away. None noticed the motorman undertake to stop the car, but it did stop when about half way past the place of collision. The witness Merkle testified that the gong was ringing, and that the car was "running apparently about the rate they generally run in the traffic over the city along the street." There was no other evidence as to the speed of the car, nor was there any evidence as to what distance a car moving at any particular speed may be stopped. [1, 2] Was this enough to carry the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury? The plaintiff had the right to the use of the entire street, including the tracks of defendant; but, as the street car could not leave its tracks to pass the vehicle he was driving, it was incumbent on him, upon notice of the approach of the car, to turn out and make way for the latter. But the defendant might not enforce his duty to be observed for its benefit by violence. It was not authorized to force the obstructing vehicle from the track. Neither it nor plaintiff had the right to assume that the other would keep out of the way at its or his peril, although the defendant might rightly demand that the horse and wagon should not unreasonably delay on the track. [3] The motorman was bound under the law to keep a lookout for vehicles on the street. If he sees a vehicle on the track ahead, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have done so, it is his duty to bring his car under such control as to avoid a collision if the driver of the vehicle shall not leave the track. The rule is applicable to all vehicles, and, whenever overtaking another in its line of progress and a possible obstacle in the way, a proper regard for the rights of others requires that the car be reduced to such control that it may be immediately brought to a standstill if necessary. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Haight, 59 N. J. Law, 577, 37 Atl. 135; Camden, etc., Ry. Co. v. Preston, 59 N. J. Law, 264, 35 Atl. 1119; La Pontney v. Shedden Cartage Co., 116 Mich. 514, 74 N. W. 712; Vincent v. Norton & Taunton Traction Co., 180 Mass. 104, 61 N. E. 822; Robinson v. Louisville Ry. Co., 112 Fed. 484, 50 C. C. A. 357; Greene v. Louisville Ry. Co., 119 Ky. 862, 84 S. W. 1154, 7 Ann. Cas. 1126. The law is accurately stated in 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 70: "While it is the duty of vehicles moving along street railway tracks to leave the tracks on the approach of cars, so as not to obstruct their passage, still those in charge of the cars must use reasonable diligence to prevent collisions, and the company is liable for injuries resulting from their failure to do so. Thus, where a vehicle is seen moving on the tracks ahead of a car, the motorman, gripman, or driver should bring his car under control, if possible, so as to avoid a collision if the driver of the vehicle fails to leave the track; but he is not required to bring the car to a stop unless the vehicle is sufficiently near to be reasonably considered in a position of danger. It has been held that, where a street car approaching from the rear runs down a wagon driving along the track, this is of itself sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the street railway company, in the absence of special circumstances excusing such act, to carry the question to the jury. Where a street car is approaching from the rear a veing the car has not the right to proceed without hicle moving along the track, the person operatregard to the presence of the vehicle, in anticipation that the vehicle will leave the track in time to give free passage to the car." As to the duty to keep a lookout and avoid injury to one on the track, see Barry v. Burlington Ry. & Light Co., 119 Iowa, 62, 93 N. W. 68, 95 N. W. 229; Doherty v. Railway, 137 Iowa, 358, 114 N. W. 183; Remillard v. Railway, 138 Iowa, 565, 115 N. W. 900; Doran v. Railway, 117 Iowa, 442, 90 N. W. 815. McCormick v. Railway & Light Co., 146 Iowa, 119, 124 N. W. 889, on which appellee seems to rely, is not in point, for there the plaintiff undertook to cross the track, and at no time was driving along the track before the car in the same direction. Of course, the motorman must have seen the person in peril on the track ahead in time to have avoided a collision, according to the majority in Bourrett v. Railway, 152 Iowa, 579, 132 N. W. 973, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 957, but on the duty to keep a lookout and a clear field of vision may be based a finding that he did see in a suit against a street railway. Barry v. Burlington Ry. & Light Co., supra, and McCormick v. Railway, supra. Why this is not so when the action is against a steam railway company, see majority opinion in Bourrett v. Railway, supra. [4] In the case at bar plaintiff was not negligent in driving his wagon on the track. He had the right to the use of the entire street, including the tracks.. As against the car approaching from behind, he would have done his duty had he driven from the track as soon as