tically aloof from China, while developing economic and political ties with Taiwan.

It was, as a consequence, a shock to the Japanese when the United States announced that Dr. Kissinger had already held long conversations with Chou En-lai, and that the President himself was going to China. For obvious reasons, this proved a considerable embarrassment to the government of Prime Minister Sato, who felt that he had been caught off guard. In fact, in many Japanese quarters there was a tendency to regard it as a direct denial of what has been considered as the spirit of the Japanese-American alliance, represented by our Mutual Security Treaty. Thus, there is no doubt that this has set in train a national reexamination by the Japanese people that could lead to a new and quite different consensus as to the direction that their foreign policy should take.

PROSPECT OF INDEPENDENT JAPANESE APPROACH TO CHINA

For several years it has been clear that Japanese policy was in a transitional state. To be sure, the adoption of a "low posture" was appropriate in the years following the war, when Japan was seeking to reestablish herself as a nation to be trusted by the rest of the international community. But it was also clear that, given her extraordinary industrial achievements, Japan would not always be content to play a purely passive political role, taking her lead largely from Washington. The levers of power were beginning to be grasped by a new generation that felt no guilt or responsibility for the war.

Nevertheless, the Sato government has been a faithful friend of the United States, pursuing a course of political action consistent with American policy, in spite of growing opposition from many Japanese who wished their country to take a more independent political line. Thus, it was only to be expected that this particular sector of opinion would hail the President's announcement of his China trip as effectively freeing Japan to follow an independent course in the future, without necessary reference to American interests or inclinations.

Meanwhile, the President's China trip has tended to unleash pent-up Japanese pressures for a "normalization" of their relations with China. This movement has now become so strong that whatever government follows that of Prime Minister Sato-and the assumption is that he will shortly resign now that the Okinawa reversion arrangements have been worked out-will be compelled to begin negotiations with Peking. By itself, there is nothing wrong with this. Sooner or later it was inevitable that Japan would feel compelled to come to terms with China. The danger created by the growing disenchantment of the Japanese with American policy, however, is that Japan may feel compelled to make its peace with China on terms that could seriously jeopardize our whole defense structure in the Pacific.

The Peking government has made clear that it intends to drive a hard bargain with Tokyo, and this could well include an insistence that the Japanese deny the use of bases in their country for the United States to carry out its defense commitments, either with regard to Taiwan or South Korea, or both.

SEEDS SOWN FOR JAPANESE GAULLISM

More important in the long run, however, is the growing feeling in Japan that the United States has made a decision to pursue an independent policy of negotiation with the Communist powers, and that we can no longer be counted on to concert policies with the Japanese, even in situations where, as is the case with China, their interests are most directly involved.

If this feeling is allowed to develop, then I feel we shall see a gradual alienation of Japan that might, at the end of the road, create a kind of Gaullist nationalism. Whether this would lead to remilitarization, or even ultimately to the development of a nuclear arsenal, cannot at the moment be clearly foreseen. But that will depend to a large extent on whether the Japanese continue to have faith in our own security commitments. It is a faith we shall certainly undermine if, by our actions, we lead the Japanese to believe that we no longer place a high value on their friendship.

Apart from the Soviet Union, which is governed from a European capital, Japan is, by all odds, the most powerful industrial nation in the Far East. In spite of the fact that China's population is eight times as large, Japan's gross national product approaches 21⁄2 times that of the People's Republic. Thus, what happens to Japan will necessarily have a major impact on the peace and stability not merely of the Far East but of the entire world.

Nevertheless, one should not overlook the repercussions of the President's China visit on other nations in the area as well.

SHOCKS TO TAIWAN AND KOREA

Most directly affected is, of course, Taiwan, to which the President's China initiative came as a serious blow. Today not only is Taiwan no longer a member of the United Nations, but its future relations with Peking are in serious doubt.

Sooner or later, this is bound to slow down the Taiwanese economy, since the flow of Japanese capital for direct investment has already dried up, and I think it unlikely that many American firms will be willing to make further capital commitments in Formosa-at least until its political future is clarified.

South Korea is another country in the area that has been greatly disturbed by our new China policy. The question in the minds of the South Korean is, of course, whether our new attitude toward China will result in a diminution of American interest in their country. Will it lead, for example, to pressures for an accommodation between the government of President Park and that of Kim Il-song in the North? Again, what will be the effect on the flow of private capital from America? Is it likely, for example, to be diverted to countries such as Singapore, whose political future seems much more certain? Apart from Formosa and South Korea, the Asian countries have, by and large, welcomed an improved relationship between America and China, particularly as they look toward the final liquidation of the Vietnamese war and the shrinking of the American presence in application of the Nixon doctrine.

SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT U.S.-PRC RAPPROCHEMENT

This leaves the Soviet Union as that power in Asia, with perhaps the greatest stake in the evolution of Sino-American relations. There seems no doubt that the Soviets have been worried by the improvement in communications between Peking and Washington, and that they have viewed the entire enterprise with deep suspicion.

Just what effect this may be exerting on the present complicated pressures and counterpressures engendered by America's recent activities in Haiphong harbor cannot be discussed in an informed manner today. Perhaps during the next few critical weeks we will have a much clearer view of the situation, but today we don't know much about what is going on.

These, Mr. Chairman, are my general impressions of some of the consequences of the President's China initiative. In principle, I have long believed that there was everything to be gained by an improvement of communications between Washington and Peking. However, I felt at the time-and feel even more strongly now-that the elaborate spectacle of a Presidential visit was unnecessary and unwise. We are already seeing some of the adverse consequences in our critical relations with Japan.

