sale of intoxicating liquors therein, the power
to issue licenses for sale of such liquors is
withdrawn from every municipality within the
county, including cities operating under home
rule charters.-State v. City of International
Falls, 156 N. W. 249.
281 (Iowa) Costs should be taxed against
defendants in a suit to enjoin a liquor nui-
sance, where after the petition was sworn to,
but before it was filed, they, unknown to plain-
tiff, abandoned their business.-Davidson
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, No.
374, Ft. Madison, 156 N. W. 187.
40 (Minn.) A liquor license issued by a
city before the power of the licensing board
was taken away by the result of a county op-
tion election, but for a period which did not
begin until after the election, held inoperative. 288 (Neb.) A licensed saloon keeper held
-State v. White, 156 N. W. 251.
VIII. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.
224 (Iowa) Under Code 1897, § 2427, no
presumption arises, from the finding of large
quantities of beer in the residence of an individ-
ual not engaged in one of the businesses enu-
merated therein, that the liquor was kept for
sale in violation of law.-True v. Hunter, 156
N. W. 363.
X. ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION.
263 (Iowa) The court may deny injunction
in a suit to enjoin a liquor nuisance, where
defendants in good faith, before action was be-
gun, abandoned their business.-Davidson v.
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, No.
374, Ft. Madison, 156 N. W. 187.
279 (Iowa) In contempt proceedings for vi-
olation of a liquor injunction, evidence held
sufficient to justify the finding that liquor was
unlawfully sold at defendant's place.-Fitzger-
ald v. Hunter, 156 N. W. 170.
In contempt proceedings for violation of a
liquor injunction, evidence held sufficient to
justify the finding that defendant was the real
proprietor and manager of premises where liq-
uor was unlawfully sold.-Ià.
279 (Iowa) Where a permanent injunction
was issued against one L. restraining him from
violating the liquor laws, and it was alleged
and found that L. was an alias for N., said
N. might be punished.-Nies v. Jepson, 156 N.
W. 292.
The Supreme Court does not review a punish-
ment for contempt de novo, and is concluded
by trial court's findings that party alleged to
be in contempt under an injunction against vio-
lation of the liquor law was not the proprietor
of the hotel, where the alleged violation oc-
curred, if sustained by any evidence.-Id.
Evidence on information charging defendant
with violation of an injunction against viola-
tion of the liquor law held not to support the
information, so that the imposition of a fine
for contempt would be annulled.-Id.
liable, under Rev. St. 1913, § 3859, to one who
suffered injury while intoxicated from drink-
ing liquors furnished by the saloon keeper,
though the injuries resulted from attempted
self-destruction.-Forrest v. Koehn, 156 N. W.
291 (Neb.) To authorize a recovery for
death resulting from sale of liquor to decedent,
the liquors furnished need not be the sole or
even the principal, cause of the injury.-Moran
v. Slattery, 156 N. W. 663.
297 (Neb.) Children of deceased may sue for
loss of means of support from death of a per-
son as a result of traffic in intoxicating liquors,
and it need not be brought by his administra-
tor.-Phair v. Dumond, 156 N. W. 637.
Where a wife who supported her minor chil-
dren died from an assault committed by her
husband while drunk, held, that a child born
after the assault could, after death of the moth-
er, recover under Rev. St. 1913, § 3859, on liq-
uor dealer's bond, for loss of means of sup-
port.-Id.
300 (Neb.) Under Rev. St. 1913, § 3862,
where whisky sold or given by a saloon keeper
resulted in intoxication, it is immaterial how
or from whom the drinker obtained other liquor
also contributing to his condition.-Phair v.
Dumond, 156 N. W. 637.
310 (Neb.) In an action against a liquor
dealer for death resulting from sale of intoxi-
cating liquors to decedent, evidence held to sus-
tain verdict for plaintiff.-Moran v. Slattery,
156 N. W. 663.
312 (Neb.) A licensed saloon keeper held
liable to the wife and children of deceased,
constituting one family, for all damages to their
means of support from sales of intoxicating
156 N. W. 1040.
liquors by defendant.-Bergmann v. Koehn,
320 (Neb.) Where in an action against a
saloon keeper and his surety for damages, the
jury returns a verdict against both defend-
ants for $9,000, the court may render judgment
against the principal defendant for $9,000 and
against the surety for $5,000, the amount of
the bond.-Bergmann v. Koehn, 156 N. W.
