DUNGARVAN HARBOUR.

The Afloat Clause, so common in Charter-parties, received an interpretation by a Special Jury in the case of the Longhirst (s), "WATERMAN V. ELLIOTTS," reported in our last impression, and heard in the Queen's Bench Division. The ship, it appears, was chartered to proceed from Riga and discharge in Dungarvan Harbour, always afloat, a cargo of railway sleepers. Dungarvan is entered from a bay of the same name on the Waterford coast, and the town proper is situated from four to five miles from the sea. When a vessel has crossed the outer bar from the sound or roadstead she enters what is called the Pool, and, after proceeding some distance further up the channel, there is another shoal, place, or bar, and beyond that is the Abbey-hole, which is the usual loading and discharging place for vessels frequenting the Port, but ships can only lie afloat at the quay there on the top of the tide. The Longhirst, it is said, was the largest vessel that had ever been engaged to discharge at Dungarvan, and she drew about 15 feet of water on entering the bay. Schooners were towed out to the steamer, and a sufficient quantity of cargo was taken out to enable her to cross the bar and anchor in the regular grounds in the Pool. The Charterer insisted that the ship should go up to the Abbey-hole, but the Master wisely declined to take his vessel where she might receive damage. There was no condition in the Charter-party that the steamer was to discharge aground; but, on the contrary, the words "always afloat" remained in the contract. The cargo was therefore discharged in the Pool. The learned Judge left it to the jury to say whether on the 29th and 30th of May the Longhirst was anchored in Dungarvan Harbour, and ready to discharge her cargo "always afloat," having regard to her size, the draught of water, and the nature of her cargo. This narrowed the question, in effect, to what may be deemed the limits of Dungarvan Harbour. action was brought for a breach of agreement, and to recover the increased cost of discharge through the receivers of the cargo having to take delivery by lighters at a distance from the quay. The plaintiff contended that the steamer had never reached Dungarvan Harbour, but, according to the verdict of the jury, she had completed the voyage when in the Sound. Harbour and Port are synonymous terms, and if a ship is not chartered to discharge at a particular dock, wharf, or berth, the Master is not to take her to an unsafe place. The boundaries of a Port are sometimes defined by Acts of Parliament; but where they are not so defined, they have to be proved, in the event of litigation, by the evidence of the Custom-house and Pilotage authorities.

The

If we

[PRICE 78. 6d.

AFLOAT CLAUSE.

If

rightly understand the decision arrived at by the jury, the Port of Dungarvan would extend to that part of the Sound where the Longhirst was anchored on the 29th and 30th of May. The Judge, however, put the alternative question as to whether, if the Sound was not in the Port the Pool was; and the jury were asked to declare whether the ship was in the harbour from the 31st of May to the 6th of June inclusive. The jury may possibly have meant by their affirmative answer that the Sound and the Pool were both within the Port; and this is our reading of their decision. The learned Judge told them to say whether there was a place known to people trading to Dungarvan as the Harbour of Dungarvan. this was answered in the affirmative on satisfactory proof being adduced, the verdict would stand for the plaintiff; but as it was entered for the defendants, and the Owners of the steamer recovered, under a counterclaim, three days' Demurrage, we may conclude that the limits of the Port included the Sound, the Pool, and the Quay at the town. The Shipping trade with Dungarvan is not extensive, but we learn by this trial that a Charterer and a Shipowner should know what sort of a place Dungarvan is, for both admitted that they entered into the agreement in ignorance of the facts. The pleas in the action on the part of the plaintiff and defendant were narrowed to the letter of the contract, outside of which neither of them travelled. The ship was chartered for Dungarvan Harbour, and, this being so, when did she get there? The old clause of "or as near thereto as she can safely get" does not seem to have been quoted, or, at all events, it was not referred to, nor was any mention made of spring tides. It is sought in these kinds of dispute to introduce custom to explain a contract, but it was not necessary in this instance. It was indirectly admitted by the Charterer's Agents that the ship drew too much water to cross the bar with all her cargo on board, and therefore the lightening of the ship in the Sound was a tacit inference that she had got as near to Dungarvan as she could, and the Laydays, as a rule, should have commenced from that time. The Railway Company to whom the sleepers were consigned had no knowledge of the tonnage or the draught of water of the ship; and all parties to the engagement acted under the contract in perfect good faith, which shows that great mischief may result from the chartering of a ship for a Port which she may not be adapted to by size and draught of water. Contracts of affreightment differ materially in their clauses, and, this being so, they must be settled in accordance with their written conditions. Each one has to stand on its own merits, as may be observed by the case of the Longhirst, above

