owner of the cart and the master of the driver of it, and was therefore responsible for the negligence of the driver. The learned judge, however, failed to point out how either of the facts mentioned could have misled the plaintiff into being injured. This case has often been criticised (see Pollock's Dig. of Partn. (6th Ed.) 54; Lindley on Partnership, 214), as it is obvious that such facts afford no foundation for the application of the principle of estoppel, and in Smith vs. Bailey (1891) 2 Q. B. 403, where the same principle was sought to be applied, it was disapproved. Bowen, L. J., concurred in a suggestion that the case might be misreported, but said also that "the sooner the case disappears from the text-books the better."

In Sherrod vs. Langdon (1866) 21 Iowa, 518, which was an action to recover damages for false representation on the sale of sheep, it was held that a defendant who had held himself out as a partner in the transaction was estopped to deny it as against the plaintiffs, who had bought in reliance upon his being a partner. In Maxwell vs. Gibbs (1871) 32 Iowa, 32, which was an action against defendants as partners to recover damages for neg

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hired, it was held "that if they held themselves out to the world as partners, and the team was hired under such circumstances as to lead plaintiffs to believe them such, they would be estopped from denying the partnership." In both of these cases. however, the cause of action arose out of contractual relations.

In Shepard vs. Hynes (1900) 104 Fed. Rep., 449, 45 C. C. A. 271, 52 L. R. A. 675, where it was sought to hold one person liable as partner for the wilful tort of another, it was held that such a liability could only be based upon an actual partnership. The fact that there had once been a partnership, which was secretly dissolved, and that the business was still conducted in the old firm name, was immaterial. There was no attempt to establish a contractual liability to someone with whom the firm had formerly dealt, but to make the defendant responsible for the wilful tort of another. The doctrine of estoppel has no application to such a case. See Ewart on Estoppel, 529.

The Legal Value of A Man.

has elicited from a judge of the Supreme Court a statement of the principles on which the legal

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mind bases its estimate of the value of a human being. The suit under review had been brought by two men, whose father, a banker's clerk, sixtyeight years of age, had been killed on the railroad company's premises The evidence showed that there had been negligence on the part of the employes of the company, and this fact was practically admitted. The lower court, in which the case was tried, had given a verdict for $4,000. The company claimed that such an amount was excessive and appealed to the higher court. In giving judgment in favor of the company, the justice called attention to the fact that the only basis for the claim of the sons, was that they had been deprived of their shares of moncy that their father might have earned if he had not been killed. As at his age it was not likely that his savings, if he had lived, would have amounted to $4.000, the verdict of the lower court could not be sustained. In other words, the value of a man must be estimated by his power to earn money.

Unsafe Reliance on Records of Title.

The uncertainty and risk of reliance upon records of title is sharply illustrated in the recent remarkable case of Marden vs. Dorthy, 16c N. Y. 39. 46 L. R. A. 694. One who, by the records of title, clearly appeared to be the owner of land, obtained a loan and gave a mortgage on the property when the recorded instrument which purported to be a conveyance to him, and which bore the genuine signature of the nominal grantor and also of a notary public, was in fact void because obtained by some trick or fraud, and without any intent to execute it as a deed. The court held that, notwithstanding the apparent title of the mortgagor shown by the records, on the faith of which the money was loaned, yet, as the apparent title was not real, the record thereof was no protection, and the mortgage based thereon was void. The recording law was denied any application to a forged or fraudulent instrument.

Th's decision does not greatly increase the risk of reliance upon records, says Case and Comment, since it merely applics to the unusual case of a false deed with a genuine signature obtained by fraud the rule applicable to deeds with forged signatures. But it emphasizes the danger of concealed flaws in apparently perfect record titles. Many peop'e, including some lawyers, appear to suppose that the records can usually be relied on to show with exact certainty who are the owners of real property. But this has nearly always been an impossibility. For instance, when the former owner of property has died without a will, the records do not, and cannot. show who the present owner may be. Even a probate of heirship provided for by such laws as that of New York furnishes only a presumption which is not conclusive. A concealed marriage of a prop

erty owner who is supposed to be unmarried may encumber a title obtained from him with unsuspected dower rights. Title obtained from the supposed heirs of a landowner, who were born and reared in his home, may be defeated by proof that they are children of a void marriage, and that some previously unheard-of heir by an early but secret marriage is the true owner. The facts of family relationship are necessary links in the chain of nearly every title, but they are necessarily unsusceptible of being proved by the records. Add to the uncertainties of this kind those that arise from the possibilities of forgery and fraud, and it can readily be seen that the record title of land is very far from being a sure reliance. Fortunately the probabilities of these concealed flaws in title are much less than the possibilities. Loss from reliance on the records is unusual, yet the risks ought to be fully understood.

