Don Joaquin d'Anduaga to the Secretary of State.-(Translation.) SIR, Philadelphia, 24th April, 1822. As soon as the news was received in Madrid of the recent occur. rences in New Spain, after the arrival at Vera Cruz of the CaptainGeneral and Supreme Political Chief appointed for those Provinces, Don Juan O'Donoju, and some Papers were seen relative to those same transactions, it was feared that, in forming the Treaty concluded in Cordova, on the 24th of August last, between the said General and the Traitor Colonel Don Augustin Iturbide, it had been falsely supposed, that the former had power from His Catholick Majesty for that act; and in a little time the correctness of those suspicions was found, as, among other things, the said O'Donoju, when on the 26th of the same August, he sent this Treaty to the Governor of Vera Cruz, notifying him of its prompt and punctual observance, he told him, that, at his sailing from the Peninsula, preparation for the Independence of Mexico was already thought of, and that its bases were approved of by the Government, and by a Commission of the Cortes. His Majesty, on sight of this, and of the fatal impression which so great an imposture had produced in some of the Ultramarine Provinces, and of what must without doubt be the consequence, among the rest, thought proper to order that, by means of a Circular to all the Chiefs and Authorities beyond seas, this atrocious falsehood should be exposed; and he has now deigned to command me to make known to the Government of The United States, that it is false, inasmuch as General O'Donoju proceeded beyond his Instructions, and because he never could have been furnished with other Instructions than those conformable to constitutional principles.

In compliance with this Order of His Majesty, I can do no less than observe to you, Sir, how unfounded one of the reasons is in your Note of the 6th instant, for the recognition by this Government of those of the Insurgent Provinces of Spanish America, that it was founded on the Treaty made by O'Donoju with Iturbide, since, not having had the power or instruction to conclude it, it is clearly null and of no value. I repeat to you, &c.

The Hon. J. Q. Adams.

JOAQUIN D'ANDUAGA.

Don Joaquin d'Anduaga to the Secretary of State.—(Translation.) Philadelphia, 26th April, 1822.

SIR,

I HAVE received your Note of the 15th instant, in which you are pleased to communicate to me the reasons which induce the President, not only to refuse to His Catholick Majesty the satisfaction which he demanded, in His Royal Name, for the insults offered by General Jackson to the Spanish Commissaries and Officers, but to approve fully of the said Chief's conduct.

Before answering the contents of the said Note, I thought it my

duty to request Instructions from my Government; and, therefore, without delay, I have laid it before them. Until they arrive, therefore, I have confined myself to two observations: Ist. If, in my Note of the 18th of November last, I said, that, as General Jackson had not specified the actions, which had induced him to declare the Spanish Officers expelled from the Floridas, as criminal, nor given proof of them, I thought myself authorized to declare the accusation false: I did not do this through inadvertency, but upon the evident principle that every Person accused has a right to declare an accusation, destitute of proof, to be false, and much more an accusation not pretended to be proved. This assertion of mine does not presume that I am not persuaded of the merit of the said General, and of the claim which he has upon the gratitude of his Country; but although it is believed to be the duty of his Country to eulogize and reward his eminent services, yet it will be lawful for the Representative of a Power, outraged by him, to complain of his conduct. I cannot persuade myself that, to aggravate my said expression, you could have thought that I had been wanting in due respect, it not being possible for that opinion to have entered your mind, when, by his orders, Mr. Forsyth had sent to the Spanish Minister, on the 1st of September last, a Note, in which, complaining of the Captain-General of the Island of Cuba, he accuses him of dishonourable pecuniary motives, in not having delivered the Archives; without giving any proof of so injurious an assertion; and I must remark, that the rank of General Mahy in Spain, is at least as elevated as that of General Jackson in The United States, and that the services performed by him to his Country have rendered him as worthy as he is, of its consideration and respect.

2ndly. Although you are pleased to tell me, that part of the Papers taken from Colonel Coppinger are ready to be delivered, which the American Commissioners, after having examined them, have adjudged to be returned to Spain, I do not think myself authorized to admit their return in this mannner, but in the mode which I demanded in my Note of the 22d of November last.

As I have seen by the Publick Papers, that the President has communicated to Congress the Note which you were pleased to address to me, dated the 5th inst. and that it has been ordered to be printed; I take the liberty of requesting that you will have the goodness to use your influence, that this my Answer may be treated in the same manner, in order that Congress and the Publick may be informed that, if I have not answered the first part of it, as respects the general business, it is only to wait for the Instructions of my Government, but that I have answered what was personal. I renew to you, &c. JOAQUIN D'ANDUAGA.

The Hon. J. Q. Adams.

MESSAGE of the President of The United States to Congress, upon the Subject of the Fortifications on Dauphine Island and Mobile Point.-26th March, 1822.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of The United States:

CONGRESS having suspended the Appropriation, at the last Session, for the Fortification at Dauphine Island, in consequence of a doubt which was entertained of the propriety of that Position, the further prosecution of the work was suspended, and an order given, as intimated in the Message of the 3d of December, to the Board of Engineers and Naval Commissioners, to re-examine that part of the Coast, and particularly that Position, as also the Position at Mobile Point, with which it is connected, and to report their opinion thereon, which has been done, and which Report is herewith communicated.

By this Report, it appears to be still the opinion of the Board, that the construction of works at both these Positions is of great importance to the defence of New Orleans, and of all that portion of our Union which is connected with, and dependant on, the Mississippi, and on the other Waters which empty into the Gulf of Mexico, between that River and Cape Florida. That the subject may be fully before Congress, I transmit, also, a Copy of the former Report of the Board, being that on which the work was undertaken, and has been, in part, executed. Approving, as I do, the opinion of the Board, I consider it my duty to state the reasons on which I adopted the first Report, especially as they were, in part, suggested by the occurrences of the late War.

