the Nation's nonmilitary defense program. I do not want to be interpreted as representing that the acceptance of this organizational proposal would, by itself, overnight result in adequate nonmilitary defense preparedness.

At the same time, I want to make it emphatically clear that I strongly believe that the organizational problem must be solved before any really effective nonmilitary defense planning and readiness can be achieved. It is the essential next step. However, it is certainly not the only step.

In this connection, it is also essential that the Congress approve another measure which, from the State and local civil defense standpoint, is of equal importance. I refer to the enactment of Mr. Durham's bill, H. R. 7576, which is currently pending before the Senate.

This bill was unanimously passed by the House last summer. It establishes civil defense as a joint responsibility of Federal, State, and local governments, with the Federal Government providing overall direction and coordination, and sharing the cost of civil defense functions at State and local levels.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of the passage of this legislation. Civil defense officials, mayors, and governors from every part of the Nation advise me that the enactment of this bill is essential to their development of an adequate civil defense program.

I want to thank the members of this committee for their strong support of this measure when it was being considered by the House, and ask their continuing support to secure its early passage.

In summary, I believe the President's reorganization plan will accomplish the following:

1. Strengthen the Nation's nonmilitary defense organization. 2. Increase the stature of civil defense and mobilization.

3. Provide the best overall coordination and supervision of the nonmilitary defense activities within the Federal Government.

4. Provide unified guidance and assistance to State and local governments.

5. Establish a solid foundation upon which accomplishment of the assigned mission can be accelerated.

6. More efficient and economical administration.

The close relationship between military preparedness and nonmilitary defense readiness activities, and the vital importance of both, demand--because these functions transcend the responsibilities of any single department or agency-that the nonmilitary defense functions be vested in no one short of the President.

Let me assure you that the Federal Civil Defense Administration wholeheartedly supports Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 and strongly urges that the Congress permit the plan to take effect.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Governor, for your statement. Are there any questions? Mr. Riehlman.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Hoegh has volunteered to outline in detail his program that he has studied and prepared for making this a more effective organization. He said he would be very happy to present it to us. Is this the proper time? Mr. HOEGH. I will do it briefly. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is this the plan? Mr. HOEGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will be glad to have it.

Mr. HOEGH. First, you will recall, we set out the purpose, and that is to set out these national courses of action and also assign the role of the respective governments.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. When you say you assign the roles, you really get down to the bedrock operating level and say that, "As governor of X State, you will be required to assume the responsibility for certain actions?"

Mr. HOEGH. That's right, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And of course this comes about as an agreement between your representatives and the governors of the separate States. Mr. HOEGH. For instance, in our organization we make this statement: “Civil defense is the responsibility of each citizen and all governments-Federal, State and local, with the Federal Government having the primary role of direction and coordination of the total national effort."

Then we go further. We state that the President is Commander in Chief. The Civil Defense Administrator is the principal civil defense staff officer. Governors and mayors are commanders of their respective jurisdictions, with civil defense directors as principal staff officers.

For the plan to be effective, I want to point out I still feel that H. R. 7576 is most essential.

Then we set out our mission. I think you are familiar with it. This is the mission that we see from reading your testimony, from reading the statutes. Our mission is to protect life and property from the effects of attack by preparing for and by carrying out emergency functions to prevent, minimize, and repair injury and damage. That is our mission.

I forgot one other point above. We do set forth a planning base. Everyone should have the same planning base. We set that out in this plan. It is somewhat like military intelligence, and attached to the plan as annex No. 1.

Then in functions, the plan sets forth the functions, step by step, how the mission is to be accomplished. These are listed under "Warning," "Communications and control," "Action prior to attack," "Action after attack."

With reference to "Warning," we point out the warning spots of the Federal, the State, and the local governments. For instance, as of today NORAD-North American Air Defense Command-has the responsibility of detecting an enemy attack. Our people sit with NORAD. Immediately when our people are informed, they pick up a telephone and communicate with 200 critical points simultaneously. And this coming fiscal year that will be increased to 276 points throughout the Nation, some points being in every State in the land. In addition to that, it will go directly to 88 radio stations and 12 national radio networks.

Then we go forward and set out uniform warning signals. It is time that people have a uniform warning signal. If you live in New York and happen to be in Los Angeles, the signal should mean the same thing there as it did in New York City. We set that out.

Then we set out warning as to fallout, what is to be done, what the responsibilities are, and so forth. Then in "Communications and con

trol." As you know, today we have a pretty good communications system. We have telephone and teletype. Again we have asked Congress this year to permit us to back that up by radio. It is most essential that we have, eventually, radio backup in order to be certain that we can always communicate.

Congress so far has granted us sufficient appropriations to enable us to backup our telephone and teletype from the national office to each regional office. Then we hope in the next 2 fiscal years to come in and ask for backup to the States. That is most important.

On control, we note that the Federal Government has its control center, and we ask that the States and local governments provide theirs. And of course, as you know, we have matching funds to help the States and local governments to that end.

Then we get into the courses of action. I think to make this brief, when you look at this plan and you hold it right next to your H. R. 2125, and see the things that you have recommended be done with reference to planning thereto, you will find that there is some similarity. We have gone a little further; not that you weren't complete; but there were things that I felt should be planned for in addition to these things.

We do the same thing with reference to the postattack action. Then we define clearly the national policy on evacuation and shelter. We state if sufficient warning time is available, evacuate; if not, take cover. Simple-but it means something.

