CO-OWNERSHIP.

MANAGER AND SHIP'S DEBTS.

SIR, I am the Managing Owner of a small vessel, and have several Co-Owners, and in consequence of the continuation of gales this winter, she has been unusually long on her voyage and sustained trifling damage, which has caused the vessel to be in debt. As one of my Co-Owners has declined to pay his portion of the loss, can I dispose of his shares in order to meet his portion of the loss; or what steps can be taken in the matter?-Yours, &c., SHIPOWNER.

April 23, 1877.

REPAIR AND CLASSIFICATION OF SHIP. SIR,-Having repaired and classed a vessel, I presented a bill of particulars to the Owners of the said vessel, and the Ship's Husband gave me a bill for the amount, drawn as Shipowner, signed in his own name. The said Ship's Husband had become bankrupt, but the bill has not yet got to maturity. The bankrupt has included me in his liabilities. On the bill not being met, can I sue the other registered shareholders of the vessel for the amount of repairs, or has my accepting the bill on the Ship's Husband debarred me from suing the other Owners? The bankrupt's share of the vessel was mortgaged when I repaired the ship, but there are three or four Owners whose shares are not mortgaged. April 6, 1876. SHIPWRIGHT.

[A Shipwright has a lien, by common law, on a vessel for the cost of repairs, and if he has accepted the personal responsibility of the Ship's Husband, and parted with his lien, and the bill is not paid, he would have to make his claim under the estate of the bankrupt. Whether, under the circumstances, the Shipwright could recover from the other Co-Owners would depend upon whether the Ship's Husband was entitled to pledge their credit. If the Ship's Husband had funds in hand, or the Co-Owners have paid him their share, a question of equity might arise.-(See pages 64 and 168, Maritime Notes and Queries, Vol. II.)]

CLASSIFICATION.

SIR,-A and B own a ship. A has the largest share. The ship is just coming off her original class. A wishes to reclass her, but B declines to pay his share of reclassing expenses-in fact, protests against her being reclassed, for no other reason than that so little is doing. Can A reclass in spite of B, holding the latter liable for his share of the expenses? If not, is there any other course A can legally pursue in the matter in order to have the ship reclassed?Yours, &c., A SUBSCRIBER.

Blyth, Aug. 21, 1876.

[The dissentient Co-Owner cannot be made to contribute to the expenses of repairs for classification.-(See letter "Repairs-Classification," page 139, Maritime Notes and Queries, Vol. II.) The shortest mode of adjusting the difficulty would be by an application to the Court of Admiralty for the sale of the ship.]

CO-OWNERSHIP.

SALE OF SHARES IN A SHIP.

SIR,-I bought 64-64th shares of a vessel, paid the money, and got a Bill of Sale. When this document was presented with the declaration to the Superintendent at the Customhouse for indorsement, it turned out that the seller owned only 60-64th shares of the vessel. Can I not demand back the value of the 4-64th shares, and how shall I proceed to do so?-Yours, &c., A SHIPOWNER.

Bangor, Oct. 4, 1876.

[The seller should be sued in a Court of Common Law for the money paid on account of the four shares conveyed in the Bill of Sale, but not legally transferred.]

SHARES AND LIEN FOR DOCK DUES.

SIR, A Part-Owner of a small steamer of which I am Managing Owner has mortgaged his shares for twice their value, and become bankrupt, without a probability of his estate paying one farthing. The vessel is eating her head off in dock rent &c., and the Mortgagee will neither hand over his deeds to enable me to carry out a sale acquiesced in by all the other Owners nor advance the proportion due to extricate the ship from an unreserved sale by the Dock Company. 1st. How can I obtain and give a title to these few shares? 2nd. Have I a lien on them for recoupment of dock rent, or shall I be thus voluntarily releasing these shares from a lien that is now actually held by the Dock Company? Νον. 2, 1877. SUNDERLAND.

[1st. By application to the Court of Admiralty. 2nd. In a Co-Owner's suit the Manager would be allowed, out of the proceeds of the sale of the ship or the Mortgagee's shares, the moneys paid for dock rent. No lien exists on the shares, and therefore, if recourse is not had to the Admiralty Court, the debt must be recovered, if at all, in the usual manner under the Bankruptcy proceedings.]

HALF-YEARLY RETURNS.

