The New China Policy: Its Impact on the United States and Asia

THE NEW CHINA POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON THE

UNITED STATES AND ASIA

I. Strategic and General Considerations

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I wish to welcome our distinguished witnesses here today.

I call the subcommittee meeting to order.

We are honored at having such distinguished men with us today as the very distinguished and able Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green, former Ambassador, Professor Reischauer, and Professor Terrill.

INTRODUCTION

We begin today the first in-depth inquiry into the impact of the new United States-China Policy on our traditional friendships and alliances in Asia. These will be educational hearings designed to lay a foundation for better understanding of the problems and opportunities that flow from the President's initiative. Because of the breadth and importance of the issues involved in this inquiry, we plan to communicate our findings to the Congress as a whole.

In my view, President Nixon deserves the support of Congress and the country for opening a historic dialogue with the People's Republic. In this nuclear age it is neither feasible nor desirable for this country and the People's Republic of China to be separated by enmity and suspicion. But to say this is not to say that what the President did was easy either politically or diplomatically. The President has assured his place in history by bridging the gap separating 200 million Americans and 800 million Chinese.

At the same time, the President's trip to Peking and its aftermathwhen viewed in context with our disengagement from Southeast Asiahave raised the question of whether the United States will continue to play an important role as a Pacific power. The basic fact of life in Asia until the President's trip was the mutual hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China with most nations in the area choosing up sides. Now, these nations are in considerable quandary about where they go from here.

(1)

Under what circumstances can they count on U.S. security assistance? How do they set about opening up a dialogue with the People's Republic and other Communist states? These are the sorts of questions the nations of Asia are asking themselves today, as my colleagues and I have learned in our trips to the area.

During the course of our hearings, we will take testimony from ranking sinologists and other Asian experts from the academic community and the Government. I might add that without exception the academic witnesses before us have had considerable government experience, so they are hardly ivy tower types.

Without prejudging the testimony we will receive, I would like, if I may, to highlight some of my own concerns about recent developments in the Far East.

(1) I am concerned that the dramatic way in which we opened our dialogue with the People's Republic has raised unrealistic expectations about the amount of hard, concrete progress that may be anticipated. I believe that people-to-people exchanges, welcome as they are, will be few in number, and will take place in the People's Republic under important limitations of freedom of movement. I gather, also, that U.S. trade with the People's Republic, welcome though it will be, will for the foreseeable future be of marginal importance. In addition, I would suggest that the proposition that the United States and the People's Republic can somehow broker solutions to the problems of the Far East as part of a four-power directorate is both immoral and factually without foundation.

(2) I am especially concerned about the impact on Japan of the socalled Nixon shocks of a new policy toward China, the yen revaluation, and the textile quota imposed upon Japan. It is one thing to say that the political dependence of Japan upon the United States as a result of recent history is excessive. It is quite another, however, to shake Japanese faith in the evenhandedness and reliability of the United States as friend and ally. Clearly, repair of our considerably frayed relationship with Japan is a first order of business for this administration.

(3) I am pleased at the quiet dignity and restraint with which the Republic of China has taken both its unfortunate expulsion from the United Nations and the idle speculation about its future. It is clear to all the world that the Republic of China fully intends to continue its remarkable pattern of economic and social development upon which we will take testimony later this week. In addition, the Chiang Kai-shek government has shown itself to be adept and flexible in its diplomatic initiatives to broaden its range of friends and trading partners, as well as raise the sense of admiration and respect of its friends here in the United States.

(4) Having served during the Korean conflict like many of us in the Congress. I retain an important interest in insuring that the Korean Peninsula continues to live in peace. I wish to underscore my commitment to the modernization program for the Korean Armed Forces. And I would hope that the administration will send to Congress a supplementary appropriation request that will allow the United States to carry out its commitment to Korea. At the same time, I want to learn, and my colleagues with me, more about the content and motives behind the North Korean peace offensive. If ever the Red Cross talks progress and broaden to the point that some relaxa

tion of tensions is possible on the peninsula, clearly this will be all to the good.

(5) Finally, I wish to underscore my belief in the importance of our good friend and ally, Thailand, to the future of Asia. Thailand has given the United States substantial aid and assistance in the Vietnam war, and in so doing has departed considerably from its tradition of walking a careful line between the great powers of the area. Ne doubt the Thai will want to develop closer relations with the People's Republic, but they should be permitted to do so at their own pace and in their own way.