he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of its near approach. The plaintiff testified he did not know that it was coming until he turned to signal. But the gong was sounding, and, had he been giving any attention, he must have heard, as no diverting circumstances were proven. He must be assumed to have been aware, in going on the track, that cars were likely to come up back of him, and it was as much his duty to keep a lookout for cars as of the defendant's employés for vehicles. But their facilities were superior to his, as he must have looked back, while the motorman faced in the direction both were moving; and, though plaintiff must have been held to have been negligent in not making way for the car, this would not necessarily excuse defendant's employé. [5, 6] Neglect of the duty on plaintiff's part is not a good defense to the action, unless it contributed proximately to the injury. If defendant's employé knew that plaintiff was continuing on the track, even though negligently, this did not exonerate such employé from taking into account plaintiff's situation, and keeping this in mind in managing his car, and, notwithstanding such situation,, 2. BROKERS 94-REAL ESTATE BROKERS— AUTHORITY TO SELL. exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision. Bruggeman v. Railway, 147 Iowa, 187, 123 [7-9] As plaintiff was driving on a "little trot," the motorman was not required to stop his car, but merely to slow down; and, but for the tug falling, likely this would have been all that was necessary before the wagon left the track. For all that appears, the speed of the car was so reduced. The testimony that it was moving as cars generally did over the city proved nothing, for the speed of these differ in different localities and according to circumstances. Though to testify to the speed of a car a witness need not be an expert, he must be shown to have known something of the subject of which he speaks. In the absence of evidence, we must asume that the car was moving at a lawful rate of speed at the time plaintiff gave the signal by raising his hand. Neither the [10] How fast he had been driving we are not advised, otherwise than that the horse was moving on "a little trot." It stopped suddenly when the tug fell. plaintiff nor the motorman had anticipated this. When he saw the wagon stop-and the jury might have found this to have been immediately-it was the motorman's duty to exercise ordinary diligence, measured by the circumstances, to bring his car to a standstill in time to avoid a collision. Whether he did so depends on the speed at which the car was moving, the grade of the street, and within what distance it might be stopped when so moving at such a grade. None of these elements were proven, and there is no basis on which to predicate a finding as to whether the motorman was negligent in not avoiding the collison. For these reasons, there was no error in directing the verdict, and the judgment is affirmed. Ordinarily a real estate agent has merely authority to find a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy on the owner's terms, or such as are acceptable to him, and he has no authority to sell, except by inference from unequivocal expression to such effect. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec, Dig. 94.1 3. BROKERS 94-REAL ESTATE BROKERS— AUTHORITY TO "SELL." Even where the words "for sale" or "sell" are used in connection with employment of a real estate broker, the agency is not necessarily to be construed as one to sell, but the circumstances may be such that finding a purchaser to whom the principal may sell is intended. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. 94. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Sell.] 4. BROKERS 94-REAL ESTATE BROKERSAUTHORITY TO SELL. A real estate agent may be given authority to execute a contract of sale for his principal, but it is an additional power not to be inferred from that to find a purchaser or to negotiate the terms of sale. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. 8 136; Dec. Dig. 94.] 5. BROKERS 94-REAL ESTATE BROKERS— AUTHORITY TO SELL. Where a real estate broker wrote the owner of land that he had been offered so much per acre and thought he could coax the buyer up, requesting to be informed if the land was for sale soon, stating his own commission, to which the owner responded that he did not know the value of the land, but that he would sell it, and asked the broker to make him an offer, to which the broker answered stating that he might coax the customer, again naming his commission and promising to do all he could, the owner answering that he was willing to pay the commission., but that he could not take less than a higher price, and writing again, to the broker's letter that he had a definite offer, that he would sell for $100 more, such broker acted without authority in attaching the owner's name to a written contract of sale at the terms accepted by the owner, since he was a mere go-between, EVANS, C. J., and GAYNOR and SAL negotiating between the parties to get them toINGER, JJ., concur. DODD v. GROOS. (No. 30625.) (Supreme Court of Iowa. March 17, 1916.) 