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sideration in determining whether there has and ordinarily the term designates those embeen an acceptance and satisfaction.

[4] It is not absolutely necessary, in order that an accord and satisfaction may arise, for the debtor to declare expressly, in connection with his tender, that it is meant to be in full payment, for circumstances may show as conclusively as language that this was meant, and that the parties so understood the matter. There must be a meeting of the minds, and it must be shown that the creditor understood or should have understood he was abating his claim when he received the consideration for the settlement. 1 R. C. L. 183.

[5] We do not understand appellant to contend that his demand was unliquidated. The claim is unliquidated if there is a bona fide dispute. Wherley v. Rowe, 106 Minn. 494, 119 N. W. 222; Fire Ins. Association v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564, 12 Sup. Ct. 84, 35 L. Ed. 860.

If it is admitted that one of two sums is due, but there is a dispute as to which is the proper amount, the demand is unliquidated within the meaning of accord and satisfaction. Greenlee v. Mosnat, 116 Iowa, 535, 90 N. W. 338; Sparks v. Spaulding, supra; 1 Cyc. 223, 335.

It is our conclusion that there was an ac

cord and satisfaction, and, this being so, it is unnecessary to consider the other points argued.

The judgment is affirmed.

ployments where the persons exercising them are and control of a supervisor (citing Words and not under the immediate personal supervision Phrases, Agent).

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2603-2627; Dec. Dig. 668(6).]

--

2. CORPORATIONS 668(6)-FOREIGN CORPO-
RATIONS
GROWING
SERVICE OF PROCESS
OUT OF OR "CONNECTED" WITH THE BUSI-
NESS OF THE OFFICE OR AGENCY.

An action by plaintiff for agreed commissions on sales made by him, was an action growing out of or "connected" with the business of the office or agency within Code, § 3532, and service of process in such action was properly made on H.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2603-2627; Dec. Dig. 668(6). For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Connected.] 3. CORPORATIONS 668(1)-FOREIGN CORPO

RATIONS-SERVICE

PROVISIONS.

OF PROCESS-STATUTORY

Code, § 3532, relative to service of process when a corporation or individual has an office or agency for the transaction of business in any county other than that in which the principal resides, is intended to avoid the injustice of compelling a citizen or resident of the state, transacting business with a foreign corporation or other defendant, to go into the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to enforce collection of a debt or redress a wrong, and should be liberally construed to promote the purpose of its enactment.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2603-2627; Dec. Dig. 668(1).j Appeal from District Court, Polk County; C. A. Dudley, Judge.

Action at law to recover compensation for services alleged to have been rendered by

EVANS, C. J., and DEEMER and WEAV- plaintiff in the employment of defendant. ER, JJ., concurring.

MOREY v. STANDARD SEPARATOR CO. (No. 30284.) (Supreme Court of Iowa. March 9, 1916.) 1. CORPORATIONS 668(6)-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-SERVICE OF PROCESS "AGENT."

Code, § 3532, provides that when a corporation or individual has an office or agency for the transaction of business in any county other than that in which the principal resides, service may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office or agency, in all actions growing out of or connected with the business of the office or agency. A foreign corporation had an arrangement with H. doing business in Des Moines, under which his place of business was made a distributing point or agency where he received and from which he was expected and authorized to send out or deliver the goods of the corporation, necessary to fill orders taken by its salesmen. He also had authority to sell and did sell goods so placed in his custody, and representing the corporation entered and displayed specimens of its goods at an implement dealer's convention. Plaintiff was employed as salesman with the agreement or understanding that goods I would be shipped to H. so that he and other agents would have a nearby depot or base of supplies, and orders taken by him were filled from goods so sent to H. for distribution. Held, that H. was the corporation's "agent" within the statute, as an agent is one who acts for or in behalf of another by authority, or one who has been intrusted with the business of another,

Dismissed on defendant's motion because of insufficiency of the service of the original notice. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

