the manor, and subject therefore to the possibility of his exercising it, and in substance taking possession of the purchased lands, compensating and paying the purchasers for the same. Such is the effect of that case; but to apply that to the present case, and to allow mines to be worked in such a way as would necessarily put an end to the existence of a public highway, or to suppose that power was conferred on the mine owner to commit an indictable nuisance, by causing a public highway to sink below its original level, without his being bound to make compensation, or offering any remedy or redress to the ratepayers, and above all to the public, would clearly be to put a construction upon this award contrary to the principles of justice and good sense. The injury done, be it more or less, is such as to compel the plaintiffs, upon whom is cast by law the duty of keeping these roads in a fit state for the public use, to repair them, and they are consequently entitled to call upon the defendants to repay them the costs of such repairs. Under these circumstances and for the reasons I have given, the judg ment of the court must be in favour of the plaintiffs. CLEASBY, B.-I am of the same opinion. In the case which has been referred to by my Lord, there was a reservation and power with regard to the whole of the minerals regardless of the surface, and there was a power to take and use land in such a way as might be necessary for the purpose. But the question before us is different from any that has been considered, and its decision rests, I think, on entirely different considerations. We have in the present case an enactment set out in paragraph 3, that the commissioners shall "assign, set out, and appo.nt certain public highways and roads." Then it appears by paragraph 10 that the commissioners did by their award, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Parliament, set out the roads in question. As soon as that was done it had the unquestionable effect of an enactment, and the public had the right of user of the roads as public roads, and to pass over them from place to place without obstruction or interference. That right of free passage from place to place is one of the most important and essential rights of the public, and one than which none has been, or is, more carefully preserved and guarded. Anything therefore which interferes with that right, or with the free use of the highway, is unquestionably a public nuisance. How, when an Act of Parliament directs a public road to be made, can that Act be read as legalising such acts as create a public nuisance? It appears from paragraph 13 of the case that the roads "have sunk below their original level, and become, until repaired, dangerous to travel over." That is equivalent to a public nuisance. The question, therefore, distinctly arises, whether the same Act which created and appointed the roads also conferred the right to create a public nuisance upon them; and precisely the same question would arise with respect to another important matter, provided for by the same section of the Act which has been referred to, whereby the commissioners are also empowered to set out common wells and watering places, the water in which is thereby appropriated to the use of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. It would be a monstrous thing if it were possible that the defendants, or those exercising the rights reserved, [Ex. Div. could take away from the public the supply of water which the Act of Parliament intended them to have. But I think it is better to confine myself to the question before us, and that is the question of the roads. I would almost say that it is impossible to adopt any construction of words that should result in the conclusion that the same Act of Parliament that created a public highway legalised a public nuisance upon it, because every reservation of right, however worded, must, I should say, be read as subject to the public right, and as if such limitations were expressed. This appears to me to be sufficient for the conclusion at which we have arrived. I may say, with reference to the words in paragraph 5, "All mines, minerals, and quarries, of what nature or kind soever, lying and being within or under the said moors or commons intended to be divided and allotted as aforesaid," that I am by no means satisfied that the mines under the roads are not excluded by them; but upon the main point of the case I am clearly of opinion that there is nothing in the Act relied on by the defendants which entitles them to exercise their rights of mining in such a way as to interrupt or interfere with the full and free user of these highways by the public, and that consequently our judgment must be for the plaintiffs. Judgment for the plaintiffs. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Rogerson and Ford, agents for J. Booth, Durham. Solicitors for the defendants, Torr, Janeways, Torr, and Gribble, agents for Hodge and Harle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Friday, May 3, 1878. (Before KELLY, C.B. and POLLOCK, B.) APPEAL FROM INFERIOR COURT. Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), sects. 6, 12, 14, 15, 20 and 21-Summary conviction for offence under sect. 6-Condition precedent to, under sect. 14-Analysis by public analyst-What notification by purchaser to seller is requisite. The purchaser of any article of food must, as a condition precedent to proceedings and summary conviction under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), notify to the seller of the article, in the express words of sect. 14 of the Act, his intention to have the same analysed "by the public analyst "; and his merely telling the seller that "he had purchased the article for the purpose of analysis" is not a sufficient compliance with the requirement of that section to sustain a summary conviction under sect. 20 for an offence under sect. 6. APPEAL against a conviction by justices under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. At a petty sessions in and for the city of Gloucester, on the 4th Jan. 1878, an information was preferred by Edward Chipp (the now respondent) against Thomas Barnes (the now appellant), under sect. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), charging for that on the 25th Sept. 1877, at Barton St. Mary, in the city of Gloucester, the appellant did sell, to the prejudice of one Richard Bowen, the purchaser, certain food -to wit, one half-pint of gin-which was not of (a) Reported by H. LEIGH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. INNKEEPERS, LICENSED BEING A Complete Practical Treatise on the Innkeeper's Liability as Bailee, as well as under the Licensing Acts, WITH APPENDICES, CONTAINING A TABLE OF OFFENCES, ALL THE STATUTES BY CHARLES H. M. WHARTON, ESQ., LONDON: "LAW TIMES" OFFICE, 10, WELLINGTON-STREET, STRAND. MANCHESTER: MEREDITH, RAY, AND LITTLER, 49, KING-STREET. A NEW EDITION (THE SEVENTH) OF SAUNDERS'S LAW OF BASTARDY. Containing the Bastardy Law and Amendment Acts, 1872 and 1873; including Appeals to the Sessions, reserving a case for the Court above, and proceedings by Certiorari; with the Statutes and Forms issued by the Local Government Board, and all the decisions upon the subject. By THOMAS W. SAUNDERS, SEVENTH Barrister-at-Law. EDITION. PRICE 6s. 6d., CLOTH. "LAW TIMES" OFFICE, 10, WELLINGTON-STREET, STRAND, W.C. NAMES AND SUBJECTS OF CASES REPORTED IN THIS PART. SCHOOL BOARD FOR LONDON v. FAULCONER. Transfer to a school board of a local school and of an annuity payable to the school so long as it was not materially altered-Elementary Education Act 1870, sect. 23Right of the school board to the annuity... 282 STALLARD AND OTHERS (apps.) v. MARKS (resps.). Excise licence-Wine and spirits-Orders taken at unlicensed premises-Boná fide traveller-6 Geo., 4, c. 81, s. 10; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 90, s. 17 284 ROBINSON (app) v. STEVENITT (resp.). THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF Rating-Public Health Acts-Local Paving SMITH V. WEST DERBY LOCAL BOARD. Continued on page 2 of Wrapper. 298 LONDON: "LAW TIMES" OFFICE, 10, WELLINGTON-STREET, STRAND, W.C. |