1040.
Where a large amount of liquor was found on
Sunday in a hotel kept by defendant's wife, in
which he lived, and in which men were found
with the liquor in a locked room, while raising
a presumption that the liquor was being drunk See Negligence, 32.
upon the premises, did not create a presumption
against defendant so as to charge him with con-
tempt of an injunction against violation of the
liquor laws.-Id.
279 (Iowa) On information for contempt
of an injunctional decree abating a liquor nui-
sance, an indictment by the grand jury, cover-
ing period seven months of which antedated the See Hawkers and Peddlers, m3.
decree, would not alone justify a commitment
for contempt.-Orr v. Cornell, 156 N. W. 296.
On information for contempt of an injunc-
tional decree abating a liquor nuisance, the min- See Carriers, 4; Constitutional Law, 208,
utes of an indictment by the grand jury cover-
ing a period seven months of which antedated
the decree could be considered in order to fix |
the time of the contempt, when it was claimed
an offense was committed to which defendant
had pleaded guilty.-Id.
279 (Iowa) Circumstantial evidence held to
show keeping or aiding in the keeping of in-
toxicating liquor for illegal sale in violation of
an injunction.-True v. Hunter, 156 N. W. 363.
297; Licenses. 7: Municipal Corpora-
tions, 591, 703; Statutes, 114.
See Action; Assignments, 43.
JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES.
See Husband and Wife, 334.
For cases in Dec. Dig, & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
JOINT TENANCY.
See Tenancy in Common.
See Criminal Law, 656; Justices of the
Peace; Statutes, 93; Trial, 29.
I. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION.
AND TENURE.
174 (S.D.) The denial of a motion to vacate
a default judgment is not final, so as to be res
adjudicata on a subsequent motion to the same
effect, but the second motion may be granted by
the court in its discretion.-Western Surety Co.
v. Boettcher, 156 N. W. 68.
VI. ON TRIAL OE ISSUES.
(A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in
General.
3 (S. D.) Under Laws 1907, c. 86, § 110, as 199 (Minn.) To entitle the defendant em-
amended by Laws 1911, c. 97, § 13, and Laws ployer to judgment notwithstanding the verdict
1907, c. 191, § 7, as amended by Laws 1909, on the ground of contributory negligence, it is
c. 176, § 2, and in view of section 6 of chapter not sufficient that the verdict be manifestly
191, Laws 1907, the election of a municipal against the preponderance of the evidence, but is
judge in a commission governed city is governed essential that it conclusively establish contribu-
by the statutes applicable to such cities.-Rogers tory negligence. Sheehy v. Minneapolis & St.
v. Walsh, 156 N. W. 88.
L. R. Co., 156 N. W. 346.
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(A) Requisites and Validity.
116 (Iowa) If the original notice in a par-
tition suit be specific as to the relief prayed, de-
fendant may rely on that and if greater relief
be granted plaintiff, defendant, despite default,
may, by proper proceedings, have the judgment
or decree set aside.-Oviatt v. Oviatt, 156 N.
W. 687.
117 (Iowa) Where defendant in partition
defaults, plaintiff is confined to the averments
of his petition and the proofs in support there-
of.-Oviatt v. Oviatt, 156 N. W. 687.
Where the notice in partition is ambiguous,
the defendant may rely on the allegations of the
petition, and by suffering default he does not
concede to plaintiff the right to take a decree
which that pleading does not fairly justify.-Id.
Where the notice and petition in partition
were ambiguous, and, though apparently conced-
ing defendant was entitled to one-sixth of the
land, might be susceptible of construction that
he was entitled only to one-third of one-third,
a default decree, awarding defendant only 2/86,
(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default.
143 (N.D.) Denial of defendant's motion to
be relieved from a default taken against him
through his excusable neglect in failing to ap-
pear and defend held an abuse of discretion.-
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of New Salem v.
Mann, 156 N. W. 535.
143 (S.D.) A default judgment, rendered
when defendant's counsel failed to appear, was
properly vacated on a showing that counsel was
of another city, and that he relied on a calendar
of court which was inaccurate, but moved for
vacation immediately on discovering the error.
