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Mr. HOEGH. I don't think it should. I think we ought to keep this channel-the mayors should get it, and he has the responsibility for taking the action. I think that is what would be done even under that suggested reorganization chart.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If I am not mistaken, the Bureau of the Budget testified yesterday that this organization chart was substantially the way that they envisioned the program after the reorganization plan went into effect.

In other words, they were satisfied with this organization. It was also my understanding up to this point that these duties would be delegated throughout the agencies of Government and would leave, as Mr. Gray pointed out, just certain functions-the direction, the coordination, and all the rest. And as indicated on the organization chart, the Office of Civilian Mobilization would develop assumptions, direct, coordinate, and test readiness measures and plans, perform specialized functions of FCDA that cannot be delegated, public information, training, research, shelter policy, and central RADEF activities, and develop plans and programs for the Government organizations and emergency controls.

This is the way we see the reorganization before us.

This is what

we are going to vote on to support the President's reorganization. You have pointed out six general items you hope to accomplish, including economy and efficiency. But I think Congress is entitled to have some idea of what specifically we are going to do in reorganization. That is why I was asking the question. Certainly, for example, some thought must have been given to what are you going to do with warning?

Are you going to keep it or are you going to delegate it?

Mr. HOEGH. Specifically with reference to warning, again I say that the system we have has proven effective.

Certainly the burden of proof would be placed upon anything that would be submitted as against that. That is a recommendation, sir, as appears in that chart. That is for the new Director to evaluate. He does not necessarily have to accept it.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You are either going to delegate the duties around the director or else you are going to still have split commands in three chains, as has been pointed out in previous testimony.

Mr. HOEGH. With reference to delegations, there will be delegations. There are delegations today by the President to various departments.

I wanted to point out that by having this Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization immediately under the President, I believe that you can do a more effective job of getting performance after you delegate it, and secondly, that you coordinate. That is most important. It is all right to delegate to experts, and we would continue to do that. But be certain that the delegations are executed and that they are coordinated with the overall nonmilitary defense. Otherwise you have inconsistencies.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think it at least fair to say that as far as this study is concerned, the committee cannot accept these recommendations as being the pattern which will obtain, that the recommendations will be considered, some of them may be accepted and some of them may be rejected.

Is that correct?

Mr. HOEGH. That's correct, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. So, from a standpoint of the committee having knowledge as to what is going to happen, we do not have knowledge by looking at this. We can understand only as to the general recommendations that have been made. But we have no specific knowledge as to compliance with the recommendations.

Mr. HOEGH. Mr. Chairman, that is one reason why I spent some time in trying to outline this national civil-defense plan. I wanted you to know what we are doing today and what should be done in our opinion in the future.

Therefore, the organizational chairman would have to take into consideration not only the performance of this nonmilitary job— particularly the civil-defense work-but also should take into consideration the functions and the performance by the now existing agency of Office of Defense Mobilization.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Before we leave this, you had one question and then I am going to recognize some of the visiting Congressmen.

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Lipscomb's question went to the distribution of functions and the Budget Bureau testified that, so far as they were concerned, this is the organization they would recommend.

The organization plan as it came up in discussion is not a plan for civil-defense organization. It is merely a shift of functions. Some of that as far as the civil-defense plan or program is concerned is indeterminate, and that rests on subsequent decisions of the President.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. HOEGH. Of course it would be the ultimate decision of the President, but certainly he would, as he always does, look to his staff officers for recommendations.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We realize that.

Mr. HOEGH. That would be my responsibility.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We realize that. The point of the question was that we cannot at this time fix the procedures which will be followed by the new organization in accepting or rejecting the separate recommendations of the McKinsey report. The committee cannot rely on this as a plan of procedure.

Mr. HOEGH. I believe, sir, when you know, as you do, the functions of civil defense and the functions of ODM, and you recognize that they are now to be placed into the President, that certainly these functions that are now being performed are going to be performed by this new agency, either directly or by indirect delegation.

But even when you delegate a function, you have the ultimate responsibility of seeing that it is performed. You don't delegate it away. You then have to make certain that there is performance.

So I feel that your committee can look into what the actions are and the functions are of civil defense and ODM and that you would know generally that that is going to be done in the future.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. At this time I wish to recognize Mr. Hoffman of Michigan. He is an ex officio member of the subcommittee.

Mr. Hoffman, at this time we would be glad to extend to you the courtesy of questioning either of the witnesses, if you desire. Mr. HOFFMAN. I am relying upon my colleagues.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Johansen, would you like to ask a question? Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to ask if it is in order-I am not sure as to the status of the McKinsey report-to include two paragraphs from it in the record relating to the physical location of the Office of Civilian Mobilization.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I have read that part of it into the record, Mr. Johansen. If you wish to have it reproduced again, we will be glad to have it.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Once is sufficient.

Mr. Chairman, I have just one question to direct to the Governor and also to Mr. Gray if he would care to comment on it. In doing so, I have a responsibility to the district and community I represent with respect to the economic stability of the community, with respect to plans now currently underway to improve some of the housing facilities and to take other steps based on the premise that there will be a major operation continued in Battle Creek.