SIR,-1st. If a ship's Captain makes a false declaration in the half-yearly returns by saying a vessel is laid up for months under repairs, which is not the case, but she has been employed at the same time discharging cargoes at different Ports, is he or the Ship's Husband in any way liable to fine or punishment or not? 2nd. Can a Co-Owner, under these circumstances, claim to see the Master's cargo or logbook? 3rd. Can anyone in any possible way ascertain when

[1st. The Master or Owner of every Home Trade ship is to transmit to a Shipping Master the half-yearly returns relating to the voyage, Crew, &c. A penalty of 51. is incurred, and transire may be refused, if this is not complied with. (Section 275, Merchant Shipping Act, 1854.) If any false declaration has been made, information should be furnished to the Board of Trade. 2nd. If concealment is suspected, a demand might be made on the Ship's Husband or Master to see papers and log-book, and, in the case of refusal, application should be made to a Court of Law. 3rd. All vessels are reported at the Custom-house, and may be traced through the Shipping and Mercantile Gazette reports. 4th. A Managing Owner can be compelled, by proceedings in the Admiralty Court, to furnish accounts.]

BILL OF SALE AND ADVANCES.

SIR,-In 1874 A. B., the Owner of 24-64th shares of a vessel, deposited the Bill of Sale of the said shares with his Bankers, and at the same time agreed (verbally) to execute a mortgage of his interest in the vessel to secure an overdraft, but no such mortgage has ever been executed. In February last the said A. B. filed his petition under the arrangement clauses of the Bankruptcy Act. A resolution to wind up the estate in liquidation was duly passed, and a Trustee appointed. The Bankers now refuse to deliver up the Bill of Sale, on which they claim a lien for the amount of A. B.'s overdraft. . Has the Trustee a right to be registered as the Owner of A. B.'s shares in the vessel, and to recover possession of the Bill of Sale from the Bankers, or are the Bankers right in their contention ?-Yours, &c., April 1, 1877.

AGENT.

[If the Trustee wants to obtain possession of the Bill of Sale, he must satisfy the demand of the Bankers who have made advances on the security of that instrument.]

BILL OF SALE AND ADVANCES. SIR,-I have read in your issue of the 4th inst. a letter on the above subject signed "Agent," and your reply not being, in my opinion, correct, I take the liberty of contending that a Bill of Sale for shares in a ship deposited with Bankers as security for an overdraft, without being properly transferred to the Bankers either by Mortgage or Bill of Sale, and properly registered in the Custom-house books, is no security at all; and if the Bankers refuse to give up the Bill of Sale in dispute, may I ask of what value it can possibly be to them to keep it ?-Yours, &c.,

Swansea, April 5, 1877.

JOHN PRUST,

Shipowner and Manager.

[The Bill of Sale must be made out to the Bankers in order to enable them to dispose of the shares; but it was competent for the Owner of the shares to deposit his Bill of Sale with the Bankers as security for an advance or overdraft. This he appears to have done, and the Bankers would have a lien on the document for that amount. They, it is true, could not realise under the Bill of Sale thus deposited with them, but they can, by holding the Bill of Sale, prevent any dealings with the shares it represents until their claim is satisfied. The deposit of the Bill of Sale in this case created in the Banker's favour what is known in law as an equitable lien, and which the holders can claim to have discharged before they surrender the document.]

MAJORITY OF VOTES.

SIR,-With reference to information supplied in your issue of Oct. 13 as to what constitutes a suflicient and valid ap

CO-OWNERSHIP.

pointment of Managing Owner of a vessel when that vessel is owned by several, will you kindly state to what majority reference is made? Is it to the Owners of the majority of shares or to the majority of individual Owners?-that is to say, is the value of an Owner's vote determined by the proportionate number of shares he possesses, or has the Owner of one share as much voice in the appointment as an Owner of 50 shares? Secondly, is the candidate for the Managing Ownership entitled to vote, seeing that in any case he would vote for himself? MANAGING OWNER.

Newport, Oct. 16, 1877.

[A majority of Co-Owners cannot bind those Co-Owners who give notice that they will not be responsible for the outlay. If the repairs are so substantial as not to admit of their being done on the order of the Manager, and a majority desire to put the ship in a fit state for sea, and the dissentients, if requested, refuse to sell their shares, the only remedy is to apply to the Court of Admiralty for a decree to sell the ship.]

INSURANCE AND MANAGEMENT.

SIR,-What are the usual charges for management of coasting vessels at the principal Ports in Britain, or the Ship's Husband's charges for vessels of from 150 to 300 tons burthen?-Yours, &c., G. S. O.