-Western Surety Co. v. Boettcher, 156 N.
W. 68.
151 (S.D.) Under circuit court rules 10 and
11, providing for vacation of default judgments,
only judgments on default of defendant to an-
swer are included, so that failure to follow such
rules, in moving to vacate a default judgment
rendered on counsel's failure to appear at the
trial, does not preclude an order of vacation.
Western Surety Co. v. Boettcher, 156 N. W. 68.
VIII. AMENDMENT, CORRECTION,
AND REVIEW IN SAME COURT.
contract for exchange of property, action of
326 (S.D.) In action to rescind executed
court in amending its findings and judgment
nunc pro tunc held proper, where the judgment
finally rendered spoke the real judgment of the
court as evidenced by the whole record.-Winde-
dahl v.
Harris, 156 Ñ. W. 489.
X. EQUITABLE RELIEF.
(A) Nature of Remedy and Grounds.
435 (Minn.) Equity may grant relief where
a decree of distribution is obtained by fraud
or through mistake, but not otherwise.-Leigh-
ton v. Bruce, 156 N. W. 285.
447(1) (Iowa) Plaintiff was bound, in his
suit to set aside judgment against him on a
note, entered against him in district court after
reinstatement of the suit thereon, which had
been improvidently dismissed for want of atten-
tion, to show that he had a defense to the note.
Loos v. Callendar Sav. Bank, 156 N. W. 712.
XI. COLLATERAL ATTACK.
(C) Proceedings.
518 (Minn.) In an action on an attachment
bond, the face of the judgment in the attach-
ment suit may be examined to determine the
nature of the judgment, without violation of
the rule against collateral attack.-Downs v.
American Surety Co. of New York, 156 N. W. 5.
XIII. MERGER AND BAR OF CAUSES
OF ACTION AND DEFENSES.
(A) Judgments Operative as Bar.
570(12) (Iowa) Under Code 1897, § 3764,
providing that an action may be dismissed, and
future action, the order of the district court dis-
such dismissal shall be without prejudice to a
missing a suit for want of attention at plain-
tiff's cost is not pleadable as an adjudication.-
Loos v. Callendar Sav. Bank, 156 N. W. 712.
XIV. CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADJUDI-
(A) Judgments Conclusive in General.
649 (Iowa) An order denying bail, with the
provision that it shall be without prejudice to
the accused's right to present the matter by
habeas corpus, cannot be pleaded as an adjudi-
cation.-Ford v. Dilley, 156 N. W. 513.
Rulings on motions made pending suit are not
in a strict sense an "adjudication."-Id.
660 (Wis.) As between the parties a judg-
ment foreclosing rights of a lessee for 99 years
held valid, the lease providing for forfeiture
though improvements had not been made of a
value sufficient to bring the case within the
foreclosure statute.-Mohawk Co. v. Bankers'
Surety Co., 156 N. W. 154.
(B) Persons Concluded.
670 (N.D.) That the present plaintiff inter-
vened in a foreclosure suit did not render the
decision therein res adjudicata and preclude | XXII. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE OF
him from enjoining further foreclosure, where JUDGMENT AS ESTOPPEL OR
DEFENSE.
he represented merely himself therein, while in
the injunction suit he represented the minority 948 (N.D.) The pleas of res adjudicata
stockholders of the corporation to whom he al- should be raised by answer, and not by demur-
leged the mortgage belonged.-Beyer v. North
American Coal & Mining Co., 156 N. W. 204. rer, unless the fact and the nature of the prior
adjudication appear on the face of the com-
672 (lowa) Where the interveners in
plaint.-Beyer v. North American Coal & Min-
action for rent who claimed ownership of the ing Co., 156 N. W. 204.
attached property failed to object to the rendi-
tion of a judgment against the defendant for
the amount sued for, they could not thereafter
claim that the amount of rent due had not been See Evidence, 32, 35.
determined, but they were concluded by the
judgment.-Crary v. Beatty, 156 N. W. 745.
707 (Iowa) In an action by the owner of See Partition, 77; Taxation, 734.
realty against an attorney for inducing the
buyer of the equity of redemption from the
owner to break his contract to redeem, etc.,
the decree in the buyer's action against the
owner, to which the attorney was not a party,
setting aside the contract for the owner's fraud
in misrepresenting the condition of the proper-
ty, was admissible in evidence to show the
reason for not complying with the contract.-
Kock v. Burgess, 156 N. W. 174.
