STATE ex rel. SMITH, Atty. Gen., v. CITY
OF INTERNATIONAL FALLS et al.
(No. 19727 [269].)
(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Feb. 4, 1916.)

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 14 COUNTY OPTION LAW-VALIDITY-MUNICIPAL COR

PORATIONS.

Chapter 23 of the Laws of 1915, known as the county option law, does not infringe the rights granted by section 36 of article 4 of the Constitution to cities operating under so-called home rule charters, and is valid.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. 14.] 2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 40-COUNTY OPTION LAW-OPERATION-MUNICIPAL CORPO

RATIONS.

Where, under and pursuant to the county option law, a county votes to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors therein, the power to issue licenses for the sale of such liquors is withdrawn from every municipality within such county, including cities operating under so-call

ed home rule charters.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. 40.]

Appeal from District Court, Koochiching County; W. S. McClenahan, Judge.

From

Action by the State, on relation of Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, against the City of International Falls and others. judgment for relator, defendants appeal. firmed.

power to issue licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors given the city by its charter has been suspended by the county option law.

Defendants contend: (1) That if the provisions of the county option law be held to apply to cities operating under home rule charters, the law is unconstitutional as infringing the rights granted to such cities by section 36 of article 4 of the Constitution. (2) That such provisions do not apply to such cities for the reason that the law has not expressly named such cities as subject thereto.

[1] 1. The Legislature possesses plenary power to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to any extent it may see fit; and the Legislature may grant to each of any class or classes of the political subdivisions of the state the right to determine for itself whether the sale of such liquors shall be permitted within its borders, unless some portion of the power over such matters previously possessed by the Legislature has been taken from it by the amendment to the Constitution invoked by defendants. This amendment is lengthy, but so far as here material provides:

"Any city or village in this state may frame a charter for its own government as a city consistent with and subject to the laws of this state. ** Before any city shall incorporate under this act the Legislature shall prescribe by Af-law the general limits within which such charter shall be framed. * * * Such charter shall always be in harmony with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the state of Minnesota. * * * The Legislature may provide general shall be paramount while in force to the proviwhich laws relating to affairs of cities, sions relating to the same matter included in the local charter herein provided for. But no local der shall supersede any general law of the state charter, provision or ordinance passed thereundefining or punishing crimes or misdemeanors."

F. J. McPartlin, of International Falls, Geo. A. Bangs, of Grand Forks, N. D., Marshall A. Spooner, of Bemidji, and Geo. R. Robbins, of Grand Forks, N. D., for appellants. Lyndon A. Smith, Atty. Gen., and Louis S. Headley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for re

spondent.

Charters adopted under this constitutional provision have been before this court frequently, and it has uniformly been held that such charters "may embrace all appropriate subjects of municipal legislation, and constitute an effective municipal code, of equal force as a charter granted by a direct act of the Legislature." Grant v. Berrisford, 94 Minn. 45, 101 N. W. 940, 1133. It has also uniformly been held that the provisions of such charters relating to municipal matters supersede prior general laws relating to such matters unless it clearly appears that the Legislature intended that such general laws should still apply thereto. Peterson v. City of Red Wing, 101 Minn. 62, 111 N. W. 840; Turner v. Snyder, 101 Minn. 481, 112 N. W. 868; American Electric Co. v. City of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 113 N. W. 899. For instances of general laws which still applied to such cities notwithstanding charter provisions, see Townsend v. Underwood Second Addition, 91 Minn. 242, 97 N. W. 977; Young v. City of Mankato, 97 Minn. 4, 105 N. W. 969, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 849; City of Duluth v. The sole question presented is whether the Orr, 115 Minn. 267, 132 N. W. 265; Laird

TAYLOR, C. At an election held under and pursuant to chapter 23 of the Laws of 1915, known as the county option law, the voters of Koochiching county voted to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors within that county. In 1910 the city of International Falls, located within Koochiching county, adopted a so-called home rule charter, under and pursuant to section 36 of article 4 of the Constitution and the enabling act passed by the Legislature pursuant thereto, which charter conferred upon the city the power to license and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within the city. Claiming that the county option law did not deprive the city of the right given by its charter to issue licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, the officers of the city were on the point of issuing such licenses when this action was brought to enjoin them from doing so. The trial court rendered judgment enjoining the city and its officers from issuing such licenses and they appealed therefrom.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

STATE ex rel. BANKROFT v. WHITE,
Sheriff. (No. 19659 [270].)

on August 2, 1915, and on August 9, 1915, the county canvassing board filed its certificate declaring the result of such election.

