not have made himself learned in some new field of learning, added fifty per cent to his working efficiency in his own line of work, made more money, established a better reputation in the community, commanded wider and deeper respect, during that

year.

It is something to be able to recognize a wasted minute when we see one. Those who know me know that I have enough on my hands to keep an average man busy and yet I am taking this lesson to myself. I don't mind telling you a secret. I don't often make first of January resolutions. Something happened January 1, 1903, that caused me to review the year that had just closed, and, as I did so before me stalked the blinking skeletons of a dozen things that lay half accomplished—every one of them things that could have been accomplished in the time I wasted in unproductive or actually harmful occupations. By starting these things and dropping them for this and that I had weakened my will, lost the impetus and inspiration of the start, and was minus the benefits that I could then be enjoying. I thereupon adopted a resolution-the first New Year's resolution I had made since I was a boy, namely,

"NOT A MINUTE WASTED."

There has not a day passed since January 1 that this sentiment has not stared me out of countenance and sent me shamefaced to work. I find myself continually asking of my every employment, on which side of the ledger is this hour going? It makes me jealous of the time demanded by the mere nothings of life. It gives to life a "worth while" aspect. Don't think that this means the cutting off of all play, or relaxation, or social pleasures. Ou the contrary, it gives to them added importance and added zest, from the knowledge that the time devoted to it is not stolen-it's mine, by every reason and every right, because I have earned it, and no compunction or conscience foilows me around like a very devil to drop poison in my cup. From an experience of two months, trying to live up to this motto. I can testify that it has added already to my life substantial gain, and put money in my purse and increased my power for good to myself and others. An instance: One evening, I said to my wife, "Let's put this thing to the test. We were to go to the theater to-night. Let's settle down before the grate fire, and while you read, I'll make ten dollars for you." She was credulous, but the theater had only occurred to us at the dinner table as a "place to spend the evening," and the new arrangement was no disappointment to either of us. She took her book. I took up pencil and paper and on the board arm of my easy chair I laid my pad of paper and just scribbied. It was hard getting a line of thought started, but in an hour she looked up from her book to inquire how soon that "tener" would materialize. "Hold on." I answered shortly; "don't interrupt. I

am into it deep. Fifteen minutes more and the ten is made." And it was. The next morning I bundled my scribbling off to the editor of a farm paper in Springfield, Mass.-a total stranger to me--and told him I wanted $15 for it. He replied at once, "According to our regular rates it's worth $6, but we want it and will give you $8. I took the $8, and that with the price of the theater tickets made $11, and I had gone my promise one better. I afterwards learned that there was some very artistic "high kicking" that night at the theater which I missed, but that $11 was just easy, and I felt so elated over the practical result of putting my motto into execution for that evening that I didn't have one regret. I do not know how much high kicking, will be done by the farmers who read my article in that Springfield paper, and I don't care; but my motto is a winner all right.

We hear a great deal about the value of a penny. You wouldn't deliberately take a penny out of your pocket and throw it away. I heard of a man doing that with five dollars the other day, but he was crazy and they locked him up. But you don't think anything of throwing away a minute, an hour, even a day; and yet I can, and so can you, turn every single minute of the day into money.

counted what they cost. They go on throwing them away-not sleeping, not idling-but using two where one is enough; dawdling is the only word, to express it. They use time as if it is a part of one's business to see how to cover it as thin as possible.

Indeed, this is the crowning error of life—this spending time like a fool spending his money. Every man, be he lawyer or what not, ought to look upon himself as a mechanism for bringing results-a mechanism that is never perfect but capable of endless improvement. Many men reach the acme of their ability to do work at 25, or 30 or 40. They look capable, but they are not. The machine has been allowed early to deteriorate; rust has gathered, it's never oiled, its parts are out of joint. They do less and less work and a poorer and poorer class of work. Men see it and cease to use it save when they can get no other; and by middle life they are in the junk shop or ought to be. There are a million men of this sort complaining of circumstances and conditions. It's their own fault; they have murdered time, assassinated their own talents, palsied their own hands, poisoned their own blood with the fatal weapon of laziness-or, what is worse, wasteful use of time.

Napoleon said that he beat the Austrians because they did not know the value of five minutes, and ten thousand lawyers, and a million men besides, are getting unmercifully licked in their battles for fame and fortune for the same reason.