B

AFLOAT CLAUSE.

reviewed. A ship, for example, may be as near to a Port as she can safely get with all her cargo on board, or, if there is no stipulation as to having all her cargo on board, when she is lightened. She may be afloat with all her cargo on board, or when bulk has been broken. One would suppose that those who have to manage a Shipping business would understand these definitions and provide against litigation; but though the majority of Masters and Chartering Brokers thoroughly understand the whole subject, no perceptible amendment is visible in the instruments submitted to us for our opinion, or to the courts of law for judgment.-June 23, 1877.

PORT OF GRANGEMOUTH.

We recently took occasion to refer to a decision in the Court of Queen's Bench which involved the question as to the limits of the Harbour of Dungarvan. The Judges of the Court of Session, Edinburgh, have been called upon to decide an appeal cause, and to say whether a vessel, when in the River Carron, was or was not within the Port of Grangemouth. (The St. Fergus, "BURRELL and SON v. BREMNER and THOMPSON," reported in the Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, June 22.) As our opinion has been solicited on this point, and as we have said that a ship's Lay-days would commence from the time she was anchored in the mouth of the Carron, we may now mention that the Sheriff Substitute, then the Sheriff, and, lastly, the Court of Session, have taken the same view of the dispute that we did, although the reasons for their judgments were confined to the written terms of the contract. A ship was chartered to convey a cargo of iron from Stettin to Grangemouth. The receiver of the cargo refused to pay a claim for Demurrage on the ground that the ship was in the River Carron for six days, and therefore beyond the harbour and out of the jurisdiction of the Trustees. It should be mentioned that Grangemouth is a Port at the east entrance of the Forth and Clyde Canal, where the River Carron unites with the canal. There are two docks at Grange mouth connected with the North British Railway, and vessels waiting for room or turn in the docks anchor in the Carron. The Forth and Clyde Canal Trustees have authority to regulate and govern Pilots, Truckers, and all other persons who may be engaged in piloting or conducting ships into or out of the harbours or basins. The Court found that the place in the Carron, on the western side, where the vessel was anchored, came within the legal limits of the Port of Grangemouth, and was a place recognised by the Custom-house officials for the legal discharge of cargoes. Whatever number of harbours or basins may be comprised as forming the Port of Grangemouth, it is now settled, at all events, that the haven at the outlet of the Carron on the Firth of Forth is within the Port for chartering purposes. Grangemouth is situated up the Firth about eighteen miles from Leith, and of late years there has been a large import trade done there in timber. It has also become a coal-loading Port, and, in consequence of the accommodation afforded by its wet docks, timber intended for adjacent places has been discharged there and floated down the Forth. The entries and clearances for one year at Grangemouth are about half a million