Advertising vs. Waiting.

The question of whether a lawyer should or should not advertise in the newspapers has been receiving considerable attention of late. The pros and cons have been ventilated freely. Sides have been taken, arguments advanced and reasons given for and against, but no conclusion has yet been satisfactorily reached. It really seems to a large number of clearheaded, practicat-minded people that no good reason can be adduced why a young man graduating from college and after going through the necessary experiences and rules prescribed by law, should not take advantage of the benefit to be derived through advertising. How, in the name of common sense, is he going to make himself and his professional calling known to the public unless through advertising? He may have a large circle of friends and a wide social acquaintance which may prove of assistance, and act as an aid to him in his proposed life work, but every young lawyer is not so luckily circumstanced. Then there is another view to be taken of that question. A young man's friend or social circle cannot always be relied upon by him for that assistance it is perfectly natural for him to expect. Then again, paradoxical as it may seem, a man, beginning life is oftentimes handicapped by perhaps the well-intentioned enough actions of his best friends. It is not always safe to count on them. He who expects nothing is sure not to be disappointed. Too much reliance on one's friends frequently leads to sad disillusions. The idea that to advertise would betray a lack of dignity, and all that kind, airy persiflage is all nonsense. What is a young man going to do? After spending the best years of early life in gaining the necessary knowledge for a profession, at perhaps severe sacrifice and deprivation on the part of poor parents whose love for him influenced them to do what their parents were unable to do for them, is he going to sit down patiently and wait contentedly for clients.to come to him? If he does, it may be a long, cruel, tiresome, heart-breaking wait. Looking at the situation practically the only reasonable course for him to pursue is to go before the public, take

None better made.

it into his confidence, tell his name, his fitness and what the aim he has in view, and that he seeks a chance to prove his ability and skill. The only way to do that is by advertising-and a plain, honest, frank avowal of that kind never lost a particle of dignity for man or woman, all statements to the contrary notwithstanding.-The National Advertiser.

Litigation.

Winthrop Packard recently published in the National Magazine under the title of "The Promotion of Ebenezer Johnson" the following clever exposition of the term "litigation."

Professor Bookerton gazed with pride at the class of young law students before him.

"Gentlemen," he said, "as you hab already imbibed from your text books and mah lectures on dis subject. de la is built upon a foundation ob common sense applied to de different conflicts and problems ob material existence. Upon dat foundation, I say, but in de more abstruse applications ob dem principles it is apt to rise a good many stories above de foundations. Dat's what I am about to examine you on and de answers what I get is gwine to determine whedder or not you am sufficiently grounded in dis science to go on into de advanced class or not; so gib me your best efforts in de problems I am about to put before you. Mistah Wombaby, will you kindly gib me a practical ebery day exposition ob what am meant by de term litigation.”

Mr. Wombaby rose cheerfully. “Litigation,” he said, "am when two men want de same cow and want her mighty bad. One ob dem gits dat cow by de ho'ns an he pull mighty hard for to carry her

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off. De odder man he gits dat cow by de tail an pull mighty hard his way. But dey both pull so hard dat de cow she ain't do a thing but stay right whar she is, and dey can't either ob dem git her. Den dey begin to offer anodder man money for to come and help dem pull. Dat am litigation."

"Correct,” replied Professor Bookerton. “Dat am litigation. Mistah Wombaby, you am promoted to de next grade for your correctness in definition. Mistah Swanboy, what am legal practice?"

"Legal practice," said Swanboy, "am when de man what's called upon takes de money what's coming to him and says to both ob dem fellers, 'Pull, gentermens, pull for all you is worf; de man what pulls hardest gits de cow.'"'

"Correct, again," said the professor. "Now can any one tell me any further functions ob de lawyer in dis case?”

There was a pause for a time and no one seemed able to wrestle successfully with this further and more advanced problem until Ebenezer Johnson arose with the light of inspiration in his eye.

"Professor Bookerton." said he, "it seem to me dat de lawyer what knows his business in dis case is gwine to wait till dem fellahs is pulling deir hardest on dat cow an den he's gwine git a pail and sit down and milk her."

The professor's eyes grew moist as he beamed with honest pride through his glasses. “Mistah Johnson," he said, "you am advanced in all de grades to de post graduate course in supreme court diplomacy. You ain't no common law student, you ain't. Dere's de making ob an expert on financial statesmanship in you."

(Continued from December number.)

35. Q. What is Larceny? What are its essentials? What is Compound Larceny?

A. Larceny is the unlawful taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, with the intent to convert it to the taker's own use, without the consent of the owner. There must be a taking of personal property of another; it must be taken from the actual or constructive possession of its owner; it must be taken under circumstances amounting to trespass; there must be a carrying of the property from the place it occupies; it must be taken with the intention of depriving the owner permanently of his property.