The energy wasted in postponing until to-morrow a duty of to-day would do the work. "Putting off"

usually means "leaving off," and "going to do" becomes "going undone."

Maria Edgeworth said: "There is no moment like the present; not only so, there is no moment at all, no instant force and energy but the present. The man who will not execute his resolutions when they are fresh upon him can have no hopes from them afterwards; they will be dissipated, lost in the hurry and scurry of the world, or sunk in the slough of indolence."

The man who always acts promptly, even if he makes occasional mistakes, will succeed when a procrastinator will fail-even if he have the better judgment.

A person was once extolling the skill and courage of Mayennes in King Henry's presence. "You are right," said the king, "he is a great captain, but I have always five hours the start of him."

(To be continued.)

More Changes in the Supreme Court of the United States.

Mr. Justice Shiras having retired by reason of age and length of service, which gives a Justice the right to retire on full pay, the President has appointed Judge Wm. R. Day, of Ohio, to fill the vacancy, and he has taken his seat as a member of the court.

Mr. Day was born at Ravenna, Ohio, April 17, 1849. His father was chief justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio and his maternal and paternal grandfathers had served in high judicial office also. The young man was graduated from the University of Michigan in 1870 and was admitted to the bar in 1872. He began the practice of law at Canton and he and William McKinley soon became warm friends. In 1886 Mr. Day was elected to the bench of the Court of Common Pleas by both political parties. In 1889 he was appointed by President Harrison, judge of the United States District Court, but ill health compelled an early resignation. Soon after the first inauguration of President McKinley, he appointed Judge Day to be an assistant secretary of state. The President knew that Judge Day had had no diplomatic training, but he knew him to be an excellent international lawyer and that he had wonderful sagacity and a great fund of sterling common sense. Upon the retirement of John Sherman, Judge Day was promoted to be Secretary of State, and served throughout the war with Spain. In August, 1899, he was appointed chairman of the commission to negotiate the treaty of peace with Spain. One of his associates was Senator Gray of Delaware, now president of the Anthracite Strike Commission. Upon the return of the commission from Paris, Senator Gray paid this tribute to Judge Day:

"Let me say that no state in this Union could have contributed to that function, or any other

great diplomatic function of statecraft, a mind and a character more equipoised, settled, clear and strong than was contributed by Ohio when she sent that quiet, sensible, strong statesman, William R. Day, to Paris to conclude the treaty of peace. Always self-contained, never self-exploitative, always selfsuppressed, yet firm and courageous in the performance of duty as he saw it, he has illustrated the very highest traits of American statesmanship and American character in the work that we brought home with us from the other side of the ocean."

On February 25, 1899. President McKinley nominated Judge Day to be judge of the Circuit Court of the Sixth District, and the nomination was immediately confirmed by the Senate. The appointment was regarded with great satisfaction by the American people; it was a recognition, and a partial reward, of exceptionally brilliant service. For three years Judge Day has served as a United States judge, and has displayed ability, evenness of temper, and the true judicial spirit. There is every reason to expect that he will be an ornament to our highest

court.

Justice George Shiras has served on the Supreme Bench since 1892, when he was appointed by President Harrison to succeed Justice Bradley. His Pennsylvania home is in Allegheny City.

He comes of a family of large scholarly attainments and high intellectual character, being a grandson of the late Rev. Dr. Herron, a Presbyterian clergyman of ability and note.

He graduated from Yale College with the class of '53, and at once devoted himself to the study of law. Mr. Shiras was admitted to practice about 45 years ago, and soon rose to an eminence in his profession, and for years he has ranked among the leading members of the Pittsburg bar. For years he was identified with nearly every large and important litigation in the extreme western section of the state, and as the counsel for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company at Pittsburg he has played a leading part in some of the most noted of railroad suits in Pennsylvania.

He is held in high esteem by his co-laborers at the bar, who regard him as a clear-headed lawyer and eminently fair in the trial of a cause, his success at the bar being attributed to the broadness of his views and his freedom from undue partisanship. Being thus popular among his associates and a man of recognized ability, he commanded a position on the western border of Pennsylvania second to no man in the state. Mr. Shiras never occupied any political office, and, indeed, avoided giving any attention even to municipal affairs at home, preferring to devote his time and attention to the practice of his profession. He was one of the leading counsel in the oil discrimination suits instituted by the oil producers against the Standard Oil Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. He represented

the producers, and attended in Pittsburg several sessions of the legislative investigation committee inquiring into these alleged discriminations.

