a female offering her body to an indiscrimi- | was well understood that prostitution was nate intercourse with men. State v. Stoyell, the act of a woman, the Legislature intended 54 Me. 24, 89 Am. Dec. 716; Haygood v. section 4943 to include men. The trial court State, 98 Ala. 61, 13 So. 325; State v. Good- charged such was the intention. It said that, win, 33 Kan. 538, 6 Pac. 899, 901; Fahne- though "when we use the word 'prostitute,' stock v. State, 102 Ind. 156, 1 N. E. 372; we mean a woman, and [though] prostitution Osborn v. State, 52 Ind. 526, 528; Miller v. is legally defined as the act or practice of State, 121 Ind. 294, 23 N. E. 94, 95; State offering the body to indiscriminate interv. Brow, 64 N. H. 577, 15 Atl. 216, 217; Car- course with men," yet this section of the penter v. People, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 603, 610; Code does "include men as well as women," State v. Toombs, 79 Iowa, 741, 45 N. W. because it uses the words "prostitution or 300; State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa, 447, 453; Com- lewdness." The position of appellee is that monwealth v. Cook, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 93, the statute includes men because it makes it 97; People v. Demousset, 71 Cal. 611, 12 Pac. a crime "for any person" to resort to a house 788, 789. It is the act or practice of pros- of ill fame for the purpose of prostitution. tituting or offering the body to an indis- The view expressed by the trial judge simcriminate intercourse with men ; common ply begs the question. It is a declaration lewdness of a woman for gain; the act of that, though the Legislature, which imposes permitting a common and indiscriminate a punishment for resorting for the purpose sexual intercourse for hire-and it is said of prostitution, knew prostitution is the consame is considered a heinous offense "for duct of none but women, and though the punwhich the woman may be punished." 2 Bou-ishment provided can have effect as to wovier's Dictionary (Rawle) p. 785. And see men, the very use of the word "prostitution" State v. Gibson, 111 Mo. 92, 19 S. W. 981; proves the punishment was intended to apply Bunfill v. People, 154 Ill. 640, 39 N. E. at to men. 566; and Century Dictionary. While cases hold there may be prostitution though there be no desire for gain (State v. Clark, 78 Iowa, 492, 43 N. W. 273; State v. Rice, 56 Iowa, 431, 9 N. W. 343; State v. Thuna, 59 Wash. 689, 109 Pac. 331, 111 Pac. 768, 140 Am. St. Rep. 902), all that speak on the point agree that it is the practice of a woman only.

[2] It follows that both "prostitute" and "prostitution" have such a fixed meaning in the approved usage of the language and such peculiar and appropriate meaning in law as that, if we give effect to such meaning, the statute in question does not contemplate that a man can be a prostitute or can practice prostitution, and does not intend to punish him for what he cannot do; for one cannot purpose to do what he knows is impossible. If a man cannot commit prostitution, he cannot go to a place for the purpose of prostitution. Having acquired such meaning, and we having ascertained "what is the appropriate and well-authorized meaning of the term," we should hold that "in this sense the Legislature is supposed to have used it." State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa, 453. The terms "prostitution" and "lewdness," as used in the statute, are by a general rule of construction to be construed according to their most usual and best-understood signification. Bunfill v. People, 154 Ill. 640, 39 N. E. 566; Fahnestock v. State, 102 Ind. 156, 1 N. E. 376. And see, also, Commonwealth v. Cook, 12 Metc. (Mass.) at 97.

[3] 2. Since the statute does not, in terms, include men, we need not and do not pass upon whether the Legislature could effectively declare that men can be guilty of "prostitution." We may for the purposes of the argument assume such power exists. Thus we reach the question whether, though it

[4] As to the position of appellee, while it is true that ordinarily the words "any person" include both men and women, this is not always so. As in all other cases, the rule of reason controls as to the interpretation of these words.