Then we go on and we state this: Plans for evacuation are being developed and will be carried out only if sufficient warning time is provided. It is most likely that take cover will be the course of action executed. This is, I think, the important statement: "The action to be taken is a local decision."

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You mean the action as to whether

Mr. HOEGH. Take cover or evacuate. The local mayor, with the advice of his civil defense staff, would make the ultimate decision as to whether the time is adequate and sufficient to permit him either to execute evacuation or to tell his people to seek the best available shelter.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is there any indication at all of any interest in this plan toward solving the problem of radioactive fallout?

Mr. HOEGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In the direction of shelter?

Mr. HOEGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is there any assumption on the part of the Federal Government of recommending the types of shelters or the financing of the shelter program?

Mr. HOEGH. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am prepared to announce the administration's national policy on shelters, if you would like to have me proceed.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will be very glad to have you do so.

Mr. HOEGH. You see, this would become an annex to this total nonmilitary defense plan.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. What do you mean by an "annex"? I don't quite understand that.

Mr. HOEGH. Well, sir, we have now

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is it not an integral part?

25978-58-pt. 1-26

Mr. HOEGH. Yes; it is an integral part of the plan. But it is to keep it so people can read it and understand it. The basic plan should tell you what you are doing, and these annexes should tell you specifically what your role is and what you are to do.

The administration, as you know, has conducted exhaustive studies and tests with which you are, I know, familiar, and each one of the members of this committee is familiar.

Mr. ROBACK. Not as familiar as we would like to be.

Mr. HOEGH. Anyway, it is with reference to the effects of nuclear weapons.

Mr. ROBACK. Isn't the fact that the Gaither Committee really was set up in the first instance to study this kind of recommendation?

Mr. HOEGH. Of course the Gaither Committee made some study of it. Mr. ROBACK. It sprang out of the administration's problem of what to do in the shelter field. Isn't that the fact? We have testimony that that was it.

Mr. HOEGH. Understand this, I have been on board 9 months. But in reading the testimony of the hearings here, and in reading many other reports, I find that this matter has been under study for many, many months and a very exhaustive study has been made and many tests have been made.

These several analyses and studies have indicated that there is a great potential for the saving of life by fallout shelters. In the event of a nuclear attack on this country, fallout shelters would offer the best single nonmilitary defense measure for the protection of the greatest number of people.

Furthermore, a nation with adequate fallout protection is a nation which would be more difficult to successfully attack. This fact alone would substantially lessen the temptation of an aggressor to launch an attack.

The Administration's national civil defense policy, which now includes planning for the movement of people from target areas if time permits, will now also include the use of shelters to provide protection from radioactive fallout.

To implement this established policy, the Administration will undertake the following action:

1. The Administration will bring to every American all the facts as to the possible effects of nuclear attack and inform him of the steps which he and his State and local governments can take to minimize such effects.

The present civil defense programs for information and education will therefore be substantially expanded in order to acquaint the people with the fallout hazard and how to effectively overcome it. The public education program will include information on the following:

(1) Nuclear weapons effects on people, plants, and animals.

(2) The provision of effective fallout protection, how to construct a fallout shelter, and how to improvise effective shelter.

(3) Necessary measures for the protection of food and water. (4) How to carry out radiological decontamination.

(5) What the Governments-Federal, State and local-are themselves doing about fallout protection.

The second step and the second action:

2. The administration will initiate a survey of existing structures on a sampling basis in order to assemble definite information on the capabilities of existing structures to provide fallout shelter, particularly in larger cities. Many facilities such as existing buildings, mines, subways, tunnels, cyclone cellars, and others already afford some fallout protection. Action will be taken to accurately determine the protection afforded by all of these existing facilities in order to make maximum use of them.

3. The administration will accelerate research in order to show how fallout shelters may be incorporated in existing, as well as in new buildings, whether in homes, other private buildings or Government structures. Designs of shelters will be perfected to assure the most economic and effective types.

4. The administration will construct a limited number of prototype shelters of various kinds suitable to different geographical and climatic areas. These will be tested by actual occupancy by differing numbers of people for realistic periods of time. They will also have practical peacetime uses.

Some of the prototype structures will be incorporated in underground parking garages; under-street shelters; subways; the Federal highway program-patrol and maintenance facilities; additions to existing schools and new schools, including such facilities as cafeterias, assembly space and classrooms; additions to existing hospitals and new hospitals, including such facilities as cafeterias, visitors' and convalescent rooms and reserve areas; industrial plants; commercial buildings; family residences and apartments, including such facilities as bathrooms, garages, basements, and recreation rooms.

5. The administration will provide leadership and example by incorporating fallout shelters in appropriate new Federal buildings hereafter designed for civilian use. Federal example is an indispensable element to stimulate State and local government and private investment for fallout shelters. Community use of the shelters in these new buildings of course is contemplated.

There will be no massive federally financed shelter construction program.

With reference to blast shelters, there are still difficult questions, having to do with the amount of time that would be available to enter the shelters, the uncertainty of missile accuracy, and the effectiveness of our active defense. There is no assurance that even the deepest shelter would give protection to a sufficient number of people to justify the cost. In addition, there may not be sufficient warning time, in view of the development of missile capabilities, to permit the effective use of blast shelters.

Our chief deterrent to war will continue to be our active military capability. Our active military defense may eventually have the capability of effectively preventing an enemy from striking intended targets. Highest priority is to be given to the development of this capability.

Common prudence requires that the Federal Government take steps to assist each American to prepare himself, as he would through insurance against any disaster, to meet a possible-although unwanted-eventuality. The national shelter policy is founded upon this principle.