Nov. 11, 1876.

[The ordinary charge is 24 per cent. There is no absolute scale. The commission varies from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent., and depends upon the number of ships and their aggregate earnings. An understanding is also common between CoOwners as to whether the commission to the Manager is to be paid-1st, on the annual profits; 2nd, on the protits of each voyage; 3rd, on the gross freights. The remuneration depends, therefore, upon the agreement entered into.]

PARTNERS IN A SHIPPING VENTURE. SIR,-I applied to a friend of mine, and we agreed to purchase a vessel. Some 10 months ago we found one advertised for sale, and she was offered to us, but we considered the price too high, consequently we waited to see if they would take lower terms. She was afterwards put up by public auction, but failed to find a purchaser. We afterwards made them an offer, but without effecting a purchase. I heard nothing further, but expected we should get the ship, until I found she was being towed from London to this Port, having been purchased by my friend. Being anxious to know if I was considered a shareholder, I called upon him for an explanation, and, to my astonishment, found he and another person had purchased the vessel for less money than we had agreed to give, and they now refuse to allot me any part. After being 10 months corresponding about the same vessel with the above result, can I claim the shares which I originally agreed to take, or am I not entitled to some recompense after being kept all this time in suspense? Whitby, June 2, 1876. A SHIPOWNER.

[If the friend who entered into the agreement with our Correspondent refuses to appor' on him any shares in the

CO-OWNERSHIP.

vessel, and he has sustained any loss thereby, he might proceed against the purchaser for non-fulfilment of contract.]

PURCHASE OF UNSEAWORTHY VESSEL. SIR,-We purchased a British-built vessel about three months ago, and paid a price for her that we expected woul insure her seaworthiness; but the Board of Trade have detained her, and on examination she has turned out quite rotten and not worth spending a large amount on. We are now informed by several persons of good authority that the seller was well aware of her being rotten, as he intended doing repairs to her topsides, &c. in the event of his not being able to sell her. Could we recover our money back, or any part of it? SUBSCRIBERS.

Newport, May 24, 1876.

[Though the sale of an existing chattel, as being of a particular description, implies a contract that it exists and is of that description-(" Strickland v. Turner," "Gompertz v. Bartlett")-yet in such case no contract is, in the absence of fraud, implied of the good quality-(" Wieler v. Schillizzi")-or condition of the chattel so sold; and therefore, when a ship is sold, and the vendor has power to sell, no contract of seaworthiness is implied. The Court of Exchequer held that the property in a ship might pass by the sale though she was stranded and a constructive total loss within the meaning of a Policy. In the absence of any oral or written warranty of seaworthiness, the vessel would be purchased with all her faults; and defects patent at the time of a bargain are not touched by a warranty, because they can form no subject of deceit or fraud. If no representations were made of seaworthiness, our Correspondents could not recover compensation from the seller of the ship.]

SHIP PURCHASED AND NOT DELIVERED. SIR,-I bought a small craft, 121 tons register, on the 9th inst., but the mast and bowsprit were not included, and were to be taken out of the vessel by the seller. As I did not stipulate any time when the craft was to be delivered up to me, what would be a reasonable time for doing so? I may mention that the sellers refuse to deliver her before another vessel of theirs arrives here, which may take from eight days to a month.-Yours, &c., SHIPBROKER.

Leith, March 12, 1877.

[Any time in excess of a week would be so unreasonable as to give a claim on the seller for non-performance of contract.]

SHIPBUILDING CONTRACT.

SIR,-I agreed to build a vessel, and during the building of her the Owner undertook to pay instalments at different times. The first was paid; the second and third, due last September, are still unpaid. Notice of such payments was given in due time to the Owner, but he declined to comply with the agreement. Can I sell the vessel and charge the Owner all damages; if so, am I supposed to advertise the vessel for sale to comply with the Merchant Shipping Act? -Yours, &c., SHIPBUILDER.

Dec. 23, 1876.

[If the vessel was vested in the purchaser on payment of the instalments, it would be necessary to sue him for the moneys unpaid, and for breach of contract, he having made a first deposit. The builder has a lien for the instalments unpaid on the vessel, so long as she is not given up to the party who contracted to pay for her building, whether on the slip or afloat. We would not advise a sale without an order from the Court.]

CREDIT FOR FREIGHT.