1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER 16(1) CONTRACT-ACCEPTANCE. Where the agent of a landowner negotiating its sale wrote to the owner naming an offered price and stating that the deferred payment was to be "a first mortgage of $6,000 at 5 per cent. for 5 or 10 years optional," understanding he was stating definite terms, and the seller expressed readiness to accept "the terms as suggested." provided that the purchase price be increased by $100, a contract resulted whereby the purchaser reserved to himself the right to elect whether the deferred payment to be secured by mortgage should be made in 5 or 10 years, the agent's proposal to the owner being sufficiently definite so that its acceptance constituted a contract. gether on terms. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. 136; Dec. Dig. 94.] 6. BROKERS 94 REAL ESTATE BROKERAUTHORITY. Where an owner of lands authorized a broker, endeavoring to negotiate their sale, to make the contract therefor at certain terms, stating nothing as to the place of paying interest on the purchase money mortgage or of furnishing the abstract, the conditions of the contract, stipulating that the interest should be paid at Gilmore City and that the owner should furnish a merchantable abstract, were in excess of the broker's authority. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. 94.] 7. BROKERS 94-REAL ESTATE BROKERSUNAUTHORIZED CONDITIONS OF CONTRACTWAIVER. Where a broker executed a contract containing conditions unauthorized by the owner rela[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Vendor and tive to the place of payment of mortgage interest Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 17; Dec. Dig. and the furnishing of a merchantable abstract, 16(1).] the purchaser could not render the contract For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes valid by waiving such conditions 7 months after the sale was to be consummated. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. 8 136; Dec. Dig. 94.] 8. ESTOPPEL 58-ESTOPPEL IN PAIS. Where the purchaser of land, prior to being informed of the seller's other grounds for refusing to perform, did not act in any manner to his prejudice in reliance upon the seller's refusal to perform because of his wife's refusal to consent, the seller was not estopped to set up other grounds in the purchaser's suit for specific performance. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. 88 144, 145; Dec. Dig. 58.1 9. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 189(1)—LIABILITY ON CONTRACT-PLEADING RATIFICATION. In suit by a principal on his agent's unauthorized contract, ratification thereof may be relied on without pleading it, since the ratification of an unauthorized act of an agent relates back to its inception, and may be alleged as the act of the principal. agreement was entered into through the correspondence and oral acceptance of defendants' proposition, that plaintiff paid Whittman $500 down according to the terms of the agreement, $420 of which was sent to Groos and $80 was retained by Whittman as commission, that thereupon such agreement was reduced to writing, but some conditions of a printed form were included by oversight inconsistent with the above arrangement, that "both plaintiff and defendant were mistaken as to both the fact and as to the legal effect of said printed stipulations, and that if necessary, in order to enforce the actual contract entered into for the purchase and sale of said real estate, said written contract should be reformed by striking therefrom all stipulations and terms which are prejudicial to the rights and interests of the defendant herein, and which are not included in said correspondence." It was further alleged that thereafter defendant repudiated the transaction, that plaintiff is ready, able, and willdefendant had refused. The prayer is for a ing to perform, but though requested so to do decree that the written contract be reformed so as to conform to the agreement through correspondence, and as so reformed be enforced. The answer and reply were such as to present the following issues: (1) Was the proposition made by plaintiff through Whittman one which exacted only an acceptance to complete a contract? (2) Was the agent Whittman authorized to enter into the written contract for defendant with the purchaser? (3) If so, can plaintiff, by waiving conditions of the written contract, other than those Action for specific performance of an al-embodied in the correspondence, insist on leged contract for the sale of land resulted in decree as prayed. The defendant appeals. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. § 713; Dec. Dig. 189(1).] 