J. A. Dyer, of Des Moines, for appellant. Patton, Nesbitt & Ralls, of Des Moines, for appellee.

WEAVER, J. The plaintiff alleges that in September or October, 1911, he entered into an agreement with the defendant, a corporation organized in New Jersey and having its principal place of business in Wisconsin, to enter the employment of defendant for the sale of cream separators in Iowa and South Dakota, and for such service was to receive a specified commission upon his sales. He further alleges that under such employment or agency he proceeded to sell said separators until the commission so earned by him aggregated $588, which amount is due and unpaid and still owing him by the defendant, and he asks judgment accordingly. Original notice of the action was given by service thereof upon J. A. Hosmer, who is alleged to be the agent of the defendant at Des Moines in this state. The defendant entered a special appearance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the case, alleging that it had never been serv

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

ed with notice, and denying that the serv-[ ice upon Hosmer gave the court any jurisdiction to entertain the action against such corporation. The issue of law thus raised was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts reading as follows:

Agreed Statement of Facts.

This agreed statement of facts is to be used in connection with the special appearance entered by defendant's attorneys in connection with the service of original notice upon J. A. Hosmer on September 8, 1913.

It is agreed by and between the parties hereto: (1) That J. A. Hosmer was served with an original notice September 8, 1913, as the agent of the defendant company.

(2) That the said J. A. Hosmer is proprietor of the Hawkeye Transfer Company, and was at the time of this service, and was proprietor of the Hawkeye Buggy & Implement Company. (3) That the Hawkeye Transfer Company is is the trade-name under which J. A. Hosmer does business with offices in Des Moines, Iowa, and his business is to receive, store, and ship goods, merchandise, etc., for all persons requiring their services, and particularly engaged in the handling of agricultural implements and implements, machinery, and devices in connection therewith. (4) That the Standard Separator Company, defendant herein, engaged and had space for exhibition and storage purposes with the Hawkeye Transfer Company for the period of one year from December 1, 1912, to December, 1913.

(5) That during said year that there was shipped to the Hawkeye Transfer Company by the defendant in this case divers and sundry articles at divers and sundry times, and that the number of shipments made at different dates was 21. (6) That the shipments of greater value were as follows:

November 13, 1912, goods of the value of

$ 625 00 1,250 00 '172 50

January 21, 1913, goods of the value of

March 13, 1913, goods of the value of ...

May 23, 1913, goods of the value of

1,325 00

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August 11, 1913, goods of the value of

633 35

September 18, 1913, goods of the value of

625 00 (7) That these said goods as described in the foregoing paragraph were shipped to the Hawkeye Transfer Company for the purpose of being reshipped on the orders of defendant to fill orders received by it through plaintiff or from others of its agents and for the purpose of exhibition to meet the requirements of the trade.

(8) That all of the said goods were shipped by defendant to the Hawkeye Transfer Company, were sold and disposed of or shipped in 73 different shipments or orders going to various parts and to various purchasers in this state, the last shipment being a shipment back to the Standard Separator Company at Milwaukee, Wis., on January 10, 1914.

(9) That the Hawkeye Transfer Company had authority to sell and did sell some of these goods to the defendant at retail in Des Moines, Iowa,

and remitted therefor.

(10) That some of the goods shipped by the Hawkeye Transfer Company were sold for the defendant by the plaintiff and shipped on its order by the Hawkeye Transfer Company.

(11) That the plaintiff understood and was advised by the officers of the defendant company orally and in writing that the defendant would maintain in Des Moines, Iowa, at the place of business of the Hawkeye Transfer Company, a Milwaukee so that the plaintiff and other agents place to which goods would be shipped from would have a nearby depot for the purpose of rapid and ready distribution of the goods sold.

(12) That some of the goods shipped by the defendant to the Hawkeye Transfer Company were goods which plaintiff and other agents sold in the territory of Iowa.

