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2nd. No hurt or injury having been received in the service of the ship, and the man not having been removed for the convenience of the ship, the hospital expenses may be deducted from his wages.]

SICK SEAMEN AND HOSPITAL CHARGES. SIR,-I engaged with a Crew at a Port in the North for a voyage up the Mediterranean and elsewhere, and upon my first day at sea I found two men quite useless and almost powerless through a bodily weakness, although they had every appearance of good health when entered. A few days after another could not walk, as he was suffering from scurvy in his legs. Now, sir, here were three out of 12 for a winter passage, but fortunately I have a light ship. On arrival at the Port, where we remained for seven weeks, the three individuals stayed in the hospital the most part of that time, and a day before leaving they came on board cured. I found, however, when we were at sea a day or two they were just the same, and up to the present time are not much better. 1st. Am I bound to pay both their hospital expenses and wages? 2nd. Can I stop their wages during their stay in hospital and make them pay for hospital expenses out of wages they have earned, although they have not been any use to the ship during the voyage? Surely, sir, it is a very hard case to carry sick men about so, and to cause the ship such expense as 24/. 16s. 114d.-Yours, &c.,

Shields, March 20, 1877.

SHIPMASTER.

DECK CARGO AND UNSEAWORTHINESS.

The question of the comparative seaworthiness of a ship, said Chief Justice ERLE, rests with the place, the voyage, the class of ship, or even the nature of the cargo; and the learned Judge told the Jury, in "FOLEY V. TABOR," "" that a ship will be unseaworthy "if the risk is materially increased by reason of diffi"culty in navigating the ship, caused by overloading "or by bad stowage of the cargo." A ship may be seaworthy at the commencement of a voyage with reference to her own safety, but not so as to the safety of the cargo. Goods may be stowed on deck which can be thrown overboard when a vessel is imperilled, and in such a case the ship is saved, but the cargo is lost. By the custom of certain trades, goods are carried on deck, and, unless there is a special

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agreement, the jettison of them is a loss that has to be made good by the Shipowner. When cargo is carried on deck at the risk of the Shipowner, he has an insurable interest in it, and ought, therefore, to protect himself by a Policy against jettison. There is another question, however, appertaining to deck cargo, in regard to a warranty of seaworthiness, implied in a Policy of Marine Insurance. There are goods that may be easily got rid of in bad weather, and danger is not created by carrying them, and these, it has been contended, do not take the warranty of seaworthiness out of the Policy. This appears to have been a mistaken notion. In the case of the Murillo (s)," DANIELS v. IIARRIS," Common Pleas, on appeal, November 2, 1874, the Court were called upon to pronounce an opinion as to whether wine in casks, if stowed on deck, endangered the ship when at sea. The action was brought on a Policy to recover for a total loss of wine by jettison "at and from Lucar, on wine in casks or under deck." When the ship's hold had been filled with other cargo, the wine which gave rise to this action was placed on the upper deck, and had to be run out of the casks for the safety of the vessel. The Underwriters pleaded that the ship at the commencement of the voyage was not seaworthy, inasmuch as she had casks on deck which could not be conveyed with safety to the steainer. To this it was said that liquids could be more easily got rid of than solids, and, by the staving of the casks, the wine would flow out and pass through the scuppers. At the trial before Mr. Justice BRETr, at Guildhall, the Jury were directed to consider whether the weight was not an encumbrance; how long it might possibly take a ship's Carpenter and his men to stave the casks; and as to what would be the effect on the ship of letting the wine run out. The Jury came to the conclusion that the wine could have been started in the Bay of Biscay, and that the casks did not practically, when the rough weather set in, endanger the safety of the ship. This verdict was appealed against, and the Court, in ordering a new trial, were of opinion that the extent and effect of the warranty, in a Policy on cargo, that the ship was seaworthy, could never be implied to be so great as to be considered by Underwriters to contemplate the destruction, in order to save the ship, of that very cargo which was the subject matter of insurance. Such a proposition, said the Court, made the contract, as a business transaction, insensible, for the extra premium invariably paid in respect of a deck cargo applied to the extra danger to it in case of weather more rough than the ordinary weather of the voyage insured. The direction to the Jury, the Court held, was wrong as applied to the Policy in dispute. It was right in saying that the question was not whether the cargo would be safe on an ordinary voyage, but whether the ship, including the cargo, would be safe; but it was wrong in leading or leaving the Jury to understand that if the ship could only be made safe for, or in, an ordinary voyage by the destruction of the insured cargo, they might nevertheless say that the ship was seaworthy. As a matter of course, this doctrine of a ship being unseaworthy if the cargo on deck has to be sacrificed to save her, must be taken as applying to a steamer crossing the Bay of Biscay in winter, but cannot attach to lake, river, or short coasting voyages, where the same ordinary perils are not supposed to exist. The Act of 1876, instead of leaving the