Section 4756 punishes rape upon a female committed by "any person." Literally construed, these words would authorize a woman, or the husband of a woman assaulted, to be punished for rape, as principals. And so of section 4758, which prohibits "any person" to have carnal knowledge of “any female" imbecile or rendered insensible; and since a four year old child is a "person" (Sutton v. State, 122 Ga. 158, 50 S. E. 61), such child could, on the theory of appellee, be guilty of rape, or of carnal knowledge of an imbecile, or of a woman by it rendered insensible. No court would so interpret "any person." If it were claimed that a statute like section 4762, which makes it a crime for "any person" to seduce or debauch a female, contemplated a seduction and debauchment by a female, it would be held that "any person" should not be so construed, because it must be assumed the Legislature believed a woman could not commit the offense. the claim were that the words included all who entered a dwelling in the nighttime by means of any breaking, it would be held they did not include the owner of such dwelling, not because the owner could not thus enter, but because the Legislature could not in reason have intended to include him. But, whether the words are held not to include some person because the Legislature knew he could not commit what is forbidden, or be cause it is clear for some other reason that it could not have been intended to include him in the general words, the rule of construction to be deduced from either or both

If

ing a statute all the language shall be considerword appearing therein as was within the manied, and such interpretation placed upon any fest intent of the body which enacted the law. Much, of necessity, depends upon the context and upon the usual and ordinary consequence of the language used."

cases is to exclude him, if it be clear for any | less than so much per bushel, that the genreason that it was not intended to include eral language of statutes will be limited to him. We think the point within this rule. such persons and subjects as it is reasonable The Legislature knew "prostitution" was to presume the Legislature intended it should generally understood to be something that apply. State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 69 Pac. men could not, and women could, be guilty of, 199, 67 L. R. A. 903. In Rohlf v. Kasemeier, and that this interpretation was settled in 140 Iowa, 182, 118 N. W. 276, 23 L. R. A. law. It used the word in the settled sense, (N. S.) 1284, 132 Am. St. Rep. 261, 17 Ann. and "any person" to avoid repetition. The Cas. 750, a case cited by the appellee, there statute forbids: (1) Resort to a house of ill was under consideration the construction of fame for the purpose of prostitution; (2) a statute making it unlawful for any persons for the purpose of lewdness; (3) using such to combine to fix the price of any article of house for prostitution; (4) occupying such merchandise or commodity. We held that house for such purpose; (5) inhabiting such the practice of medicine and surgery was house for such purpose; (6) using such labor, and did not come within the purview house for the purpose of lewdness; (7) occu-of the act, and we said: pying same for such purpose; (8) inhabiting "Moreover, it is well settled that in construsame for such purpose. The Legislature knew it was matter of common knowledge that some of these can be committed by both men and women, and some by women only. It therefore refrained from labeling four of these as applying to women only. In the light of this, it is plain that "any person" was intended to mean "any person who can be guilty of any of these"; that the purpose was to save words regarded as needless, rather than to enlarge a class of offenders. In effect, the statute is within the reasoning of cases like State v. Cooster, 10 Iowa, 453, and State v. Brandt, 41 Iowa, 593. It is its purpose to enable the state to indict in the alternative, to charge an offense that can be committed by men and women, or by men or women, or by women alone-not to permit men to be punished for what all understood they could not do. It is against reason, so long as any other explanation can be found, to suppose that a Legislature which knew that all persons believed prostitution could not be practiced by a man intended to declare that it could, and omitted to put so radical an innovation into unmistakable language. No statute that imposes a five-year imprisonment in the penitentiary should be construed to work such a change unless its words compel such interpretation.

[5] When section 4943 was enacted it was settled that men could not be guilty of prostitution. Hence they did not become punishable for prostitution unless this was effected by enacting that statute. We said in Caster v. McClellan, 132 Iowa, at page 505, 109 N. W. at page 1021:

"The general rule is, however, that words must be construed according to their natural meaning. And in the case of a statute which imposes a liability which, but therefor, would have no existence, a strict construction must be given not only to the particular words employed, but to the act generally."

Where a statute provided that all persons should be denied the right to form or be in any manner interested, either directly or indirectly, in any trust as defined by the act, it was held, against the argument that the law was unconstitutional because it prohibited two or more farmers from agreeing not to sell their wheat to a neighboring mill for

[6] We believe both reason and authority justify us in refusing to give said general words the effect the state claims for them. The rule ejusdem generis is an avoidance of giving to general words a strict construction inconsistent with the general scope of what they are found in. It is that, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. 36 Cyc. p. 1119; State v. Campbell, 76 Iowa, 122, 40 N. W. 100; State v. Eno, 131 Iowa, 619, 109 N. W. 119, 9 Ann. Cas. 856; Brown V. Bell, 146 Iowa, 89, 123 N. W. 231, 124 N. W. 901, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 852; State v. Wignall, 150 Iowa, 650, 128 N. W. 935, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 507; Low v. Goldtrap, 1 N. J. Law, 272, 274, 275; State v. Fry, 186 Mo. 198, 85 S. W. 328.

