subject to which the act applies, which would authorize us to hold that there is a separable portion of the act applicable to local or state commerce which could be upheld notwithstanding the invalidity of the act in general. [5, 6] A comparison of the decisions in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550, and Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 20 Sup. Ct. 518, 44 L. Ed. 657, with the distinction noted in the last-mentioned case makes this point of law perfectly clear. Mere general words in a statute literally, including cases over which the Legislature had no jurisdiction, may be limited to cases where the Legislature had power to act if that intention of the Legislature can be de terminal charges include demurrage charges which are not within the jurisdiction of state authorities. Peale et al. v. Central R. Co. of N. J., 18 Interst. Com. Comm. R. 25. The very words of the statute, “additional free time," must, with reference to interstate shipments, be taken to mean additional to that specified in the schedules on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Congress has acted in the matter of regulating this feature of interstate commerce, and that action excludes further or additional regulation covering the same subject by the state Legislature. State v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 136 Wis. 407, 117 N. W. 686, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326. This regulation by adding "additional free time" conflicts with the regula-rived from a consideration of other language tion made as described pursuant to the laws of the United States. State v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., supra. [4] The question then arises whether the Legislature intended that this act should be in force as to local or state commerce only. The statute is manifestly aimed at delays at the point of shipment, at transfer points between that and the destination of the freight, and delays in large yards where the freight is delivered to be afterwards distributed on the various side tracks to the several consignees. It therefore affects interstate commerce principally. The actual rate of travel between the point of shipment and point of destination is not intended to be accelerated by this law, because no railroad train which keeps moving travels less than 75 miles in 24 hours. The delays by snow blockades or washouts may be considered negligible. One effect of upholding this law as to local or state commerce would be to place a premium upon expediting from the points of shipment, transfer points, or from the large yards to the consignee intrastate freight as against interstate freight. The railroad would naturally deliver the state or local freight first so as to shorten the time for the consignee to hold the car without demurrage charges. Another effect which the law would have would be to induce the consignee after delivery to unload his interstate freight first. Further "free time" for unloading means more difficulty in obtaining cars for interstate as well as for local transportation. State and interstate freight are carried in different cars of the same train, and sometimes in the same car. While the present mode of switching cars obtains, local freight must be moved in order to distribute interstate freight, and vice versa. The interrelation of state and interstate freights, the impracticability of having different spaces of "free time" for unloading, taken in connection with the general words in the act, tend to show that it was not intended that the act might be upheld as to state or local freight if invalid as to interstate freight. There is nothing in the words of the act, or in the 156 N.W.-39 in the statute, its subject-matter, the evils intended to be remedied thereby, and the practicability of separating the invalid from the valid portions of the statute. Mere general words will ordinarily be restrained so as to include only such subjects as the state Legis-. lature had jurisdiction to include. See revis-, or's notes to subdivision 10, § 1770b, Stats. 1915, p. 2325. All statutes are in some degree limited by this consideration. It is not necessary to specify in a state statute that it is limited to persons, property, or transactions within the state. But, where the plain meaning of the statute is that it shall apply to these matters over which the state Legislature has jurisdiction, and equally to these matters over which the state Legislature has no jurisdiction, and these subjects are so interrelated that it is reasonably apparent that the Legislature would not have attempted the regulation of one alone in the manner and to the extent specified in the statute, then the statute, being invalid in its main purpose, must be held wholly nugatory. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, supra; Ashland Lumber Co. v. Detroit Salt Co., 114 Wis. 78, 89 N. W. 904; Elwell v. Adder Machine Co., 136 Wis. 82, 116 N. W. 882, and cases cited; Chicago, etc., Title Co. v. Bashford, 120 Wis. 284, 97 N. W. 940; Security, etc., Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 249, 26 Sup. Ct. 619, 50 L. Ed. 1013, 6 Ann. Cas. 317; Sargent v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 328, 85 Atl. 654. It might be that this law, if upheld as to local or state commerce, would impose a burden on interstate commerce by its tendency to expedite the movement of intrastate freight at the expense of interstate freight; but we do not find it necessary to decide that point. We prefer to rest this decision on the ground that the statute is invalid as to interstate commerce, and that the provisions relative to local or state commerce covered by the same general words included in the same provisions and subject to the same duties do not, taking into consideration the words of the statute and the subject-matter