Today we are fortunate to receive testimony from Prof. Edwin Reischauer, the ranking U.S. expert on Japan and Ambassador to Tokyo from 1961 to 1966.

We will then hear from another Harvard professor, Ross Terrill, who rumor suggests-I am not sure this will be good or bad, Mr. Terrill-will be the "Dr. Kissinger" of Australia if the Labor Party wins the next election, although we are impartial on this. Mr. Terrill is well known to the press and this subcommittee for the superb job he did as CBS commentator on the President's trip to Peking.

In the cleanup slot for the administration, we will hear from an old friend of this subcommittee, Assistant Secretary Marshall Green. Secretary Green was chosen by the President to travel to 13 Asian countries where he briefed their leaders on the results of the Peking visit.

I suggest that Professor Reischauer lead off, followed by Professor Terrill, and then Assistant Secretary Green for the administration. If it is agreeable to the subcommittee, we will hold all questions until Mr. Green is finished, and then the subcommittee will question the witnesses as a panel.

Professor Reischauer, you may proceed as you choose, reading, summarizing, and adding any additional thoughts you have. You statement will be submitted for the record.

Again, we welcome you gentlemen here.
Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN AND PROFESSOR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Reischauer was born in Tokyo to which he later returned as American Ambassador from 1961 to 1966. As scholar and Government official, Dr. Reischauer has held a variety of jobs concerning the Far East including lieutenant colonel in military intelligence during World War II, director of the HarvardYenching Institute from 1956 to 1961 and president of the Association for Asian Studies from 1955 to 1956. A university professor at Harvard University since 1966 Dr. Reischauer is author of "East Asia: The Great Tradition" (with J. K. Fairbank), "East Asia: The Modern Transformation" (with J. K. Fairbank and A. M. Craig), "The United States and Japan" and "Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia."

Mr. REISCHAUER. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to be asked to testify before this distinguished group.

I have submitted a fairly long statement in writing and I shall only try to summarize it briefly here.

(The statement referred to appears on p. 10.)

I think we all welcome the recent relaxation of tensions between this country and the People's Republic of China.

GAINS FROM NIXON TRIP TO PEKING

It is desirable that we should be moving away from the military containment of China as the core element in our relationships with East Asia.

The People's Republic has not shown a desire nor made preparations for military aggression beyond the frontiers it recognizes and the policy of containment has left us in much too inflexible a position. toward China and toward its neighbors.

Still more important is the start of a dialogue between ourselves and the Chinese, because they do constitute something like a quarter of the population of the whole globe, and it is vastly important that a real meaningful dialogue should be developed between our one-third of the world's wealth and the Chinese one-quarter of the world's population if we as a human race are going to be able to address ourselves to the great global problems that are pressing down on us very rapidly.

STYLE OF NIXON TRIP UNFORTUNATE

I heartily endorse the President's initiatives in this direction. I think at long last we are going in the right direction, but I am disturbed by some of the false expectations that have been aroused both in this country and abroad by the histrionics that accompanied this desirable shift in policy and I am appalled by the possible cost to this country and to the world of the apparently thoughtless, one might even say reckless, style in which the policy change was effectuated.

This style was not necessary, because the results could all have been achieved by a much more sober, more low profile, and more traditional form of diplomacy.

Now, some people might argue that the style is a matter over the dam and we should not concern ourselves with it; however, it seems to me symptomatic of the administration's continued thinking. The administration, I think, is in some sense a victim itself of the false hopes and unrealistic expectations that it has raised, and the blind spots that permitted it to do so much damage through the style of its diplomacy still remain to limit its vision.

LIMITATIONS OF NIXON TRIP

Let me first say something about the limitations of what has been achieved by the President's visit to China.

It leaves most of the immediately pressing problems in East Asia virtually unchanged. We can't expect any helpful influence by Peking on Hanoi. If Peking were to try to make a deal with us about Vietnam, that would expose its ideological flank to attack by the Soviet Union. Beyond that, I do not think that the Vietnamese are going to be any more willing to let Chinese or Russians determine their fate as they would be to let Americans attempt to do that.

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