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Feb. 4, 1916.) Upon the filing of this certificate, the power

of the city of International Falls to issue (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor ceased. State ex rel. Attorney General v. INTOXICATING LIQUORS 40-LICENSES-VA- City of International Falls, 156 N. W. 249, LIDITY COUNTY OPTION ELECTION.

Where a vote to prohibit the sale of intoxi-filed herewith. The license in question was cating liquor in a county was taken on August 2, 1915, and on August 9, 1915, the canvassing board filed its certificate declaring the result of such election to be to prohibit, a liquor license issued by a city in such county on July 30, 1915, for a term of one year commencing September 1, 1915, was inoperative.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. 40.] Appeal from District Court, Koochiching County; C. W. Stanton, Judge.

Habeas corpus by the State, on relation of S. K. Bankroft, against Thomas P. White, as Sheriff. Fom an order discharging relator, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Lyndon A. Smith, Atty. Gen., and Franz Jevne, of International Falls, for appellant. M. A. Spooner, of Bemidji, for respondent.

issued before the county had voted for prohibition, but for a term which did not begin until after the issuance of such licenses had been prohibited. In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Orr, 155 N. W. 216, it was held that a license issued before the power of the licensing board had ceased, but for a period which did not begin until after the issuance of such licenses had been prohibited was inoperative and of no effect. Following these decisions, we hold that the license in quesrelator in making the sale with which she tion is of no effect and did not protect the

is charged.

Order reversed.

JACOBSON v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY.
CO. (No. 19576 [158].)
(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Jan. 28, 1916.)
(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. TRIAL 352
ISSUES-DISCRETION.

The matter of submitting special issues to a jury in an action at law rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; and the discretion extends also to the form and substance of the special issues so submitted. There was no abuse of the discretion in this case.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 840-842, 844, 845; Dec. Dig. 352.]

PER CURIAM. The relator was arrested and bound over to the district court upon the charge of having unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor, in the city of International Falls in the county of Koochiching, on the 1st day of October, 1915. Having failed to give bail, she was committed to the custody of the sheriff, and forthwith procured a writ of habeas corpus upon the alleged ground that she was illegally deprived of her liberty. At the hearing upon this writ, it was stipulated, among other things, that on July 30, 1915, the city of International Falls issued to the relator a license to sell intoxicat-2. ing liquor for a period of one year commencing on September 1, 1915, and terminating on August 31, 1916; that the sale charged was made under this license on October 1, 1915; that on August 2, 1915, under and pursuant to chapter 23 of the Laws of 1915, known as the county option law, the county of Koochiching duly voted to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor therein; and that on August 9, 1915, the county canvassing board duly filed its certificate declaring the result of such election. The trial court made an order discharging the relator from custody, and the sheriff appealed from that order.

RELEASE 17 RIGHT TO RESCIND FALSE REPRESENTATIONS.

A settlement and release of a cause of action, induced and procured by false representations of material facts, the falsity of which was unknown to the person making them, may be rescinded and avoided, though there was fraudulent or other wrongful intent to deceive or defraud.

--

no

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Release, Cent. Dig. § 32; Dec. Dig. 17.] 3. RELEASE 17 RESCISSION OF SETTLEMENT-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS. Plaintiff was injured while a passenger on one of defendant's trains. Soon thereafter defendant's physician made a physical examination of plaintiff's person, and, to induce or cause him to act thereon, represented that he had suffered no serious injury, had no broken bones, and would recover in the course of two or three weeks. It is held, that the representations were material, plaintiff had the right to rely thereon

The sole question presented is whether the license issued to the relator is valid and authorized her to sell intoxicating liquor in the city of International Falls, notwithstand-in effecting a settlement with defendant, and, ing the fact that prior to the commencement of the term for which such license was issued the county had voted to prohibit such sales.

The vote to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor in Koochiching county was taken

since the representations were untrue in fact, though the falsity was not known to the physician at the time, and were not made with intent to deceive, plaintiff had the right to rescind the settlement. Such facts constitute fraud in law.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Release, Cent. Dig. $§ 32; Dec. Dig. 17.]

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

4. APPEAL AND ERROR ~1064 HARMLESS therein the engineer and conductor of the ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS-EXPERT TESTIMONY. train as parties defendant. When the cause

The instructions of the trial court upon the question of expert opinion evidence held not prejudicial to the rights of defendant. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. 88 4219, 4221-4224; Dec. Dig. 1064.]

Appeal from District Court, Blue Earth County; W. L. Comstock, Judge.

