and not to punish a lottery made or drawn for mere amusement, or the determination by lot of some matter involving no right of property.

Sec. 181. In Chavannah vs. The State, 49 Ala. 396, the defendant operated a wheel on which were numbers. He sold a dozen "paddles" on which were numbers to correspond with the numbers on the wheel. The conductor revolved the wheel and when it stopped, the number, at which a spring indicator (attached to the device) pointed, won ten times the amount paid for it, being the amount paid for all the "paddles" less twenty per cent, which went to the operator.

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The Court said: "The transaction represented in the evidence is evidently a game of chance. The good or bad fortune of the party making the risk did not depend upon any skill of the player in control of the event which entitled him to win. That depended wholly on lot or chance. Lot is defined to be a contrivance to determine a question of chance without the action of man's choice or will.' When such a contrivance is applied to gaming where the chances are sold before the game is played, it is a lottery under our Criminal Code. Rev. Code, S. 3616; 2 Bish. Cr. L. S. 469; Bell vs. The State, 5 Sneed, 507. It is true that the manager did not determine the chance by putting his hand into a box or wheel and drawing out a prize or blank. These 'paddles' which represented chances were sold to the player in lieu of lottery tickets as used in a regular lottery. When the wheel stopped the fixed index attached to the machine pointed to some number on the face of the wheel. If the number, thus shown by the index, corresponded with the same number on the paddle sold, the holder of the paddle won—if it did not he failed. Such a performance, when a small sum of money is ventured for the chance of obtaining a greater sum, is carrying on a lottery. It may be somewhat nondescript and may not yet have received a name by which it can be definitely registered in the catalogue of games yet it has all the essentials of a lottery and it is forbidden by our statute."

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Sec. 182. In Com. vs. Wright, 137 Mass. 250, it was

held that, where a party chose a number and paid a certain sum and the seller drew an envelope from a box full, containing a slip with numbers on it and if the number chosen was on the slip the buyer received a multiple of the sum paid, greater or less according to the agreement and if not, he lost what he had paid, was a lottery.

The Court said: "The event is none the less uncertain that the chances of the event are certain. The chances only

represent the average of a long series of events.

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The event does not appear to have been even mechanically certain, as the selecting of the envelope seems to have been made arbitrarily after payment. But if the choice of the number had also fixed the envelope, so long as the event could not be predicted by the party concerned, it would be uncertain and depend on chance in the only sense which the law has to take into account.

Perhaps it is a little more difficult to show how the game is more than a wager. A bet, however, is usually executory on both sides, isolated and determined by events independent of the action of the parties while in this game a price is paid for the chance of a prize and it is determined by a mechanical device worked by the manager of the game according to a scheme held out to the public whether he who pays the money is to have the prize or nothing. It may be that the difference between this and a single wager on the cast of a die is only one of degree; but, if so, the difference is sufficiently marked to warrant the finding of the jury. We can not say, as a matter of law that the fact that the prize was money and not specific and that more than one could select the same number with the same result prevented the game from being a lottery. It is a lottery according to the popular use of the word as shown by the dictionaries, according to history, to which lotteries with money prizes not specific have long been known, and according to the course of the decisions."

Sec. 183. Two parties met on Sunday and one of them said he believed he would raffle off his dwelling house and lot by chances, stating the chances to be 500 at a specified valu

ation. The other party replied that he would take all the chances, and it was agreed that the deed should be made next day and they put up their watches as a forfeit to stand by the proposition as made and accepted This was held not to be a lottery scheme in Thornhill vs. O'Rear, 31 L. R. A. 782; 108 Ala. 299.