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. MORLEY, DIRECTOR, EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Morley is a Professor and Director of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University. A Japanese expert, Dr. Morley served as Special Assistant to U.S. Ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson, from 1967 to 1969. His books include "The Japanese Thrust in Siberia," "Soviet and Communist Chinese Policies Toward Japan," and "Japan and Korea: American Allies in East Asia." A contributing editor to the Journal of International Affairs, Dr. Morley is a Director of the Japan Society, a former Research Professor at Waseda University (Tokyo), and a former Director of the Association for Asian Studies.

DISSOLUTION OF UNITED STATES-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP

Mr. MORLEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, in listening to Mr. Ball, I would like to associate myself with many of his comments here. But I would also like to put them in a slightly different context because my feeling is that the damage done by the "Nixon shocks" and other events of the last few years can only be understood really if we see them in a rather long historical perspective and realize they are simply one stage in something which is a much vaster problem and that problem, in my opinion, is the dissolution of the old Japanese-American partnership.

Simply put, the old partnership which we have had with Japan for the last 20 years is no longer viable. When that partnership was originally forged, Japan was wracked with the moral confusions of defeat. Its economy was prostrate. It was isolated from the world by occupation fiat. Its people were uncertain of the meaning of the new social

and political institutions made in America. They wanted guidance, help, and protection.

The United States at that time was more than willing to respond. Its China-centered foreign policy was being frustrated by the collapse of the Kuomintang and its global aims were being confronted by Soviet power and revolutionary forces around the world. It seized the opportunity therefore for forging an unusual partnership with its former foe, hoping to help rebuild Japan as a stanch supporter of the "free world."

Now, 20 years later, the premises on which this partnership were built are dissolving. The cold war world of two armed camps has been eroded. The Chinese and the Russians have split apart. Neither is as overtly threatening to its non-Communist neighbors as before; and new power centers have sprung up in many places.

Japan also has changed. Although still a minor power militarily, it has developed a major capacity in science and technology and climbed to superpower status in economic productivity. The most important trading partner of every state in Asia except South Korea and South Vietnam, Japan now produces more goods and services than all the rest of Asia combined. And with these successes it has acquired confidence.

America, on the other hand, plagued by war in Vietnam, social conflict, and economic recession, is far less eager than it was to sacrifice for its foreign friends. The effects of these profound shifts are felt in every phase of the partnership.

REMOVING U.S. TROOPS FROM JAPAN

Militarily, Japan still values the nuclear protection and the promise of air and naval support of the United States, but it feels little threat and sees little need for the stationing of American forces in Japan in any substantial numbers. It is increasingly concerned lest the presence and activities of these forces be incompatible with Japan's own

purposes.

One can well foresee that by the late seventies, as Japan's military strength grows, it may well want fundamental revision or dissolution of the Security Treaty. Already all opposition parties, which together enjoy a majority of popular electoral support, hold that view. This will not be because Japan is going militaristic, but simply because by that time its own very modest and methodological military buildup plans will give it, at least in budgetary terms, major power status.

It will then probably neither require nor want foreign troops on its soil. And it is very likely that by that time the United States will not want to help them there either. The return of Okinawa yesterday is another major step in this long disengagement process and leaves us, as our other reductions in Japan leave us, with the question of the future: After the phasing out of the conventional military relationship, with which the old partnership was primarily concerned, what kind of nuclear relationship should be sought and how can it be obtained?

PROBLEM OF JAPAN'S TRADE SURPLUSES

While our conventional military relationship is growing attenuated, our economic bonds also are being subjected to increasing strains. The vast volume of trade between us-valued at more than $10 billion a year-is vivid evidence of the economic value of our Japanese ties; but the juxtaposition of Japanese growth and American recession has brought side effects which are damaging indeed: Extraordinary balances in Japan's foreign trade account, inequities in exchange rates, and commercial rivalries in sensitive industries which neither country can ignore.

If the present trend continues, one can well foresee that the bitter experience of the recent textile crisis will be repeated in industry after industry, and the irritation engendered by these commercial conflicts may well poison relations far outside the business field. How in the face of these conflicts can a viable partnership be maintained?

PROSPECT OF INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT POLITICAL COURSES

Politically also, there are forces on both sides of the Pacific tending to pull us apart. For their part, the Japanese people are increasingly dissatisfied with the figure they cut in the world. To them, their devotion to peace seems unappreciated: The Chinese belabor them for "remilitarizing," the Americans talk ambiguously about "burden sharing," and the world accords their economic successes not so much respect as fear.

Moreover, they grow tired of being charged with toadyism to America and are increasingly restless to take some new course of their own. The United States, on the other hand, seems to take Japan less and less into political account.

The President's recent change in China policy, for example, seems to have been taken quite independently of Japan and without concern for Japanese reactions, apparently ignoring the fact that only a generation ago it was largely differences over China that brought Japan and the United States to war.

JAPAN DISTURBED AT U.S. INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Culturally, too, the grounds between us have shifted. More concerned with ourselves than we were a generation ago, we are decreasing our efforts through the Fulbright program and other forms of educational support both to help Japanese understand America and to help Americans understand Japan. This is at a time when many Americans are turning their backs on the outside world and when most Japanese no longer see America as the model they once did for their own society. Our racial conflicts, urban crises, school strikes, and polluted environment are as disturbing to Japanese as to Americans.

Fortunately, the Japanese Government is beginning to recognize for the first time the seriousness of this problem-there is, after all, no deep historic well of common culture to draw upon in times of political and economic tension. But we Americans are not. The likelihood is real that unless timely and far-reaching efforts are made on both sides of the Pacific, the level of understanding which grew out of the old partnership will not sustain the burdens of the future.