of regulation, constitute a separate or severable portion of the statute which might survive. Other points of invalidity alleged 4. STATUTES 64-TITLE-TOTAL INVALIDneed not be noticed. Judgment affirmed. MARSHALL, J., took no part. ITY. * * Laws 1915, c. 518, entitled "An act to creIt follows that the judgment of the circuit ate a superior court in the county of Fond du court should be affirmed. Lac," so doing, and also abolishing the county court, and chapter 589, entitled "An act to amend * * * chapter 518, * relating to the superior court of Fond du Lac county,' violative of Const. art. 4, § 18, as being local bills embracing matter not expressed in their titles, are void in toto, because, from the interrelation of the two matters, it cannot be asCOUN-sumed that the Legislature would have created a superior court without abolishing the county court, while statutes void in their main purpose, or a substantial part closely interrelated with other substantial parts, are void in toto. CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. v. ROCK Action by the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company against the Rock County Sugar Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Jeffris, Mouat, Oestreich & Avery, of Janesville, for appellant. Lines, Spooner, Ellis & Quarles, of Milwaukee, for respondent. TIMLIN, J. This action was brought to recover $848 demurrage charges accruing on local or state shipments and $411 of like charges upThis on interstate shipments to the defendant. case is in all other respects like the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Rock County Sugar Co., 156 N. W. 607, decided herewith, and is ruled thereby. Judgment affirmed. MARSHALL, J., took no part. STATE ex rel. RICHTER v. CHADBOURNE, (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 22, 1916.) 1. COURTS 207-JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT-QUO WARRANTO. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, despite that of the circuit court, of a writ of quo warranto to test the constitutionality of acts creating a superior court for a county and abolishing the county court thereof, in view of the public rights that may be affected and the necessity for a speedy decision. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 786; Dec. Dig. 207.] 2. STATUTES 106-TITLE. Laws 1915, c. 518, entitled "An act to create a superior court in the county of Fond du Lac," so doing, and also abolishing the county court, and chapter 589, entitled "An act to amend * * * ** chapter 518, * relating to the superior court of Fond du Lac county,' are violative of Const. art. 4, § 18, providing that no local bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, since the bills are local within the meaning of the Constitution, while, if the body of an act contains substantial matter foreign to the title, liberally construed to include all matters reasonably germane thereto, the act is violative of the Constitution. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 119, 120; Dec. Dig. 106.] 3. STATUTES 109-TITLE-CONSTITUTIONALITY. The title of a bill must be construed to include within it anything reasonably germane to its expressed subject to avoid the inhibition of Const. art. 4, § 18, providing that no local bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139; Dec. Dig. 109.] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. 64.] Barnes, J., dissenting. Quo warranto on the relation of A. E. Richter against F. W. Chadbourne to test the constitutionality of statutes creating a superior court for Fond du Lac county and abolishing the county court thereof. Judgment for relator. Original action of quo warranto brought in this court on the relation of A. E. Richter against F. W. Chadbourne to test the constitutionality of chapters 518 and 589 of the Laws of 1915, creating a superior court for Fond du Lac county and abolishing the county court thereof. In April, 1913, the relator was duly elected county judge of Fond du Lac county for a term of six years from the first Monday of January, 1914. On said last date he duly qualified and entered upon the duties of his office and performed the same until September 2, 1915, when the office was declared abolished by the laws above mentioned, and the jurisdiction of the county court transferred to the superior court of Fond du Lac county. The defendant, who was by the Governor appointed judge of the newly created superior court, on September 2, 1915, demanded possession of the county court rooms, records, books, papers, and property belonging thereto, and threatened relator with legal proceedings of ouster if surrender was not made as demanded. Under written protest the relator surrendered possession, and at the same time he notified the defendant and the county board of supervisors that he claimed the law creating the superior court and abolishing the county court to be invalid. On September 2, 1915, the defendant took possession of the rooms and property of the county court, and has since acted as judge of the superior court of Fond du Lac county, and has exercised the jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the county court. The provisions of chapter 518 which relate to the county court are as follows: "Sec. 65. From and after September first, 1915, all of the powers of the county court of Fond du Lac county and of the county judge shall be and hereby are transferred to and vested in the superior court of Fond du Lac county and its judge. "Sec. 66. From and after the first day of For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes cated. September, 1915, the county court of Fond du Lac county shall be and hereby is abolished and the office of the judge of said county court va"Sec. 67. All matters and proceedings pending before the county court of Fond du Lac county or the judge thereof