tons. It seems strange that parties should go to law in order to determine whether the anchorage ground is included under the term "Port of Grangemouth," when any Officer of Customs or local Pilotage authority could have settled the whole affair by an affirmative or negative answer. The ship having been pronounced as within the Port when she was anchored outside the docks and in the Carron, the Demurrage claim was allowed for the time the vessel was waiting to discharge. When the docks are full, or the berths are occupied, vessels are not allowed to enter; but, as the ship was chartered for the Port of Grangemouth, and not for a particular dock or quay, she had reached the Port when in the Carron, and the Merchant should have taken to his cargo there, or pay for Demurrage, as there were only three Lay-days unexpired out of the ten loading and discharging days on the vessel's arrival. The Superior Courts have held that, when a ship reaches as near to a dock as she can safely get, the Lay-days commence to run. In the Scotch Court, in the case of the St. Fergus, former judgments are in effect practically upheld, for the decision goes the length of further establishing the principle that, when a ship is kept out of dock by the crowded state of the basins, and is not chartered to load or discharge in turn, the Lay-days begin, as a rule, when the vessel is at the nearest anchorage to the berth, whether inside or outside the dock. There is, perhaps, a custom at the Port of Grangemouth that iron cargoes should be discharged in the docks, but custom cannot upset the conditions of a written agreement. If a ship is to be unladen in dock, and her Lay-days are not to commence until she is on turn and berthed, it is easy to make a stipulation to that effect a part of the contract. The Scotch Courts have lately shown an indisposition to the introduction of alleged customs. The Courts there have gone as much as possible on the letter of the contracts, and have disallowed attempts to alter the meaning of express terms in Charter-parties or Bills of Lading by evidence of custom. In the Superior Courts of England, Ireland, and Scotland, the stipulations in Charter-parties are as literally construed as their phraseology will admit of; but if such a case as the above had been tried by some of the County Court Judges, custom would have been let in to explain the agreement, and witnesses, in all probability, might have proved that the regular place of discharge was in the dock basin, and that the ship was not in Port until actually in berth. We could refer to more than one case where the contract of affreightment was more definite than that of the St. Fergus, yet custom was admitted to vary the plain wording of the instrument. The Judges of our inferior Courts are honourable and independent men, but they are not all well versed in Maritime Law; and when the customs and prejudices or interests of a locality are imported into a case, and are set before a Court by a skilful barrister, their judgments are swayed by the strong influence and appeals brought to bear upon them. These costly litigations-which, after all, involve the payment in the first instance of comparatively small sums-could be averted by making the conditions in Charter-parties and Bills of Lading more intelligible than they frequently are at present. When they are intentionally ambiguous, it requires considerable acuteness to detect their alternative interpretation.-June 30, 1877.

AFLOAT CLAUSE.

SECURE PORT.

SIR,-A vessel to which I am Agent has arrived in this Port, and her Charter contains the following clause :-" Per un viaggio da qui per un buon e sicuro porto del Regno Unito della Gran Bretagna ed Irlanda, o del Continente fra Havre ed Amburgo, questi due Compresi, ove il bastimento potrà entrare subito e stare sempre galleggiante, carico anche con ogni piu bassa marea, ai patti e condizioni seguenti." The Captain has received orders to proceed up the river to Cork Quay to discharge, but the tides at present will not allow the ship to go up without lightening. Is the vessel entitled to discharge at the part of the river between Cork and Queenstown where she can now lie afloat, or must she wait till there is sufficient water to go up to Cork? Queenstown, Jan. 11, 1876. [The ship was chartered to discharge at a secure Port in the United Kingdom, or on the Continent between Havre and Hamburg, where she could enter at high or low water, and always lie afloat. According to our reading of the Charterparty, the vessel was to discharge at a Port where she could enter at any state of the tide; and therefore the Charterer or Bill of Lading holder would have to lighten the ship to reach Cork, and the Lay-days would commence from the time she got as near to Cork as she could with safety do with her cargo on board.]

BERND. MAZZINI.

YARMOUTH A “GOOD AND SAFE PORT." SIR,-My vessel was loaded with a cargo of grain, bound for Great Yarmouth; but as I do not consider it to be a good and safe Port, where a vessel of my draught of water (16 feet 9 inches) could go, I have noted a Protest, and should now like to know whether you consider it a good safe Port, where such a ship could always lie afloat and discharge her cargo of grain, or what would be the nearest safe Port to go to? Enclosed I hand you a copy of my Charter for your inspection. My ship is not insured for that place.-Yours, &c., Baltimore, March 15, 1877. SHIPMASTER.

[The ship could not enter the Yare and lie afloat with her cargo on board. She might be safely lightened in the roads in fine weather, and then discharge afloat up the river.-(See the case of the Sacramento, of 572 tons, Ipswich County Court, Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, March 30, 1876, in which damages were recovered from a Shipowner whose vessel was ordered to Yarmouth, but which was discharged at Harwich.)]

