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DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, HON. DON EDWARDS OF CALIFORNIA, HON. JOHN CONYERS, AND HON. THOMAS N. KINDNESS

We regretfully dissent from the Committee's approval of H.R. 15552. This bill is primarily designed to implement U.S. treaty obligations with respect to two international conventions on terrorism;1 to the extent it does so, we support it. The bill, however, goes beyond what is necessary to carry out these treaties and includes provisions that seriously infringe on constitutional freedoms. We believe that the bill should have been recommitted so its vague, unconstitutional provisions could have been redrafted."

One of the most serious problems with the bill is that it punishes peaceable assembly. Section 5 makes it a crime for a person "to congregate with two or more persons with an intent to violate" the provisions of the bill. All that is punishable is intent, not action.

Thus, under this bill, three people who peaceably stand in a silent vigil outside the U.N. or a foreign embassy to protest events in South Africa, the Soviet Union, Arab countries or elsewhere, can be arrested. Moreover, the "congregating" provision is hopelessly ambiguous. It is not clear how many of the three people must intend to violate the act. Further, how is a person to know what is in the mind of the person next to him?

The "congregating" provision is not required by the international conventions. It is unconstitutional and senseless and should be stricken. A second problem is that the bill punishes innocent conduct. Section 5 makes it a crime to "obstruct a foreign official in the performance of his duties." In addition, "foreign official" is broadly defined to include families and employees of diplomats.

Take the case of an American policeman who attempts to arrest a diplomat's chauffeur for drunken driving or the supermarket manager who detains an ambassador's cook in the supermarket for suspected shoplifting. The policeman and the store manager intend to detain the foreign chauffeur or cook and, for the time being, to stop him or her from carrying on official duties, but they are not acting for the urpose of harassment, intimidation, coercion or the like. Nonetheless, the literal terms of the bill do not preclude such a result.

Careful drafting could have avoided this absurd result. "Obstrucion" that results from lawful or constitutional action should not be enalized. "Obstruction" that is the result of efforts to threaten or arm ought to be punished.

1 The Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of imes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance was reed to by the Organization of American States on February 2, 1971. The Convention on e Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons was opted by the United Nations Assembly and signed by the United States in December 1973. 2 Since these conventions have been signed for three and five years respectively, an adtional day or two to perfect the vague language should do no great harm.

Furthermore, the bill by penalizing "harassment" of foreign officials. without defining the term, subjects Americans to arrest for such constitutionally protected acts as heckling or booing a foreign representative who makes a public speech. Since harassment is such a vague term, whether a person is arrested may depend on the boiling point of particular foreign officials.

The Committee's rationale for these provisions is that they are better than the present language of the present law (18 U.S.C. 112). Granted, the present provisions of Section 112 of Title 18 are terrible. Nonetheless, the Committee should have redrafted this bill to "improve" Section 112 in a way that does not abridge constitutional freedoms.

The Committee's rationale-trying to improve the present lawbreaks down, however, with respect to Section 7 of the bill. In amending Section 970 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the bill makes present law

worse.

The current statute makes it a crime to injure, damage or destroy real or personal property belonging to a foreign government. Its scope and objective are unoffensive. But, under the guise of wanting to protect foreign officials from smoke bombs or persons who chain themselves to trees in front of the embassies, the present bill has broadened the definition of criminal activity to cover innocent or constitutionally protected actions that in no way interfere with the personal liberty. safety or official business of foreign emissaries.

Thus, Section 7 of the bill punishes anyone who "forcibly thrusts any part of himself or any object" onto premises owned by foreign governments with an intent to harass. Premises used by foreign gov ernments for official business, including businesses like airlines or tourist offices, are covered. Thus, someone who walks into the offices of Aeroflot (the U.S.S.R.'s airline) or the South African Tourist Office, says nothing, and walks right out, could be committing a crime if he or she has the intention to harass.

We strongly deplore recent episodes of international terrorism and support international efforts to deal with these problems. The conventions involved here require the United States only to enact legisla tion to protect foreign officials and guests from murder, violent attack. assault, kidnaping or threats. These conventions do not require the wholesale infringement of constitutionally protected activities found in this bill. It is disingenuous to use the excuse of implementing treaties to enact statutes that punish peaceable assembly and such vague acts as "harassment", "forcible thrusts" and "obstruction". We hope that the bill can be amended to solve these problems.

ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN.
JOHN CONYERS.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS.
DON EDWARDS.