on September first, 1915. shall be and hereby are transferred to and vested in the jurisdiction of the superior court of Fond du Lac county and of its judge. "Sec. 68. All of the records, files, proceedings and property of the county court of Fond du Lac county on September first, 1915, shall be and hereby are turned over to and vested in the superior court of Fond du Lac county and its judge. "Sec. 69. The provisions of law with reference to the office of register in probate of the county court of Fond du Lac county shall apply to and provide for a register in probate for the superior court of Fond du Lac county." Chapter 518 was entitled: has been thought best not to pass upon them in this case, since its disposition can be rested upon only two of them, namely: First, that chapter 518 is a local bill within the meaning of section 18, art. 4, of the Constitution; and, second, that its subject is not expressed in the title as required by said section, which reads: "No private or local bill which may be passed by the Legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." In Milwaukee v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N. W. 131, 53 L. R. A. 635, the cases in this state involving the question of when a law is general or local within the meaning of the constitutional provision above quoted were reviewed at length, and it was there held that a law might be public and local, or it "An act to create a superior court in the might be general in the restricted sense in county of Fond du Lac." Chapter 589 was entitled: "An act to amend sections 3, 5. 12, and 64 of chapter 518 of the Laws of 1915, relating to the superior court of Fond du Lac county." The amendments do not affect any question material to the determination of the case. Doe, Ballhorn, Wilkie & Doe, of Milwaukee, for relator. H. E. Swett, T. L. Doyle, and R. L. Morse, all of Fond du Lac (J. M. Gooding, Fred A. Foster, D. D. Sutherland, L. E. Lurvey, and F. Ryan Duffy, all of Fond du Lac, of counsel), for respondent. VINJE, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] In the Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W. 164, the question of the original jurisdiction of this court was treated so fully that only a brief reference to the subject need now be made. It was said, in substance, that where in a matter of public right the remedy in the lower court is entirely lacking or absolutely inadequate, this court will take original jurisdiction, to the end that justice shall not be denied. In this case there is no lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court, but, in view of the public rights that may be affected by the acts of the newly created court whose process runs to all parts of the state and which has civil jurisdiction up to $25,000, and jurisdiction of all criminal cases except homicide, it is deemed that the remedy through the circuit court and to this court by appeal is inadequate because of the long delay involved. The rights of litigants who may desire or be compelled to resort to that court and the importance of the probate business of Fond du Lac county that must be transacted therein alike, call for a speedy determination of the question of the validity of its creation. For these reasons, this court entertains original jurisdiction of the case. [2, 3] The relator urges a number of constitutional objections to the validity of chapter 518 of the Laws of 1915, creating the court. Many of them are of such importance and so far-reaching in their results that it which the term is used in section 21, art. 7, of the Constitution, which provides that "no general law shall be in force until published," and at the same time be a local law; the lic in the sense that it affects the public at word "general," as here used, meaning publarge in a single defined subdivision of the state, such as a county, town, city, or village, or a collection of such localities not constituting a legitimate class for purposes of legislation, and still is local within the meaning of section 18, art. 4, because affecting but a single locality not constituting a legitimate class for legislation. It was also held in that case that a bill entitled "An act in relation to sheriff's fees," which dealt with the compensation of the sheriff of Milwaukee county only, was local in character. In Wagner v. Milwaukee County, 112 Wis. 601, 88 N. W. 577, the same construction was given to an act authorizing any county to build a viaduct costing not less than $80,000, with other conditions, because it could apply only to Milwaukee county. The law in question deals with the establishment of a superior court in Fond du Lac county and the abolishment of its county court. It is limited in its effect to the boundaries of Fond du Lac county, and therefore local in character. True, it is public or general in the sense that it may affect publicly or generally all the people of the county or outside thereof, but it deals with the establishment and abolition of courts of a specified locality which does not constitute a class for purposes of legislation. So, within the rule laid down in the case of Milwaukee v. Isenring, supra, it must be held to be a local law coming within the provisions of section 18, art. 4, of the Constitution. The failure of counsel for defendant to realize that a law may be general or public within the meaning of section 21, art. 7, and still be local within the meaning of section 18, art. 4, has led them to claim that acts like the one in question have been held to be not local in these cases: In re Boyle, 9 Wis. 264; In re Ferdinand Bergin, 31 Wis. 383; Atty. Gen. v. Foote, 11 Wis. 14, 78 Am. "A short and most conclusive answer to this position is that this court in Re Boyle, 9 Wis. 264, held that the act of 1859 establishing such court is a general law." Dec. 689; Meshke v. Van Doren, 16 Wis. 