10. BROKERS 103-REAL ESTATE BROKERS -UNAUTHORIZED CONTRACT-RATIFICATION BY RETENTION OF PAYMENT. A real estate broker, agent for a landowner merely to find a purchaser, was not authorized to receive payment of the part of the price to be paid down, authority to convey as well as to sell being requisite in order to warrant payment to the agent, so that the owner, repudiating the transaction, did not in effect retain the payment made the agent and forwarded to him, thus ratifying the contract, where he returned it to the agent, as the purchaser, in giving it to the broker, employed him to forward the money. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 147; Dec. Dig. 103.] Appeal from District Court, Humboldt County; D. F. Coyle, Judge. Reversed. Maurice O'Connor, of Ft. Dodge, for appellant. Healy & Thomas, of Ft. Dodge, for appellee. LADD, J. The defendant, Groos, residing at San Antonio, Tex., owned 80 acres of land near Pioneer. The plaintiff claims to have purchased said land through defendant's agent, J. F. Whittman. In his petition, filed February 20, 1914, he prayed for the specific performance of a written contract to which Whittman attached Groos' name by himself as agent. This contract, among other things, exacted the payment of $6,000 of the purchase price 10 years after March 1, 1914, with interest payable at Gilmore Exchange Bank, Gilmore City, Iowa, and that plaintiff "furnish an abstract showing good merchantable title on last-mentioned date." After the hearing had commenced and on October 10, 1914, plaintiff filed an amended and substituted petition alleging that he purchased of defendant the 80 acres for $960 by written contract executed by Whittman in pursuance of authority given him in the correspondence hereinafter set out, that a binding the specific performance of the latter? And (4) did defendant by asserting that his wife would not consent to the sale waive all other grounds and thereby estop himself from pleading other grounds in defense? Another issue is involved, though not specially pleaded: (5) Whether defendant in mailing the check and drafts back to Whittman, instead of Dodd, defendant ratified the written contract. II. The decision of these issues necessarily depends on the evidence adduced. On July 23, 1914, J. F. Whittman wrote Groos that a man from the east had offered $100 per acre for his land, and that he thought "we can coax him up to about 105," and requested to be informed if his land was for sale soon as the man would go back and stated his commission would be $1 per acre. Groos responded that he did not know the value of the land, but would sell it, and asked Whittman to make him an offer. Whittman responded by saying the improvements were poor, the land not tiled, and might be assessed for ditch to be excavated north of it, that he might coax the customer to $110, and asked for price and terms, again named his commission and promised to do all he could for him, and inclosed a circular with For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes prices on several farms. Groos acknowledged receipt of this, stated that land was part tiled, that he could not take less than $120 per acre, that he was willing to pay the commission, and, though he preferred cash, would take a mortgage at 5 per cent., adding "the terms depend sometimes a great deal on the buyer." In response to this Whittman wrote on August 13, 1914: "I have an offer on it $9,500. The party will give $500 now to bind contract and $3.000 March 1, 1913, and a 1st mortgage of $6,000 at 5% for 5 or 10 years optional. That is pay on any interest pay day $1,000.00 or more. Now then if you want to sell on these terms let me know at once as this party is going to buy soon." He advised that the deal was a good one and requested that if he would not do this he state his best terms, and added that "Mr. Dodd, of Humboldt, is the party who wants to buy." Groos answered August 16th saying: 99 "The terms as offered are not the most suitable, but I will agree to accept the terms as suggested in your letter providing the party will pay $9,600 for the place or $120 per acre.' Whittman exhibited this letter to Dodd, who said to him, "I will take the farm today," and handed him $50 in currency with the understanding that as soon as he got the contract for him he would tender the balance. Thereupon Whittman wrote on August 19th: "Your letter of August 16th rec'd and I 'phoned my man at once. He will take the place at $9.600.00, $120.00 per acre, terms as per my letter of August 13th. Will send you check and contract as soon as we can have same drawn up. I will enclose herewith check $50.00 to bind contract for the man, as he asked me to do this contract will follow also ck less my commission which is $80.00. $1.00 per acre.' Whittman testified that he employed Van Alstine to draw a contract, that it was signed in duplicate on the same day when Dodd handed him an additional $450 in currency. The contract bears date August 19, 1914, but was acknowledged by Whittman August 23d following, was mailed to Groos August 27th and recorded September 2d. On August 27th Whittman wrote: "Enclosed find contract also draft for three hundred and seventy and 00-100 ($370.00) for payment as per contract, $50.00 mailed you August 