world of the dealing, and consequent protection to those who have business negotiations with either mortgagor or mortgagee, readiness of adjusting liens and the greater confidence of the trading community, that chattel mortgages unaccompanied by any transfer of possession are invalid if not legally recorded: Whittleshoffer v. Strauss, 83 Ala. 517, 3 South. 524; Woods v. Rose, 135 Ala. 297, 33 South. 41; Garner v. Wright, 52 Ark. 385, 12 S. W. 785, 6 L. R. A. 715; Berson v. Nunan, 63 Cal. 550; Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Cal. 290, 53 Pac. 911, 59 Pac. 827, 46 L. R. A. 371; Ankele v. Elder, 19 Colo. App. 330, 75 Pac. 29; In re Wilcox & Howe Co., 70 Conn. 220, 39 Atl. 163; Hope v. Johnston, 28 Fla. 55, 9 South. 830; Armitage-Herschell Co. v. Muscogee Real Estate Co., 119 Ga. 552, 46 S. E. 434; Gregg v. Sanford, 24 Ill. 17, 76 Am. Dec. 719; Roberts v. Kingsbury, 71 Ill. App. 451; State v. Griffin, 16 Ind. App. 555, 45 N. E. 935; Blackman v. Baxter, Reed Co., 125 Iowa, 118, 100 N. W. 75, 70 L. R. A. 250, 2 Ann. Cas. 707; Fromme v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 474; Cameron v. Marvin, 26 Kan. 612; Lehmann-Higginson Grocer Co. v. McClain, 63 Kan. 881, 64 Pac. 1029; Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Citizens St. R. Co., 24 Ky. Law Rep. 334, 68 S. W. 463; Morrill v. Sanford, 49 Me. 566; Kelley v. Goodwin, 95 Me. 538, 50 Atl. 711; Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270; Shurtleff v. Willard, 19 Pick. 202; Harrison v. J. J. Warren Co., 183 Mass. 123, 66 N. E. 589; Waite v. Matthews, 50 Mich. 392, 15 N. W. 524; People v. Burns, 161 Mich. 169, ante, p. 466, 125 N. W. 740; Hargreaves v. Reese, 66 Minn. 434, 69 N. W. 223; Clarke v. National Citizens' Bank, 74 Minn. 58, 76 N. W.

965, 1125; Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Powers, 134 Mo. 432, 34 S. W. 869, 35 S. W. 1132; Harrison v. South Carthage Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 106 Mo. App. 32, 68 S. W. 963, 79 S. W. 1160; John Caplice Co. v. Beauchamp, 22 Mont. 258, 56 Pac. 278; Sanford v. Jensen, 49 Neb. 766, 69 N. W. 108; National Bank of Commerce v. Bryden, 59 Neb. 75, 80 N. W. 276; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Penn Cordage Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 181, 55 Atl. 231; Button v. Rathbone, 59 Hun, 615, 12 N. Y. Supp. 667; Dickinson v. Oliver, 96 App. Div. 65, 89 N. Y. Supp. 52; Lawrence v. Weeks, 107 N. C. 119, 12 S. E. 120; Sykes v. Hannawalt, 5 N. D. 335, 65 N. W. 682; Hennessey First Nat. Bank v. Hesser, 14 Okl. 115, 77 Pac. 36; Horn v. Livesley, 44 Or. 501, 75 Pac. 1057; City Bank v. Easton Boot & Shoe Co., 187 Pa. 30, 40 Atl. 1026; Harris v. Chaffee, 17 R. I. 193, 21 Atl. 104; Burdeck v. Coates, 22 R. I. 410, 48 Atl. 389; London v. Youmans, 31 S. C. 147, 17 Am. St. Rep. 17, 9 S. E. 775; Noyes v. Brace, 8 S. D. 190, 65 N. W. 1071; Williams v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 581, 56 S. W. 261; Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433; Hunt v. Allen, 73 Vt. 322, 50 Atl. 1103; Hinchman v. Point Defiance R. Co., 14 Wash. 349, 44 Pac. 867; Dunsmuir v. Port Angeles Gas etc. Co., 24 Wash. 104, 63 Pac. 1095; Morrow v. Reed, 30 Wis. 81; Dornbrook v. M. Rumely Co., 120 Wis. 36, 97 N. W. 493; Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513, 22 L. ed. 758; Crooks v. Stuart, 2 McCrary, 13, 7 Fed. 800; Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. 738; Guarantee Trust Co. v. Galveston City R. Co., 107 Fed. 311, 46 C. C. A. 305; In re H. G. Andrae Co., 117 Fed. 561. In addition to the authorities cited, reference to the majority of the cases cited in support of the proposition that mortgages do not need to be recorded inter partes will be found to substantially support the converse proposition, that as to third parties the necessity is vital.

