Mr. Rowe. They have reiterated at the United Nations their intention, their irrevocable intention, to "liberate" Taiwan, and said "no force on earth can stop us." That is the crux of their attitude on that, as expressed in the United Nations.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Whalley.

POSSIBLE LIMITS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Professor Rowe spoke about updated colonialism. I would ask you one question, Mr. Reisman. The policy of self-determination, would you extend that everywhere for instance, the many peoples of India, Pakistan, the scattered tribes of Africa-or is not the doctrine of self-determination really an outdated one, as some people think, where the application produces much turmoil and bloodshed?

Mr. REISMAN. Mr. Chairman, if there was no word "self-determination," we would have to invent it. We always encounter the demands of people to affiliate, to form groups as a way of realizing certain shared interests. When people want a degree of protection from a larger group, they make a claim on the international legal process, and now we generally characterize that claim as "self-determination." We will have to recognize that any people that forms in this way may make these claims. We may not always respond with a grant of full sovereignty; the response of the international community may be a graduation of some degree of international protection, minority treaties, on through to full sovereignty. But the claim for self-determination will always be very loud and very vigorous. We cannot stop it. Mr. GALLAGHER. No question but it is one of the troublesome terms of our times as to the proper application.

Mr. REISMAN. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Where do we begin and where do we end?

I want to thank you, gentlemen. I think we are imposing on your time.

If anyone has anything further to add, you may send it to us.

I want to thank you very much for an excellent contribution and for adding to the education of the Congress, which is an awesome task at best.

Mr. Rowe. I would like to express my appreciation for the invitation of the committee to come and speak before it; I appreciate it very greatly.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4.32 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, May 4, 1972.)

THE NEW CHINA POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON THE
UNITED STATES AND ASIA

III. The New China Policy: Its Impact on Korea and Thailand

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2: 15 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we continue our inquiry into the impact of the new United States-China policy on our traditional friendships and alliances in Asia. Our focus will be Korea, Thailand, and Burma.

We are fortunate to have with us today Prof. John Badgley of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins here in Washington and Prof. Robert Scalapino who has flown in from Berkeley, Calif., to be with us today.

We are also honored with the presence of the distinguished Ambassador from Thailand who is with us today.

Professor Scalapino is well known to this subcommittee for the excellent testimony he offered just a year ago during our hearings on United States-Korean relations. We are happy to welcome Professor Badgley in his first appearance before the subcommittee. Thank you for coming, Professor Badgley.

INTRODUCTION

May I start off on a personal note. Having served during the Korean conflict like many of us in the Congress, I retain an important interest in insuring that the Korean Peninsula continues to live in peace. I wish to underscore my commitment to the modernization program for the Korean Armed Forces. At the same time I want to learn more about the content and motives behind the recent North "peace offensive." If ever the Red Cross talks progress and broaden to the point that some relaxation of tensions is possible on the peninsula, clearly this will be all to the good.

Also, I wish to underscore my belief in the importance of our good friend and ally, Thailand, to the future of Asia. Thailand has given the United States substantial aid and assistance in the Vietnam war, and in so doing has departed considerably from its tradition of walk

ing a careful line between the great powers of the area. No doubt the Thai will want to develop closer relations with the People's Republic, but they should be permitted to do so at their own pace and in their

own way.

We will hear first from Professor Scalapino. Because of his broad perspective on Asia we have asked Dr. Scalapino to give us his general observations about recent developments in the Far East as well as advise the subcommittee on the impact of the new United States-China policy on Korea.

Professor Badgley will then compare how Thailand and its neighbor Burma have followed radically different paths in terms of their respective relations with the People's Republic. Professor Badgley will be suggesting that the Thai may have some lessons to learn from the Burmese example.

I suggest that Professor Scalapino lead off, and then we will hear from Professor Badgley. We will hold all questions until Dr. Badgley is finished, and then the subcommittee will question the witnesses individually and also as a panel.

The full statements of the witnesses will, of course, be submitted for the record.

Professor Scalapino, you may proceed as you choose, reading, summarizing where you wish and adding any additional thoughts you have.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Scalapino is a professor and former Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of California. An Asian scholar with a specialization in Korea Dr. Scalapino is editor of the Asian Survey and his books include "North Korea Today," "The Communist Revolution in Asia," "Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan," and "Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan." Dr. Scalapino is consultant to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Rand Corporation.

Mr. SCALAPINO. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be again with your subcommittee and to express my opinions on the general question of our changing Asian relationship and the impact on the Republic of Korea.

In my prepared remarks I sought to indicate first, the context in which our relationships with individual nations should be viewed, second, the primary factors as I saw them entering into our new and as yet untested relationships with China, and, third, the impact of those relations on the Korean Peninsula, including both North and South Korea.

(The prepared statement of Professor Scalapino appears on p. 109.) I would like therefore to excerpt certain parts of my prepared remarks for purposes of oral presentation. Let me outline the five basic conditions which I think characterize the general scene in Korea today.