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question of deckloads to the insurers and insured, has given a quasi legal sanction to deckloading of timber in the summer, and to the piling of three feet of deals, boards, or battens on deck during the winter. The Statute does not, we are bound to say, declare that ships are safe with timber on deck at one season, and deals stowed-as they are now-wedged endways, at another; but there is a sort of Parliamentary sanction given to such loading. In the event of the deals, battens, or boards being jettisoned in the winter in consequence of their encumbering the decks, or causing vessels to strain and leak, it is evident that, when permission is not given in a Policy to carry such goods on deck, it may be pleaded that if the wood has to be thrown overboard to save the ship, the claims under Policies will be defeated unless the cargo is insured-" in and over all." It will be curious, however, to learn what the Judges may have to say as to the implied warranty of seaworthiness given by the Merchant Shipping Act of 1876 to the stowage of deck cargo. It may be presumed that the Legislature deemed the carrying of timber or wood on deck to be a safe method, and one in which a ship would be in no way endangered thereby. Perhaps it may be possible to reconcile the dicta of the Judges in "DANIELS v. HARRIS," herein referred to, by holding that a ship is unsafe if she has to jettison timber, as distinguished from light wood, in winter; but that there is no breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness in loading deals, battens, and boards on deck during the close time. The judicial opinion, that a ship must necessarily be unsafe if the cargo has to be sacrificed to prevent a loss of the vessel, is the greatest blow ever inflicted on deckloading, so far as insurances are concerned. It will not be sufficient to insure the deck cargo if it can be proved that a ship was unseaworthy. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in the case of the West (8), held that if a ship on sailing was unseaworthy from defective equipment, even though the default was remedied before the loss, the Policy would be voided. All Policies imply seaworthiness at and before sailing, and therefore, if a ship has a cargo on deck which must be jettisoned in a gale on an ordinary voyage, she is unseaworthy at sailing, and the Policy does not attach. These facts have to be found out by costly litigation; but when a Court lays down a rule of law, it is as well, until that rule is pronounced untenable by a higher tribunal, that those who are likely to be affected should understand it, in the event of their making claims on Underwriters and being met by the plea of unseaworthiness. A jury of Nautical men would, we feel certain, find, in such a case as that of the Murillo, a verdict in accordance with that originally given. It would not take many minutes, with a crowbar or a heavy hammer, to start liquids from casks; and if the latter did not, when empty, prevent the work of the vessel being done, the ship's safety would not be jeopardised. Deckloading has received a fair share of public attention as regards security to life, but the significance of the ship being declared unseaworthy if cargo carried aboveboard has to be sacrificed is a new element in the controversy.-October 12, 1876.

STAMP DUTIES ON INSURANCE. The Stamp Act and the Common Law of Insurance have been shown by several long litigated cases

66

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to be at variance with each other. Disputes between Insurers and Insured have lately turned too much upon legal quibbles instead of being determined on their merits. The initialled "Slip" question has warded off a few claims, simply because the "Slip" or memorandum filled in previous to the issue of the Policy had not been stamped. In the language of Lord COLERIDGE, a "Slip" is "a contract binding in "honour, and which ought not to be repudiated or "violated, but which could not be enforced at Law or Equity." The Policies of Mutual Marine Insurance Clubs have been held to be void from the fact that the Stamp Law requires the names of all the Underwriters to be at the bottom. On the 16th of January, in the Court of Queen's Bench, in "SASSOONS v. HARRIS," the claim of the plaintiffs for a sum of 14,000l. was decided in favour of the defendant in consequence of, as Mr. Justice LUSH remarked, a deficiency of 48. in the Stamp Duty, arising entirely through mistake. The Underwriter, however, subsequently agreed to pay the amount claimed, and thus the affair ended in an honourable manner. The plea of non-sufficiency of Stamp Duty was, nevertheless, urged; and, on an intimation from the Court that the defendant should not object to return the premium, the counsel for the Underwriter intimated that they by no means consented to it. Mr. Justice BLACK BURN said :-"The Legislature gave those who "were disposed to be dishonest the opportunity of "being so, and thus became morally guilty and re"sponsible-like accessories before the fact for all "the dishonesty thus perpetrated In 1789 an "eminent Judge (Mr. Justice BULLER) said he knew "the time when no Underwriter would allow his "attorney to take such an objection. Then, however, "one Underwriter was found capable of doing so, "and now, unfortunately, there were a great many "of them." These were strong observations to be made by a Judge in an open Court, and therefore, as the Stamp Act can be pleaded to set aside any contract of insurance if the instrument is not stamped in accordance with the Statute, it is necessary, both in the interest of the Underwriters and the Insured, that attention should be paid to its requirements. In "SASSOONS v. HARRIS," the custom of taking out Policies for fixed amounts, and then filling in the separate interests, is quite common in practice. The duty in respect of every sum of 100. is 3d., and a like duty for every fractional part of 1007., on a Voyage Policy; and with respect to a Time Policy, the duty is the same for less than six months, but is double for any period exceeding six months and notexceeding twelve months. It is easy to understand, therefore, how a Merchant may render a policy void without any intention on his part of defrauding the Revenue. If he takes out a Policy for, say, 1,000l., he is entitled, so far as the half-crown Stamp Duty is concerned, to fill in separate consignments to that amount. We will here show how a Policy may be rendered illegal by the following proportionment of values:

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As between the Stamp Act and the Merchant, in both cases he has shipped under the Policy up to the value of the duty; but in one case the duty is only 2s. 6d. while in the other it is 3s. 3d., from the separate consignments being a fraction over 100%. in each instance. In the one case the Policy could not be disputed, but in the o her the separate and distinct interests of two or more persons are insured by one Policy, and every fractional part of the 1007. must be covered by the additional threepenny duty. This is a state of things that should not be suffered to exist. There are Policies that partake of both time and of voyages. These are what are called mixed Policies. In the Lxchequer Division, on January 19, a special case, "STONE v. The Ocean Marine Insurance Company (Limited) of Gothenberg," was stated for the opinion of the Judges. A ship was insured under a Time Policy for twelve months with a warranty "not to sail for America." It was desired to send the ship from Liverpool to Philadelphia, and the Underwriters agreed to allow the vessel to be sent to the latter Port, and thence to the United Kingdom. It then transpired that the ship would have to go to Baltimore, and the Policy was endorsed-"It is hereby agreed to allow the vessel to go Baltimore." The vessel reached that place, took in a cargo of grain, and sailed for Antwerp. This of course was in direct opposition to the agreement; but the Underwriters were once more applied to, and the Policy was again endorsed to the effect that, in consideration of an extra premium of 7s. 6d., the vessel might go to Antwerp. On reaching Antwerp the market had fallen, and the Master of the ship was telegraphed to sail for Leith. The vessel left, but was wrecked two days after sailing. The ship had never reached ber destination at Antwerp and ended her voyage, for just as the Captain was removing his vessel from the outer dock to the inner basin, where a grain ship would have to unload, she was ordered away, and therefore deviated. The Court held that Antwerp had been substituted for a Port in the United Kingdom, and that, as she was not lost in going to Antwerp but in coming from it, the Policy was void, and the premium not returnable. We cite this case in illustration of the Stamp Law. We should state, however, in justice to the defendant Underwriters, that they declined to have the cause tried on such an extraneous issue. The Policy nevertheless was void in Law and Equity, and could not have been pleaded if the Stamp Act had been referred to. Baron AMPHLETT, notwithstanding the disinclination of the Underwriters to raise the question, remarked that the substitution of the words made the original Time Policy a Voyage one, and, this being so, it required a stamp for time, and stamps for the voyages. We fear that nearly every Policy entered into might be contested on the insufficiency of stamping. A Policy must be stamped for time and voyage if, as in the case of "GAMBLE v. The Ocean Marine Insurance Company of Bombay," the Policy is to hold good for both. All ordinary Policies make it a condition that the liabilities of the Underwriter run on till a ship has been in good safety for twenty-four hours. No one ever thinks of having a Policy stamped for time, an impression generally prevailing that the twentyfour hours is part of the voyage; but if a ship were in safety immediately after arrival, and met with a disaster before the twenty-four hours had expired,

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the letter of the law might be urged to prove that the Policy required the additional stamp for time. It has been the custom of Underwriters, according to the earliest records extant, to allow a certain time to secure a ship in full safety on reaching the end of the voyage, but usage will not set aside a Statute. Where no exception was taken to the stamp on the Policy, the Courts would hold Underwriters liable to the end of twenty-four hours; but here again the Act of Parliament is in opposition to the practice of Insurers, and to the decisions of cases on their merits. -February 3, 1876.