(13) That Exhibit A hereto attached is a true in force between plaintiff and defendant at the and correct copy of the contract of employment time of the sales mentioned in paragraph 12 hereof and thereafter until plaintiff left defendant's employ.

ant

(14) That goods of the defendant were placed Dealers' Convention held in Des Moines Decemon exhibition at the Coliseum at the Implement ber 3, 4, and 5, 1912, and that the goods so placed on exhibition were by defendant shipped to the Hawkeye Transfer Company by whom it was placed in the Coliseum. J. A. Dyer,

Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Patton, Nesitt & Ralls,

Attorneys for Defendant.

Upon the record thus made the trial court sustained the defendant's objection to the sufficiency of the notice and dismissed the

action.

It is from this ruling appeal has been taken by plaintiff.

That the courts of this state have jurisdiction to entertain actions at law against foreign corporations, companies, and individuals where proper service is had, is, of course, not disputed. Code, § 3532, provides a method of obtaining jurisdiction of such defendants as follows:

"When a corporation, company or individual has, for the transaction of any business, an office or agency in any county other than that in which the principal resides, service may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office or agency, in all actions growing out of or connected with the business of that office or agency."

Appellant argues that under the terms of this statute and the facts conceded in the agreed statement the service on Hosmer constitutes good service on the defendant, and this question, upon which the trial court held with the appellee, is the only one calling for our decision.

[1] This inquiry involves the determination, first, whether Hosmer was an agent of the defendant; and, second, whether the plaintiff's action is one "growing out of or connected with" the business of such agency agreed facts do disclose the relation of prinas contemplated by the statute. That the cipal and agent between defendant and Hosmer is quite certain. As defined by Webster, an agent is one who acts for or in behalf of another by authority. He is one who has been intrusted with the business of another, and ordinarily the term designates those employments where the persons exercising them are not under the immediate personal super

vision and control of a supervisor. Words and Phrases, vol. 1, p. 261. Hosmer's relation to defendant was not that of a mere warehouseman or bailee. His place of business was made the distributing point or agency where he received and from which he was expected and authorized to send out or deliver the goods necessary to fill the orders taken by plaintiff and other salesmen in that field. He also had authority to sell and did sell goods placed in his custody. Representing the defendant he entered and displayed specimens of their goods at the Dealers' Convention held in Des Moines. These and other facts embodied in the agreed statement show very satisfactorily that Hosmer was defendant's agent within the meaning of that word as used in the statute.

See or clerk" of a foreign defendant in any county of the state when the action arises out of or is connected with the operation of such office or agency is a legislative recognition of the manifest propriety of holding such defendant to answer in the locality where he assumes to do business. In a very large proportion of cases, to compel a citizen or resident of the state, who transacts business in the state with a foreign corporation or other defendant, to go into the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to enforce collection of a debt or to find legal redress of a wrong is a practical denial of justice, and a statute intended to avoid such injustice should be liberally construed to promote the purpose of its enactment. In our judgment, the trial court should have overruled the defendant's objec[2] Does it appear that this action grew tion to jurisdiction. The ruling and judgment out of or is in any manner connected with appealed from is therefore reversed, and the business of that office or agency? This cause remanded to the district court for furtoo must be answered in the affirmative. It ther proceedings not inconsistent with the is admitted that defendant employed plaintiff views expressed in this opinion. with the agreement or understanding that it Reversed and remanded. would from time to time ship from Milwaukee to Hosmer at Des Moines goods of the kind which plaintiff undertook to sell "so that plaintiff and other agents would have a nearby depot or base of supply for the rapid and ready distribution of the goods sold"; that defendants did in fact send goods to (Supreme Court of Iowa. March 8, 1916.) Hosmer for that purpose, and that orders 1. MASTER AND SERVANT 270 ACTIONS taken by plaintiff were filled in this manner FOR INJURIES-EVIDENCE-CUSTOM. through the agency of Hosmer. The language In an action for injuries sustained by a of the statute is quite broad and general, and driver in a mine when a rope used in opening a door broke and plaintiff's mule was forced permits the service of notice to be made not upon him by the weight of the loaded cars which only where the action grows out of the busi- he was hauling before he could open the door ness of the agency, but also where it is "con- by hand, evidence that it was the general cusnected with" such business. The admitted tom or plan in other mines to construct such doors so that they would swing both ways was business relation or connection of this agen- admissible as bearing upon defendant's care, cy with the business out of which this rela- since, while evidence of custom is not admissible tion has arisen brings the case within the for the purpose of excusing negligence, it is adscope of the statute, and the service of no-struction is reasonably safe, especially with remissible on the question of whether a given contice on Hosmer was sufficient. See Murphy v. spect to machinery and other appliances or placAlbany Pecan Co., 151 N. W. 500; Locke v. es to work with which an ordinary juror is not Chronicle, 107 Iowa, 390, 78 N. W. 49; Pleak familiar. v. Marks, 152 N. W. 63.