19th and enclosed $370. and receipt for $80 my commission, which completes the $500 payment as per contract." Groos answered the previous letter August 29th. "Your letter of Aug. 19th with enclosed check of $50.00 as payment on farm came to hand. Will herewith enclose same check and return it to you and will say that my wife will not consent to the selling of our place and never was in favor of it when I first offered it for $120.00 per acre, she feels that we ought to keep it as it is a safe investment and always brings in a nice income. I am also in receipt of a letter from a law firm and land agency of Humboldt, Iowa, saying that I had offered my place much to cheap. "I acted hasty and without first consulting my wife when I first offered the place for sale, it may be that in the future or within a year or to that I can convince my wife that it will be best to sell." On September 1st Groos wrote, returning the draft for $370 and the contract: "Your communication of Aug. 27th 1913 with enclosed contract, draft of $370.00 and receipt of 80.00 came to hand last Saturday. You have no doubt received by this time my former letter with returned check of $50.00 and informing you that I desire to reject the entire matter pertaining to the selling of my land and also stated the reasons. "The part of the contract which reads that a mortgage will be given on March 1st 1914 in the sum of $6000.00 drawing interest at 5% per annum and maturing on March 1st 1924, that part is objectionable it is to long a time to accept a mortgage at such small interest for so many years, it should have been 6% for such a long time as ten years, and then $120.00 per acre would be selling the place about $10.00 per acre to cheap. "It is not necessary for me to say more now in regard to this matter as I stated my other reasons for not wanting to sell, in my former let ter.' Whittman responded September 3d: "Enclosed find draft for $50.00 in place of check mailed you on August 19th which you returned August 29. Now, then Mr. Groos, I sold your land according to your written instructions and sent you the payment down less my $1.00 per acre. I made a written contract of sale and same is recorded. You cannot sell to anybody else. "If you repudiate your contract the buyer will at once begin suit for a deed and if you fail to deed the Clerk of the Court will make a deed. If your wife refuses to sign, one-third of purchase price will be held by the Clerk until she does." Groos' final letter of September 10, 1913, reads: "Replying to your favor of September 3d I herewith return draft unaccepted. I find that my place is worth more and that I can secure more than the price you mentioned to me that it was worth. It occurs to me that you did not act fair toward me in representing same to be of the value you did; as you well knew or had means of knowing that it was worth at least $8.00 or $10.00 per acre more. Further, I did not authorize you to make any contract with the buyer or to sign my name thereto; and I repudiate any such contract. The terms you made for me are not acceptable to me, as I would want at least one-half cash if I sold it to anybody. "From what I learn about land values from adjoining property owners to mine, you know that my property is worth considerably more; and I have had better offers since hearing from you. But I am not disposed to sell at this time. "But, to show I am fair to you for your efforts, without admitting or adopting any act you have made, I am willing to give you the sum of $80.00 for your services in trying to secure a purchaser for the land. The price you suggested is unfair and unreasonable; and if I sold the land, I would want what was fair and right." At Dodd's instance Whittman addressed Groos on February 5, 1914, as follows: "Mr. Dodd ask me to write you in regard 'Abstract' he would like that you send same to Bank here that he can have same examined as contract calls for settlement Mar. 1st, 1914. "And Mr. Dodd ask me deliver the land he bought so I guess it will be up to you to deliver the goods. "Kindly let me hear from you." [1] III. It will be noticed that as part of the terms proposed in Whittman's letter of August 13th, the deferred payment was to be "a first mortgage of $6,000 at 5% for 5 or 10 years optional." Groos responded by saying | are used in connection with the employment the terms were satisfactory if he were paid of a real estate broker, the agency is not an additional $100 for the land. Would an necessarily to be construed that to sell, but acceptance of this complete the contract or the circumstances may be such that finding a were further negotiations as to the time of purchaser to whom the principal may sell is the maturity of the mortgage required to intended. Ford v. Easley, 88 Iowa, 603, 55 complete the contract? This necessarily de- N. W. 336; Bird v. Phillips, 115 Iowa, 703, 87 pends on whether such time, 5 or 10 years N. W. 414. A real estate agent may be given after March 1, 1914, was optional with the authority to execute a contract for his