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OVER-INSURANCE.

Mr. C. W. MERRIFIELD was a member of the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, and has recently appeared in print as an advocate for the abolition of "over-insurance." He winds up a letter to a contemporary by asserting that the question should be relegated to the basis mentioned in the Report of the Commission, namely-"to restore Marine Insurance "to what is its true character and only legitimate object, namely, a contract of indemnity which "should protect the Assured from losses occasioned by events over which he has no control;" but he omits all mention of what preceded or followed this extract. The Commissioners reported that it was difficult to interfere in the complex arrangements which have grown up with the growth of Trade, without the risk of incurring some new danger while endeavouring to promote safety at sea; and it appeared to the Commissioners that it would be unjust and unwise to interfere with the contract between the Assured and the Underwriter, unless our whole system of Marine Insurance was to be revised and amended. The Commission received evidence relative to unseaworthy ships, but the designers of a large number of ships that were lost between 1861 and 1874 from imperfect construction or faulty design, were not called to be examined as to improper lengths and depths to breadths, or deficient scantling. It is now the order of the day to attribute the drowning of Seamen to over-valuation in Policies and to no other cause, although the greatest losses of life have taken place in uninsured or only partially insured ships. Legislation, it is said, may, in 1876, carry into force the principle enunciated by the Royal Commissioners, that the Shipowner should not be "enabled to recover his insurance, whether under a "time or voyage Policy, when it could be shown "that he or his Agent had not done everything "reasonably within their power to make and main"tain the ship in a seaworthy condition, and that unseaworthiness occasioned the loss." Those who have read the articles in this Journal during the past few months, on the law as applied by the Superior Courts in cases of alleged unseaworthiness, will understand that such a proposal as that made by the Commissioners is superfluous. Unseaworthiness avoids a Policy and relieves the Underwriter from liability to pay under the same whenever the plea of unseaworthiness can be established. We made this clear enough in an article on the subject in these columns on the 27th of last month, in commenting upon and explaining the judgment of the Court of Appeal in "DUDGEON v. PEMBROKE." A Shipowner cannot, by common law, recover his insurance,

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whether under a time or voyage Policy, if it can be shown that he or his Agent has not done everything reasonably within their power to maintain the vessel insured in a seaworthy condition. An owner is also liable to be punished as a misdemeanant for sending an unseaworthy ship to sea; and, in addition to all other penalties, there is an implied warranty towards the Crew, at the time of sailing and during the voyage, that the vessel shall be kept in a seaworthy condition. (See Section 9, Merchant Shipping Act, 1875.) It is not open, therefore, to an Owner to contract himself out of his liabilities in the event of unseaworthiness being proved. If a ship is unseaworthy from inherent weakness of hull, or defect in construction, or neglect of repair, the insurance is not recoverable. The indemnity is against perils and losses of the sea, and not against unseaworthiness of the ship, her equipment, or the insufficiency of her Crew. No declaratory Statute is needed to enact that unseaworthiness shall render a Policy void in law or equity, or that it shall not be pleaded. The Courts must be left, as heretofore, to decide whether unseaworthiness has or has not contributed to the loss of a ship. Amid all the talk about over-insurance, no one seems prepared to bring forward cases of proved fraud. Twelve witnesses tendered their opinions on Insurance to the Royal Commissioners, but none of them was in a position to cite facts to support the principles they held. Mr. Butt, Q.C., thought there should be a warranty of seaworthiness under a time as well as under a voyage Policy, and, in the event of a ship being at sea when insured, the warranty might attach when she leaves the first Port afterwards, where she could be made seaworthy. Mr. CLOUSTON, an Underwriter at Glasgow, told the Commissioners he objected to overvaluation as giving an Owner an interest in the loss of his ship; and, in his opinion, the value of bond fide interest orly should be declared, whereas limiting the amount below that would stop enterprise. Mr. CLOUSTON, as a Broker for forty Underwriters, thought, from his experience, it would be unsound policy to interfere with all for the sake of a few unscrupulous Owners. Mr. HOLLAMS considered that the present law causes both loss of life and property, and, in his belief, no one should be entitled to recover more than an indemnity:-" Just as a house is valued by its rent, a ship should be valued by its freight." How a ship could be valued by the freight earned we should like Mr. HOLLAMS to explain. A ship, he said, should be taken at her fair value to the Owner, not her market value; and, even under a valued Policy, the actual loss only should be paid, and to effect this a clause should be inserted referring disputes, as in fire policies, to arbitration or Average Adjusters. In the event of a ship being largely over-insured, and lost under a suspicion of being fraudulently cast away or unseaworthy, we should say that the over-valuation would influence a Court in their decision on a disputed Policy. Mr. HOLLAMS is a solicitor consulted in shipping affairs, and he thinks that all that is needed to protect the lives of Seamen and prevent frauds upon Underwriters is the enactment of a clause in an Act of Parliament to the following effect:-"Notwithstanding any agreement

or valuation to the contrary, the Assured shall not "be entitled to recover more than the amount of his "loss." If this loss is to be estimated by adding the