EVANS, C. J., and DEEMER and PRESTON, JJ., concurring.

JOHNSON v. PLYMOUTH GYPSUM PLAS-
TER CO. (No. 30863.)

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 913–927, 932; Dec. Dig. 270.]

2.

MASTER AND SERVANT 286 ACTIONS FOR INJURIES-QUESTIONS FOR JURY. In an action for injuries sustained by a driver in a mine when his mule was forced against him by the load while he was attempting to open a door in the entryway, evidence held to make questions for the jury as to defendant's negligence in failing to furnish a safe place to work or a reasonably strong rope with which to open such door, and in furnishing a rope which was rotten, defective, and unsafe, in not examining the rope, in not so constructing the door that it would swing both ways, and in not having some one stationed there to open the door.

[3] It is true that under a recent statute a party sued in this state may enter a special appearance to deny the jurisdiction of the court because of want of proper service of notice upon him; that is, he may come into court to solemnly assure the court that he is not in court. For many years prior to this enactment the rule in this state was other wise, and an appearance by a defendant for any purpose was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over him. The change made is a reversion to a discarded technical practice, the wisdom of which is open to question, but it is the duty of the courts to give it effect in all proper cases. The change does not, however, work a repeal or modification of the statute governing the service of original notice. The Code section hereinbefore quoted In an employé's action for injuries, instrucallowing service to be made on "any agent tions that defendant's negligence, if any, was For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 156 N.W.-46

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1001, 1006, 1008, 10101015, 1017-1033, 1036-1042, 1044, 1046-1050; Dec. Dig. 286.]

3. MASTER AND SERVANT
INJURIES-INSTRUCTIONS.

291-ACTIONS FOR

not the proximate cause of the injury, and no opening it by hand. On one occasion the rope recovery could be had if the injury would not broke, and before he could open the door by have occurred save for the voluntary act of hand his mule was forced against him by the plaintiff intervening between defendant's negli- weight of the load. Held that, in the absence gent acts and the injury, were properly refused, of evidence that the driver knew the rope was as they were misleading and confused the ques-defective, it was a question for the jury whether tions of negligence and contributory negligence he assumed the risk; as the jury was justified in such a way as to mislead, since the doctrine in finding that there was no peril so long as the of intervening cause has primarily no reference rope was kept in repair and in condition to perto plaintiff's conduct, but to some other respon- form its work. sible agency, and, while plaintiff's conduct bears upon contributory negligence, it does not, strictly speaking, bear upon the question of proximate

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[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1068-1088; Dec. Dig. 288.] ACTIONS

9. MASTER AND SERVANT

293

FOR INJURIES-SUBMISSION OF ISSUES. In an action for injuries to a driver in a mine, crushed against a door which he was attempting to open in the entryway of the mine by his mule and the load he was hauling, he alleged negligence in failing to furnish a safe place to work, a reasonably strong rope with which to open the door, in not examining the rope, in so constructing the door that it would open but one way, and in not having some one stationed there to open the door for approaching cars. Defendant did not move for a more specific statement, and the court submitted, in adthe question of whether defendant furnished

5. NEGLIGENCE ~61 - LIABILITY - CONCUR-dition to the other specifications of negligence,

RING NEGLIGENCE.