prinpurchaser or seller. The matter involved cipal, but it is an additional power not to be something to be done by the purchaser. The inferred from that to find a purchaser or to agent was stating what he would do, and, negotiate the terms of sale. Holmes v. Redafter having done so, he added, "Now if you head, 104 Iowa, 399, 73 N. W. 878; Nelson want to sell on these terms let me know." v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 162 Iowa, He then understood he was stating definite 50, 143 N. W. 833; Balkema v. Searle, 116 terms, and the seller so treated the proposi- Iowa, 374, 89 N. W. 1087; Brandrup v. Brittion, for he expressed his readiness to accept ten, 11 N. D. 376, 92 N. W. 453; Larson v. "the terms as suggested," provided the pur- O'Hara, 98 Minn. 71, 107 N. W. 821, 116 Am. chase price be increased $100. The purchaser St. Rep. 342, 8 Ann. Cas. 849, and cases in merely reserved to himself the right to note. The decisions are quite generally to elect whether the deferred payment to be se- the effect that a written contract for the sale cured by first mortgage should be made in 5 of land which the agent has signed on the or 10 years from date. The proposition was parol authority of his principal is not within sufficiently definite so that acceptance ac- the statute of frauds, and may be enforced. ceded to such an election and with such prop- Brandon v. Pritchett, 126 Ga. 286, 55 S. E. osition would constitute a contract. 241, 7 Ann. Cas. 1093, and note in which cases are collected. For this reason such authority is not to be implied, unless necessary to enable the agent to perform the service he has been employed to render. IV. The purchaser Dodd testified that the written contract was the only one he understood he had with plaintiff, and in both the original and the amended and substituted petition the prayer is for the enforcement of that contract. A question of vital importance then is whether Whittman was authorized to execute the written contract by signing Groos' name thereto. If any authority there was, it must be inferred from the correspondence between them. This necessarily depends on the intention of the owner in engaging the agent, whether the latter was actually to sell the land or merely find a purchaser therefor. In the first two letters Whittman pretended to have a customer (of whom he knew nothing at the trial) whom he might coax to pay $105 per acre (first letter) or $110 per acre (second letter), and he mentioned the commission he would require. [5] For this reason the weight of authority seems to deny the right of an agent employed to sell to enter into a written contract with the purchaser, on the ground that many matters which the owner must determine necessarily are involved in making such an agreement. Halsey v. Monteiro, 92 Va. 581, 24 S. E. 258; Larson v. O'Hara, supra. Contra, Vanada's Heirs v. Hopkins Adm'r, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 285, 19 Am. Rep. 92. It is unnecessary to pass on this question now for what was said in the letters cannot be tortured into the direction to the agent to enter into contract of sale. He was the "go-between," negotiating between the parties to get them together on terms. He acted with[2-4] In answer to the last Groos stated his out authority in attaching Groos' name to the lowest price and indicated that he would give written contract. See Weatherhead v. Ettime on part of it. Whittman then wrote tinger, 78 Ohio St. 104, 84 N. E. 598, 17 L. R. that Dodd had offered $9,500, and stated the A. (N. S.) 210, and extended note. The corterms of the offer. Groos replied that upon respondence in Hopwood v. Corbin, 63 Iowa, the payment of $100 more he would agree to 218, 18 N. W. 911, is not in conflict with conaccept. Dodd said he would take the land, clusion, for there the correspondence was and paid the earnest money exacted. Noth-construed to direct the agent to sell the land. ing was said concerning a sale of the land by [6] V. Some of the conditions in the conWhittman, and the only inference to be tract were in excess of Whittman's authority, drawn from the correspondence is that he even if he had had the right to attach his was negotiating with a possible purchaser principals' name thereto. He could only inand would exact a commission if he found sert conditions proposed and accepted in any one on terms acceptable to Groos. Ordinarily event. Nothing had been said of the place a real estate agent's only duty is to find a of paying the interest or furnishing the abpurchaser ready, able, and willing to buy on stract. The contract stipulated that the inthe owner's terms or such as are acceptable terest should be paid at Gilmore City, and to him, and he is not to be held to have au- that Gross should furnish a merchantable thority to sell, unless this is to be inferred abstract. These conditions were in excess from unequivocal expression to that effect. of authority. Knox v. McMurray, 159 Iowa, Even where the words "for sale" or "sell" | 171, 140 N. W. 652; Hunt v. Tuttle, 133 Iowa, |