The policy which induced Congress to decide on, and provide for, the defence of the Coast, immediately after the War, was founded on the marked events of that interesting epoch. The vast body of Men which it was found necessary to call into the field, through the whole extent of our Maritime Frontier, and the number who perished by ex'posure, with the immense expenditure of money and waste of property, which followed, were to be traced, in an eminent degree, to the defenceless condition of the Coast. It was to mitigate these evils, in future Wars, and even for the higher purpose of preventing War itself, that the decision was formed, to make the Coast, so far as it might be practicable, impregnable; and that the measures necessary to that great object have been pursued with so much zeal since.

It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion, by the numerous avenues leading to it, or more defenceless by the thinness of the neighbouring Population; or offers a greater temptation to invasion, either as a permanent acquisition, or as a prize to the cupidity of grasping Invaders, from the immense amount of produce deposited there, than the City of New Orleans. It is known, also, that the seizure of no part of our Union, could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate interests of so many States, and of so many of our Fellow

citizens, comprising all that extensive Territory and numerous Population, which are connected with, and dependant on, the Mississippi, as the seizure of that City. Strong works, well posted, were, therefore, deemed absolutely necessary for its protection.

It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the Waters which communicate directly with, or approach nearest to, New Orleans, that the Town is assailable. It will be recollected that, in the late War, the publick solicitude was excited, not so much by the danger which menaced it, in those directions, as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be made there, the main force, landing either in the Bay of Mobile, or other Waters between that Bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the Town, in the rear of the Army which had been collected there for its defence. Full confidence was entertained that that gallant Army, led by the gallant and able Chief who commanded it, would repel any attack to which it might be exposed in front. But had such a Force been thrown above the Town, and a position taken on the Banks of the River, the disadvantage to which our Troops would have been subjected, attacked in front and rear, as they might have been, may easily be conceived. As their supplies would have been cut off, they could not long have remained in the City, and, withdrawing from it, it must have fallen immediately into the hands of the Force below. In ascending the River, to attack the Force above, the attack must have been made to great disadvantage, since it must have been, on such ground and at such time, as the Enemy preferred. These considerations show, that defences, other than such as are immediately connected with the City, are of great importance to its safety.

An attempt to seize New Orleans and the lower part of the Mississippi, will be made only by a great Power, or a combination of several Powers, with a strong Naval and Land Force, the latter of which must be brought in Transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defences around New Orleans are well posted, and of sufficient strength to repel any attack which may be made on them, the City can be assailed only by a Land Force, which must pass in the direction above suggested, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile. It becomes, therefore, an object of high importance to present such an obstacle to such an attempt, as would defeat it, should it be made. Fortifications are useful for the defence of Posts, to prevent the approach to Cities, and the passage of Rivers; but, as Works, their effect cannot be felt beyond the reach of their cannon. They are formidable, in other respects, by the body of Men within them, which may be removed and applied to other purposes.

Between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile there is a chain of Islands, at the extremity of which is Dauphine Island, which forms, with Mobile Point from which it is distant about 3 miles, the entrance

into the Bay of Mobile, which leads through that part of the State of Alabama, to the Towns of Mobile and Blakeley. The distance between Dauphine Island and the Rigolets is 90 miles. The principal Islands between them are Massacre, Horn, Ship, and Cat Islands, near to which there is Anchorage for large Ships of War. The first object is to prevent the landing of any Force, for the purposes above stated, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile; the second, to defeat that Force, in case it should be landed. When the distance from one point to the other is considered, it is believed that it would be impossible to establish works so near to each other as to prevent the landing of such a Force. Its defeat, therefore, should be effectually provided for. If the arrangement should be such as to make that result evident, it might be fairly concluded that the attempt would not be made, and thus we should accomplish, in the best mode possible, and with the least expense, the complete security of this important part of our Union, the great object of our system of defence for the whole.

There are some other views of this subject, which, it is thought, will merit particular attention, in deciding the point in question. Not being able to establish a chain of posts, at least for the present, along the whole Coast, from the Rigolets to Dauphine Island, or on all the Islands between them; at which point shall we begin? Should an attack on the City be anticipated, it cannot be doubted that an adequate force would immediately be ordered there for its defence. If the Enemy should despair of making an impression on the Works near the Town, it may be presumed that they would promptly decide to make an attempt, in the manner and in the line above suggested, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile. It will be obvious, that the nearer the Fortification is erected to the Rigolets, with a view to this object, should it be on Cat or Ship Island, for example, the wider would the passage be left open, between that work and the Bay of Mobile, for such an enterprise. The main Army being drawn to New Orleans, would be ready to meet such an attempt, near the Rigolets, or at any other point not distant from the City. It is probable, therefore, that the enemy, profiting of a fair wind, would make his attempt at the greatest distance compatible with his object, from that point, and at the Bay of Mobile, should there not be Works there of sufficient strength to prevent it. Should, however, strong Works be erected there, such as were sufficient not only for their own defence against any attack which might be made on them, but to hold a Force, connected with that which might be drawn from the neighbouring Country, capable of co-operating with the Force of the City, and which would doubtless be ordered to those Works, in the event of War; it would be dangerous for the Invading Force to land any where between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile, and to pass towards the Mississippi above the City, lest such a body might be thrown in its rear, as to cut