[(1)] (2) "Foreign government" means the government of a foreign country, irrespective of recognition by the United States. (3) "Foreign official" means (A) a Chief of State or the political equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Ambassador, Foreign Minister, or other officer of Cabinet rank or above of a foreign government or the chief executive officer of an international organization, or any person who has previously served in such capacity, and any member of his family, while in the United States; and (B) any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. (4) "Internationally protected person" means— (A) a Chief of State or the political equivalent, head of government, or Foreign Minister whenever such person is in a country other than his own and any member of his family accompanying him; or (B) any other representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States Government, a foreign government, or international organization who at the time and place concerned is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection against attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity, and any member of his family then forming part of his household. [(2)] (5) "International organization” means a public international organization designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288). [(4)] (6) "Official guest" means a citizen or national of a foreign country present in the United States as an official guest of the [government] Government of the United States pursuant to designation as such by the Secretary of State. (c) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if the alleged offender is present within the United States, irrespective of the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender. As used in this subsection, the United States includes all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of this title and section 101 (34) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1301 (34)). (d) In the course of enforcement of this section and any other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate this section, the Attorney General may request assistance from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding. CHAPTER 55.-KIDNAPPING § 1201. Kidnaping. (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when: (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce; (2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; (3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 101 (32) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49) U.S.C. 1301 (32)); or (4) the person is a foreign official [as defined in section 1116(b) or an official guest as], an internationally protected person, or an official guest as those terms are defined in section 1116【(c) (4)] (b) of this title. shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. (b) With respect to subsection (a) (1), above, the failure to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable presumption that such person has been transported to interstate or foreign commerce. (c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any terms of years or for life. (d) Whoever attempts to violate subsection (a) (4) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years. (e) If the victim of an offense under subsection (a) is an internationally protected person, the United States may exercise jurisdiction over the offense if the alleged offender is present within the United States, irrespective of the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender. As used in this subsection, the United States includes all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including any of the places within the provisions of sections 5 and 7 of this title and section 101 (34) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C.1301 (34)); (f) In the course of enforcement of subsection (a) (4) and any other sections prohibiting a conspiracy or attempt to violate subsection (a) (4), the Attorney General may request assistance from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding. ! DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, HON. DON EDWARDS OF CALIFORNIA, HON. JOHN CONYERS, AND HON. THOMAS N. KINDNESS We regretfully dissent from the Committee's approval of H.R. 15552. This bill is primarily designed to implement U.S. treaty obligations with respect to two international conventions on terrorism; 1 to the extent it does so, we support it. The bill, however, goes beyond what is necessary to carry out these treaties and includes provisions that seriously infringe on constitutional freedoms. We believe that the bill should have been recommitted so its vague, unconstitutional provisions could have been redrafted.2 One of the most serious problems with the bill is that it punishes peaceable assembly. Section 5 makes it a crime for a person "to congregate with two or more persons with an intent to violate" the provisions of the bill. All that is punishable is intent, not action. Thus, under this bill, three people who peaceably stand in a silent vigil outside the U.N. or a foreign embassy to protest events in South Africa, the Soviet Union, Arab countries or elsewhere, can be arrested. Moreover, the "congregating" provision is hopelessly ambiguous. It is not clear how many of the three people must intend to violate the act. Further, how is a person to know what is in the mind of the person next to him? The "congregating" provision is not required by the international conventions. It is unconstitutional and senseless and should be stricken. A second problem is that the bill punishes innocent conduct. Section 5 makes it a crime to "obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his duties." In addition, "foreign official" is broadly defined to include families and employees of diplomats. Take the case of an American policeman who attempts to arrest a diplomat's chauffeur for drunken driving or the supermarket manager who detains an ambassador's cook in the supermarket for suspected shoplifting. The policeman and the store manager intend to detain the foreign chauffeur or cook and, for the time being, to stop him or her from carrying on official duties, but they are not acting for the purpose of harassment, intimidation, coercion or the like. Nonetheless, the literal terms of the bill do not preclude such a result. Careful drafting could have avoided this absurd result. "Obstruction" that results from lawful or constitutional action should not be penalized. "Obstruction" that is the result of efforts to threaten or harm ought to be punished. The Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance was agreed to by the Organization of American States on February 2, 1971. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons was adopted by the United Nations Assembly and signed by the United States in December 1973. Since these conventions have been signed for three and five years respectively, an additional day or two to perfect the vague language should do no great harm. Furthermore, the bill by penalizing "harassment" of foreign officials, without defining the term, subjects Americans to arrest for such constitutionally protected acts as heckling or booing a foreign representative who makes a public speech. Since harassment is such a vague term, whether a person is arrested may depend on the boiling point of particular foreign officials. The Committee's rationale for these provisions is that they are better than the present language of the present law (18 U.S.C. 112). Granted, the present provisions of Section 112 of Title 18 are terrible. Nonetheless, the Committee should have redrafted this bill to "improve" Section 112 in a way that does not abridge constitutional freedoms. The Committee's rationale-trying to improve the present lawbreaks down, however, with respect to Section 7 of the bill. In amending Section 970 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the bill makes present law worse. The current statute makes it a crime to injure, damage or destroy real or personal property belonging to a foreign government. Its scope and objective are unoffensive. But, under the guise of wanting to protect foreign officials from smoke bombs or persons who chain themselves to trees in front of the embassies, the present bill has broadened the definition of criminal activity to cover innocent or constitutionally protected actions that in no way interfere with the personal liberty. safety or official business of foreign emissaries. Thus, Section 7 of the bill punishes anyone who "forcibly thrusts any part of himself or any object" onto premises owned by foreign governments with an intent to harass. Premises used by foreign gov ernments for official business, including businesses like airlines or tourist offices, are covered. Thus, someone who walks into the offices of Aeroflot (the U.S.S.R.'s airline) or the South African Tourist Office, says nothing, and walks right out, could be committing a crime if he or she has the intention to harass. We strongly deplore recent episodes of international terrorism and support international efforts to deal with these problems. The conventions involved here require the United States only to enact legisla tion to protect foreign officials and guests from murder, violent attack. assault, kidnaping or threats. These conventions do not require the wholesale infringement of constitutionally protected activities found in this bill. It is disingenuous to use the excuse of implementing treaties to enact statutes that punish peaceable assembly and such vague acts as "harassment", "forcible thrusts" and "obstruction". We hope that the bill can be amended to solve these problems. о ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN. PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT SEPTEMBER 18, 1976.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed Mr. STAGGERS, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign REPORT together with MINORITY VIEWS [To accompany H.R. 13000] The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 13000) to provide for the protection of franchised distributors and retailers of motor fuel; to prevent deterioration of competition in gasoline retailing; and to encourage conservation by requiring that information regarding the octane rating of automotive gasoline be disclosed to consumers, having considered the same, eport favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. The amendments are as follows: Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following: That this Act may be cited as the "Petroleum Marketing Practices Act". Sec. 101. Definitions. TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE I-FRANCHISE PROTECTION Sec. 102. Sanctity of franchise relationship-termination and failure to renow. Nee. 103. Trial franchise period-failure to renew. Sec. 104. Notification of termination or failure to renew. Sec. 105, Enforcement. Sec. 106. Relationship of this Act to State law. (1) |