6 Convention at first protective on both sides; became non-protective in 1828; terminable after six months' notice.

7 Continuable by its own terms; terminable on year's notice.

8 As to reciprocity articles only.

9 By act of Congress-repealable.

10 To be revised, if desired, after five years.

11 Abrogated by treaty, 1853.

Ind.-Term Is "indefinite," but terminable after year's notice.
Italics.-Countries we now have agreements with.

None. No term stated.

*Notice of annulment given by Nicaragua, Oct. 24, 1901.

STATUS OF TREATIES.

In eighty-seven years we have made agreements with fortytwo different countries. We have such agreements now with twenty-three countries. There have been fourteen agreements terminated by eleven foreign nations. Of those marked "None," signifying no term, only two are now in force. The two having "Ind." terms-the British of 1828 and the Danish of 1858 are terminable on a year's notice. Where reciprocity articles have been put into treaties proper, they generally stand for a term of years, subject thereafter to notice and abrogation. In other cases, except in two instances, the treaty as a whole may be terminated by notice. The reciprocity in British colonies, except as to the East Indies, stands upon statute law-repealable. There is no convention for full reciprocity with Great Britain.

THE GAINERS BY OUR LOSS OF CARRIAGE.

We note in the table that our carriage culminated in 182526. Up to this time only three nations-Great Britain, Sweden-Norway and France had reciprocity agreements, and the Netherlands had an act, which affected the direct trade only. In 1815, 1816 and 1817 British arrivals increased greatly, threatening a larger loss of American carriage; but our acts of 181820 cut down British arrivals materially. The other reciprocators gave us little competition before our carriage culminated. Our damaging competition came from the British in the beginning and after 1829; and the advantage of partial reciprocity, for a few years, was more than offset by our acts of 1818-20. It was after the act for full reciprocity and the opening of ports, mutually, with England in 1830, that we may fix the point of permanent decline of our carriage. The figures of proportionate arrivals corroborate this.

By the columns of proportionate carriage in the table our percentage in 1830 was 93.6 for imports, 86.3 for exports. Ten years afterward, with eighteen countries cutting into our carrying trade, the figures were down to 86.6 for imports, to 79.9 for exports; in 1850 we had reciprocity with twenty-five countries, and the figures lowered-77.8 for imports, 65.5 for exports. At the opening of the Civil War, 1861, discriminating duties nearly all suspended-the figures stood at 60 for imports and 72.1 for exports-the latter raised from efforts of merchants to get cargoes out of the country. Thus, in thirtyfive years, our average loss of carriage had been, for imports one per cent, for exports half of one per cent annually.

Unaware of these facts speculative persons have attributed the loss of our carrying trade to our use of wooden sailing ships, to the British use of iron steamers, and to the high tariff since 1861, but our decline was well under way before the day of iron ships or the use of steamers, and many years before the

war.

THE IMPOLICY OF RECIPROCITY.

One great failing of reciprocity has been that it presumed to equalize footing in navigation, but did not. It equalized footing-in-law at the custom house, but there is a footing-infact that it never touched and cannot lay hands on. It was our footing-in-law that we depended on to equalize footingin-fact. Removing it and tying up Congress, it was open to foreign nations to improve their footing-in-fact by all sorts of protections that did not spring from the government—even some that did so spring-subsidy, for instance. Not a single shipping nation is now depending upon reciprocity, which is simply non-protection at the custom house, but all are applying footing-in-fact protections, making it impossible for a nation not resorting to these "aids" or instrumentalities, or to regulations of trade, to hold its own in competition.

In the PROTECTIONIST magazine for February last the writer demonstrated that the Constitution of the United States provided Congress with power to regulate commerce in the interest of navigation, but did not provide authority to tax the country for subsidy support to the freighting marine. The logic of our situation is, therefore, to return to our early policy under the power of the Constitution, but if we adhere to reciprocity this cannot be done. Citizens preferring "aid" from the Treas

ury to trade regulations tell us we must stick to reciprocity. This we can do, but the Constitution bars the "aid." Reciprocity is perfectly useless to us, the constitutional course is the only one, if we want an adequate marine.

THE "TREATY" HINDRANCE.

It has been a fine argument for subsidy support that "treaties stand in the way" of resuming our early policy. We have shown already that one-fourth of the countries with whom we made maritime reciprocity agreements, for a limited time, have freed themselves of their obligations in a legal manner. We were not offended. Every nation profiting from our diplomatic bonds would doubtless be pleased with their continuance, but our first duty is to the interest of our own people. Under our Constitution and under our practice the power of Congress to supersede treaties and conventions by enactments is indisputable.

That our true policy is the regulation of our commerce is beyond question. We have but two treaties in which reciprocity is not limited by time-those with Liberia and Argentina. Last year only one sail vessel of the Argentina flag entered one of our ports and paid $17.97 in tonnage tax, and no vessel of the Liberian flag entered. Under the discriminating duties bill vessels coming from their own countries, with their own country's productions, would not pay such duty. This provision will avoid friction with many countries, and much reduce it with all countries. Our conventions have all exceeded their time and may all be terminated under their own provisions in one year. We once had a convention for commercial reciprocity with Canada. We terminated it lawfully. No difficulty followed. Be it remembered, we were twentysix years without a single agreement for maritime reciprocity. In that time we produced our early marine, the equal of any in the world. We agreed with Great Britain not to exercise the power of Congress for the regulation of our commerce, and consequently our shipping in the foreign trade has been swept away. If we will not now annul this and like agreements and reverse our policy, as the world can see, we must love subordination and subservience to British power.

IMPROBABILITY OF RETALIATION.

It has been objected that "retaliation" awaits us the moment

we take proper means to regain our place at sea; that subsidies would be tolerated, but regulations of commerce would be resented. While this has been used as an argument for government aid, its force lies chiefly in the cowardice from which it springs. This argument has many times been urged against the enactment of high tariff rates, but has never been effective in fixing low rates. It should have no influence whatever in respect to shipping. There is no nation that can afford to say to the United States, "Your Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate foreign commerce, so as to encourage the possession of an American marine, but if this power shall be exercised we will retaliate and resist your measures with all our might." In what would justification be found?

Look out upon the sea. Are there any flags there, but our own, unprotected? Has not every nation, whose government or people think its marine in need of encouragement, taken such steps as it is believed will secure its continuance on the ocean? The nations now paying bounties will one day give them up-probably in the first war which they have, if their taxpayers do not sooner object. When this happens regulations of trade will follow.

But England-what of England? Will she ever consent to our encouragement of navigation by proper means? If she must she will. The relations of the two nations have greatly changed. We now feed England. She must continue her food dependence. She must have our cotton also. She may bluster, but she will restrain the "dogs of war." Why should England longer strive to curb and cramp American shipping power? She knows that if we are true to ourselves she cannot. Our developed resources have made our friendship too valuable to be rejected. Why should England, having a most effectivę system of ship protection, complain of us for a few regulations in the interest of our own marine? Before attacking us, will she not consider if she has the justification? Let us recapitulate her system:

1. An efficient steam mail subsidy policy, for intercourse with the world in British ships.

2. A naval reserve subvention policy in support of steam lines for the engrossment of British commerce with the United States.

3. Lloyds discriminative ship inspection, prejudicial to foreign vessels, particularly if foreign built.