Compound Larceny is that which is committed under aggravating circumstances, such as Larceny committed by means of assault and battery.

36. Q. What is deceit? What are its essentials? A. Deceit is some trick, device, craft, collusion, false representation, or underhand practice, used to defraud another. There must be a false representation of material facts by the defendant; the defendant must make the representation with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard as to its truth; the representation must be made by the defendant with the intention that it be acted upon: the plaintiff must be ignorant of the falsity of the representation, and believe it to be true: the representation must be acted upon by the plaintiff, to his damage.

37. Q. What is the difference between Deceit and Larceny?

A. In Deceit, the person acquiring property, acquires title and possession with the consent of the

owner.

In Larceny, the person acquiring property does not get title to it, nor does he get the possession of the property with the consent of its owner.

Property acquired by Larceny is acquired by trespass, while property acquired by Deceit is not acquired by trespass

38. Q. A. with the knowledge of the dishonesty of his servant B. whom he discharged. gave him a certificate of good moral character, upon the faith of which certificate C employed B. B stole a pair of earrings from C. while in his employment. Has C any cause of action against A? If so, what is it? Give reasons?

A. Yes. C has an action of Deceit against A. While A was under no obligations to give B a certificate of character, yet, it was A's duty, if he did give B a certificate, to give a truthful one. The certificate was given for the purpose of enabling B to secure employment, and the certificate being untrue, it constituted a false representation by A to any person, who, relying upon its truth, was induced to give B employment.

39. Q. How may a law be passed by Congress, wthout the consent of the President?

A. If. after the President vetoes a bill. it is returned by him to the house in which it originated. and it is then passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses, it will then become a law. just as if it had been signed by the President. Also, if the President keeps the bill longer than ten days after it is presented to him for his signature. Sunday excepted, it will likewise become a law, just as if the President signed it.

ANSWERS.

40. Q. A corporation was granted certain powers in a special charter, over which the State reserved no right of control. Subsequently, the State legislature passed a statute which sought to take away the right of corporations to exercise powers of the kind granted in the special charter. The statute also gave to corporations, upon their compliance with specified conditions, the right to exercise certain powers therein named, which powers, the corporation in question exercised, after complying with the specified conditions of the statute. The corporation also claimed the right to exercise the powers granted to it in its special charter. Was the contention of the corporation good? Why?

A. Yes. This statute violates Sec. 10 of the 1st article of the U. S. Constitution, which denies to States the right to pass laws which impair the obligation of contracts. If, however, the non-exercise of the powers in the special charter were made a condition precedent to the exercise by the corporation of the powers contained in the statute, the exercise of such powers by the corporation in question, would be a waiver of the powers in its special charter.

41. Q. Name five powers expressly granted to Congress by the constitution? Name five restrictions expressly imposed by the constitution, upon Congress?

A. Congress is given express power to (1) lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; (2) to borrow money on the credit of the United States; (3) to regulate commerce with the foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes: (4) to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and to fix the standard of weights and measures; (5) declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and sea.

The restrictions are: (1) Congress shall pass no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law; (2) no tax or duty shall be laid on any articles exported from any state; (3) no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another; (4) no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the official census; (5) no money shall be taken from the treasury, except in consequence of an appropriation made by law.

42. Q. What provisions are there in the United States Constitution as to ex post facto laws? Name the different kinds of ex post facto laws.

A. Sec. 9 of Art. 1 of the Constitution says: "Congress shall pass no ex post facto law."

Sec, 10 of Art. I of the Constitution says: "No state shall pass any ex post facto law.

The different kinds of ex post facto laws are: (1) those making criminal an act done before the passing of the law, and punishing the same; (2) those which aggravate a crime, and make it greater than it was when committed; (3) those which inflict a greater punishment than was inflicted when the crime was committed; (4) those which alter rules of evidence, so as to require less or different testimony to convict than was required when the act was committed; (5) those which deprive persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have been entitled.

43. Q. A was indicted under a statute which

made it a misdemeanor for employers to persuade their employees not to join lawful labor unions. A moved that the indictment be quashed, because unconstitutional, to which motion a demurrer was

filed.

Should the demurrer be sustained or overruled? Why? Was any constitutional provision violated? If so, what was it?

A. The demurrer should be sustained, because the act is unconstitutional, being in violation of the 14th Article of the Amendments, whereby "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The statute in question does not come within the police power of the State.

44. Q. A and B were partners. B gave his individual note to X, which B guaranteed in the firm name. Before the maturity of the note, X sold it to a bank. B defaulted in the payment of the note, and the bank brought an action against A for its collection. Can the bank recover from A? Why?