94TH CONGRESS | HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session

PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT

SEPTEMBER 18, 1976.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. STAGGERS, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 13000]

The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 13000) to provide for the protection of franchised distributors and retailers of motor fuel; to prevent deterioration. of competition in gasoline retailing; and to encourage conservation by requiring that information regarding the octane rating of automotive gasoline be disclosed to consumers, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

That this Act may be cited as the "Petroleum Marketing Practices Act"

Sec. 101. Definitions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE I-FRANCHISE PROTECTION

Sec. 102. Sanctity of franchise relationship-termination and failure to renew. Nee. 103. Trial franchise period-failure to renew.

Sec. 104. Notification of termination or failure to renew.

Sec. 105. Enforcement.

Sec. 196. Relationship of this Act to State law.

(1)

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(1) The term "distributor" means any person, including any affiliate of such person, who

(A) purchases motor fuel for sale, consignment, or distribution

to another; or

(B) receives motor fuel on consignment for consignment or distribution to his own motor fuel accounts.

Such term does not include any person who is an employee of another, or any person who solely provides motor fuel distribution services to the motor fuel accounts of another.

(2) The term "franchise” means any written or oral agreement

or contract

(A) between a refiner and a distributor,
(B) between a refiner and a retailer,

(C) between a distributor and another distributor, or
(D) between a distributor and a retailer,

under which a refiner or distributor (as the case may be) grants the authority for, or permits, a retailer or distributor to use, in connection with the sale, consignment, or distribution of motor fuel, a trademark, trade name, service mark, or other identifying symbol or name which is owned or controlled by such refiner or by a refiner which supplies motor fuel to the distributor which grants the authority for, or permits, such use. The term "franchise" includes any written or oral agreement or contract under which a retailer or distributor (as the case may be) is granted the authority, or permitted to occupy premises owned, leased, or in any way controlled by a refiner or by a distributor, which premises are to be employed in connection with the sale, consignment, or distribution of motor fuel under a trademark, trade name. service mark, or other identifying symbol or name which is owned or controlled by such refiner or by a refiner which supplies motor fuel to the distributor which grants the authority for, or permits, such occupancy. The term "franchise" includes any written or oral agreement or contract pertaining to the supply of motor fuel which is to be sold, consigned, or distributed under a trademark, trade name, service mark, or other identifying symbol or name which is owned or controlled by a refiner. The term "franchise" includes the unexpired portion of any franchise, as defined by the preceding sentences of this paragraph. which is transferred or assigned as authorized by the provisions of such franchise or by any applicable provision of State law which permits such transfer or assignment without regard to any provision of the franchise.

F

(3) The term "franchisor" means a refiner or distributor (as the case may be) who grants the authority for, or permits, a retailer or distributor to use, in connection with the sale, consignment, or distribution of motor fuel, a trademark, trade name, service mark, or other identifying symbol or name under a franchise.

(4) The term "franchisee" means a retailer or distributor (as the case may be) who is granted the authority, or permitted, to use, in connection with the sale, consignment, or distribution of motor fuel, a trademark, trade name, service mark, or other identifying symbol or name under a franchise.

(5) The term "refiner" means any person engaged in the refining of motor fuel, and includes any affiliate of such person.

(6) The term "retailer" means any person who purchases motor fuel for sale to the general public for ultimate consumption.

(7) The term "motor fuel" means gasoline and diesel fuel of a type distributed for use as a fuel in self-propelled vehicles designed primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways.

(8) The phrase "failure to comply" does not include

(A) any failure which is only technical or unimportant to the franchise relationship, or

(B) any failure for a cause beyond the reasonable control of the franchisee.

(9) The phrase "failure to renew" means a termination of a franchise

(A) at the conclusion of the term, or on the expiration date, stated in the franchise, or

(B) at any time in the case of a franchise which does not state a term or an expiration date.

(10) The term "affiliate" means any person who (other than by means of a franchise) controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, any other person.

·(11) The term "abandonment" means any failure of the franchisee (other than for a cause beyond the reasonable control of the franchise) to operate the premises, which are the subject of the franchise, for a period of at least 5 consecutive days, accompanied by evidence of the intent of the franchisee to terminate operation of such premises, such as the rmeoval of personal property of obvious value from such premises. The failure of the franchisee to furnish an explanation to the franchisor for such failure to operate such premises, within 10 days of commencement of such failure to operate such premises, shall create a presumption that the franchisee intends to terminate the franchise. (12) The term "relevant geographic market area" includes a State or a standard metropolitan statistical area as periodically established by the Office of Management and Budget.

(13) The term "termination" includes cancellation.

SANCTITY OF FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP TERMINATION AND FAILURE

TO RENEW

SEC. 102. (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), and section 103, no franchisor may terminate any franchise (entered into or renewed on or after the date of enactment of this Act) prior to the conclusion of the term, or the expiration date, stated in the franchise,

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