ized, and a nullity upon the face of the record. There was no action pending at that time. The court, therefore, did not err in excluding the judgment when offered in evidence: 1 Black on Judgments, 278.

Though the former action was not dismissed in fact until after the commencement of the present action, its subsequent dismissal and proof thereof were proper: Page v. Mitchell, 37 Minn. 368, 34 N. W. 896. The real issue in this case did not so much involve the dismissal of the action as it did the alleged fact that it had been compromised and settled, and that was the principal issue litigated on the trial. That the action was in fact dismissed there can be no question. While plaintiff's dismissal did not take effect until after the alleged settlement, defendant was chargeable with notice of the want of authority in plaintiff's counsel to enter into the same, and cannot now be heard to say that he settled and compromised the action with the attorney in good faith and before notice that plaintiff had dismissed the same: 4 Current Law, 315.

This covers all questions requiring special mention. For the reasons stated, the validity of the settlement and compromise was a proper issue in the case, and, though the court submitted the same to the jury upon the question of fraud and collusion, a verdict that it was unauthorized as a matter of law could properly have been directed, and it is not important whether there were or were not errors in the admission of evidence or in the submission of the question to the jury on the issue of fraud.

The rights of the former attorney are not involved in the case, and the suggestion that he should have an opportunity to be heard before setting aside the stipulation is without force. If the application to set aside had been made in the former action, he would not have been a necessary party. Whatever rights the attorney may have in the premises may be presented by him in proceedings for their protection. Nor is the question before us whether the former attorney was rightly discharged by plaintiff. That plaintiff had the right to dismiss him there can be no question. Of course, this could not be done to defraud the attorney. But, as already stated, his 198 rights are in no way involved in the action. He asserts none, by intervention or otherwise, and defendant cannot urge them for him.

Order affirmed.

An Attorney has No Implied Power to Compromise a case which he has been employed to conduct: See the note to Tobler v. Nevitt, 132 Am. St. Rep. 163-168.

▲ Plaintiff Ordinarily may Dismiss His Suit at pleasure, without the intervention of his attorney: Tompkins v. Railroad, 110 Tenn. 157, 100 Am. St. Rep. 795; Boogren v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 51, 114 Am. St. Rep. 691; note to Cameron v. Boeger, 93 Am. St. Rep.

STATE v. ROSENFIELD.

[111 Minn. 301, 126 N. W. 1068.]

DANCE-HOUSE-Offense of Permitting Attendance of Minors. The Minnesota statute makes it a misdemeanor for the keeper of dance-houses or concert saloons to permit any person under twentyone years of age to be there, whether or not in fact such places are conducted in a manner injurious to morals. (By the editor.) (p. 558.)

A DANCE-HOUSE is a Place Maintained for Promiscuous and public dancing, the rule of admission to which is not based upon personal selection or invitation. (By the editor.) (p. 558.)

DANCE-HOUSE.-A Complaint Charging the Offense, in the language of the statute, of permitting a person under twenty-one years of age to be or remain in a dance-house, is sufficient. (By the editor.) (p. 559.)

DANCE-HOUSE.-A Statute is Constitutional which makes it a misdemeanor for the keeper of a dance-house to permit any person under twenty-one years of age to be there. (By the editor.) (p. 559.) DANCE-HOUSE.-A Statute Making It a Misdemeanor for the keeper of a dance-house to permit any person under twenty-one years of age to be there is not unconstitutional as class legislation because not fixing the age limit of females at eighteen years, the statutory limit of their minority. (p. 559.)

DANCE-HOUSE-Constitutional Law-Attendance of Minors. The defendants were convicted of the offense of permitting, contrary to Revised Laws of 1905, section 4936, a person under the age of twenty-one years to be and remain in a dance-house conducted by them. Held, that the statute is a proper exercise of the police power; that it is not class legislation; that a dance-house, as the term is used in the statute, is a place maintained for promiscuous and public dancing, the rule of admission to which is not based upon personal selection or invitation; that the complaint states a cause of action; that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; and that the verdict is sustained by the evidence. (pp. 558-560.)

DANCE-HOUSE-Offense of Permitting Attendance of Minors. The Minnesota statute, making it a misdemeanor for the keeper of a dance-house to permit any person under twenty-one years of age to be there, does not make knowledge on the part of the person accused an essential element of the offense. (p. 560.)

(Syllabi by the court except when stated to be by the editor.) Geo. W. Caldwell, for the appellants.

Frank Healy and John A. Dahl, for the state.

301 START, C. J. The defendants were charged by complaint in the municipal court of the city of Minneapolis with the offense of permitting, on March 20, 1909, a person under the age of twenty-one years to be and to remain in a dancehouse owned and managed by them. The prosecution was based upon Revised Laws of 1905, section 4936, which is as follows: "Whoever permits any person under the age of twenty-one years to be or remain in any dance-house, concert saloon, place where intoxicating liquors are sold or given away, or in any place of entertainment injurious to the morals,

owned, kept or managed by him 302 in whole or in part, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

There was a trial by jury, and a verdict of guilty against each of the defendants, and they appealed from an order denying their motion for a new trial.

1. The first contention of the appellants is that the complaint does not charge a public offense. The here material allegations of the complaint are these: On March 20, 1909, within the corporate limits of the city of Minneapolis the defendants did unlawfully permit Marie O'Conners to be and to remain in the premises known as No. 401 Washington Avenue South, then being a dance-hall owned, kept, and managed by them, and Marie O'Conners then being a person under the age of twenty-one years, to wit, of the age of sixteen years, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

It is urged that the complaint does not in any way describe the character of the dance-house, nor does it allege that it was a place injurious to morals; hence it does not charge a public offense, for the reason that the statute applies only to dancehouses in which intoxicating liquors are sold and to those which are injurious to morals. The statute cannot be so construed, for its express language makes it an offense to permit persons under the age of twenty-one years to be or remain in any one of the four specified places, namely, a dance-house, a concert saloon, a place where intoxicating liquors are sold or given away, and any place of entertainment injurious to morals. If the offense be for permitting a minor to remain in a place other than a dance-house or concert saloon, it is clear that the complaint must charge, either that intoxicating liquors were sold or given away at such place, or that the place was one injurious to morals. But it is clear from the language of the statute that dance-houses and concert saloons are within its prohibition, whether or not in fact they are conducted in a manner injurious to morals.