WAITING FOR TIDE TO DOCK. SIR,-My steamer was ordered to a Port in the United Kingdom, with every chance of having to wait four or five days before being able to get into dock. Can I make the Merchant lighten the ship, or deduct the delay from the days left for discharge? The Charter-party fixes the destination as a "safe Port in the United Kingdom, or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and deliver the same, as ordered, always afloat." Yours, &c., SHIPOWNER.

April 11, 1877.

[If there is not room in the dock, and the Port only is mentioned, the time spent in waiting to enter would count in the Lay-days. On the other hand, if there is room in the dock, and the ship has to wait for the rising of the tide, and is chartered to discharge in the dock, the Lay-days would not commence before she was in the dock, and the Merchant would not be bound to lighten the ship at his expense.-(See pages 13 and 81, Maritime Notes and Queries, Vol. II.)]

FRESHET AND SPRING TIDES. SIR,-I chartered my vessel to load a cargo of manure at Plymouth for Coleraine. On my arrival I found there were only eight feet of water on the bar, and as my vessel drew 9 feet 6 inches, and it being the last quarter of the moon, I proceeded into Lough Foyle, where I lay till sufficient water. On arriving off Coleraine Bar, I find it impossible to get in owing to the fresh water coming out, and the Merchant sent word by the Pilot to proceed to Portrush and discharge. On my arrival at the latter place, the Merchant wants the ship

AFLOAT CLAUSE.

to pay the carriage to Coleraine, which is 18. 9d. per ton. Can he compel the ship to pay the carriage or not, or must I wait till next springs? The Charter states-" Coleraine, or so near thereunto as she may safely get; the cargo to be brought to and taken from alongside at Merchant's expense and risk." Yours, &c.,

Portrush, April 17, 1877. A SMALL SHIP CAPTAIN. [The vessel having waited for the spring tides, and being prevented from entering by the freshets, fulfilled the conditions of the Charter in proceeding to Coleraine, or as near thereto as she could safely get. In our opinion, as the Merchant ordered the ship to Portrush, the cost of carriage should fall on him.]

NOT WATER ENOUGH.

SIR,-My vessel was chartered in Odessa, in March 1878, to load a cargo of grain for United Kingdom, and a few days after my arrival at Queenstown I received orders to proceed to this Port, against which I protested, seeing there was not sufficient water for my vessel. In spite of the protest, the Merchants insisted on my proceeding according to orders. When my vessel arrived in Pool, where all vessels anchor till lightened to 14 feet, which is said to be the usual draught to proceed to canal entrance, I came to Newry to enter at the Customs and see the Merchant. During my conversation with him then, which I renewed a few days afterwards, I find he wants my vessel to enter Newry Basin, but before I could take her there her draught will have to be lessened to 12 ft. 6 in. aft, which will mean 12 ft. 3 in. at sea, while my vessel, in ballast, with 320 tons, draws 13 ft. 4 in. aft. I am afraid to run the risk of coming up to the basin with my vessel drawing 12 ft. 6 in., as then she will only have about 170 tons of cargo on board, and, in case she should turn over on either side of the canal bank and do damage, who am I to look to-to the Merchant or the Canal Company? I am of opinion the Merchant cannot compel my vessel to leave Pool (where he first commenced to discharge) on the conditions of my Charter-party, which I enclose for your inspection.Yours, &c.,

Newry, July 14, 1876. AN AUSTRIAN SHIPMASTER. [If the vessel, with only 170 tons on board, is likely to be blown over in a breeze and to do damage to herself and the canal, the Master would not be justified in taking her up to the basin. The Charter-party stipulates as follows:-"Where the ship will be able to enter and to stand always afloat with her cargo on board at low tide." Afloat means, in such a case, afloat with safety.]

LIGHTERAGE.

