of lowest common denominator, i. e., the program no one objects to; usually a mediocre program.

I think that this is the nub of the problem, that there is a very big civil defense job to do. It needs a very strong central organization to do it and it cannot develop and do its job unless it has the full support of Congress.

It has to get the full support on an official basis to attract good people and it has got to have enough funds so that it is taken seriously.

I personally feel that just large funds without the strong organization could very well come to naught, or at least I am sure that you would have too great a delay in execution.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And is it not also your opinion that such an agency must be based on statutory authority and functions which have been made permanent through legislation by the Congress, rather than the temporary and changeable policies that might be wrapped up in Executive orders?

Dr. JOHNSON. Very much so.

I very strongly believe in good organization.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. If a function of an agency is dependent upon Executive orders, it will not have, in my opinion, the support of Congress in a major way from the standpoint of appropriations.

Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. We see the favorable effect of organizations set up in a statutory way, for example, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics some of these statutory organizations have done wonderful jobs. Ad hoc organizations and arrangements, I believe, are all right during a war; but, for the prolonged period we are considering, you need the long and continuing know-how of a skilled professional staff associated with central organization, and you cannot get that unless it has the prestige and status. That is especially true among scientists these days.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. This is one of the reasons why members of this committee advocated legislation which would define functions and place the responsibility in a central agency, and set it up by statute, and also place it on the level of prestige and dignity of a Cabinet department.

You would not subscribe to the idea that the functions of civil defense should be placed in the Department of Defense?

Dr. JOHNSON. No, sir, I would not.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You would have

Dr. JOHNSON. I feel very strongly opposed to that.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You feel if it is going to be successful it would have to be a separate mission and directed by civilians?

Dr. JOHNSON. Yes, with the reservation that this civilian organization does need to have access to the military facts of life.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes; that is true. In order to evaluate its mission and prepare for it.

Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. I have just a few closing comments.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Very well.

Dr. JOHNSON. I believe bearing the costs of a civil defense program is essential to the United States. I think the critical question is whether the President, the Congress, and the people think the burden necessary and possible. I do.

Finally, the question is whether the possibility of disarmament may obviate civil defense.

First, I think we must proceed with civil defense until actual disarmament is actually assured, and must bear the annual cost until then. Second, it is absolutely certain that the Soviet could surreptitiously set aside the 50 or more bombs required to decimate an unprotected United States and could deliver them by converted aircraft. There is no inspection system that would guard against that. There is no possible inspection system. Such an illegal attack after disarmament would require a Soviet conspiracy involving only a few people; the Communists are quite capable of such a conspiracy. If, then, all of our defenses are gone, if we are both disarmed to zero as many people seem to desire, that still does not mean that we might not suddenly have appear in our skies over our cities, unscheduled aircraft capable of killing 20 to 90 million people. If that happened to us, as a result of Soviet conspiracy, then they could easily rebuild unopposed their armament and could then take over the world, whether we liked it or not. Unless we can completely trust the Soviet Union, disarmament might be fatal to the free world unless great safeguards are established. Therefore, defense at least against manned aircraft and civil defense are required indefinitely, or until long after the Soviet Union ceases hostility and attempts to subvert the free world. I see no escape from that conclusion. We have no reason to believe at present that either with or without world disarmament the Soviet Union can be trusted. On the basis of the Soviet record, we cannot afford to neglect our defense.

I hope that I have been able to substantiate my opinion that civil defense is an integral part of deterrents, a continuing part of the need to make ineffective the possibility of an unprovoked thermonuclear attack on the United States, either with or without disarmament, and, as an integrated and important factor in United States defense, it is a civilian function and should be established on a statutory basis as an independent agency of the Government.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We appreciate your summarization and the remarks which you have made which are outside of your prepared testimony. Any questions, Mr. Lipscomb?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. No, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Any questions from the staff?

Mr. ROBACK. Dr. Johnson, can you tell us a little bit more about the function of the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins? Is this an agency that is exclusively devoted to Government contract

work?

Dr. JOHNSON. Yes. It has been up to this time. Its work has been primarily but not only for the Army. At Army request we have done work which involved the whole Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department. Essentially we have a straightforward and simple contract with the Department of the Army.

Mr. ROBACK. Is that a continuing contract or a renewable one?

Dr. JOHNSON. The budgets are provided on a 3-year basis so far as expenditures are concerned, but from a practical point of view it is on a 1-year basis. That is to say, the funds appropriated can be spent over a 3-year period. They are almost all expended in 1 year, but because of subcontracting, consultant arrangements, rent, and accu

mulated leave, we do need to have the 3-year authorization for expendi

ture.

Mr. ROBACK. Does Rand Corp. occupy an analogous position with the Air Force that you do with the Army

Dr. JOHNSON. Yes, it does. They are about twice our size though and have been in existence about 2 years longer than we have.

Mr. ROBACK. What kind of studies has Rand made in this field? Have they made general defense studies, do you know?

Dr. JOHNSON. Yes, they have. They are an exceptionally competent organization. We work in general with very good cooperation

with them.

In the case of the recent ORO report, or our air defense report, they have some strong differences of opinion with us. It is interesting that there are also many people inside of Rand who have strong differences of opinion with the people in Rand who do not feel that our report is one that they could agree to.

I, however, hope you will talk directly to Rand about this because they are an excellent group. They do studies that in methods are very similar to ours except that they concern themselves with Air Force action. Many of their studies have been of somewhat broader scope than ours.

In 1953 they did a topnotch study of air defense emphasizing Air Force actions. When it was our turn last year because of the deep Army interest in air defense, we emphasized Army operations. For either one of us to study air defense continuously would strain our resources so that we could not be able to do the other very important work we have to do for the Army and Air Force.

The Rand opinions on this very problem would be very important. I have the fullest confidence in their abilities. However, let me say this: I have heard arguments in the Department of Defense that you ought to have only one scientific outfit because scientists do not agree

with each other.

Of course they do not. They are looking for new ways to go and use new information. In the beginning of new studies nobody can be absolutely sure of the early facts. We search out the truth by use of the classical methods of science-rankless Aristotelian arguments.

If you look at the Physical Review for 1900 to 1910, you find that about 95 percent of the papers did not live; they were exploratory and some went up blind alleys. But we got where we are now by the scientific method which includes controversy in the Aristotelian sense; that is, argument.

Thus I cannot honestly represent Rand's capability. You should ask them. I do say that I have a high respect for them.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, sir.

(See exhibit B of the appendix for a statement subsequently submitted by the RAND Corporation.)

Dr. JOHNSON. I want to say once again, Mr. Chairman, that I think the time for action on this problem is now. I am scared by this 196163 capability of the Soviet Union, and if the Congress waits 1 more year we have waited too long already-but if we wait 1 more year, that next year we can never buy back.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is certainly a sober note of warning, Dr. Johnson.

The Chair agrees with you. We have waited too long already to face up to some of these problems. We can only push forward with the capability that we have and with the state of mind which the Congress has in some of these problem areas. We appreciate very much your testimony.

Would any of your associates like to say anything at this time? Dr. PETTEE. No, sir, thank you. I think Dr. Johnson very well represented us.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Fine. We appreciate all of you being here this morning. We appreciate your testimony, Dr. Johnson. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee was adjourned.)