In Dowell v. Railway, 61 Miss. 529, it is held that the words "any person," in a statute declaring that a railroad shall be liable for any damages or injury which may be sustained by any person from a locomotive or cars, do not embrace employés of the road. In Carle v. Canal Co., 43 Me. 271, a statute making a railroad corporation liable for damages sustained by "any person" by the neglect of its servants is held to be limited to such persons as were not the servants of the corporation, and who sustained damages without any contributory fault. Sala v. Railway, 85 Iowa, 683, 52 N. W. 664. In Miller v. Coffin, 19 R. I. 164, 36 Atl. 8, Sullivan v. Railway, 97 Mo. 113, 10 S. W. 854, Atchison Railway v. Farrow, 6 Colo. 505, Lutz v. Railway, 6 N. M. 496, 30 Pac. 913, 16 L. R. A. 819, Proctor v. Railway, 64 Mo. 122, and Connor v. Railway, 59 Mo. 292, in a statute permitting the representatives of "any person" who shall die from any injury resulting from or occasioned by the negligence of any person or employé while

See

running a train of cars, the words "any per-ers v. Railway, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 488, a son" are held not to include a servant whose statute relating to the lease of railroads, and death was occasioned by the negligence of a making the lessor and lessee jointly liable fellow servant. for all rights of action accruing to any person for any negligence or default growing out of the operation and maintenance of such railroad, is held to cover obligations of the lessor and lessee to the public, and hence not to apply to an action for negligence by an employé of the lessee against the lessor and lessee.

A statute requiring county officers to permit examination of documents by any person is to be limited to persons who have an interest of some sort, great or small, to be subserved by such examination. Boylan v. ment, taken alone, do not show whether that "The words 'unmarried person' in the indictWarren, 39 Kan. 301, 18 Pac. 176, 7 Am. St. unmarried person was man or woman; but it Rep. 551. The right of any person to con- is not in this narrow sense that we are to contest the validity of a will is to be limited to ognized that the crime of seduction can be comstrue this indictment. The law has never recany person having an interest in the sub-mitted by any other than male persons, nor upject-matter of the contest. Campbell v. Fich- on any other than female persons." ter, 168 Ind. 645, 81 N. E. 662, 11 Ann. Cas. 1089; Crawfordsville v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98 N. E. 180.

ment in the lower court, and is so flagrantly guilty that the finding of the lower court should be sustained. This court does not pass upon the guilt or innocence of this defendant de novo. Both as to those who may be guilty and those who may be innocent it is our duty to give to statutes which impose degrading imprisonment a construction which avoids the punishment of accused where the statute proceeded under imposes no punishment. Fahnestock v. State, 102 Ind. 156, Bunfill v. People, 154 Ill. 640, In the last case it is said that

1 N. E. 377;
39 N. E. 567.

are irrelevant. So is Williams v. Poor, 65 | nocent and a woman guilty, and that "this Iowa, at 413, 21 N. W. 753, cited by appel- defendant is so plainly guilty that he should lant. We are unable to see how Common- not have complained of any kind of treatwealth v. Lavonsair, 132 Mass. 1, and State v. Phillips, 26 N. D. 206, 144 N. W. 94, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470, cited by appellant, or United States v. Cannon, 4 Utah, 122, 7 Pac. 369, and Purdy v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 384, cited by appellee, bear upon anything in this appeal, and State v. Myers, 10 Iowa, 448, State v. Smith, 46 Iowa, 670, State v. Shaw, 125 Iowa, 422, 423, 101 N. W. 109, presented by appellant, and Commonwealth v. Goodall, 165 Mass. 588, 43 N. E. 520, and State v. Burns, 145 Iowa, 588, 124 N. W. 600, cited by appellee, have very remote, if any, bearing, and whatever is said in the last as to resort-prosecutions for even such offenses as this ing is said as to a woman defendant. The substance of the decision is as to the admissibility of evidence on reputation. State v. Toombs, 79 Iowa, 741, 45 N. W. 300, upon which the state puts some reliance, was the case of a woman charged with keeping a house of ill fame, and does not touch the point now in consideration. The following citations on part of appellant are relevant to nothing involved in this appeal: State v. Moore, 78 Iowa, 495, 43 N. W. 273; State v. Hasty, 121 Iowa, 507, 96 N. W. 1115; Wright v. Paige, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 438; Cannon v. United States, 116 U. S. 55, 6 Sup. Ct. 278, 29 L. Ed. 561; Commonwealth v. Sliney, 126 Mass. 49; and Sweenie v. State, 59 Neb. 269, 80 N. W. 815.

