finding; for it is utterly impossible for the Court to decide, which is the truth of the case; and, if it were otherwise, there is no authority to substitute its own opinion for that of the jury. In such case, the repugnancy will be fatal. A verdict which finds two inconsistent material facts is void, and cannot be a foundation for a legal judgment.* On the other hand, a general verdict, (as this must be deemed to be) which finds the point in issue by way of argument or inference is void, even as it is said though the argument or inference be necessary.† It follows, therefore, that in no event can the verdict be adjudged in favour of the plaintiff. It is either a verdict which finds the substance of the issue for the defendant, or it is void for repugnancy, uncertainty, or insufficiency.

There are many authorities, in the books, respecting this subject, some of which are not easily reconcileable with sound sense, or with legal principles. From the mass of cases, however, some rules may be extracted, which commend themselves to the judgment of all of us. If, for instance, the jury find the point in issue, and also another matter out of the

* Com. Dig. Pleader, S. 23.

+ Rowe vs. Huntington, Vaug. R. 66, 75-Com. Dig. Pleader, S. 22.

be

issue, the latter finding is void, and may rejected as surplusage.* But it is otherwise, if the matter so found be contained in the issue; for then, if it be material, and contradictory, it cannot be rejected as surplusage. So if the point on which the verdict is given be so uncertain that it cannot be clearly ascertained whether the jury meant to find the issue or not, it cannot be helped by intendment, and a fortiori, if it be repugnant to other facts already expressly found.†

Let us now apply these principles to the present verdict. From the terms in which the verdict is expressed it seems to be an argumentative finding for the defendant. The jury find that the plaintiff has not supported his allegations, and, therefore, find for the defendant. What were those allegations? That the patent was obtained surreptitiously and upon false suggestion, as stated in the original affidavit? Or that the machine in controversy was the sole invention of the plaintiff as stated in his amended allegations? The terms of the verdict more correctly apply to the latter, than to the former; and there is this additional reason for this construction, that the fact specially found, is, in this view,

* Com. Dig. Pleader, S. 18, S. 28. † Com. Dig. Pleader, S. 2, S. 23.

consistent with the general finding. For as the jury find that the plaintiff and defendant were both concerned in the invention, then the allegation of the plaintiff, that it was his sole invention, was not supported. In this view of the verdict, it is void; either because it is merely argumentative, and uncertain, or, more properly, because it does not find the real point in issue between the parties.

On the other hand, if the verdict be supposed to refer to the real issue between the parties, it is to be considered if it be not nenessarily repugnant. By the patent act no person could entitle himself to a patent for any machine, unless he was the true inventor of it, and would make oath to that fact before competent authority. By the expression in the statute "true inventor," is undoubtedly meant the sole and exclusive inwentor; for if the machine were the joint invention of several persons, neither of them could claim to be the true inventor, having an exclusive title to the patent; but the interest would be a joint or common interest in the whole. In such a case, therefore, if a party were to obtain a patent for the invention, having sworn that he was the true inventor, he would in the language of the act,

obtain it "6 upon false suggestion, and as such false suggestion would be a surprize and fraud upon the government, it might well also be declared to be obtained surreptitiously." In the present case, the defendant obtained his patent, claiming it to be his own exclusive invention, and asserting the fact upon his oath. The jury have found "that that the plaintiff and defendant were both concerned in the invention." It is said by the defendant's counsel that this is not a finding that the plaintiff and defendant were jointly concerned in the invention." I confess that this seems to me an over refinement, and an exercise of legal astuteness, too ingenious, and too subtle to be applied to the language of verdicts. When the jury declare, that both were concerned in the invention, the natural meaning of the words is, that the invention was the result of their joint and not of their several and independent labours. However complicated the machine may be, the invention itself is not susceptible of division. If the plaintiff and defendant separately and independently invented several parts of the machine, capable of a distinct use, then those parts might be considered as separate inventions, for which each inventor might, perhaps, be entitled to a separate patent. But the present patent claims the invention, as a

whole; and the jury find that in this invention they were both concerned, which I cannot understand in any other sense, than as verifying the invention to be a joint, simultaneous production of the genius and labour of both parties. The special fact, so found is necessarily repugnant to any general verdict in favour of the defendant, upon the real issue between the parties; it is a fact, consistently with which no such verdict could be given. It is also a direct contradiction of the allegation in the plea of the defendant, that the improvement was invented by him; and if that allegation be considered as part of the issue, the finding is so far against the defendant. In either view, the verdict is repugnant in a material point, and consequently void.

In any way, therefore, of considering the verdict, it cannot, in my judgment, be supported. And I will add, that when a verdict is not expressed substantially in the terms of the issue, the case ought to be extremely clear, that should induce a Court to make it the ground of a final judgment. For this defect in the verdict, the judgment of the District Court must be reversed, and a new trial had at the bar of this Court.