(C) Matters Concluded.
713 (Iowa) Where defendant fails to object
to the entry of judgment because of plaintiff's
failure to comply with conditions for such entry,
he is thereafter estopped from asserting a claim
based upon such refusal.-Nelson v. McMillan,
156 N. W. 327.
720 (Neb.) A judgment is conclusive of a
question raised in a subsequent suit, where it
appears from the face of the record or is shown
by extrinsic evidence that such question was
raised and determined in the former suit.
Bodie v. Bates, 156 N. W. 8.
That a judgment may operate as an estoppel,
it is essential not only that there be a sub-
stantial identity of issues, but that the issue to
which the estoppel is pleaded was actually de-
termined in the former action.-Id.
XVII. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
818 (N. D.) Petition by receiver of a Minne-
sota corporation against a North Dakota stock-
holder for superadded liability under Rev. Laws
Minn. 1905, §§ 3184-3187, and Const. Minn.
art. 10, § 3, held demurrable, where it showed
that it was a manufacturing corporation; its
stockholders not being liable for superadded
liability, though an assessment of liability had
been made by a Minnesota court.-Marin v.
Augedahl, 156 N. W. 101.
822 (Iowa) In an action on a foreign judg-
ment, evidence directed against the merits of the
case in which it was entered is irrelevant; such
judgment being conclusive of matters adjudicat-
ed.-Nelson v. McMillan, 156 N. W. 327.
See Admiralty; Courts; Divorce, 57, 65;
Habeas Corpus, ~27; Infants, 18;
Judgment, 818.
See Criminal Law, 863; Grand Jury;
Trial, 307-315.
II. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
(1) (Neb.) Laws 1915, c. 182, establishing
a municipal court for cities of the metropolitan
class, held not unconstitutional for failure to
make direct provision for trial by jury, since
this matter is covered by the general provision
concerning procedure.-State v. Hunter, 156 N.
W. 975.
14 (S.D.) An action to foreclose a chattel
mortgage is triable without a jury.-Massey v.
Fralish, 156 N. W. 791.
33 (Mich.) Comp. Laws 1897, § 2450, giving
concurrent jurisdiction to counties bordering
Lake Huron of all offenses committed on that
part of the lake lying within the state, is not
violative of the constitutional provision guaran-
teeing to a defendant the right of trial by a jury
of the vicinage.-Andrews v. Ellsworth, 156 N.
W. 115.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.
See Forcible Entry and Detainer, 24.
I. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION,
AND TENURE.
2 (Iowa) Under Const. art. 5, § 1, empower.
ing the Legislature to create courts inferior to
the Supreme Court, the Legislature may create
or abolish courts of justices of the peace, al-
though Const. art. 11, § 1, provides the scope of
the jurisdiction of justices.-Younker v. Susong,
156 N. W. 24.
V. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS.
(A) Appeal and Error.
ance of judgment waives the right to review on
appeal but one may, to avoid sacrifice of his
rights by forced sale on execution, remove from
leased premises in obedience to a judgment with-
out losing his right to appeal therefrom.-Hanes
v. See, 156 N. W. 852.
822 (Wis.) Judgment for plaintiff in Ill-149(2) (Iowa) Generally voluntary perform-
inois in suit against a railroad by the assignee
of a switchman's wages, does not, under the
rule that the judgment of another state shall be
given the faith and credit it receives where
rendered, bind the switchman suing for wages in
Wisconsin, where he notified the road of defens-
es to the assignment before the judgment against
it in Illinois, and the road failed to interpose
them.-Porte v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 156
N. W. 469.
XXI. ACTIONS ON JUDGMENTS.
(B) Foreign Judgments.
Evidence held to show that the defendant did
not, after judgment rendered in justice court,
from which he appealed, make a voluntary set-
tlement, or voluntarily obey the judgment so as
to cut off his right of appeal, where the plain-
tiff sent an officer with execution and gave the
defendant his choice of being ejected or of mov-
ing out.-Id.