In personal appearance and general address Mr. Shiras is a man calculated to attract attention. He is tall and slender, standing nearly six feet high, with an agreeable, open countenance, dark hair and dark sidewhiskers.

License Tax on Attorneys, Defeated.

In City of Sonora vs. Curtin, decided by the Supreme Court of California in November, 1902 (70 Pac., 674), it was held that a license tax on attorneys imposed by a municipality pursuant to the authority conferred by St. 1883 (Cal.), p. 93, Sec. 852, Subd. 10, empowering municipalities to license "for purposes of regulation and revenue" every business authorized by law carried on therein, and to fix the rates of license, is unauthorized as a regulation of the business or profession of practicing law, and can be sustained, if at all, only as

a revenue measure.

It was decided that since the power of municipalities to impose a license tax on business for purposes of revenue is impliedly repealed by Act March 23, 1901 (Pol. Code, Sec. 3366), limiting their power to license for the purpose of regulation, a municipal ordinance imposing a license tax on attorneys as a revenue measure is also repealed. The court said in part:

"If the board, in this case, had the power to issue the license, as a police regulation, it would have the power to prohibit the defendant from practicing law without the license. There is nothing about the practice of the profession of the law which makes the business dangerous to the public. It does not threaten the public health or safety, nor is it demoralizing to the public. It is one of the most honorable and learned professions, and its members are among the most conservative citizens in any community. It is said by Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (6th ed., p. 744): The general rule undoubtedly is, that any person is at liberty to pursue any lawful calling, and to do so in his own way, not encroaching upon the rights of others. This general right cannot be taken away. It is not competent, therefore, to forbid any person or class of persons, whether citizens or resident aliens, offering their services in lawful business, or to subject others to penalties for employing him.' In Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power (p. 272 et seq.), the subject is thoroughly discussed, and the author says (page 281): 'It is, therefore, conclusive that a general requirement of a license for the pursuit of any business that is not dangerous to the public can only be justified as an exercise of the power of taxation, or the requirement of a compensation for the

enjoyment of a privilege or franchise.' In City of St. Paul vs. Traeger (25 Minn., 248, 33 Am. Rep., 462), it was held that an ordinance imposing a license tax upon farmers or gardners selling vegetables on the streets was not within the police powers of the city authorities. In the opinion it is said: The business itself is of a useful character, neither hurtful nor pernicious, but beneficial to society, and recognized as rightful and legitimate both at common law and by the general laws of the state.' In State vs. Bean (91 N. C., 558, the question as to the distinction between powers of taxation and police powers is discussed, and in speaking of police powers it is said: 'These powers are granted for the purpose of enabling city and town authorities to preserve the peace and good order of the community, to provide for the sanitary condition, to establish markets and regulate them, to have supervision over the streets, and pass all ordinances for the administration of their internal affairs which are consistent with their charters, and not in contravention of the general laws of the State. And these ordinances may be enforced by penalties or fines, and by criminal actions in cases where the courts have jurisdiction. But the power to tax for the purpose of revenue is not one of the functions of police power.' In City of San Francisco vs. Insurance Co. 74 Cal., 113, 15 Pac., 380, 5 Am. St. Rep. 425), it was held that an act requiring the agents of foreign insurance companies doing business in California to pay to the treasurer of any county or city and county a certain proportion of the premiums is a charge imposed by the Legislature for the purpose of revenue, and cannot be upheld as a valid regulation under the police power of the State. The measures that are needful or appropriate to be taken by the legislative body of a municipality in the exercise of its police powers is largely left to the judgment and discretion of such body. In such case a wide discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative body, and courts will only interfere in a clear case, where the ordinance or statute has no real or substantial relation to those objects, and the fundamental rights of the citizen are assailed under the guise of a police regulation. In such case, where the right of the citizen to engage in a lawful business or follow a lawful profession is involved, the courts will interfere and determine whether the regulation or ordinance is a valid exercise of police power (Fx parte Tuttle. 91 Cal., 591, 27 Pac., 933: Ex parte Whitwell, 98 Cal., 78, 37 Pac., 870, 19 L. R. A.. 727, 35 Am. St. Rep., 152).

This ordinance could not have been passed under the power to regulate, for it is evident that the board of trustees have no power to regulate the practice of the law. They have no power to pass upon or inquire into the qualifications or character of persons who desire to practice law, nor to say