SIR,-My vessel was ordered from a Port of call to a safe Port on the Continent; and on arrival in the roads, drawing 18 feet of water, I was informed by the Pilots that they would not attempt to take my vessel into Port drawing over 17 feet. I thereupon applied to the Tribunal to name a Surveyor to define the draught of water on which the vessel could safely enter the Harbour on the top of the approaching spring tides. His decision was the same as the Pilot's-to lighten the vessel to 17 feet. I then called upon the Merchants, requesting them to lighten, but they absolutely refused to do so, stating that the ship was liable for lighterage, as the clause "So near thereunto as she can safely get" did not exist in the Charter-party. I have perused Maritime Notes and Queries, but find nothing bearing on my case-" so near thereunto," &c., always existing. Would not the clause, "Safe Port," intend in good faith a Port where a vessel could safely enter on the first spring tide without lightening; and would not the lighterage (if necessary) fall upon the Merchants? Aug. 17, 1876. JUSTICE.

[The vessel was chartered to discharge at any safe Port in the United Kingdom, or on the Continent between Havre and Hamburg. At the Port to which the ship was ordered it has been decided by the Tribunal of Commerce that, when a vessel reaches the Port and can enter by lightening, the cost of lighterage falls on the ship, in the absence of any express stipulation to the contrary, and when the clause "as near thereto as she can safely get" is not contained in the Charter-party.]

AGENTS AND PRINCIPALS.

AGENTS AS CHARTERERS.

The liability of Agents in the United Kingdom, who act for Principals residing in foreign countries, and enter into Charter-parties for the hire of ships, was very fully discussed in these columns on the 5th of June 1873. We then showed, by cases we quoted, that, if an Agent does not perform his agreement, he is liable, as Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN stated, for all matters done while the ship remains under his control, although he may attempt by a clause in the agreement to exonerate himself from responsibility after the cargo is shipped. In our impression of the 13th inst. will be found a letter from the Master of a Norwegian ship relating to the charter of his vessel by a Broker in England for the conveyance of a cargo of timber from Quebec, without the insertion of the non-liability clause. In the first part of the memorandum the hirer of the vessel entered his own name only, but at the bottom of the document, after his signature, he added, "Agent in for Messrs.

-"A person may be Agent in England for a foreign firm, but merely adding that description of himself is not sufficient to relieve him of his liabilities under the contract. Merely disclosing the name of a Principal will not of itself absolve an Agent from fulfilling the terms of a contract, for unless the other party to the instrument accepts the liability of the Principal by express stipulations, the Agent must be considered as the Principal. There are Brokers who appear to be ignorant of the position in which they stand to Shipowners, and we therefore deem it expedient to explain, for their more special instruction, the actual state of the law governing Charterparties entered into by Agents. In order to practically illustrate the subject, let us take the case of the Montrose, "CowIE v. WITT," which was tried by a special jury at the Court of Passage, Liverpool, July 18, 1874. The plaintiffs (Shipowners) sued the defendants (Merchants and Agents) for the sum of 100., alleged to be due as balance of freight. The Charter-party was signed by the Agents for and on behalf of the Consignee at Chittagong, and the latter deducted from the freight the amount in dispute. The defence to the action was, that the Agents agreed verbally with the Shipowners that they were not to be liable under the Charter, and it was asserted that this was assented to. The jury found that the defendants were not liable, but leave was given to appeal. On November 6, 1874, the cause was heard in the Common Pleas before Lord Justice COLERIDGE and Justices KEATING, BRETT, and DENMAN. The Court held that the evidence taken at the trial was affirmative, as regarded the defendants, as to what they stipulated at the time of signing the agreement, and appeared to be uncontradicted; and as the jury had come to the conclusion that both parties did in fact understand the conditions under which they were bound, the rule for a new trial must be refused. The Court, however, ruled that—“ the mere fact of the "defendants signing as Agents was not sufficient to "fiee them from their liability; but that was so 66 strengthened by what had occurred at the time of 66 signing, as to afford abundant evidence to go to the "jury on that plea, and the learned Judge was right "in leaving it to them." This is about the clearest exposition of the law of Principal and Agent that we could produce. The Agents, in signing as such, were proved to have gained the acceptance of their

AGENTS AND PRINCIPALS.