A. The bank cannot recover from A. Where the guarantee of the firm appears as such upon what is clearly the individual note of one partner, it is evidence of itself that the firm name is used for his accommodation, and the firm cannot be held liable, unless it authorized the guarantee. In this case, the bank, as well as X, took the note with constructive notice that it was an individual transaction and was therefore, subject to that defense by A, who was sued on the firm's guarantee.

45. Q. A, B and C are partners. C advances money to the partnership, and A, who is managing partner, gives C the firm's note, which C endorses to X before maturity, for value and without notice. After the maturity of the note, X brings action against the firm for its collection. Can X recover? Why?

A. X can recover. The giving of the note was clearly within the power of A, and it was for a perfectly valid partnership transaction. There were no equities against X at the maturity of the note, and there can be none against him after its maturity.

46. Q. S and G were partners doing business under the name of S & Co. L gave M his promissory note for $6,000, which S guaranteed in the firm name of S & Co. Before the maturity of the note, S & Co. dissolved partnership, of which fact they gave all concerned proper notice. Subsequently, the $6.000 note was renewed, which S likewise guaranteed in the firm name of S & Co. L failed to pay the note, and M brought an action against G for its collection. S being insolvent. Can he recover from G? Give reasons.

A. If the guarantee was given in a partnership transaction, and there was binding consideration for the extension of the note. M could not recover from G-not on the first note-because the extension, when binding, discharges the guarantee; nor on the second note, because after the dissolution of the partnership, S, the former partner, has no authority to bind the former firm by new obligations, nor can he change, alter, or vary the form, character or obligation of existing obligations against the firm.

If, however, there was no binding extension of the note, assuming that the guarantee was made in a valid partnership transaction, recovery might be had against G, because one partner has the right to bind his firm on a guarantee in a partnership transaction, on which guarantee any of the individual partners may be held personally liable.

47. Q. A testator devised lands to his executor

to be sold, and the proceeds thereof equally divided between the testator's two sons, John and James. A creditor of John's obtained judgment against him. The sheriff levied execution on the land, and put it up for sale, and there being no purchaser, the sheriff turned the land over to the creditor. What do you say as to the creditor's right to the land? What is the Equitable doctrine involved in this case? What is the nature of the doctrine?

A. The creditor has no right to the land. This is a case of Equitable conversion, a doctrine by which Equity, for certain purposes, and under certain circumstances, considers real property as personalty, and personal property as realty. By this doctrine the land belongs to the executor for the purpose of selling it. John has no right to it, consequently, the creditor can have no right to it.

48. Q. What is the Doctrine of Equitable Election? Give an example.

A. An Equitable Election is the choice that a party is compelled to make between the acceptance of a benefit under a written instrument, and the retention of his own property, which is attempted to be granted away by the same instrument.

A devises his house to B, and B's house to C, by the same instrument. Here, B can take A's house and give his house to C; or B can keep his house, and let C take A's house.

49. Q. What is the difference between a Bill of Discovery and a Bill for Discovery and Relief?

A. A Bill of Discovery is one filed by a person for the discovery of facts within the defendant's knowledge, or of deeds, papers, or other instruments, in his custody or under his control, for the purpose of enabling a person prosecuting or defending an action at law to obtain material facts for his cause. A Bill of Discovery, properly so called, never asks for Relief.

If, in addition to the discovery that a bill asks, any exercise of the jurisdiction of the court is prayed, which involves the necessity of a hearing, and a decree or decretal order on the rights alleged in the bill, the bill is thereby rendered one for Discovery and Relief.

50. Q. A insured his property with an insurance company. There was a mistake in the policy, in the description of the premises, and the agent of A signed the application for the policy, instead of A. The premises are destrovea by fire before the error is discovered in the policy. Has A any remedy against the insurance company? What Equitable Doctrine is involved? What is the nature of this Doctrine? How many suits are necessary to a complete adjustment of the case, including A's recovery of insurance money from the company?

A. Yes, A has a remedy against the insurance company. The Equitable Doctrine of Mistake is involved in this case. By this doctrine, a mistake, when it is mutual, material. and not induced by negligence, may be corrected in a Court of Equity, in a suit for that purpose. One suit is necessary for a complete adjustment of the case, including the recovery of the insurance money, because when a Court of Equity once takes jurisdiction of a case, it will retain jurisdiction until all the rights of the parties are completely and satisfactorily adjusted, even though some of those rights are of such a nature that the jurisdiction of an Equitable Court would not extend to them, if they were not associated with rights in themselves equitable.

51. 9. A devised to trustees, property, the interest of which he directed to be used to relieve the needy poor of Chicago. Was this devise good? What kind of devise was it? For what purposes is