[8] The indictment charges that defendant feloniously resorted to a house of ill fame "for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness." The jury was directed to give time and energy which should have been expended on the consideration of a real case to considering whether defendant was guilty of something not prohibited by the statute under which he was indicted. At the least, it was made possible for the jury to find that defendant resorted for the purpose of lewdness, because the jury thought he went to the house for the purpose of prostitution. To create such a situation is error. O'Brien v. People, 28 Mich. 214. This might have been error had the jury disregarded prostitution by its verdict. But it appears by the verdict that it was or may have been a basis for the verdict. And the court by instructions, overruling a motion in arrest of judgment, and entering sentence equally upon either finding, affirmatively put the element of prostitution into the case as a co-ordinate factor.

"can only be conducted under and in accordance with the statutes," and that errors entitle the defendant to a new trial because "the law warrants it and the court doth give it." We do not administer lynch law, which at times executes men because it is believed they are guilty of something, and felt they should be hung, on general principles.

[9] II. The witness Laura Heigner testified she had been a witness in State v. Deviney, and that on that trial she testified that she had had improper relations with Deviney and him only, and she repeated the statement on the instant trial. She testified also that she had been a witness in the case of State v. Lawrence, and, as such witness, had said that she had such relations with forty different men in Mrs. Lawrence's house, and that the Brose girl was present. She testifies that both statements are true, in her opinion. Thereupon she was asked to say why she testified thus differently as to this matter on different trials, to say why she had changed her testimony since a witness in State v. Deviney, to say when she first made up her mind to testify differently in the instant case, to say why she changed her testimony upon the trials of these various cases, and to say whether any one told her to change her testimony for the instant case. To this objections were sustained, that it is immaterial, irrelevant, unfair, because there is no evidence that some of the alleged contradictory statements were made, and that it is improper cross-examination. We think the examination was neither irrelevant nor immaterial, and that for the purpose of crossexamination at least it appeared sufficiently the witness had changed her testimony substantially as the questions indicate, and that therefore the examination was not unfair. See Abstract, 91 to 99. See State v. Cater, 100 Iowa, 505, 515, 69 N. W. 880. Was it improper cross-examination?

In all the steps which work a holding that section 4943 punishes men for resorting to a house of ill fame for the purpose of prostitution, the trial court was in error. For State v. Caron, 118 La. 349, 42 South. 963, this we are constrained to order a reversal; approves the text in Roscoe that cross-exnotwithstanding the argument of the rep-amination may go to any subject, however resentatives of the state that "this is a crime remote, if it bear on testing the character which affects the very foundation of society," or credibility of the witness. Inquiries into that no sense of justice and no theory of the feelings or disposition of the witness to fairness permits the holding a man to be in- conceal or pervert the truth are not to be

excluded as being collateral. Alward v. provide for a second opportunity to demur Oakes, 63 Minn. 190, 65 N. W. 270. To say by means of a motion in arrest if, at the the least, it is proper, where a witness ad-pleasure of the defendant, neither may be mits the existence of a variance between his used, and an acquittal be obtainable by attestimony and his statements on other occa- tacking the indictment by means of an ofsions, to examine him as to the motives in- fered instruction? Who would ever use deducing the variance. 7 Enc. Ev. 69. In murrer or motion in arrest if this be permisState v. Pulley, 63 N. C. 8, a witness admit-sible? We can see no justification for the ted that he had on a former occasion denied the truth of a statement he was then making, and it is held to be admissible thereupon to ask him why he had thus formerly made denial. The accused in a criminal case should be given very large liberty in proving the motives which induced a change in the testimony of a witness from favorable to accused to favorable to the state. People v. Dillwood, 39 Pac. 438;1 Galveston v. Porfert, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 716, 20 S. W. 870.