It is evident that the legislature, in enacting the statute, was satisfied that the tendency of dance-houses and concert saloons as ordinarily conducted was the corruption of youth, and in the exercise of the police power of the state it decided that, without reference 303 to the manner in which they might be conducted, young persons should not be permitted to be or remain therein. It is true, as claimed by defendants' counsel in this connection, that the statute does not define a dance-house; but in the absence of such a definition the term must be construed in accordance with its ordinary So construing it, a dance-house is a place maintained for promiscuous and public dancing, the rule of admission to which is not based upon personal selection or invitation.

The gist of the offense as defined by the statute is the permitting of persons under twenty-one years of age to be or

remain in a dance-house. This is a sufficient definition of the offense. The complaint charges the offense in the language of the statute, and thereby sets forth all the essential elements necessary to constitute the offense; hence the complaint states a cause of action if the statute is a valid one: State v. Abrisch, 41 Minn. 41, 42 N. W. 543; State v. Howard, 66 Minn. 309, 61 Am. St. Rep. 403, 68 N. W. 1096, 34 L. R. A. 178.

The defendants, however, contend that the statute is unconstitutional, because it is not a proper exercise of the police power. It clearly is. "Public dance-halls easily become. centers of vice, are sometimes made the subject of special provisions, [and] may be entirely forbidden": Freund on Police Power, sec. 250.

Again, it is urged that the statute is class legislation, and unconstitutional, in that it "discriminates between women who have arrived at the age of majority, under the age of twenty-one, and those over the age of twenty-one." The purpose of the statute is to protect the youth of the state from corrupting influences, and it was necessary for the legislature to fix an age limit. It was a matter of legislative discretion whether such limit should be the common-law limit of minority, and apply alike to the youth of both sexes or whether a distinction should be made of females by fixing the age limit of females at eighteen years, the statutory limit of minority of females. The fact that the legislature did not make such distinction affords no ground for inferring that the statute is an arbitrary exercise of the police power, or an improper classification, for it applies alike to all persons, male and female, under the age of twenty-one years. 304 It follows that the statute is constitutional, and that the complaint charges a public offense.

2. It is also contended that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty. There was evidence tending to show that public dances were conducted, at the place named in the complaint, by the defendants personally as proprietors and managers, for several months; that promiscuous crowds gathered at such dances, sometimes as many as two hundred; that the dances were open to all women, without admission fee or escort, and they came and went without inquiry or restraint during the hours for dancing, which were between 8:30 o'clock P. M. and midnight; that Marie O'Conners, the person named in the complaint, who was less than seventeen years of age, attended the dances regularly for some three months, to the personal knowledge of both defendants, and usually remained until closing time; that she was present at the dance on the evening named in the complaint, to the personal knowledge of the defendant Brooks, but it does not appear from the evidence that the defendant Rosenfield was present at the dance on this particular night;

that there were no restrictions as to who should be admitted to the dances, except the men alone were charged an admission fee; and further, that the associations of this particular dance-house were vile. It is insisted that the evidence is wholly insufficient to warrant the conviction of the defendant Rosenfield, because he was not present at the dance on the night alleged in the complaint. He was, however, one of the proprietors and managers of the dance-house, and had been frequently in charge of the dances when Marie O'Conners was present. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict as to each of the defendants.

3. The last alleged error to be considered is that the trial court erred in refusing certain requested instructions and in its charge as given. The defendants requested the court to give, with other similar requests, the following:

"In order that you may find both of the defendants guilty, it will be necessary that you find that both of them knew that the minor, Marie O'Conners, was present in the dancehall on the night of March 20, 1909; that they were both present themselves, and permitted her to be or remain therein. 305 "In order that you may find either of the defendants guilty, it will be necessary for you to find that such guilty party knew, or ought to have known, from the appearance of [the witness] Marie O'Conners, that she was a minor.

"If you do not find that the defendants, or either of them, intended to violate the law, you cannot find them, or either of them, guilty."

These requests were properly refused, for it was not, under the evidence, necessary as a matter of law, in order to convict both defendants, that both should have been physically present and have known that Marie O'Conners was present at the dance on the night of March 20, 1909. The other two requests did not state the law of the case, for the statute does not make the knowledge of the defendants an essential element of the offense: State v. Heck, 23 Minn. 549; State v. O'Connor, 58 Minn. 193, 59 N. W. 999; State v. Sodini, 84 Minn. 444, 87 N. W. 1130; State v. Edwards, 94 Minn. 225, 102 N. W. 697, 69 L. R. A. 667; State v. Quackenbush, 98 Minn. 515, 108 N. W. 953.

The instructions given, to which exception was taken by the defendants, were not erroneous.

Order affirmed.

For Authorities Bearing upon the Principal Case, see Gastenau v. Commonwealth, 108 Ky. 473, 94 Am. St. Rep. 386; State v. Nelson, 10 Idaho, 522, 109 Am. St. Rep. 226; Mossman v. City of Fort Collins, 40 Colo. 270, 122 Am. St. Rep. 1060; City of St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 124 Am. St. Rep. 750; Ex parte Morgan, 57 Tex. Cr. 551, 136 Am. St. Rep. 996.