d. As to Time of Recordation.-The statutes variously require the recordation to be within a specified time, which unfortunately is not standardized, in some states ten days, in others twenty, thirty or forty as the case may be. Whatever the time limit may be, the mortgage should be recorded at the earliest possible opportunity after execution in order to obtain the recognition of its priority. Where the statute provides for the "immediate" recordation of the mortgage, the law is satisfied if it is recorded as soon as may be by reasonable diligence and despatch under the circumstances of the case: Roe v. Meding, 53 N. J. Eq. 350; Hardcastle v. Stiles & McClay, 69 N. J. L. 551, 55 Atl. 104. A reasonable time is practically what the law demands: Summerville v. Kelliher, 144 Cal. 155, 77 Pac. 889; E. Spencer Co. v. Papach, 103 Iowa, 513, 70 N. W. 748, 72 N. W. 605; Cutler v. Steele, 85 Mich. 627, 48 N. W. 631; Way v. Braley, 44 Mo. App. 457; Dunham v. Cramer, 63 N. J. Eq. 151, 51 Atl. 1011; Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073.

e. As to Place of Recordation.-Here again there is a wide diversity of statutory requirement. The general provision is that the mortgage shall be recorded in the town or county where the mortgagor resides. Special provision has been made in several states that the mortgage shall be recorded at the place the chattels are, if the mortgagor is a nonresident of the state. Others provide for recording in both places, and others again for recording in the place to which the goods may be removed. The importance of the phrase, "where the property is," with reference to recording the mortgage at such place, was recognized in Marquette First Nat. Bank v. Weed, 89 Mich. 357, 50 N. W. 864, and received the interpretation that the filing should be

in the township or city where the property is at time of the execution and delivery of the mortgage. The law governing recording is dealt with ante, IX, a, and we have only to urge the necessary obedience to the requirement of the local statute to insure safety for mortgagees. There is scarcely a point as to the place of recording that has not been settled, and in a great number of cases new code provisions have met doubtful cases presented to the courts.

f. The Onus of Seeing That the Mortgage is Duly Recorded.-To many it will come as a surprise to learn that, after having complied with each and every requirement of the directing statute both as to the substance and form of his security, after having discovered the proper place for recording his security, after having handed his mortgage to the proper officer for recording, the duties of the mortgagee are not yet completed. The law now casts on him the burden of seeing that his mortgage is duly recorded by the officer. The careful opinion in People v. Burns, 161 Mich. 169, ante, p. 466, 125 N. W. 740, does not fail to note this and to point out that "one who seeks to benefit from the recording laws must incur all risks of the failure to put his papers duly upon record, whether the fault shall be his own or that of an officer: Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162; Grand Rapids Nat. Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 114 Am. St. Rep. 668, 107 N. W. 76, 8 Ann. Cas. 102." We draw attention specially to the words, "whether the fault shall be his own or that of an officer." Most of our lawyers were nourished on the proposition that once the instrument was handed to the proper officer it was filed for record. So long as it was delivered to some person apparently in authority at the recording office (it was not sufficient merely to leave it there, no one being present to receive it: Standard Implement Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 51 Kan. 566, 33 Pac. 363; Crouse v. Johnson, 65 Hun, 337, 20 N. Y. Supp. 177), the general reliance on the authorities was justified that the task of the one seeking registration of the instrument was accomplished: McGregor v. Hall, 3 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 397; Truss v. Harvey, 120 Ala. 636, 24 South. 127; Case v. Hargadine, 43 Ark. 144; Meherin v. Oaks, 67 Cal. 57, 7 Pac. 47; Craig v. Dimock, 47 Ill. 308; Holman v. Doran, 56 Ind. 358; Chandler v. Scott, 127 Ind. 226, 26 N. E. 797, 10 L. R. A. 374; Day & Congleton Lumber Co. v. Mack, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 640, 69 S. W. 712; Head v. Goodwin, 37 Me. 181; Jordan v. Farnsworth, 15 Gray, 517; Gorham v. Summers, 25 Minn. 81; Miller v. Whitson, 40 Mo. 97; Parker v. Palmer, 13 R. I. 359; Hunt v. Allen, 73 Vt. 322, 50 Atl. 1103; Davis v. Turner, 56 C. C. A. 669, 120 Fed. 605. And, of course, where the statute in some such words enacts that the mortgage has priority from the time it is left with the register, in effect making that the equivalent of recording, the mortgagee is protected, but otherwise he must see by an examination of his instrument that it has been recorded, and properly and legally recorded, or he must take the risk of losing the benefit of it. If a statute provides that deeds and mortgages shall be recorded in separate books kept for that purpose (and most statutes do), a deed, absolute in form, though intended as security for a loan of money, and accompanied by an unrecorded defeasance, is void as to a bona fide purchaser if recorded in the book of deeds instead of mortgages: Grand Rapids Nat. Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 114 Am. St. Rep. 668, 107 N. W. 76, 8 Ann. Cas. 102. "It has been held," says the opinion in that case, "that our statute, section 8988, puts the burden upon the person offering the paper for record, of seeing to it that the

instrument is properly recorded: Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162; Gordon v. Constantine Hydraulic Co., 117 Mich. 620, 76 N. W. 142. . . . If the grantee in a conveyance complies with the terms of the statute, he is protected. If he fails to comply with the plain requirements of the statute, the subsequent purchaser in good faith is protected and is not to be charged with constructive notice."