319. | civil and criminal jurisdiction in addition to Only the case of In re Ferdinand Bergin, 31 their probate jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Wis. 383, lends color to this claim. There provisions of section 14, art. 7, of the Constithe question was whether chapter 137, Laws tution, chapter 86 of the Statutes of 1849 of 1871, which authorized the commencement abolished the office of judge of probate, and of criminal prosecution by information in- established county courts in each of the counstead of indictment, applied to the municipal ties of the state. The Constitution also procourt of Milwaukee county. It was claimed vides for the establishment of municipal and it did not because the act creating that court inferior courts. Section 2, art. 7. We have was a local act. The court says: at present thirty-three municipal courts, one superior court, one district court, and one civil court consisting of seven branches. In the establishment of all these courts the probeen invaded; much less has such a court bate jurisdiction of a county court has not been abolished. It is obvious, of course, that, where a new court is created in a locality already supplied with courts having jurisdiction of all cases that may arise, the new court must at least have concurrent jurisdiction with existing ones, and that it may take away entirely some jurisdiction from other not naturally or reasonably imply the abolcourts. But the creation of one court does where the new court is styled a superior ishment of another, and especially is this so court. Previous to the attempted abolishment of the court in question we have had only two superior courts, that of Milwaukee county, now abolished, and that of Douglas county. The creation of neither of those interfered with the probate jurisdiction of the county court of the county in which it was organized or abolished an existing court. Since during the establishment of all these courts the probate jurisdiction of county courts has been kept inviolate, how could the people of Fond du Lac county dream that they were to be deprived of their county court act to create a superior court in the county when they read that chapter 518 was "An has held time and again, that a title must be of Fond du Lac"? Conceding, as this court liberally construed, and must be held to include within it anything reasonably germane to the expressed subject, still it cannot, in view of the history of the creation of previous courts, as well as in view of the lack of any logical connection between the creation of a superior court and the abolishment of a county court, be held that the title in question includes within it the idea that the county court of Fond du Lac county was to be abolished. This ruling must be deemed to stand on a par with that of Zitske v. Goldberg, 38 Wis. 217, referred to by Mr. Justice Marshall in Milwaukee v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 14, 85 N. W. 131, 53 L. R. A. 635, as a case where, without discussion, the words "local" and "general," in their restricted sense, were held not applicable to the same act. For in Re Boyle the only point decided bearing upon the question under consideration was that the act creating the municipal court of Milwaukee county was a general act within the meaning of section 21, art. 7, of the Constitution, requiring it to be published before it took effect. In State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Foote, 11 Wis. 14, 78 Am. Dec. 689, the same act was held to be public, and that judicial notice of its publication would be taken. In Meshke v. Van Doren, 16 Wis. 319, it was held that an act conferring upon the county court of Winnebago county jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court up to $500 was held to be a public act of which the court would take judicial notice. So it appears that none of the cases relied upon except In re Ferdinand Bergin, 31 Wis. 383, bear out the claim made, and that the latter case as to this question was based upon the misconception that an act could not be both general and local, though the court, in State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279, after a full discussion and mature consideration, had decided that it could. That such decision has since been quite consistently adhered to is pointed out in Milwaukee v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N. W. 131, 53 L. R. A. 635. The readjustment of local courts in Fond du Lac county constituted the subject of chapter 518, and the main purpose thereof was twofold: First, the creation of a new court called the superior court; and, second, the abolition of the county court. Of such main purpose only one-half is expressed in the title, namely, the creation of the new court. The abolition of the county court is not mentioned therein, though such court was created pursuant to constitutional provisions as early as 1849, and has continued in existence ever since. Not only is that true of Fond du Lac county, but it is true of every other county in the state since its organization as a county. All counties have county courts exercising general probate jurisdiction, while some have limited civil or So far as it has come to our attention, acts abolishing an existing court and creating a new one or transferring the entire jurisdiction of one court to another have referred to the existing court in their title. Thus chapter 107 of the Laws of 1873 changed the name of the police court to the municipal court and enlarged its jurisdiction. Its title was "An act relating to the police court of the city of Madison." Chapter 146 of the Laws of 1876 established a municipal court in Marathon county. In 1879 the court was abolished, and a new one created by chapter day of September, 1915, entitled to the said office by virtue of the election and qualification alleged in the complaint, and to the franchises, privileges, and emoluments thereof; and that he have and recover of the defendant, F. W. Chadbourne, his costs of this action to be taxed by the clerk. 