that China's first concern with naval power would relate to that region. Mr. BURKE. Thank you very much. I thank you both. KOREA A TESTING GROUND FOR US Professor Scalapino, we want to thank you for being here, but I can't help feeling in looking at Korea's role in the future and our role, vis-a-vis Korea, that perhaps we should think of Korea different than as a dagger poised at the major powers. Perhaps Korea's role in the future will be that of a key that great powers need if the search for peace is to be a successful one. Korea is where the activities of the great powers come into potential conflict, which is why I think it is so important that no one dominates Korea except the Koreans. In this regard I think it is essential the United States continue its commitments to Korea to assure it the stability it needs to grow and prosper under its present leadership which has the support of the Korean people. I can think of no American ally that has the same depth of support not only of our government, regardless of the party in power, but also of the people of the United States. In the great quest for peace now going on in the world, we should look to Korea as a place where peace can be sustained if we remain firm in our commitments. I support the firm U.S. commitments to Korea, and I feel this will be, as I said in the conclusion of my statement, a real testing spot for the kind of peaceful coexistence in Asia to which all major powers are now giving lip service. If this lip service is to become a reality, I feel not only the United States but also Japan, the Soviet Union, and China must support an independent and viable Korea, whether this be as two countries at present or ultimately, through long political evolution, as a unified state. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will stand adjourned. (Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.) THE NEW CHINA POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA IV. The New China Policy: Its Impact on Japan TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1972 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:15 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order. Today we continue our indepth inquiry into the impact of the new United States China policy on our traditional friendships and alliances in Asia. Our focus will be on Japan. We are fortunate to have with us today former Under Secretary of State George Ball, Prof. James Morley of Columbia University, and Joseph Yager of the Institute of Defense Analysis. Mr. Ball is well known to this subcommittee as a frequent commentator on the international political scene. His article, "Mr. Nixon's Appointment In Peking-Is This Trip Necessary?" appeared in the New York Times Magazine. 1 Dr. Morley heads the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. He has written extensively about Japan and served in Tokyo from 1967 to 1969 as special assistant to U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. Mr. Yager is the Acting Director of the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis. The subcommittee will remember him as a State Department Asian expert. I wish to thank all of you for being with us today. INTRODUCTION May I start off on a personal note. I am concerned at the serious deterioration in the U.S. relationship with Japan as a result of the so-called Nixon shocks. We have heard during the opening days of these hearings from Professor Reischauer and others that Japanese faith in the United States as friend and ally has been severely shaken. Clearly, repair of this relationship with Japan is a first order of business for this administration. We will hear first from Mr. Ball. Because of his broad perspective on Asia we have asked Mr. Ball to give us his general observations 1 See appendix, p. 286. about recent developments in the Far East as well as advise the subcommittee on the impact of the new United States-China policy on Japan. Professor Morley will then draw on his Japanese expertise in giving us his thoughts about United States-Japanese relations. In the cleanup slot will be Mr. Yager who will discuss the Japanese national security role during the 1970's decade in the light of the new United States China policy. I suggest that Mr. Ball lead off, followed by Professor Morley and then Mr. Yager. We will hold all questions until Mr. Yager is finished, and then the subcommittee will question the witnesses individually and as a panel. I would suggest that the subcommittee encourage the witnesses to comment on each other's testimony, so we can have a general exchange. Mr. Ball, you may proceed as you choose, reading, summarizing, and adding any additional thoughts you have. STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AND SENIOR PARTNER, LEHMAN BROTHERS BIOGRAPHY Mr. Ball served from 1961 to 1966 as Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Now a Senior Partner with Lehman Brothers, the New York investment banking concern, Mr. Ball is a frequent commentator on the international political scene. His "Nixon's Appointment in Peking-Is This Trip Necessary?" appeared recently in the New York Times magazine. And his "Discipline of Power", published in 1968, drew on his U.S. Government experience and his post-World War II role as an architect of European integration. Mr. BALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Within the past month I have again been in Japan. I spent a week or 10 days there and had an opportunity to talk with many people so that what I say today reflects the impressions that I gained during this trip. In any assessment of the impact of our changing relations with the People's Republic of China on the other countries of the Far East, we must take note, not only of the nature of that changed relationship, but also of the manner in which it was brought about. LIMITED ACHIEVEMENTS OF NIXON TRIP In substantive terms one might argue that all that has been achieved is an improvement in communications, although one byproduct of last summer's diplomatic activity was undoubtedly to hasten the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations. But we still have no formal diplomatic relations with Peking, nor are we likely to achieve any until the Taiwan issue has been resolved, and certainly no one can contend that, in political terms, our two governments are yet on a friendly basis. Had all these arrangements been made through quieter diplomatic channels, the impact would have been very different on several Far Eastern countries. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS In my judgment we complicated-and, indeed, impaired-our relations with those countries by the extravagance of a Presidential visit, dramatically announced to the world without prior consultation with, or advice to, our friends in the Far East. Most importantly, in its implications for total U.S. policy, has been the effect of the visit and the manner in which it was handled on our relations with Japan. There are a number of reasons why this has had corrosive consequences. In the first place, the announcement of the China visit on July 15 last year was only the first of a series of actions that have upset the Japanese. It is the cumulative impact of these actions that has created the impression in informed Japanese circles that the United States, if not antagonistic to their country, is at least indifferent to Japanese interests. Thus, the China announcement was followed a month later by the abrupt disclosure of our new economic policy, which-it was made. quite clear-was aimed primarily at Japan; then by a textile ultimatum, reinforced by threats of applying the Trading With the Enemy Act; and, finally, by the enlistment of Japan in a frantic effort to prevent the admission of Peking to the United Nations-when, at the same time, the prospective China visit had created a climate in which such effort was bound to fail. INEXPERIENCED U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO That, however, has not been the end of it. While the Japanese have made it quite clear that though they hoped we would send as our new Ambassador an experienced diplomat with whom they could carry on a searching dialogue, we have, in fact, appointed an industrialist-an intelligent and, I believe, sensitive man, but who, nevertheless, lacks any prior diplomatic experience. Then, under pressure of other preoccupations-principally Vietnam-Dr. Kissinger has several times postponed his announced visit to Japan, which again has reinforced the feeling that our relations with Tokyo are far down on our list of priorities. UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE PREOCCUPATIONS WITH CHINA All of this has, of course, had an abrasive effect on Japanese sensibilities. Yet, what has made the effect acute and serious is Japan's complex psychological involvement with China as the primordial source of much of its own culture. For many years the Japanese had hoped that, given this special relationship, Japan could provide the bridge between China and the West, interpreting Chinese interests and attitudes to the Western nations, and assisting China in understanding the Western industrial world in which Japan was playing such a prominent role. At the same time, though, there were strong pressures in Japan to move toward the establishment of a close relationship with China, the Japanese had-largely in deference to American policy-held poli |