The Theaetetus of Plato: With Translation and Notes

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University Press, 1881 - 235ÆäÀÌÁö
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134 ÆäÀÌÁö - becomes,' he must say that it 'is' or 'becomes' 'to something,' or 'of something,' or 'in relation to something'; but, if we have come to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of anyone else saying, that anything ' is ' or ' comes to be ' absolutely. Theae. Undoubtedly, Socrates. So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myself and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does. Theae. Certainly. So. Then my perception is true to me : for it belongs always to my being ; and, according...
134 ÆäÀÌÁö - ... is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely: — such is our conclusion.
131 ÆäÀÌÁö - Grote says that the cardinal principle set forth exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I the subject perceive is to say that I perceive some object: to perceive, and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient subject : swed, but sweet to no one, is an impossibility.
232 ÆäÀÌÁö - ... which he is examining : because he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose — whether to expound or to deride the opinions of others — whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.
193 ÆäÀÌÁö - ¬¢, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again : but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong past impression, ie with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it •with the past impression B, instead of A ; or vice versa.
121 ÆäÀÌÁö - What you call colour has no definite place or existence within or without you. <__// is the result of a passing collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage between them. It will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same subject at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself great, white, hot or anything else ; if...

ÀúÀÚ Á¤º¸ (1881)

Catalin Partenie is co-editor of Plato's Complete Works in Romanian (2001-2005).

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