SIR,-1. If three persons own a vessel, and one of them, who is Manager, lets one of the Co-Owners have the cargoes unknown to the third Owner and does not receive payment,

[1. The freight should be paid on delivery of the cargo; and if the Manager has given a Co-Owner credit for the carriage of a cargo, he (the Manager) would be personally liable to the other Co-Owner for the third share. Not having received the freight from the Co-Owner, the Manager should not have paid the latter any profits on the earnings of the ship. 2. The Admiralty costs would depend upon the length of the proceedings and the opposition. These charges fall on the joint shares of the Co-Owners.]

EXECUTRIX WANTS TO SELL.

SIR, A, B, C, and D are Owners of two vessels, each holding 16-64ths of each ship. A being the Managing Owner, chartered the vessels, and paid and received all moneys. One ship got a good deal in debt, but the other ship did not. A died, leaving his wife sole executrix. Can she sell both ships to pay the debt of the one? If not, can D, being Captain, sail the ship that is not in debt ?—Yours, &c., Whitby, Jan. 23, 1877. CAPTAIN D.

[The widow, as executrix of the deceased Managing Owner, cannot sell one or both ships to pay the sums due by the Co-Owners to her late husband. The Manager had no lien on the ships for his disbursements. The Co-Owners must be personally sued for their share of expenses if they decline to pay. The holder of a 16-64th share cannot force himself on the ship as Master. Another Manager should be appointed and left to deal with the Masters.]

PASSENGERS AND MASTER'S WIFE. SIR,-1. Can a Managing Owner grant the Captain the privilege to take his wife to sea with him, and charge the same to the working expenses of the ship? 2. Can a partner object to the Captain's wife going to sea in the ship? The Captain has no certificate to carry passengers, nor is the ship a passenger ship;" and if the Managing Owner has not got that power, what are the best steps for the Co-Owners to take to obtain redress?-Yours, &c., CO-OWNERS.

66

London, Dec. 21, 1876.

[1. The Managing Owner has no power to charge the CoOwners with the expense of provisioning the Master's wife, she not being on the ship's articles. 2. A majority of CoOwners could settle the question by disallowing the expenses in the settlement. It would be too trivial a case to take into Court.]

DAMAGE.

DAMAGE TO PIER.

A curious, but by no means an unimportant case was argued at some length last week before the Court of Appeal. It had originally come before the Court of Admiralty, and the appeal was from the decision of that Court, the question being-whether, in an action in an English Court for an alleged injury sustained in a foreign country, the liabilities of the parties were to be determined according to the law of the place in which the alleged wrong occurred, or according to the municipal law of England. It appeared that the plaintiffs, the respondents in the Court of Appeal, are the owners of a pier in a Port

DAMAGE.

of Spain where iron ore is exported, and they sued the defendants for damage to the pier by their steamer, the M. Moxham, caused, as was alleged, by the carelessness of the Master and Crew of that vessel. The vessel had been arrested in Spain, and released on an undertaking not to raise the question of jurisdiction-in other words, the parties agreed to refer the case to the decision of the Court of Admialty in this country. Had the question of jurisdiction been reserved, it would have been an interesting point as to whether the Court of Admiralty could, in such a case, have exercised the powers given by the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, which confers a jurisdiction in respect of damages committed anywhere by any ship. The other question then remained -namely, whether the law of Spain or the law of this country should be applied to the case. According to the Spanish law, the Master and Mariners only would be liable; according to the English law, the Owners would be responsible. For some time after the Act of 1861 became law, it was thought that the extension of jurisdiction which it effects in matters of damage only applied to ships, but the Court of Admiralty has not hesitated to exercise it in cases of damage done by vessels to harbour works. In the case of the Robert Pow, for example, Judge LUSHINGTON appeared to attach a limited and technical meaning to the word "damage" as it occurs in the Statutes. His Lordship's successor has not, however, hesitated to enlarge practically the definition; and when the Owners of the Falmouth Pier (the Uhla, Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, June 1867) sued the Owners of a ship, in the Admiralty Court, for damage done by the vessel to the pier, the Court asserted its jurisdiction, and in the result the Owners of the pier recovered the damage from the Owners of the ship. In the present case, the Court of Admiralty had to decide as to whether the law of Spain or the law of England should govern. The broad question as to the application of British or foreign law to a case of damage occurring between two vessels in foreign waters was finally settled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the leading case of the Napoleon v. the Halley, appealed from the Court of Admiralty (Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, August 1868). In this case the damage occurred in the Scheldt, and the Judge of the High Court decided that the case was governed by the Belgian law. This decision was reversed on appeal, the Judicial Committee holding, in effect, that in any contention in respect of damage occurring in a foreign Port, the law of England, and not the law of the foreign State, must govern. The decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of the M. Moxham appears to point the other way. The Court below decided that the Shipowners were liable for damage done to the pier at Marbella, although they would not have been liable by the law of Spain. The Court of Appeal have reversed this decision, and given judgment for the appellants, with costs. Their Lordships said, "they were clearly of "opinion that acts committed in a foreign country, "and which imposed no liability in that country 66 upon a particular individual, could not be made the 66 ground of action against that individual in an Eng"lish Court. To found an action in an English "Court for an alleged wrong committed by the "defendant in a foreign country, two things must