Sec. 184. Where clubs of 40 persons each were formed by a merchant tailor for the disposition of suits of clothing, each of the stipulated value of $40, by lot under nominal contracts of purchase, the price to be paid in weekly instalments of $1 each, such payments entitling the holders of tickets to participate in weekly drawings by lot with a chance of receiving goods of the value of $40 at any drawing without further additional payments than the weekly instalments paid, the scheme was held a lottery within the statute of Minnesota by the Supreme Court of that state, in State vs. Moren, 48 Minn. 555. A provision in the contract that each member of the club should eventually receive a suit of clothes when he should have paid $40, if not previously drawn, or that he might withdraw at any time and receive "the value of money paid in on said contract in merchant-tailoring" does not make the scheme any the less a lottery or take it out of the operation of the statute. The sale of each ticket gave the purchaser a chance to obtain something more than he paid in. The Court held that this provision "would probably operate only as an additional incentive to purchase coupons in aid of the lottery scheme." The Court said: "They (the coupons) were not bought in order to get their face value in goods. The vicious element still inheres in the transaction. Patrons come into it with the hope and chance of winning a $40 suit by lot for the price of a coupon. The sale of the ticket gave the purchaser the chance to obtain something more than he paid and that became an extra inducement for the purchaser. U. S. vs. Olney, 1 Abb. (U. S. 275; Regina vs. Harris, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 352. The term 'lottery' has no technical meaning, but under the statute it must be construed in a popular sense and with the view to remedy the mischief intended to be prevented. The statute

is intended to reach all devices which are in the nature of lotteries, in whatever form presented; and the Courts will tolerate no evasions for the continuance of the mischief. It declares and defines a lottery to be a scheme for the distribution of property by chance among persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable consideration for the chance, whether called a 'lottery,' 'raffle,' or 'gift enterprise,' or by some other name." Sec. 185. The Postoffice Department has gone farther than this case goes. It has held that a scheme of the character described in the Moren case is a lottery though each adventurer be required to pay his periodical dues after he draws his suit of clothes or other thing provided for by the scheme until the end of the stipulated period, on the ground that the benefits, which are determined by chance, are unequal. It is true that all the adventurers are required to pay the same amount and are to receive an article of the same kind and value but those who receive the article first have an advantage over the others, in two respects: 1, they have the use of the article first; and, 2, they may from one cause or another fail to pay their dues after they have drawn their prizes. It is true the advantage in drawing the article first is slight but that makes no difference, so far as the principle of a lottery is concerned; and this advantage must be regarded as valuable or the adventurers would not otherwise enter into any such a scheme.

Sec. 186. Defendant owned and operated a device consisting of a circular board, in the center of which was an arrow turning on a pivot, pointing to numbers around the edge of the board. Opposite each number was placed an article of jewelry or a sum of money in value from 5 cents to $1. One having paid ten cents for the privilege of whirling the arrow was entitled to the prize opposite the number on which it stopped. Held a lottery. Reeves vs. State, Feb'y 9, 1895, Sup. Ct. Ala. 17 South. 104.

Cases cited: Buckalew vs. State, 62 Ala. 334; Yellowstone Kit vs. State, 88 Ala. 196, and Bell vs. State, 5 Sneed,

Sec. 187. The scheme, operated in Fleming and Nevill vs. Bills, 3 Oregon, 286, was this: A box was divided into compartments numbered from 1 to 48, some of which contained prizes; others were empty or blank. The game was played by means of eight dice thrown by the person, who chose to pay the specified sum for the chance of winning. The person, throwing a number corresponding with a number of a compartment containing a prize, became entitled to the prize contained therein; otherwise he received nothing. Fleming and Nevill claimed that this scheme was not a lottery: First, because the person paying the money cast the lot; and second, a scheme or game is not a lottery unless all the ticket holders taken collectively have a certainty that some one or more of their number will gain the prize or prizes; and in support of these contentions they relied on the definition of a lottery given by Mr. Bishop, 2 Bishop Cr. L., sec. 496.

The Court overruled these contentions and held the scheme a lottery. The court quoted from the American Cyclopaedia as follows: "Two kinds of lottery may be distinguished, the Genoese or numerical and the Dutch or Class lottery" and then added: "This work describes the former as a scheme by which out of ninety consecutive numbers five are to be selected or drawn by lot. The players fixed upon certain numbers, wagering that one, two or more would be drawn among the five or that they would appear in a certain order." Of the Dutch or Class Lottery the author says: "In this species the number and value of the prizes are regularly estimated, all the ticket holders are interested at once in the play, and chance determines whether a prize or blank shall fall to a given number." The court then goes on to hold that it is not necessary in a lottery patterned after the Genoese System that there should be tickets or ticket holders, or that a given number of chances should be taken or that the holders of chances should have a certainty that a prize would be gained by one or more of their number, or that more than one at a time should bet or wager money or that the promoter should cast the lots.