115 of the Laws of 1879. The title of the [ no right to the office of county judge of Fond latter act was "An act to establish a munici- du Lac county or to the exercise of the funcpal court in the city of Wausau and county tions or duties thereof, and that he be oustof Marathon, and to repeal chapter 146, Gen-ed and excluded therefrom; that the relator, eral Laws of 1876." The superior court of A. E. Richter, is and has been since the 1st Milwaukee county was created by chapter 125 of the Laws of 1887. In 1903 it was abolished by chapter 1 of the laws of that year, entitled "An act to repeal the acts establishing a superior court for Milwaukee county and providing for the transfer of causes and proceedings pending therein to the circuit court for the second judicial circuit." An examination of nearly a dozen acts creating other inferior courts of record in this state has failed to disclose a single case of the inclusion of matters foreign to the main subject of the act. The constitutional prohibition against the passage of private or local laws whose subjects are not expressed in their title has a substantial foundation for its existence. That it was considered important by the framers of the Constitution is evidenced by the fact that it found a place in the basic law of the state. It is of no less importance now than then. The mischief of smuggling private or local laws through the Legislature under false, inadequate, or misleading titles is a serious one, and whenever such smuggling, whether intentional or not, is found to have taken place, courts should not hesitate to declare a law so passed invalid. No branch of the government, however high, is above a constitutional prohibition or safeguard, and no citizen, however low, is outside their beneficial protection. Within the scope of its operation the Constitution acts upon all alike. declared invalid. BARNES, J. (dissenting). The method here pursued of disposing of a public officer is not one calculated to create a very favorable impression. What the reasons were for attempting to legislate Judge Richter out of office I do not know. The fact that the movement seems to have had the backing of nearly the entire bar of Fond du Lac county negatives the idea that partisan politics entered into the matter. At the same time the lengthy postponement of the time at which an election could be held would seem to indicate that the judge might be more popular with the electors than he was with the lawyers. These are considerations, however, which do not concern this court. The question is: Had the Legislature the right to enact such a law as it did, and, if so, did it proceed in a constitutional manner in doing so? The Constitution expressly authorizes the Legislature to abolish the office of judge of probate. Section 14, art. 7, Const. This is what Mr. Richter was. So I think we have no debatable question so far. There is some conflict in the decisions as to whether such a law as we have here is general or local. Perhaps the weight of authority accords with the conclusion of the court; so I find no fault with the decision in this regard. I do not believe that the title is fatally defective. In speaking of the sufficiency of the title to a local law, this court said, in Re Southern Wisconsin Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 251, 122 N. W. 801, 804: If after giving the title of a private or local law a liberal construction, including within its meaning all matters reasonably germane thereto, it is found that the body of the act contains matters of substance foreign to the title so construed, then such law falls within the condemnation of the Constitution. We think the title of chapters 518 and 589 of the Laws of 1915, though liberally construed fail to meet the require-judged invalid except upon clear and unmistak"An act of the Legislature should not be adments of the basic law, and hence they are able grounds, and the title of a private or local act should be liberally construed, and the act such title does not express the subject as fully should not be declared void merely because or as unequivocally as possible. Mills v. Charle ton, 29 Wis. 400 [9 Am. Rep. 578]. The title to an act must be liberally construed, giving all reasonable leeway for the exercise of legislative discretion. It should not be held insufficient if a reasonable doubt exists as to its sufficiency. It is only where the title is so insuffigest the purpose of the act it covers, and where cient and so defective as not to reasonably suga reading of the act will disclose provisions that are clearly outside of its title, that it will be Wis. 9, 24, 85 N. W. 131 [53 L. R. A. 635]. held invalid. Milwaukee Co. v. Isenring, 109 The title to a legislative act must not only be liberally construed, but the act should not be condemned as insufficient because of the title, reason will permit, something is found in the unless, giving such title the largest scope which body of the act which is neither within the liter [4] They are void not only in so far as they affect the county court, but in toto, because from the whole scheme of the acts we cannot assume the Legislature would have created a superior court in Fond du Lac county without abolishing the county court. The two are so interrelated in the acts that they must stand or fall together. Statutes void in their main purpose or void as to a substantial part which is closely interrelated with other substantial parts thereof are void in toto. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Rock County, 156 N. W. 607, decided herewith, and cases cited. It is considered, ordered, and adjudged that the defendant, F. W. Chadbourne, has |