If an accident would not have happened except for plaintiff's concurring fault, he cannot recover, because by his own negligent conduct he brought the wrong upon himself, and the wrongs cannot be apportioned.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 74, 75; Dec. Dig. 61.] 6. MASTER AND SERVANT

289-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. A driver in a mine ordinarily opened a door in the entryway, which swung only in the direction from which he was approaching, either by means of a rope or by running ahead and opening it by hand. On one occasion the rope broke, and he attempted to open it by hand, but, his mule at the time being close upon him, it was forced against him by the weight of the load. There was evidence that he was under a duty to preserve the employer's property from harm, and it appeared that the mule and train of cars piled up when they struck the door, some being derailed. Held, that he was not negligent as a matter of law in attempting to open the door instead of attempting to stop the train by braking or spragging the cars or mounting the cars or standing aside without attempting to save the mule and train, as these courses would also have been attended with danger, and, moreover, one choosing a negligent way of accomplishing an object where others are open to him is not negligent as a matter of law.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1089, 1090, 1092-1132; Dec. Dig. 289.]

7. NEGLIGENCE 65-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

In considering the question of a plaintiff's contributory negligence, it is always proper to consider whether he was required to act in an emergency or deliberately, whether he was under a duty to save property in his charge, and whether he was in peril, and from all these to determine whether he acted with the degree of care and prudence which an ordinary man would observe under like or similar conditions.

ACTIONS

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 83, 94; Dec. Dig. 65.] 8. MASTER AND SERVANT 288 FOR INJURIES-QUESTIONS FOR JURY. From a door in an entryway of a mine, which swung in only one direction, a rope was carried over pulleys to a point 20 feet distant, and a driver ordinarily opened the door either by means of the rope or by running ahead and

plaintiff a safe place to work. Held, that this was proper; as the general charge of an unsafe the entry, including other matters than those place to work involved the entire construction of ant's failure to have the grounds of negligence specifically charged, and it was due to defendmore definitely specified that the question was thus left open.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1148-1156, 1158–1160; Dec. Dig. 293.]

10. APPEAL AND ERROR 1064-HARMLESS ERROR ACTIONS FOR INJURIES - INSTRUCTIONS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

In an action for injuries sustained by a driver in a mine when his mule was forced against him by the weight of the load while he was attempting to open a door in the entryway, the court, after charging that plaintiff, before he could recover, must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty of contributory negligence, defined "contributory negligence" as the doing of some act that to some extent aided in "bringing about the conditions" that produced the injuries that a person of ordinary care, prudence, and caution would not have done under the surrounding circumstances or the omission of some act that such a person Held that, while the language of the instrucwould not have omitted under the circumstances. tion was unusual, it was manifest that no harm resulted, since, whether the conditions referred to were the acts of plaintiff which caused the

collision or conditions existent at the time for which plaintiff was responsible, the instruction referred to some act done by plaintiff which to some extent aided in bringing about the injury. [Ed. Note. For ther cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4219, 4221-4224; Dec. Dig. 1064.]

11. TRIAL 267-ACTIONS FOR INJURIES—

INSTRUCTIONS-MODIFICATION.

driver in a mine when a rope used in opening In an action for injuries sustained by a to open it by hand, but was unable to do so bea door in the entryway broke and he attempted fore his mule was forced against him by the weight of the load, defendant requested instructions on the assumption that plaintiff left a perfectly safe place and voluntarily assumed a hazard which he knew or had reason to believe would result in harm, and charging that this would defeat a recovery. The court modified these instructions by adding that this would

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

not be true if the place plaintiff was in was not a safe place, or if, acting as a reasonably prudent man, he believed that he was in a place of danger. Held, that the modification was not

erroneous.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 668-672, 674; Dec. Dig. 12. MASTER AND SERVANT

FOR INJURIES-INSTRUCTIONS.