position as Agents by the Shipowner, and this understanding outside the Charter-party, coupled with the description in that agreement, operated as a release. The verbal agreement having been established, the Court allowed it to govern and explain the written condition of the contract of affreightment. This is explicit, though the Court guarded their judgment by observing that the Charter was exceptionally confirmed to the extent of constituting the Charterers as Agents, otherwise the declaration of Agency would not have freed them from liability. There is only one way for an Agent to make his Principal liable, and not himself personally, and that is by a contract to that effect. Agents agree to load a ship within a given number of days, and then to give a lien on the cargo for Demurrage. This lien is, and has been, repudiated by Shippers in numerous instances recorded in our columns, and Masters have been compelled to sign Bills of Lading without any reference whatever to the conditions specified in the Charter-parties. An Agent who does not, in his character as Charterer, carry out the stipulation agreed upon, cannot afterwards fall back upon any clause in the contract for protection. It is a condition precedent that he shall fulfil his obligations if he desires to keep aloof from legal proceedings. With respect to coal charters, ships have been detained in consequence of want of trucks, insufficient supply from the pits, or from strikes; and when the Masters of ships have presented the Bills of Lading, no lien has been given for Demurrage due in loading. In the case of a charter entered into to bring a cargo of ore from Bibao, the Judge of the County Court of Glamorganshire, when a Charterer undertook to load a vessel within a given time-"accidents or causes occurring "beyond the control of the Shippers or Affreighters "which may prevent or delay her loading or discharging, including civil commotions, strikes, riots, "and stoppage of trains, always excepted "-he'd that these were disturbing causes, and not merely local riots, and gave judgment against the Shipowner. When the case went on appeal to the Admiralty Court, Sir R. PHILLIMORE reversed the judgment, and allowed thirty-nine days' Demurrage on the ground that the respondent had not produced evidence of general commotion. It is not sufficient, said his Lordship, to show that there was a general civil disturbance and a stoppage of the railway for a short period, but it was bound to be proved that there was a disturbing cause of such a character as would prevent the loading of the particular vessel, and that it did actually prevent the loading, and so bring the Charterer within the excepted peri's. Charterers in this country who desire to escape such liabilities as the latter case discloses, should guard their agreements in accordance therewith; for it is plain that Agents are de facto Principals unless it is agreed that those for whom they act are to be accepted as such.-September 23, 1876.

CHARTERING AGENT.

The case of "Sanguinetti v. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company," heard and determined by the Judges in the Court of Appeal, December 1, 1876, should be attentively considered by Shipowners and Merchants, as it involves questions deeply affecting them both. In a leading article in the Shipping and

AGENTS AND PRINCIPALS.

Mercantile Gazette, June 5, 1873, will be found some cases referred to wherein it was held that, where an Agent in this country signs as such for a Principal abroad, and endeavours to free himself from all liability, under a Charter-party, from the time the cargo is put on board a ship, he could not by reason of such contract rid himself of his responsibility for acts done while the vessel was under his control and previous to the completion of the loading, in the absence of any special agreement limiting his engagements to everything done before or subsequent to the lading of the vessel. The case of "Sanguinetti v. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company" opens up a new phase of the question of Demurrage, for there was a clause in the Charter as follows:-"To be loaded at the rate of 75 "tons per working day, beginning when the ship is "in berth, unballasted, and ready to receive cargo; 66 any time lost by strikes or lock-outs to be excluded "in the computation of the working days." Then it was provided, further, that stiffening coal-i.e., coal put on board to stiffen or steady the ship in lieu of ballast-was to be shipped at the rate of 40 tons per day; and the days on which stiffening coal was put on board, or the ship was detained for it, were to be excluded in computing the working days allowed for loading; Demurrage to be paid for every day beyond the days allowed for loading and discharging, at the rate of 3d. per ton per day; the Master to have a lien on the cargo for freight and Demurrage under the agreement; all liability of the Charterer to cease as soon as the cargo was on board, and all questions, whether of short delivery, Demurrage, or o herwise, to be settled with the Agent of the Charterer at Callao, which settlement was to be binding on the Owners, who were to have a lien on the cargo. It was alleged by the plaintiff (the Shipowner) that the defendant (the Charterer) delayed for a month to put the stiffening coal on board, by reason of which the ship was not ready to receive cargo, and was detained for 48 days, for which the plaintiff claimed the sum of 350l. It was further stated that when the ship, having ultimately received its cargo, got to Callao, the defendant's Agent there was requested to settle the Demurrage, but refused to do so, and demanded and received the cargo without settling the claim. The defendant stated, by way of defence, that previous to entering into the Charter-party, he had contracted for a cargo of coal to be put on board the ship, and that the contractors were prevented from loading the cargo by reason of strikes and lock-outs, and would not have been able to load the coal until 1 ng after the cargo was loaded, on which account the defendant got the cargo from other Coalowners. The defendant contended that the stiffening coal was part of the cargo, and that the days during which the ship was detained for want of it were to be excluded in the reckoning. Further, the defendant denied that there was an application on the part of the plaintiff to the Agent at Callao to settle the claim, or that the plaintiff was ready to accept such settlement there. Moreover, the defendant demurred to so much of the statement of claim as alleged liability in respect of what happened in England, on the ground that it appeared that the cargo was on board, and that all liability of the defendant was by the Charter to cease thereon, and that it did not