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premium to the value of the ship, and also the interest on payments during construction, compensation for the time lost in outfitting, the loss of permanent employment, and the loss of what might be called the "good-will" of a business, it is possible the Underwriters would make a dead letter of the Statute, except in the case of fraud or concealment, in which last-mentioned instances there would be no necessity to plead the Statute. Mr. DANSON, in his evidence before the Commissioners, pointed out that a lawyer's knowledge of Marine losses was necessarily based only on the few cases litigated. He considered over-insurance and designed loss very rare. In a half-dozen suspicious cases he was convinced, on inquiry, that ignorance or neglect, not fraud, was the cause of unseaworthiness. It was his opinion that power to open valued Policies would be inoperative, and that it did not pay a Shipowner to insure at high premiums, for it was unlikely an Owner would pay thirty-five times to gain the over-insurance once. As to fighting Policies in a Court of Law, their case, he said, must be a strong one, for juries nearly always opposed the Underwriters. If it be so, what relief to Underwriters would be an Act directed against over-valuation? Mr. RILEY, one of the Managers of the London Mutual Marine Clubs, insuring 1,300 ships, to the extent of 1,600,000%., said he had resisted payments under Policies about three or four times in twenty-five years. In Club, however, there are no over-valuations, and the facts mentioned by Mr. RILEY go far to upset the scandalous charges made against Shipowners as a class. Mr. ELLIS, a gentleman of vast experience, who had been fifty years the Underwriter for the Indemnity Company, said:-"The competition of Underwriters leads to improper risks being accepted. No modifi"cation of the law would affect this; and Mr. "PLIMSOLL'S statement that Underwriters at Lloyd's "cannot combine to resist fraud is inaccurate." All those engaged in Shipping or Underwriting pursuits who were examined before the Royal Commission were of opinion that any alteration of the law of Insurance would not be likely to increase the safety of ships. It may be observed that the witnesses who had never superintended the fitting out or the sailing of a ship, or had been practically acquainted with insurance, were in favour of legislating against overvaluation; whereas men of business and experience were all of a different opinion.-January 19, 1876.

ADVANCE ON FREIGHT.

The House of Lords, on the 30th of March, gave judgment in a case involving the several liabilities of Charterers, Shipowners, and Underwriters on payment of freight on delivery and deduction for cash advanced. The cause to which we refer had been pending a considerable time. Our opinion was solicited, in 1869, on the merits of the case as represented to us, and we now find that, on final appeal, the House of Lords has confirmed the view we took of the matter. We allude to the action of the Merchant Prince," ALLISON v. The Bristol Marine Insurance Company," reported in our issue of the 31st ult. It is customary, in the chartering of ships, for the hirer of the vessel to pay one-half of the freight on or before sailing, and the other half on the delivery of the cargo at its destination. The Merchant Prince was chartered to load a