I am concerned also from the standpoint of the principle of dispersal, from the standpoint of efficient operations in the interests of the national security which at all times is the paramount consideration. Would you care to comment, Governor, and Mr. Gray, as to any implications of this proposed reorganization with respect to the continued maintenance of the very substantial share of the operations of Federal civil defense, national headquarters, and/or the newly designated agency in Battle Creek?

Mr. HOEGH. I have no hesitancy, Mr. Johansen, in restating what I had previously stated to the committee, and that is that our operations in Battle Creek have been effective, with good communications there. It is accessible to the people throughout the Nation, and that it does permit us to practice what we advocate by having dispersion. I do not see any great change in the facilities that we are now occupying in Battle Creek, Mich.

Mr. JOHANSEN. I appreciate that statement and will be glad to have Mr. Gray comment, if he cares to.

Mr. GRAY. As we went over this a little earlier, sir, while you were not in the room, I don't think I have anything to add to what Governor Hoegh has said. It is my understanding that the Bureau of the Budget has made certain observations to Members of Congress, and perhaps to you, about this.

The only comment I made earlier for the record is that as far as that portion of the McKinsey paragraph to which you referred is concerned which relates to the locus of the office of the Director of Defense and Civil Mobilization, I agree that that office must be in Washington. But as far as the activities and functions which are carried on now by the Civilian Defense Administration are concerned, I don't have anything to add to that.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Neither of you would anticipate there would be any major or appreciable transfer of personnel in proportion to the present personnel!

Mr. HOEGH. That is correct.

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I had had the impression these questions had not been asked. I apologize for burdening the record. Thank you.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mrs. Griffiths?

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. No, I have no questions.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Any further questions by any members of the committee?

Staff?

Thank you very much for your testimony, Governor Hoegh. I apologize for the lateness of the hour, but we thought this might prevent us from having to have another session.

Thanks to you, Mr. Gray, for your attendance.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I did forget one thing. I understood the witness to say this delegation of authority was going to be immediately under the President.

Who do you mean?

Mr. HOEGH. No, sir.

Mr. HOFFMAN. You said immediately under the President?
Mr. HOEGH. Yes.

Mr. HOFFMAN, Who is actually going to do it?

Mr. HOEGH. The President does it, sir.

Mr. HOFFMAN. He isn't going to do it all. We know that. Mr. HOEGH. Of course as the staff officer we prepare them and coordinate them. It is actually signed by the President, sir. Mr. HOFFMAN. I know that. But who comes up to him with the statement about what we are going to do? Is it Sherman Adams or is it this fellow, that fellow, or who?

Mr. HOEGH. The Director.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Who is he?

Mr. HOEGH. In this instance on civil-defense matters, sir, it is the Administrator, and that is myself. We, or I, with my staff perfect what we feel would be logical delegation.

After we have it coordinated, sir, we then take it to the President and he then either approves or rejects.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Then you are going to give the advice to the President of what should be done in this case?

Mr. HOEGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is that all, Mr. Hoffman.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you very much.

The committee will be adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 1: 15 p. m. the subcommittee adjourned.)

25978-58-pt. 1————27

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A-MCKINSEY & Co. REPORT ON NONMILITARY DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

PART I-A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING NONMILITRAY DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

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DEAR SIR: We submit herewith our report entitled "A Framework for Improving Nonmilitary Defense Organization." This report presents the findings and recommendations resulting from phase I of the study we were asked to undertake by your letter of November 27, 1957.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

Your letter directed that we

1. Examine existing organizational arrangements for the conduct of the Federal Government's defense mobilization and civil defense functions and ascertain the problems resulting from these arrangements.

2. Consider possible alternative solutions to these problems.

3. Recommend improved organizational arrangements for the conduct of these functions.

WHAT WE HAVE DONE

To gain an understanding of existing organizational arrangements, and the problems they pose, we

1. Assembled and analyzed materials describing the roles, functions, and programs of both the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. These materials included the basic legislation, Executive orders, proposed budgets, current program statements, national mobilization and civil defense plans, and delegations of responsibilities to other Federal departments and agencies.

2. Interviewed officials in ODM, FCDA, the Bureau of the Budget, and various delegate departments and agencies such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The names of the officials interviewed during this phase of the study are set forth in appendix A.

On the basis of these sources of data we have pictured in chapter 1 of the accompanying report the nature of the organizational problems. In chapter 2 we have summarily described those proposals that have been offered to meet the organizational problems. In chapter 3 we present conclusions reached during this preliminary study and recommend a course of action that should be taken at this time to insure orderly progress toward an improved organizational framework for nonmilitary defense.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In summary the accompanying report recommends that a statement be developed for inclusion in an early Presidential message which will indicate: 1. The President recognizes that overlap and duplication limit the effectiveness of the present organizational arrangements for conducting nonmilitary defense functions (i. e., defense mobilization and civil defense functions).

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