Action by W. H. Jacobson against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and from denial of new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. C. J. Laurisch, of Mankato, Webber & Lees, of Winona, and F. W. Root and Nelson J. Wilcox, both of Minneapolis, for appellant. S. B. Wilson, of Mankato, H. L. Schmitt, of Minneapolis, and J. W. Schmitt, of Mankato, for respondent.

was called for trial, defendant company conceded liability for the injuries sustained by plaintiff, but claimed that settlement therefor had been made, and the sole issue litigated, aside from the nature and character of the injuries and the question of damages, was whether the release was obtained by fraud. The action was dismissed as to the individual defendants.

The assignments of error challenge the ruling of the court in refusing to submit to the and form requested by defendant, and certain jury certain special questions in the language of its instructions and refusals to instruct the jury. We dispose of these in their order.

[1] 1. At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for defendant requested the court to submit to the jury certain special questions embodying the issue whether either the claim

BROWN, C. J. Action for personal injuries in which plaintiff had a verdict and de-agent or the defendant's physician at the fendant appealed from an order denying a fraudulent statements as to the character of time of the settlement made any false and

new trial.

ments were.

plaintiff's injuries with intent to deceive and
defraud him, and if such statements were
found by the jury to have been made to in-
dicate what they were. The court refused to
submit the question in the form presented,
but did submit two distinct questions em-
bodying the substance of those presented by
defendant with the exception that the intent
to deceive was eliminated, and the jury was
not required to state what the false state-
In point of substance the spe-
cial question submitted called for the general
conclusion whether any false and fraudulent
statements were made to bring about the set-
tlement. The contention is that, though it
was discretionary with the court to submit
or not submit special issues to the jury
(Morrow v. Railway Co., 74 Minn. 480, 77 N.
W. 303), having decided to submit them, they
should have been so framed as to require the
jury to state in their answer the facts call-
ed for by the questions proposed by defend-
ant, and that, since the questions in fact sub-
mitted called only for the general conclusions
of the jury, there was an abuse of discretion
entitling defendant to a new trial. In this
we do not concur. As conceded by counsel,
the question whether special issue shall be
submitted to a jury in a case of this kind
rests wholly in the discretion of the court.
The matter so resting with the trial court, it
necessarily follows that the form of the
question or issue to be so submitted rests also
in its discretion, in the exercise of which in
this case we discover no substantial reasons
for serious criticism. 11 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 667.
Decisions from courts of those states where
by statute special issues are required to be
submitted to the jury are not in point.

Plaintiff was a passenger upon one of defendant's accommodation trains running between Wells and Mankato. The train was wrecked and plaintiff was injured. The accident occurred on July 5, 1913, and plaintiff was removed to a hospital at Mankato, where he was given treatment by the defendant's local physician. On July 7th, two days after the injury, and when plaintiff was still at the hospital, a claim agent representing defendant called upon him and effected a settlement, paying to plaintiff in full for his injuries $150. Plaintiff signed and delivered the usual formal release. It was represented to him at the time of the settlement by the company physician, and also by the claim agent, that his injuries were not serious, and that he would fully recover within three or four weeks. Within a few days thereafter plaintiff left the hospital and returned to his home at Mapleton, some 25 miles from Mankato. It appears that he was unable to walk unassisted, and defendant's physician supplied him with a pair of crutches. He thereafter occasionally returned to Mankato for further treatment, but, not recovering as rapidly as represented by the physician, he applied, on August 4th, to other physicians for relief. A thorough examination was made, an X-ray photograph taken of his back and hips, and the new physicians discovered what they termed an impacted fracture of the neck of the femur of the left leg, an injury to the sacro-iliac joint, a curvature of the spine, and a shortening of one of the legs. Thereupon he brought an action against the company to recover for his injuries, claiming that the settlement and release was obtained by fraud. That action was transferred to the federal court, where, after trial, it was dis- [2, 3] 2. Defendant requested the court to missed without prejudice, and thereupon charge the jury that fraud and intention to plaintiff brought the present action, joining deceive were necessary ingredients of plainFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

tiff's cause of action in so far as the validity | intentional deception does not appear. And of the release was concerned, and that, unless the jury found that the statements made to plaintiff at the time of the settlement, by the physician and claim agent, as to the nature and character of plaintiff's injuries, were made with a knowledge of their falsity and with intent to deceive plaintiff, the release could not be set aside, and plaintiff must fail in the action. The court refused to so instruct, and it may be conceded that the general charge did not include the element of intentional deception.