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cargo of coals at Greenock for Bombay, and it was stpulated that the freight was to be paid on unloading after the rate of 428. per ton on the quantity delivered. One-half the freight was to be paid on shipment of the coal, but the Owner of the vessel had to allow the Charterer four months' interest on that sum at the Bank rate, and pay for the insurance of the amount so advanced. In August 1867 the Merchant Prince struck on a reef near Bombay, and became a total wreck. A moiety of the cargo, however, was saved and delivered to the Charterer's Agouts at Bombay. The Master of the ship made no demand for freight on the half of the cargo thus safely landed. The Shipowner considered that he had no right to claim freight on the coal delivered, and he therefore elected to fall back upon the Policy he had taken out for 2,000l. on the freight at his risk. The Charterer of the ship was protected by his Policy on the half freight advanced, the other moiety, as we have stated, being covered by the insurance effected by the Shipowner. The question, therefore, practically resolved itself into who was to bear the loss of half the freight. It was said, in the first instance, as then represented to us, that the Charterer should be entitled to recover under the Policy for the half freight advanced, but that he ought to have paid the two guineas per ton, as agreed upon under the Charter-party, on all the cargo delivered. Next, it was contended that the Underwriters under each Policy should pay onehalf the loss. This distribution of the liability was objected to, and the Shipowner insisted upon being paid his full claim under the Policy he himself had taken out for the half freight. This was resisted by the Insurance Company on the ground that the prepayment of half the freight reduced the rate from two guineas to one guinea per ton. The Court of Common Pleas, consisting of Lord Chief Justice BoVILL and Justices BRETT and GROVE, decided in favour of Mr. ALLISON, holding that the advance was a cash payment in respect of what might be earned; and as half the goods had been lost, all that was actually earned had been paid in advance, and therefore the plaintiff had no further claim against the Charterer. As to whether the plaintiff had, in reality, insured what he had lost, it was obvious, said their Lordships, that the plaintiff's interest in the first half freight could not be the subject of sea risk, and that his intention was only to insure what was exposed to peril. There was a total loss, said the Court, of the subject matter of insurance, for which the defendants were liable. The Underwriting Company appealed from this judgment; and on the 18th of June 1874, the Court of Error, having taken time to consider the case, delivered a decision against the Shipowner. The most reasonable construction of the Charter-party, said Baron AMPHLETT, was to hold that for all purposes the prepayment should be taken as made in respect of the whole cargo, and, consequently, in the event which had happened, distributable between the part lost and the part saved. The Lord Chief Justice coincided with the judgment of Baron AMPHLEгT, but argued that if the freight in advance could not be recovered from the Shipowner, it presupposed the delivery of the entire cargo, and a payment in respect of it was therefore distributable over the entire cargo, and for this reason it was not competent for the Owner of the cargo to appropriate the whole amount prepaid to the portion of the cargo delivered, but that he should

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only have the benefit of it pro rata. Mr. Justice MELLOR took the Underwriters' view of the case, and considered that the loss was a partial and not a total one. Baron CLEASBY and Baron POLLOCK dissented; and as the majority of the Judges were in favour of the Underwriters, the judgment of the Court was pronounced against the Shipowner. After some further litigation, the House of Lords have settled the case by confirming the judgment of the Common Pleas, and reversing that of the Court of Exchequer. The cause was heard by the Lord Chancellor, Lord CHELMSFORD, Lord HATHERLEY, Lord PENZANCE, Lord O'HAGAN, and Lord SELBORNE, and their Lordships we e unanimous in their finding that the sum paid was in respect of half the total freight, and not on half the freight upon each ton. This judgment cannot be further impeached, and therefore a rule of law has now been established which will form a precedent in future in the settlement of all other similar contracts of affreightment. These protracted lawsuits must prove exceedingly costly to those who have to bear the charges, and perhaps in the above case the winner has not gained anything in a pecuniary sense by his success. There was much room for doubt; and sundry interpretations might have been put on the meaning of the terms in the Charter-party which were cited to determine the point at issue. We considered that the cargo could not be divided into halves, and therefore the Policies must stand as a whole. On ultimate decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal this construction has been upheld.—April 11, 1876.

DOUBLE POLICY.

In our impression of April 27 we gave a report of the case of the "North British and Mercantile Insurance Company v. The Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Company," which involved Overlapping or Double Policies. It may be remembered that several actions were heard on appeal in the High Court of Justice, last year, relating to the liabilities of insurers on separate Policies for Marine risks, or the destruction by fire, while on shore, of goods sent for shipment, and in possession of the Agents of a Shipowner. An unusual number of cases demanding the opinion of the Courts of Law turned upon the legal construction of the wording or the operation of clauses in Underwriting agreements. In the cause to which we now refer, it appears that Messrs. BARNETT and Co. had seeds belonging to several Merchants stored in their granaries, and for their own protection, they, being by the custom of London responsible for the safe keeping of the grain entrusted to them, effected what is known as "Wharfinger's Policies" to cover the value of the same from loss by fire or water. The granaries were destroyed by a conflagration, and grain to the value of 127,4591. happening, at the time, to be deposited therein, the Wharfingers were liable to their clients for the amounts of their separate interests, they themselves being covered to the extent of 151,000. Messrs. RODACANACHI and Co., according to their custom and the usage of other Merchants in the grain trade, took out policies in their own name upon the grain warehoused at the granaries, with the object of securing themselves against loss, in the event of the Wharfingers being unable to indemnity them to the full value of their liabilities in the event