DAMAGE.

concur the act complained of must be wrongful on the part of the defendant in the foreign country, "and it must be such, also, as the English law "regards as wrongful. If either of these conditions "is wanting, the action cannot be maintained. "Here the act complained of was not, according to "the Spanish law, as pleaded, a wrongful act of the "defendants, or one for which the Spanish law would "hold them responsible; and, the matter being governed by the law of Spain, it followed that the plea was a good defence." It is true that, in the case of the Halley, the question was one of the liability of the Owner under the Belgian Pilotage Law; in the case of the M. Moxham it is one of the Owner's liability under the Spanish law for injury caused by a ship to pier or harbour works. But both are causes of damage. Yet in the one the Judicial Committee have decided that the English law must govern; and in the other the Court of Appeal have held that it must be decided in accordance with the principles of the Spanish law. The latest decision is always that to which the greatest importance is attached. But it is not a little embarrassing to find two Tribunals of the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal, taking apparently different views on a point of jurisprudence of great interest and consequence to persons connected with Merchant Shipping.-Feb. 17, 1876.

GRAIN AND BILL OF LADING STIPULATIONS.

A great outcry was made in 1875 about what was alleged as the contracting of Shipowners out of their liabilities by express stipulations in Bills of Lading. Meetings of Merchants took place to protest against and oppose all attempts to cast upon them the damage or losses arising from the negligence of the servants of Shipowners. On the part of the latter it was said:"We find seaworthy vessels with certificated "Masters, Mates, and Engineers. We do our best to secure immunity from sea damage, but if our ser"vants act negligently and injure our interests, and "at the same time inflict loss upon the goods on "board, the fault does not rest with us, and we will "not convey merchandise by our ships unless we are "exonerated from all liability for the acts of the "Masters and Crews, over whom, when they leave

66

port, we have no further control." The question was then narrowed to that of a contract for the carriage of goods under conditional terms. The Merchant was not compelled to forward, nor the Shipowner to carry, the goods; but if the former consented to the terms of the latter, then the agreement rested on the limitation of liability as expressed in the Bills of Lading. There is no monopoly of sea routes; and if one Shipowner is unwilling to take upon himself the risks attendant upon the negligence of his Crew, it is possible another may be found of a more reckless character. A Shipowner insures his vessel against perils of the sea, but the destruction inflicted by winds and waves does not include the, at times, equally disastrous losses brought about by the carelessness or ignorance of his servants. In many cases it would be the most prudent course to sell a ship if the Owner is to be made liable for the acts of tnose he employs. There are many familiar examples of the liability of Shipowners for damage done to goods while in their possession, which we need not

DAMAGE.