267.]
296-ACTIONS

In such action the court, after charging that, if defendant's negligence placed plaintiff in a place of danger and peril, then in such emergency he was not required to act with the same deliberation and foresight that might be expected under ordinary circumstances, but that all the law required was that he act with ordinary and reasonable care in the light of the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time, further charged that the fact, if it was a fact, that he did not take the safest or best course which he could have taken in such emergency, would not authorize a finding that he was guilty of contributory negligence in so doing. Held, that this last part of the instruction was not erroneous; as it did nothing more than state the rule that one placed in sudden and imminent peril and confronted with an emergency which may be met in two or more different ways is not negligent as a matter of law simply because he chooses the most hazardous way.

shaft of the mine with which to open the door, and that the rope furnished was rotten, defective, and unsafe; (2) that defendant failed to notify the plaintiff of the dangers incident to the use of the defective rope; (3) was negligent in not examining the rope; and (4) careless in so constructing the door in the shaft that it would open but one way, and that toward the cars which were being driven to the mouth of the shaft; and (5) negligent in not having some one stationed at a point to open the door for approaching cars.

The second specification was not submitted to the jury, but the others were, resulting in the verdict hitherto stated. Defendant denied all negligence, and pleaded assumption of risk and contributory negligence. It is claimed in argument that there was no evidence of defendant's negligence; no testimony that the negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the injury, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and assumed the risk, and that upon the whole record no judgment should have been entered for plaintiff. In addition certain rulings on the admission of evidence and some 132-EXCESSIVENESS-PER- of the instructions given and the refusal

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1180-1194; Dec. Dig. 296.]

13. DAMAGES

SONAL INJURIES.

A driver in a mine was crushed against a door which he was attempting to open when his mule was forced against him by the heavily loaded cars which he was hauling. His leg was broken, and he was otherwise bruised, and was confined in a hospital for more than seven weeks, and to his room after his discharge from the hospital for a few days. The broken leg was somewhat stiff and shortened from three-fourths to seven-eighths of an inch, necessitating his spine adjusting itself thereto, and, though there was testimony that he would eventually recover its use, he still walked with a cane and could bear no weight on the injured leg at the time of the trial, and the knee joint was still stiff. He was 40 years old, earning about $75 a month at the time of the injury, and subsequently was not able to do any considerable work. Held, that a verdict for $5,000 was not excessive and would not be interfered with.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. $$ 372-385, 396; Dec. Dig. 132.] Appeal from District Court, Webster County; E. M. McCall, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff while working in defendant's mine. Upon issues joined the case was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Kenyon, Kelleher & Price, of Ft. Dodge, for appellant. Gabrielson & Hemingway and Robert Healy, all of Ft. Dodge, for appellee.

DEEMER, J. Plaintiff was employed as a driver in defendant's mine, and on September 19, 1913, while engaged in the performance of his duties, he received the injuries of which he complains. It is charged that defendant: (1) Failed to furnish a safe place to work, failed to furnish a reasonably strong rope which was attached to the door in the

to give certain others are complained of, and it is also asserted that the verdict was excessive.

II. Defendant's mine is what is called a drift one, the shaft entering at or near the bottom of a hill, and from this main one which runs into the hill several entryways At the time of the branch off into rooms. accident the working face of the mine was something like 1,400 feet from the opening of the shaft or entryway. The mine and the entries were lighted by electricity. The main shaft or entryway was from 10 to 14 feet wide and about 9 feet high. A ventilating system was installed, and an air tube extended into the main entry something like 12 feet, where a fan was placed in a box, this box being near the top of the entry. At the mouth of the entry a framework was constructed with a door in this frame. This door was hung upon heavy hinges attached to the south side or southeast wall, and the door itself was about 6 feet wide and 6 feet 6 inches in height. It was constructed of inch boards nailed together diagonally. It opened but one way, and when opened swung into the mine and rested against the southeast wall or rib. There was a handgrip upon it, but it had no latch. It was also equipped with a half-inch rope attached to the upper north corner of the door and from there was carried over pulleys for something like 20 feet along the south side of the rib back into the mine. This was for the purpose of opening the door without using the handle or grip thereon. The forcing of the air into the mine kept the door closed, and it is claimed that for this reason it could

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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