943 (Iowa) Facts and circumstances appear-
ing in the transcript of a foreign judgment may See Libel and Slander, 54.
be considered in ascertaining the reasons for an
order striking the case from the calendar when
such reasons are not noted in the transcript.—
Nelson v. McMillan, 156 N. W. 327.
For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
76 (Minn.) Evidence in an action against See Appeal and Error, 853, 1097.
lessors for refusal to give written consent to as-
signment of lease to plaintiff, held to sustain
a finding that plaintiff procured the assignment
relying on the assurance of the lessors that the See Highways, 172-184.
transfer would be acceptable to them.-Bowder
v. Gillis, 156 N. W. 2.
(C) Extensions, Renewals, and Options to
Purchase or Sell.
92(1) (Iowa) Performance of the covenants
of a lease by the lessee is sufficient considera-
tion for an option to purchase contained in the
lease.-Larson v. Smith, 156 N. W. 813.
LAWYERS.
See Attorney and Client.
See Evidence, 432, 441; Landlord and Ten-
ant; Mines and Minerals; Specific Per-
formance, 57, 92, 99.
101 (Minn.) That the tenants, pending an See Pleading, 236, 237..
adjustment of the loss, remained in possession
after a fire which rendered the premises unten-
antable, held not a waiver of their right to
terminate the tenancy.-Wolfson v. Zimmerman,
156 N. W. 119.
VII. PREMISES, AND ENJOYMENT
AND USE THEREOF.
1772 (Minn.) Where the assignee of a lease
secured possession and moved bulky property
into the building and retained the key, he could
not sue for constructive eviction; there being
no constructive eviction without a complete
abandonment of possession.-Bowder v. Gillis,
156 N. W. 2.
VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES.
(A) Rights and Liabilities.
181 (Minn.) Unaccrued rents are incorpo-
real hereditaments, and not personalty.-State v.
Royal Mineral Ass'n, 156 N. W. 128.
198 (Wis.) After a lessor re-entered upon
the premises, having obtained an improper judg-
ment of foreclosure although it was entitled to
declare forfeiture, held, that the lessor was
not entitled to recover rentals lost thereafter.
-Mohawk Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., 156 N.
W. 154.
I. WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE,
AND LIABILITY THEREFOR.
15 (Iowa) The statutory definition of "li-
bel" applies to civil actions to recover damages
for libel.-Gundram v. Daily News Pub. Co.,
156 N. W. 840.
16 (Iowa) Alleged libelous newspaper ar-
ticle set out in an action for libel held not to
expose plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, or to alienate his friends and take
away public confidence, and hence not action-
able per se.-Gundram v. Daily News Pub. Co.,
156 N. W. 840.
II. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,
AND MALICE THEREIN.
248 (Iowa) Under Code, § 2905, a contract,
although it used the words "rent" and "lease,'
instead of "sale" and "price," was ineffectual,
unless recorded, to create a lien on personal
property sold to defendant by interveners on
which the plaintiff landlord claimed a statutory 48 (Neb.) A public statement as to the
lien for rent, and of which interveners claimed
to be the real owners.-Crary v. Beatty, 156 N.
W. 745.
254 (Iowa) The mere consent of a landlord
that another than the original lessee shall also
be bound with him on the lease does not estab-
lish waiver of the lien for rent as against the
original lessee, but is merely an evidentiary
fact to that effect, and rebuttable.-Crary v.
Beatty, 156 N. W. 745.
qualification of a candidate seeking nomination
and election is a communication of qualified
privilege. Estelle v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156
N. W. 645.
A citizen interested in an election may with-
out liability inform other voters of any well-
grounded belief relative to the candidate's fit-
ness for office.-Id.
50 (Neb.) Where a voter acts in good faith
in stating to other voters his belief as to the
fitness of a candidate for office, he is not lia-court.-Gundram v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156
ble in damages for expressing to the voters such N. W. 840.
belief. Estelle v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156 N.
W. 645.
(B) Parties, Preliminary Proceedings,
and Pleading.
80 (Iowa) In petition in action for personal
libel or defamation allegation of injury to
plaintiff's business held made simply as an ele-
ment of damage growing out of the personal
libel, not to be considered as a distinct charge
of a libel of plaintiff's business.-Gundram v.
Daily News Pub. Co., 156 N. W. 840.