particularise; but the recent action of "STEEL and CRAIG v. The State Line Steamship Company," and the decision of the Court of Session, Edinburgh, will suffice for our present purpose. About 15,409 bushels of wheat were shipped by steamer from New York to Liverpool, and the Bill of Lading holders made a claim upon the Company for 2,7937. in respect of damage to the grain by sea-water. The Shipowners admitted that, through the negligence of one of the Crew, a port on the orlop deck had been left unfastened, through which the water had entered and found its way into the wheat. The port was situated about a foot above the load-line, and when the ship had been five days at sea the leakage commenced. The port, it appears, had been merely pulled in, and not screwed up. Had the Crew performed their duty in a faithful manner they would have seen that all the lower ports in a laden ship were securely fastened, but this was not done in the case referred to. The Steamship Company relied upon a clause in the Bill of Lading which stipulated that they were not responsible for the bursting of bags, or the consequences arising therefrom, or for any of the following perils, whether resulting from the negligence, default, or error in judgment of the Pilot, Master, Mariners, Engineers, or persons in the service of the ship, or for whose acts the Shipowner was liable, or otherwise, namely, risk of craft or hulk, or transhipment, explosion, heat or fire at sea, in craft or hulk, or on shore, boilers, steam or machinery, or for the consequences of any damage or injury thereto, howsoever such damage or injury might be caused; or for collision, straining, or other peril of the seas, navigation or land transit, of whatever nature or kind soever. Some exceptions were raised to the wording of the clause, but as they were of a clerical nature, they are not necessary for the elucidation of the particular question we are discussing. The Court held that the Shipowners were relieved from their liability under these stipulations, and could not, consequently, be made to pay for losses incurred under such an agreement. The Lord President, in delivering judgment, said he arrived at this conclusion with regret, because he was perfectly satisfied that the limitation of the liability of Shipowners in the manner above stipulated relieved them of responsibility for any amount of negligence on the part of their servants, and was likely to lead to negligence and to be attended with very disastrous results; but if parties would enter into such contracts, the Court was powerless to help them. We do not see what the Bill of Lading had to do with the negligence of a man who is sent to shut a port and does not screw it up. He could know nothing about conditions in Bills of Lading and the respective liabilities of Shippers and Shipowners. A rush of water through the port might have given the ship a list, and thus have led to her destruction, and perhaps the sacrifice of all or the greater portion of the Crew. If men will not take measures of security in guarding their own lives, or are too ignorant or lazy to stop water from going inboard, what is the Shipowner in England to do, who is thousands of miles away at the time? When the steamer was loading at New York, the Master, the Officers, and all the Crew were on board, and yet no one looked to the fastening of the ports. An Engineer may also, by an oversight or want of thought, leave a valve open, and by this means cause a ship to

DAMAGE.

founder or the cargo to be damaged. It is a serious thing for a Shipowner to make himself liable to the Cargo-owner for the loss of goods by accident such as those spoken of. The Underwriters may refuse to pay for damage to goods by sea-water when it is not caused by the perils insured against. The Insured, when cargo is damaged by sea-water through the negligence of servants, is told by the Insurer to look to the Shipowner for compensation; and when the Shipowner does not protect himself from the consequences flowing from the wrongdoing of his servants, he must pay. We see, however, in the case decided by the Scottish Court on appeal, that a Shipowner may shift the liability for given causes from his own shoulders to that of the Shipper of goods or the Bill of Lading holder. But, as regards the observations of the Lord President, we do not see how the exemption clause can lead to disaster. All Shipowners, in these days of competition in steam trades, are anxious to deliver in good order the cargoes entrusted to them, and all that can be done by them is to censure, suspend, or discharge those who fail to carry out their instructions. No Shipping Company can afford to lose their character for carefulness; for, when they do so, their business is certain to fall off, and any neglect will work its own cure. Premiums of insurance rise in proportion to the claims of Shippers; and it is the interest, therefore, of every Shipowner to secure a high reputation for the conveyance of passengers and goods with safety in the trade in which his ship may be permanently employed. No other system, said the late Sir SAMUEL CUNARD, will succeed.-April 26, 1877.

HARBOUR AUTHORITIES.

The liability of Harbour Authorities for neglect of any duty fairly falling within their jurisdiction, long since settled as a question of law, was very forcibly illustrated by a case heard and decided recently in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, and reported in our Law Intelligence on Thursday last. The Mayor and Free Burgesses of the Borough of Saltash, in Cornwall, were made defendants in an action brought by the Owner of a vessel named the Christabel, belonging to Whitstable, for damages sustained by that vessel in consequence, as alleged, of a certain buoy not having been in its place to warn vessels of a reef in the Plymouth Sound, known as the "Cobbler." It appears that from time immemorial the Corporation of Saltash have been bound by their Charter to maintain a buoy to mark this danger, and what is, perhaps, more to the present purpose, they own and collect Dues from Shipping for maintaining the Buoyage. Before the accident occurred which was the cause of this action, the defendants had given notice to all persons navigating Plymouth Sound that they had placed a buoy near the reef, and directing that all vessels entering should pass to the westward of it. In the month of March last the Christabel entered Plymouth Sound, and shaped her course to pass westward of the buoy. In attempting, however, to pass somewhat close to the buoy, the vessel struck the reef and sustained considerable damage. was proved that the buoy was not in its proper position, and that if it had been the Christabel would have gone clear. It was also proved that

F

It