tiff claimed, was annulled by the treaty entered into between this country and the country whose sovereign made the grant; and that it was for the President and Senate to determine whether the sovereign (in that case the King of Spain) was authorized to annul a grant previously made by him. They having recognized that power by ratifying the treaty, the Courts of Justice were bound to so regard and treat it. The claim of the plaintiff in the case that the courts could inquire whether the President and Senate were not mistaken as to the authority of the Spanish Monarch or whether he knowingly sanctioned an act of injustice committed by him upon an individual in violation of the laws of Spain, was held to have no support in the Constitution of the United States nor in the jurisprudence of any country where the judicial and political powers are separated and placed in different hands, and the court refused to grant relief, though the contest was between private parties on both sides.

Sec. 265. An officer, to whom public duties are confided by law, is not subject to the control of the courts in the exercise of the judgment and discretion which the law reposes in him as a part of his official functins. Gaines vs. Thompson, 7 Wall. 237; Statesby vs. U. S., 146 U. S. 196; Mississippi vs. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; City of New Orleans vs. Paine, 147 U. S. 261; Noble vs. Union River Logging R'y Co., 147 U. S. 165.

In the City of New Orleans vs. Paine, supra, the court, in referring to Gaines vs. Thompson, said: "In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Miller stated the general doctrine to be that an officer, to whom public duties are confided by law, is not subject to the control of the courts in the exercise of the judgment and discretion which the law reposes in him as a part of his official functions. Certain powers and duties are confided to those officers, and to them alone, and however the courts may, in ascertaining rights of parties in suits properly before them, pass upon the legality of their acts after the matter has once passed beyond their control, there exists no power in the courts by any of its processes to act

upon the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of that judgment while the matter is properly before him for action." Sec. 266. In Philadelphia and Trenton R'y Co. vs. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, the court said: "Now the objection is that the present patent does not contain any recitals that the pre-requisites thus stated in the act have been complied with, viz., that the error in the former patent has arisen by inadvertency, accident or mistake and without fraudulent or deceptive intention, and without such recitals, as in the case of a special authority, the patent is a mere nullity and inoperative. * * * Where, as in the present case, an act is to be done or patent granted upon evidence and proofs to be laid before a public officer, upon which he is to decide the fact that he has done the act or granted the patent, is prima facie evidence that the proofs have been regularly made and were satisfactory. No other tribunal is at liberty to re-examine or controvert the sufficiency of such proofs, if laid before him, when the law has made such officer the proper judge of their sufficiency and competency."

Sec. 267. In Kendall vs. Stokes, 3 How. 86, which was a case brought against Kendall for damages for official acts done by him as Postmaster-General, the Supreme Court, though it did not pass on the question directly, conceded in the argument, that such an action would lie and the case was disposed of on other grounds. The court, however, used this language: "But a public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake. This was fully recognized in Gridley vs. Lord Palmerston (J. B. Moore, 91; B. and B. 275." The court cited also 9 Clark and Finley 251.

The court seems to have fallen into an inconsistency here, for in Kendall vs. Stokes, 12 Peters, 524, where the same facts were before the court, it was held that the act Kendall, as Postmaster-General, was required to perfom was not a judicial

but a ministerial one and that, therefore, mandamus would lie against him to compel him to perform it.

Sec. 268. In U. S. Ex. Rel. Aaron Goodrich vs. Guthrie, 17 How. 284, which was an application for mandamus to compel Guthrie, as Secretary of the Treasury, to pay Goodrich his salary as judge of the Territory of Minnesota, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Daniel, denied the writ and, after stating that the question presented was whether the courts of the United States possessed the power to compel the withdrawal of money from the treasury to satisfy disputed claims against the government, said: "This is the question the very question presented for our determination; and its simple statement would seem to carry with it the most startling considerations-nay, its unavoidable negation-unless this should be presented by some positive and controlling command; for it would occur a priori to every mind that treasury not fenced round and shielded by fixed and established modes and rules of administration, but which could be subjected to any number or description of demands, asserted and sustained through the undefined and undefinable discretion of the courts, would constitute a feeble and inadequate provision for the great and inevitable necessities of the nation. The government under such a regime, or rather, under such an absence of all rule, would, if practicable at all, be administered not by the great departments ordained by the Constitution and laws and guided by the modes therein prescribed, but by the uncertain and perhaps contradictory action of the courts in the enforcement of their views of private interests. Thus it has been ruled that the only acts to which the power of the courts by mandamus extends are such as are purely ministerial and with regard to which nothing like judgment and discretion in the performance of his duties is left to the officer; but wherever the right of judgment or discretion exists in him, it is he and not the courts who can regulate its exercise. These are the doctrines expressly ruled by this court in the case of Kendall vs. Stokes, 12 Peters, 524; in that of Decatur vs. Paulding, 14 Peters, 497 and in the more recent