X. Summary.

While the courts have with infinite pains decided innumerable questions of law arising out of the important subject of chattel mortgages, inquiry that is not merely academic will show that their faces are always averted from the consideration of the points presented and objections taken as ordinary technicalities. No word is perhaps worse jargonized than "technicalities," and it is invariably used by the defeated contestant in the legal tournament. "The point was a purely technical one and I lost," is a much more common proposition than "the point was a purely technical one and I won." As we said in opening, we do not regard the rigid demand for compliance with the statutory requirements relating to chattel mortgages in any other aspect than that in which we view substantive law, and when "technicalities" is used, it should not be taken to mean the pernickety caviling of the stickler for literal compliance with every word of a statute or the quibbling nicety of the stranger to common sense, but rather the recognition of the full and trained mind of those matters exclusively belonging to the science and the study of the law relating to a special subject. The technical lawyer would then be above the plane of the pettifogger. In its broad sense, therefore, the technicality with which the subject of chattel mortgages has been invested calls for the continued support of the courts. Hitherto, they have been champions of the cause, they have seen nothing in the statutory demands with which the prudent cannot comply, they have only asked the trader and business man to avail himself of the protection the law undoubtedly holds out to him, and they have held the scales even in favor of the suppliant whose rights have accrued by reason of the mortgagee's neglect. The law is parental in its anxiety to see that when securities are given, the parties contracting shall be protected from each other, and that third parties who have rights and claims shall not be hindered, delayed or prejudiced through the want of care or honesty of the mortgagor or mortgagee. Throughout the operation, the contract, the execution, attestation, acknowledgment and recording, the law provides a safe guide, and if its votaries prefer to worship the false god of carelessness, they must suffer, but they must not ascribe their suffering to the technicalities of the law which will only not aid them because of their neglect to abide its precepts. We hope to see the whole machinery regulated to a standard form of mortgage and affidavit and a uniform period within which the document should be recorded, with full provision for alias recordations.

The decisions of the various state courts will then be even more valuable than they are at present, the work of research correspondingly lightened, and the ability to transact business connected with such mortgages rendered easier, not alone to those immediately concerned, to those whose rights may grow out of the subject matter, but to the public at large.

GRAND RAPIDS AND INDIANA RAILROAD COMPANY v. CHEBOYGAN CIRCUIT JUDGE.

[161 Mich. 181, 126 N. W. 56.]

ATTORNEY-Agreement and Lien for Compensation.-An agreement between attorney and client in a personal injury case that the former shall have one-half of the amount of any judgment recovered or settlement obtained, and shall have a lien thereon, is valid and operates as an assignment to the attorney of any judgment or settlement obtained, to the extent of the lien. (p. 500.)

ATTORNEY-Agreement and Lien for Compensation.-The plaintiff in a personal injury case can give the defendant no valid discharge of his claim to the prejudice of the lien of his attorney, if the defendant has notice of the lien. (pp. 500, 501.)

ATTORNEY-Lien Before Judgment.-There can be No lien in favor of an attorney before judgment, except by special agreement. (p. 501.)

ATTORNEY-Notice of Lien' for Services.-Where the attorney for the plaintiff in a personal injury case notifies the general counsel of the defendant corporation that he has a lien for his services upon any money which the client may obtain by judgment or settlement, this is sufficient notice to put the defendant upon inquiry, and it is not necessary that the defendant be apprised of the exact terms of the attorney's contract with his client. (p. 501.)

ATTORNEY-Enforcement of Lien for Services.-Where the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries has stipulated for a settlement and discontinuance, his counsel, in order to proceed in the original suit for the recovery of their fees under contract for one-half of any judgment recovered or settlement obtained, must have the stipulation of settlement and discontinuance set aside or stricken from the files. But this will not interfere with the defendant's right to prove the compromise agreement at the trial. (p. 502.)

ATTORNEY.-A Client may Assign an Interest to his attorney in a cause of action for personal injuries. (p. 502.)

ATTORNEY-Enforcing Compensation After Settlement.— Where the plaintiff in a personal injury case, who has agreed that his attorney shall have one-half of any judgment recovered or settlement obtained, and have a lien therefor, makes a settlement with the defendant who has notice of the attorney's lien, the proper practice for the attorney, in enforcing his rights under the agreement, is to proceed in the original cause. He should present to the court, by petition or otherwise, the alleged agreement and his claim thereunder. The defendant will be permitted to give notice of its settlement agreement, in the nature of a plea puis darrein continuance. If upon the trial both agreements are established, the attorney may recover in the name of the plaintiff the amount of his fees as shown by the agreement, upon the basis of the settlement. If the making of the settlement agreement is not shown, the attorney may prosecute the original action and prove the case as though there had been no settlement and recover his contract share of the damages awarded. (p. 503.)

James H. Campbell, for the relator.

Benjamin & Quay and De Vere Hall, for the respondent. 183 STONE, J. The case of Foley v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. was before this court in 157 Mich. 67, 121 N. W. 257.