AGENTS AND PRINCIPALS.

"There

appear that the question had been settled with the Agent there. The defendant also demurred to so much of the statement of claim as alleged liability in respect of what happened at Callao, because the settlement did not impose any liability on the Charterer, the cargo having been once on board, and all liability then ceasing, the Shipowner's remedy then being only his lien. The defendant (the Charterer) desired to raise the question of law, whether what happened in England, as to which there was no dispute, was sufficient to sustain the action, because, as to what occurred abroad, the facts being in dispute, a commission to take such evidence would be necessary, which would entail great expense. This narrowed the question as to whether the Charterer who gave a lien on the cargo was liable for the Demurrage incurred in loading in England, and on its discharge in Peru. The Court held that the stiffening coal was a part of the cargo, and, as the Master was to have a lien for Demurrage, that would apply to the whole of the coal and to the delay in loading any part of it, and therefore the question of stiffening was immaterial. The clause under which it was agreed that all claims for Demurrage should be settled with the Agent, it was held, referred to Demurrage incurred in England as well as to Demurrage abroad. "was [said the Court] to be one settlement of all "claims on both sides before the cargo was delivered." The Charterer, therefore, was held to be non-liable under the contract, and the decision of the Queen's Bench was confirmed. This case, it will be seen, turned upon the written terms of the Charter. The Shipowner understood it in the sense that for all detention of the ship in discharging he had a lien on the cargo; but for the Demurrage incurred in loading and discharging he could finally fall back upon the Charterer when he had parted with his lien by delivering the cargo, and could not secure a settlement of his claim for either through the Agent at Callao. A lien on cargo in a foreign Port, given under Charter, is an unsafe agreement to rely upon. If the Bills of Lading stipulate that a certain sum is to be paid for Demurrage incurred at the Port of loading, and that a given number of days are to be allowed for discharge, and after their expiration the Master of the ship is to have a lien for Demurrage, it is possible the Shipowner may be protected by the landing and warehousing of a sufficient quantity of the cargo to cover his lien. Disputes, however, are raised as to Saints' Days, Sabbaths, holidays, bad weather days, and custom, and then the Master is sued for withholding the goods of the Consignee. In such latter cases, if the Charterer has taken care to protect his interests by contracting himself out of all his liabilities, the redress open to the Shipowner is a doubtful one, and may turn out very expensive. If Shipowners, however, will continue to exonerate Charterers from all liabili ties under the contracts of affreightment, they must be prepared to put up with the consequences. The Court guarded itself against any expression of opinion as to the personal liability of the Agent at Callao, as that was independent of the Charter-party. The lien was given on the cargo, and did not necessarily make the Agent liable for the payment. The Court held that there was no right of action, under the Charter, against the Charterer, and, as the Agent was no party to the contracts, he might not be personally liab'e unless he gave a guarantee to settle the Demurrage if