86 (Neb.) An "innuendo" is to explain and
apply the meaning of ambiguous expressions,
and, where it cannot be derived from the lan-
guage used, it should be stricken on motion.-
Estelle v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156 N. W. 645.
89(1) (Iowa) Any publication inhibited by
the statute defining libel is libelous per se, and
no special damages need be alleged or proven.-
Gundram v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156 N. W.
840.
See Constitutional Law, 62; Municipal
Corporations, 591; Negligence, 32.
I. FOR OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVI-
LEGES.
7(1) (Iowa) One contending that a munici-
pal ordinance imposing fees for the licensing of
the operation of jitney busses is invalid as im-
posing a tax has the burden of proving that the
amount fixed cannot be justified as a police or
v. City of Des
regulatory measure.-Huston
Moines, 156 N. W. 883.
7(9) (Iowa) An ordinance imposing gradu-
ated license fees upon the operators of jitney
busses ranging from $15 to $35 per year held
not invalid as an unauthorized tax measure.-
Huston v. City of Des Moines, 156 N. W. 883.
7(2) (Neb.) Laws 1915, c. 204, relating to
loan brokers, held valid.-Althaus v. State, 156
N. W. 1038.
7(5) (S.D.) Laws 1903, c. 190, purports only
to relate to county tax on peddlers, section 5
expressly providing that those affected by the
county tax may be subject to the payment of
taxes in cities or towns; hence a city ordinance
imposing such tax is not invalid.-City of Dell
Rapids v. McShane, 156 N. W. 789.
14(2) (Iowa) Jitney busses are common car-
riers which may be regulated and controlled;
such regulation including the power to license
or tax.-Huston v. City of Des Moines, 156 N.
W. 883.
See Agriculture, 12, 15%; Landlord and
Tenant, 248, 254; Mechanics' Liens;
Municipal Corporations, 519.
LIFE ESTATES.
Unless an alleged libelous article is actionable
per se, the plaintiff before he can recover must See Trusts, 134, 140; Wills, 616.
allege and prove special damages proximately
resulting from the publication.-Id.
101(1) (Iowa) Plaintiff suing for libel in
the publication of an article libelous per se is
not required to prove its falsity or malice in its
publication, as both are presumed.-Gundram
v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156 N. W. 840.
Plaintiff suing for the publication of an arti-
cle libelous per se is not required to make
proof of damages; for such a libel is presumed
to cause some injury.-Id.
101 (Neb.) Where a statement concerning a
candidate is libelous per se and untrue, the bur-
den is on the party making it to prove that he
made it in good faith on evidence sufficient to
justify a reasonable man in believing it to be
true. Estelle v. Daily News Pub. Co., 156 N.
W. 645.
Where the statements published are false and
libelous per se, malice is presumed, and the
burden is on defendant to prove that he had
evidence justifying him in believing the state-
ments to be true, and that he so believed them.
-Id.
(E) Trial, Judgment, and Review.
123(1)(Iowa) "Defamation," as used in the
Code definition of libel, means the taking from
another's reputation; so that the publication
of words which injure another's reputation and
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or rid
icule, etc., entitles him to go to the jury upon
proof of publication.-Gundram v. Daily News
Pub. Co., 156 N. W. 840.
19 (Iowa) Under Code Supp. 1913, § 3447,
subd. 7, where plaintiff acquired land three years
after his grantor had been ousted from posses-
sion of an alleged part of the land, plaintiff is
bound to bring his suit to quiet title within ten
years from the ouster.-Dwight v. City of Des
Moines, 156 N. W. 336.
29 (Iowa) Quarterly hospital charges, paid
by a county to a state hospital for care of an
insane person, constituted an open running ac-
count, and hence the county's action to recover
of such person's husband was not barred as to
payments made more than five years previous to
the commencement of the action.-Scott County
v. Townsley, 156 N. W. 291.
II. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF
(A) Accrual of Right of Action or De-
fense.
50(2) (Iowa) Where services to decedent
extended continuously over more than five
years before suit against estate, services ren-
123(2) (Iowa) Under the Code definition, dered more than five years before held not
whether a publication is libelous, and hence li-barred by statute of limitations.-In re Old-
belous per se, is always a question for the field's Estate, 156 N. W. 977.
For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
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