*

* *

case of Brashear vs. Mason, 6 How. 92; principles regarded as fundamental and essential and apart from which the administration of the government would be impracticable."

Sec. 269. In Hetton vs. Merritt, 110 U. S. 97, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "the valuation of merchandise, made by the custom officers under the Statutes of the United States for the purpose of levying duties thereon, is, in the absence of fraud on the part of the officers, conclusive on the importer and such valuation is not reviewable in an action at law, brought by the importer to recover back duties paid under protest and that a denial of the right to bring an action at law to recover duties paid under an alleged excessive valuation of dutiable merchandise is not depriving the importer of his property without due process of law." The court further remarked: "Thus court, in referring to the general policy of the laws for the collection of the revenues, said, in Bartlett vs. Kane, 16 How. 263: 'The interposition of the courts, in the appraisement of importations, would involve the collection of the revenue in inextricable confusion.' And referring to section 3 of the Act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. L. 630), which is reproduced in section 2930, Rev. Stat., this court declared, in Belcher vs. Linn, 24 How. 508, that, 'in the absence of fraud, the decision of the custom officers is final and conclusive, and their appraisement in contemplation of law becomes, for the purpose of calculating and assessing the duties due to the United States, the true dutiable value of the importation. * * * Plaintiffs in error contend further that a denial of the right to bring an action at law to recover duties paid under an alleged excessive valuation of dutiable merchandise is depriving the importer of his property without due process of law and is therefore forbidden by the Constitution of the United States. The cases of Murray's Lessees vs. Hoboken L. and I. Co., 18 How. 272; and Springer vs. U. S., 102 U. S. 586, are conclusive on this point against the plaintiffs in error." The doctrine here announced was affirmed in Passavant and Co. vs. U. S., 148 U. S. 212, Auget vs. Hedden, 155 U. S. 231; and Aufmordt vs. Hedden, 157 U. S. 310.

Sec. 270. Sections 4026 and 3990, R. S., U. S., authorize the Postmaster-General to empower special agents to make searches for mailable matter transported in violation of law, not being in a dwelling house, and authorize the agent, collector or other Custom Officer or U. S. Marshal or his deputy to seize all letters and bags, packets or parcels, containing letters which are being carried contrary to law and detain the same for two months after the final determination of all suits that may be brought against the person carrying them. These sections were involved in the case of Blockham vs. Gresham and others, 16 Fed. Rep. 609. The court refused to pass on their constitutionality, but remarked that "Provisions for searches and seizures to enforce revenue laws have long been familiar to the legislation of Congress; and, as Judge Cooley remarks (Cons. Lim. 304, note), 'the federal decisions go very far to establish the doctrine that in matters of revenue the regulations Congress sees fit to establish, however unreasonable they may seem, must prevail.'"

Sec. 271. C. J. Taney, in Commissioner of Patents vs. Whitely, 4 Wall, 522, said: "The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief and we are quite satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given them."

Sec. 272. The Comptroller of the Currency may be clothed with power to determine when a receiver of a National Bank should be appointed and the receiver may adjust claims against the bank and his decisions on these questions are conclusive against the stockholders, who have no notice and are not heard. Kennedy vs. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498; Casey vs. Galli, 94 U. S. 674; U. S. vs. Knox, 102 U. S. 423; and Bushnell vs. Leland, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209.

Sec. 273. The Postmaster-General has power to discontinue a postoffice, when authorized to do so by Congress, notwithstanding the discontinuance has the effect to remove the postmaster, who has been appointed and commissioned by the President, from office. Ware vs. U. S., 4 Wall. 617.