LOOSE-KNIT MULTIPOLARISM IN ASIA

First, a loosely knit multipolarism is making its appearance on the global scene, with special consequences in Asia. The principal actors— the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and possibly

India-each betrays some uncertainty as to the implications of this event and the appropriate policies to be pursued. Most, if not all of these states, however, appear reconciled to a balance of power, once merely the goal of the United States.

SOVIET POWER CREDIBLE IN ASIA

Second, despite the partial demise of bipolarism, the credibility of Soviet power is at an alltime high in East Asia, the Russians having demonstrated both their strength and their resolve on many fronts. With success, however, has come new responsibilities and new problems. Thus, at present, Soviet policy must be concentrated extensively upon the containment of China. Having been the staunchest critic of John Foster Dulles during his lifetime, the Russians have now proven themselves to be his most apt pupils.

INTERNAL TRENDS IN CHINA UNCERTAIN

Third, the uncertainties surrounding China and her future role in Asia relate at least as much to questions of internal trends as to decisions on foreign policy. A new leadership in Peking could conceivably make some dramatic changes in policies at home and aboard. A succession crisis after Mao, moreover, might adversely affect China's unity and strength. Given the present structure of the political-military elite in China, political instability is very likely to continue in the years immediately ahead. The central question is whether that instability can be contained at elitist levels, as was the case during the purge of Lin Piao and his associates, or whether it will seep downward into the broader reaches of society, as it did temporarily, toward the climax of the cultural revolution.

At present, however, Peking is determined to thwart Soviet containment policies by resistance rather than accommodation; to enter into dialog with the United States, thereby increasing its flexibility while at the same time weakening the non-Communist alliance structure in Asia; and to contain Japan politically and militarily, if not economically. The Chinese People's Republic has also put the world on notice that it intends to be a nuclear power, and to play a special role in Asia.

U.S. CREDIBILITY IN DOUBT IN ASIA

Fourth, the credibility of the United States is currently in doubt in many quarters in Asia, precipitating fierce debates and sharp cleavages with respect to policies among America's allies, the neutrals, and its erstwhile opponents. The transition from an American-centered East Asia toward a multipolar Asia has proven to be a traumatic experience for many Asian states and leaders, with the ultimate outcome unclear at this point.

This is a period of striking paradoxes. No one questions, for example, American military power or even the essential strength of the American economy. The uncertainties revolve around the American will, and the impact upon foreign policy of the ongoing American revolution which has been underway for decades and now appears to be reaching a climax. Never in history has there been such an intimate connection between domestic and international politics.

Meanwhile, however, despite all of the reservations concerning its future role, the United States remains the only truly omnipresent element in the East Asia scene, possessing a flexibility with respect to all other principal actors available to none of them. The United States, moreover, stands at the apex of the two critical triangular groups in the contemporary world-the Russian-American-Chinese triangle so important to the issues of peaceful coexistence and weapons control, and the Japanese-American-Western Europe triangle so vital to the economic health of both the advanced nations and the developing ones.

JAPAN ECONOMIC GIANT AND MILITARY DWARF

Fifth, Japan faces the 1970's as an economic giant and a politicalmilitary dwarf. The task of how, or whether to balance economic, political, and military inputs in fashioning a foreign policy for the future will occupy the Japanese during the years immediately ahead. Japan must now define her national requirements and interests and shape a policy to meet these in an age when "multipolarity" is of increasing significance in the world at large and "autonomous diplomacy" is the popular slogan of the hour at home.

I should now, Mr. Chairman, like to switch to the second point which I sought to emphasize in my prepared remarks; namely, the conditions under which a change in our relations with China occurred. It seems to me this is a necessary preliminary to discussing the problems of the Korean Peninsula. As is well known, the most important consideration from a Chinese standpoint was the increasing fear of the Soviet Union. I shall not deal on this here because it has been amply demonstrated in a number of papers and I have tried to discuss it briefly in my prepared remarks. Rather, I should like to turn to a second important consideration, namely, China's desire to contain Japan. Such an effort does affect relationships in Northeast Asia.

CHINESE DESIRE TO CONTAIN JAPAN

Several years ago, Peking's leaders discerned what they believed to be an American or American-Japanese plan for Northeast Asia. The United States would withdraw from its forward military positions in East Asia, establishing its basic defense lines on its mid-Pacific islands and utilizing such mobile bases as nuclear-power submarines. Increasingly, therefore, Japan would be expected to play a political and military role commensurate with her economic power and politicalstrategic stakes in the region immediately around here.

Thus, as Peking saw it, the long-threatened Northeast Asia Treaty Organization would come into existence in de facto if not de jure terms. Japan would gradually assume some military responsibility for the defense of the Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, an independent Taiwan under Japanese or joint Japanese-American protection would emerge. And at some point, faced with these new commitments, and confronted with neither economic nor technical difficulties, Japan would move toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This, I emphasize, was Peking's reading of future developments.

It is a central goal of Chinese Communist leadership to prevent any part of this scenario from being enacted. How could a policy, involving interaction with the United States, be conducive to that end?